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Abstract 
The main arguments for Greek influence in Indian logic are that the Indian and Greek 
systems of logic display more similarities than can be reasonably explained as the result of 
coincidence; that Indian logic, unlike Greek logic, shows no signs of progressing through 
stages of development; that Greek logic pre-dates Indian logic; that the Greeks were in India 
at the right time to influence Indian logicians; and that the Greeks are known to have 
influenced Indians in areas other than logic, e.g. art and astronomy. 
I show that the arguments for Greek influence in Indian logic are not compelling. 
Moreover, I present a case that Indian logic most likely developed without Greek influence. 
The main argument against Greek influence in Indian logic is that there are developmental 
stages in Indian logic, and these demonstrate that logic in India most probably evolved from 
the ancient tradition of debate in a manner completely independent of any Greek influence. 
My account of early Indian logic draws on a wide variety of sources. These range from 
the very earliest surviving records that describe the days of the Buddha (fifth century Be) 
down to the works of Nagarjuna (second century AD). These sources include ancient works 
on debate, as well as religious, philosophical and medical works. The logically significant 
material scattered through these works has been separated from all other extraneous material 
and arranged both chronologically and by topic. My thesis therefore presents the essential 
features of early Indian logic without the complications normally associated with research in 
this area. The stages in the development of early Indian logic show that there is no need to 
invoke Greek influence in order to account for the existence of well-developed logic in India 
during the Hellenistic period. 
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Nature and scope of the investigation 
There are those who claim that ancient India had no logic at all. but such claims are no 
longer considered defensible. The arguments that Indian logic came from Greece are far more 
compelling. The strongest case for this is made by McEvilley in his recent book The Shape of 
Ancient Thought (2002). This work builds on similar ideas he put forward in three articles 
published during the early 1980' s. McEvilley is certainly not the only advocate of this view, 
but his book is the most recent and the most comprehensive - containing over 700 pages of 
densely packed text that resulted from thirty years of research on the topic. McEvilley argues 
for a massive transfer of ideas and methods of thinking in two directions: firstly, from India 
into Greece during the pre-Socratic period, and secondly, from Greece back into India during 
the Hellenistic period. Only the second of these two is investigated in this thesis. That is, 
McEvilley argues that during the Hellenistic period, Greek ideas found their way into Indian 
logic, philosophy, art, medicine and astronomy. 
The main arguments put forward by McEvilley for Greek influence in Indian logic are 
that Indian and Greek systems of logic display more similarities than can be reasonably 
explained as the result of coincidence; Indian logic, unlike Greek logic, shows no signs of 
progressing through stages of development; Greek logic pre-dates Indian logic; the Greeks 
were in India at the right time to influence Indian logicians; and the Greeks are known to have 
influenced Indians in areas other than logic, e.g. art and astronomy. McEvilley concludes that 
the probability of Greek influence in Indian logic is so high that it must be accepted as a fact. 
The aim of this thesis is to show that McEvilley' s arguments do not establish that the 
Greeks did in fact influence Indian logic. The main argument used against McEvilley is that 
there is evidence of developmental stages in Indian logic that explain its evolution from the 
tradition of debate in a manner independent of any Greek influence. This fact removes the 
need to invoke Greek influence in order to explain the existence of well-developed logic in 
India during the Hellenistic period. This shows not only that McEvilley's arguments for 
Greek influence are not proven, but also that Indian logic most likely developed entirely 
without Greek influence. 
There were two types of logic in ancient India: the first focused on establishing matters 
of fact using structured proofs governed by rules, and the second focused on refuting matters 
of fact using conditionals with an opponent's position as the antecedent and an unacceptable 
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position as the consequent. The most well-known representatives of these two types of logic 
are the Nyaya Siitra and Nagarjuna, respectively. The stages in the development of these two 
types of logic are presented here in chronological order, covering a period from the days of 
the Buddha in the fifth century BC down to Nagatjuna in the second century AD. This 
account serves two purposes: firstly, it provides a description of the development of early 
Indian logic, and secondly, it shows that there is no need to invoke Greek influence in order to 
account for well-developed logic in India during the Hellenistic period. 
The final chapter of the thesis takes the evidence for Greek influence in Indian 
astronomy as an example of the type of evidence that should be found in Indian logic if it had 
been influenced by the Greeks as claimed. The fact that there is no such evidence, as well as 
the fact that there are developmental stages within Indian logic, adds further weight to the 
position that the case for Greek influence in Indian logic remains unproven. 
1.1 Methodology 
Indian logic has been studied in the West for only a relatively short time. One of the 
earliest pioneers in the study of Indian logic in the West was Sir William Jones. He 
announced in a speech entitled Philosophy of the Asiaticks, delivered to the Asiatic Society, 
Calcutta, on the 20th of February, 1794, that Aristotle based his logic on Indian logic. 
Here I cannot refrain from introducing a singular tradition, which prevailed, according to 
the well-informed author of the Dabistiin, in the Panjiib and in several Persian provinces, 
that, "among other Indian curiosities, which Callisthenes transmitted to his uncle, was a 
technical system of logick, which the Briihmens had communicated to the inquisitive 
Greek," and which the Mohammedan writer supposes to have been the groundwork of the 
famous Aristotelean method ... I 
The "inquisitive Greek" is Callisthenes, Aristotle's nephew, who visited India with 
Alexander the Great in the 4th century Be. Sir William was apparently quoting from the 
Dabistan-i-Mazahib (School of Manners) by Zulfaqar Mubed (c.1612-c.1670 AD), although 
Zulfaqar Mubed does not say exactly what Sir William claimed? 
I Teignmouth 1807,3,237-238. 
2 Zulfaqar Mubed 1843,210. Zulfaqar Mubed describes the sixteen terms on reasoning (tarka) and says that 
these had been related to him by the Imam Arastu, who had taken them from an old work on logic. Zulfaqar 
Mubed then says: "The same doctrine was taught in Greece: in confirmation of this, the Persians say, that the 
science oflogic which was diffused among them was, with other sciences, translated into the language of Yonia 
and Rumi, by order of King Secander, the worshipper of science, in the time of his conquest, and sent to Rumi." 
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In 1824, some thirty years after Sir William's announcement, Colebrooke "discovered" 
the Indian syllogism.} Colebrooke was both an orientalist and a mathematician. In a recent 
article, Ganeri describes the effect of Colebrooke' s work: 
This essay became the standard reference for the next fifty years, and Colebrooke, 
through his influence in the Royal Society and the Royal Asiatic Society, and his contacts 
with such logicians as Boole, Hamilton, and De Morgan, was able to generate a great deal 
of interest in his discovery of the Indian syllogism, not only among Orientalists, but also 
within the English philosophical community.2 
The syllogism that Colebrooke described was none other than the five-membered proof 
which is not a syllogism at all. Colebrooke and others like him interpreted Indian logic in 
terms of the current Western understanding oflogic. The five-membered proof was therefore 
described as an Aristotelian syllogism, complete with its major, minor and middle terms. 
Other scholars rightly pointed out that the Indian proof does not conform to the requirements 
of a syllogism, but then they wrongly concluded on that basis that Indian logic was at fault. 
Ritter, for instance, said in 1846: 
One point alone appears certain, and that is, that they [the Indians] can lay but slight 
claims to accuracy of exposition. This is proved clearly enough by the form of their 
syllogism, which is made to consist offive instead of three parts.3 
The tendency to describe Indian logic in Aristotelian terms was done not only to make it 
conform to Western ideas of logic, but also because support for traditional Indian disciplines 
had political ramifications during the days when Europeans controlled India. Some scholars 
were openly hostile towards Indian logic. Blakey, for instance, said in 1851: 
It is absurd to conceive that a logic can be of any value from a people who have not a 
single sound philosophical principle, nor any intellectual power whatever to work out a 
problem connected with human nature, in a manner that is at all rational or intelligent. 
Reasoning, at least in the higher forms of it among such semi-barbarous nations, must be 
at its lowest ebb; nor does there seem to be any intellectual stamina, in such races of men, 
to impart to it more vigour and rationality ,4 
I Colebrooke 1824. 
2 Ganeri 1996,4; and Ganeri 2001b, 5. 
3 Ritter 1838-46,4, 365. 
4 Blakey 1851, 380. 
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Mary Boole, by contrast, rallied to the defence of traditional Indian disciplines. She 
explained that her husband George and his colleagues had a high regard for Eastern learning: 
I do as George Boole and De Morgan did: I bow my head in reverent thankfulness to that 
mysterious East, whence come to us wafts of some transcendent power the nature of 
which we ourselves can hardly state in words.} 
She also suggested that her husband and his colleagues had been influenced by Indian ideas: 
Think what must have been the effect of the intense Hinduizing of three such men as 
Babbage, De Morgan, and George Boole on the mathematical atmosphere of 1830-1865? 
The extent to which Babbage, Boole and De Morgan may have been influenced by 
Indian logic is unclear, but they were certainly well aware of it. De Morgan, who was born in 
India, said in 1860 that: 
The two races which have founded the mathematics, those of the Sanscrit and Greek 
languages, have been the two which have independently formed systems of logic. 3 
De Morgan was quite right in saying that Greek and Indian logic formed independently, 
although Europeans continued to describe Indian logic in terms of the Aristotelian syllogism. 
This gave Indian logic a Greek appearance and totally ignored its unique features. Muller was 
aware of this problem as early as 1853. He said that if he had described Indian logic using 
Aristotelian terminology then: 
All that is peculiar to Indian philosophy would have been eliminated, and the remainder 
would have looked like a clumsy imitation of Aristotle .... Even such terms as conclusion 
or syllogism are inconvenient here, because they have with us an historical colouring, and 
throw a false light on the subject.4 
The tendency to describe the Indian five-part proof in terms of Aristotelian logic still 
continues in modem times. Kitagawa noted the problem in 1960: 
... it has been customary among scholars to interpret Indian logic using the terminology 
of Aristotelian logic and here lies a problem. If we want to learn something really new 
from a foreign system of thought, we must first try to understand it as it is. To interpret 
Indian logic using the terminology of Aristotelian logic, according to my opinion, is not 
to represent Indian logic as it is, but merely to review Aristotelian logic as applied to 
Indian logic.s 
J Boole 1901,961. 
2 Boole 1901,958. 
3 De Morgan 1966, 184 note 1. 
4 Muller 1853, 68. 
5 Kitagawa 1960, 390. 
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The main problem with explaining the Indian five-part proof in terms of the Aristotelian 
syllogism is that the Indian proof simply does not meet the requirements of a syllogism. When 
it is modified to make it resemble a syllogism, the result is not an accurate representation of 
Indian logic. Also, when it is assessed against the requirements of a syllogism, the five-part 
proof appears deficient. Further, all that is unique to Indian logic is discarded in the process 
and nothing new is learnt. 
Many of the requirements unique to Indian logic are completely absent in modem 
descriptions simply because they have no counterparts in the Aristotelian model. An example 
of this is the fundamental rules for a proof. For instance, one rule states that the reason in a 
proof must serve a purpose, since a reason that serves no purpose proves nothing. The 
purpose of a reason is to remove doubt about the proposition, since a reason that removes no 
doubt serves no purpose. Thus, a basic requirement for the proposition in a proof is that it 
must be in doubt, because if there is no doubt regarding the proposition then there is no doubt 
to be removed by the reason. All that is required for the proposition to be in doubt is that it 
must not exclude the possibility of its being doubted. This does not mean that the proposition 
must be doubted by everybody at all times, only that it could be doubted by somebody at 
some time. A proposition like 'sound is impermanent' is therefore considered legitimate, 
whereas a proposition like 'sound is audible' is not, since this proposition excludes the 
possibility of its being doubted. The reason for this is that anyone who knows what sound is 
has no doubt that it is audible. 
With the advent of modem logic during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially 
with the work of Frege (1848-1925) and Russell (1872-1970), the syllogism was abandoned 
as the model of logical excellence. Europeans then "discovered" that Indian logic should be 
understood in terms of the new mathematical logic. One of the earliest advocates of this 
position was Schayer. He argued in 1932 that it is a mistake to interpret the five-membered 
proof in terms of an Aristotelian syllogism: 
In summary, under no circumstances can we force the Indian syllogistic onto the 
Procrustean bed of the authentic Aristotelian syllogistic .... Indology has to rid itself from 
the false suggestion that the Aristotelian or the traditional syllogistic provide a suitable 
basis for the interpretation of the problems of Nyaya philosophy. J 
J Schayer 1932, 95-96. 
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Schayer was a student of the great Polish logician Lukasiewicz and was no doubt 
inspired by the progress Lukasiewicz had made studying Greek logic from the standpoint of 
modem 10gic.1 Schayer aimed to do the same with Indian logic. According to Schayer, 
knowledge of symbolic logic is absolutely essential to understanding Indian logic: 
For more than 50 years now there has been a strict scientific logic which really deserves 
its name; it is the symbolic (mathematical) logic which was anticipated by Leibniz, 
prepared for by Boo1e and Schroder, and founded by Frege and Russell. Without 
knowledge of the elements of this logic, historical research into Indian logic is 
unthinkable ... 2 
However, knowledge of modern mathematical logic is definitely not essential in order 
to understand Indian logic. Indian logic can be understood perfectly well when it is explained 
in its own terms. Of course, knowledge of mathematical logic is required in order to 
understand a description of Indian logic expressed in terms of mathematical logic, just as 
knowledge of English is required in order to understand a description of Indian logic written 
in English. But knowledge of mathematical logic is certainly not essential in order to 
understand Indian logic, just as knowledge of English is not essential to understand Indian 
logic. After all, the ancient Indian logicians were able to understand their own systems of 
logic without knowledge of modern mathematical logic. 
Modern authors who present Indian logic in terms of Greek syllogisms or modern 
mathematical logic, presumably do so because they see advantages in expressing an 
unfamiliar system of proofs using the more familiar Greek paradigm, or in expressing the 
imprecise natural language formulations of Indian logic using a precise symbolic language. 
However, these benefits come at a price. The cost of using these explanatory models is that a 
misleading impression is easily created in the mind of the reader. In the case of using 
syllogisms, Indian proofs take on a Greek appearance when in fact Indian proofs are quite 
different from Greek syllogisms. In the case of using mathematical logic, Indian logic appears 
to be either a term logic or a propositional logic depending on what is taken as the values for 
variables, when in fact Indian logicians made no such distinctions. Modern interpreters can 
unwittingly colour their explanations of Indian logic in the eyes of their readers simply by 
using a particular explanatory model. 
1 Lukasiewicz 1951. 
2 Schayer 1933b, 102-103. 
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This thesis therefore describes Indian logic in its own terms. This preserves the original 
style of the logic and avoids the pitfalls of colouring the presentation with characteristics that 
have no place in the Indian systems. Since the primary sources for this thesis are preserved in 
Sanskrit, p~ni, Chinese and Tibetan, there is the need to translate the logical terminology into 
English. Wherever possible, logical terms are translated using words that do not have 
recognised meanings in Western systems oflogic. Thus, rather than use words like major 
premiss and middle term, words such as example and application are used. Another reason not 
to use Greek terminology when translating Indian logical terms concerns the question of 
Greek influence in Indian logic. The use of separate terminology when describing the Greek 
and Indian systems ensures that a clear distinction is maintained between these two. 
One of the main arguments for Greek influence is that Indian logic did not pass through 
stages of development. The advocates of this position argue that the sudden appearance of 
logic in India, complete with all the subtleties that took centuries to develop amongst the 
Greeks, can be accounted for only by invoking Greek influence. A major part of this thesis is 
therefore devoted to describing the stages in the development of early Indian logic. Many 
modern studies ignore these early stages and focus on the later, more well-developed forms of 
Indian logic. Even when the early works are discussed, the logical material in them is often 
described, not as it actually appears in the original work, but according to interpretations that 
date from later times. 
The methodology employed here is to describe the early forms of Indian logic exactly as 
they are found in the original works. This approach is essential, given the aims of the exercise. 
If the logical material in the early Indian works were described according to later Indian 
commentators then this would create the impression that Indian logic began its history in a 
well-developed form and did not pass through any stages of development. Since this thesis 
aims to show that Indian logic did pass through developmental stages, it is essential that the 
logical material in the early works is described exactly as it appears in the original documents. 
This methodology does not mean that an assortment of extracts are simply translated 
and presented in a selected sequence so as to form an account of early Indian logic. Such an 
approach would be fraught with difficulties. This is because logic was not treated in isolation 
in ancient Indian works. Logical material is found in works on debate, as well as scattered 
through religious, philosophical and medical works. Information on logic is therefore mixed 
with material from various other disciplines. Any collection of translations would inevitably 
7 
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include a lot of irrelevant and distracting material. Moreover, even those passages that are 
exclusively logical would not be easily understood from a translation. This is because the 
style of composition used in ancient India is extremely compact. The original works are 
therefore not at all self-explanatory. 
The problems arising from of a compact writing style were addressed in India by 
producing explanatory commentaries. However, translations of passages from traditional 
commentaries would not be very helpful, firstly because these commentaries typically involve 
later interpretations, and secondly because commentaries are also constrained by the need to 
be faithful to the wording of the original documents. Any translation would therefore require 
not only an explanation of the logic involved but also an explanation showing how this logic 
can be understood from the often cryptic wording of the original passage. This justification 
would add an unnecessary layer of complexity to an already complex subject and increase the 
bulk of the thesis without providing much additional information on the logic. 
The approach taken, therefore, is to explain early Indian logic without the limitations 
that would be imposed by attempting to preserve the idiosyncrasies of the source language or 
the compact writing style of the original documents. This preserves the style of early Indian 
logic, untainted by later Indian interpretations, and without the influence of Western 
explanatory models. 
The logical material has been gathered from a wide variety of sources, ranging from the 
very earliest surviving records that describe the days of the Buddha (fifth century Be) down 
to the works of Nagarjuna (second century AD). These sources also vary in terms of their 
subject matter, language and country of origin. The logically significant material scattered 
through these works has been separated from all other extraneous material and arranged both 
chronologically and by topic. This provides the reader with a simple introduction to ancient 
Indian logic and explains the differences between the Indian and Greek systems of logic. 
Autobiographical note 
I began learning the Tibetan language in Nepal in 1976 and worked as a translator in the 
Dalai Lama's cultural centre, New Delhi, for seven years (1978-1985). During this time I 
studied Indian logic with Tibetan monks (who even today continue to study the ancient 
traditions of India). This traditional training in Indian logic was supplemented with studies 
(also at the Dalai Lama's cultural centre) in the philosophies, religions, history and literature 
of ancient India. Following this, I studied Western philosophy and modem mathematical logic 
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at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, for five years (1986-1990) prior to beginning 
the research for this thesis in 1999. 
My knowledge of Tibetan gives me first-hand access to Tibetan translations of Indian 
works. In some cases, Indian works survive only in Tibetan translation, the Sanskrit originals 
having been lost over the centuries. Even when a Sanskrit original is extant, the Tibetan 
translation is sometimes used to confirm or even help correct the Sanskrit edition where this 
has become corrupt through being copied by hand countless times over many centuries. The 
Tibetan translations of Indian works have become readily available only in the last 20 or 30 
years. Before the existence of the Tibetan translations was known, it was thought that many of 
the great Indian works had been lost forever. Nowadays, with a greater number of original 
works or their translations coming to light, the understanding of ancient Indian logic is 
growing in the West. 
The Indian tradition of composing explanatory commentaries was continued in Tibet 
and access to these Tibetan commentaries is invaluable in understanding Indian logic. The 
study of Indian logic is becoming increasingly popular in the West and modem commentaries 
on Indian logic are being published in Western languages. These are in effect a continuation 
of the Eastern tradition of composing explanatory commentaries on ancient texts and this 
thesis itself continues that tradition. 
1.2 Summary of chapters 
1.2.1 The earliest records (chapter two) 
The earliest recorded system of debate and its associated logical material is found in the 
early Buddhist works and, to a lesser extent, in the early Upani$ads. 
Early Buddhist works 
The early Buddhists works contain information on debate, lists of topics debated, a 
classification scheme for statements, and a fourfold scheme of predication nowadays called 
the tetralemma (catu$kotO. A tetralemma consists of four statements where the subject is, is 
not, both is and is not, or neither is nor is not some predicate. Statements formed in these 
ways may be either true or false. If anyone of the statements is true then the other three are 
false. Sometimes all four forms of a statement are said to be wrong, not because all four are 
false, but because true and false do not apply to some statements. 
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There are four types of statement: unambiguous, vague, ambiguous, and misleading 
statements. True and false do not apply to misleading statements. These four types of 
statement correspond to four types of question, i.e. those requiring a categorical, 
discriminating, counter-question, or no reply, respectively. Each type of question must be 
answered in the appropriate manner. It is not acceptable to be simply evasive about questions 
formed from misleading statements. Such questions must be recognised for what they are and 
then set aside for that reason. 
There is no evidence of Greek influence in these ideas, although the tetralemma bears 
some resemblance to the ideas of the early Greek sceptics, especially those of Pyrrho. Greek 
sources record the fact that Pyrrho visited India with Alexander's army in 326-325 Be. The 
similarities between Pyrrho's ideas and the Indian tetralemma are unlikely to be the result of 
Pyrrho's influence on Indians. This is because the tetralemma has a long history of use in 
India that stretches back at least to the time of the Buddha, i.e. before Alexander's visit. 
McEvilley argues that Pyrrho's ideas are from earlier Greek philosophers, although he does 
admit that Pyrrho could have adopted some Indian ideas that agreed with his own views. 
Upani~ads 
The early Upani!iads contain information on debate that pre-dates the Buddha and there 
is evidence to suggest that the early Buddhists simply adopted this same tradition of debate. 
This shows that debate in India pre-dates the arrival of the Greeks and the indications are that 
it began even before Greek philosophy began. There is nothing to suggest that this tradition of 
debate, or its associated logic principles, were influenced by the Greeks. The main point here 
is that Greek influence can be ruled out on chronological grounds. The next chapter takes up 
examples of logic that date from a time after Alexander's historic visit, i.e. when Greek 
influence cannot be ruled out simply on chronological grounds. 
1.2.2 Early works on debate (chapter three) 
The literary sources used in this examination are four Buddhist works: the Kathiivatthu 
(Points of Controversy), the Vijiiiinakiiya (Consciousness Group), the Yamaka (Pairs), and the 
Milindapanha (Milinda's Questions). These works cover the period from after Alexander's 
visit in the fourth century BC down to the first century Be. Greeks were present in India 
during these times and some Geeks became Buddhists, thus the opportunity for Greeks to 
influence Buddhist authors certainly existed during this period. 
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Kathavatthu 
The Kathavatthu presents a series of arguments with a strict adherence to a dialectical 
method. The logical rules are not formulated, but the systematic procedure that is adhered to 
throughout the work suggests the existence of a rule-governed system. These debates are 
organised into two types: primary and secondary. Each primary debate consists of eight 
sections, arranged in four pairs. The first pair of debates are whether A is B, or A is not B. 
Each of these involves the same five-part argument. These five parts are: the way forward, the 
way back, the refutation, the application and the conclusion. This makes ten parts in the first 
pair of debates. Each of the remaining three pairs of sections consists of the same ten parts, 
the only difference being that the qualifications everywhere, always, and in everything are 
added. The pattern of argument used in the secondary debates is similar to that found in the 
primary debates. 
VijiHinakaya 
The same pattern of argument is also found in another work from this period, the 
Vijiianakaya. The Vijiiiinakiiya, like the Kathavatthu, uses a pattern of argument that involves 
five parts. The first of these five consists of two propositions that are either both true or both 
false. The second part argues that the acceptance of the first proposition implies the 
acceptance of the second. The third part says that it is wrong to accept one proposition but not 
the other. The fourth part argues that the denial of the second proposition implies the denial of 
the first, and the fifth part says the original position of accepting one proposition but not the 
other, is wrong. This form of argument was no doubt the accepted form of argument in the 
period when the Kathiivatthu and the Vijiiiinakiiya were originally composed. There is no sign 
of anything resembling Greek logic in the Kathavatthu or the Vijiiiinakiiya. They display a 
style of argument that is typical of ancient India: it is long and cumbersome with frequent 
repetition. 
Ten-part arguments 
Ancient Indian logicians presented their arguments using ten components. There is an 
example of this in the Kathiivatthu. Another example of a ten-membered argument is 
described by the J aina logician Bhadrabahu, traditionally fourth century BC, but possibly first 
century BC. Bhadrabahu's ten parts are: proposition, limitation of proposition, reason, 
limitation of reason, counter position, exclusion of counter position, example, doubt, 
exclusion of doubt and conclusion. The style of argument involving ten components is 
indicative of logic at a very early stage of its development in India. 
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Vatsyayana (c.4S0-S00 AD) also describes how some ancient Indian logicians formed 
arguments with ten parts. These ten are: inquiry, doubt, belief in the possibility of a solution, 
purpose, dispelling doubt, proposition, reason, instance, application and conclusion. The first 
five of these ten are psychological states associated with an argument. The last five are the 
actual statements used to construct an argument. In this system, all ten components are 
considered parts of the proof. In the work described in chapter four (see below) the same ten 
parts are found, except that they are separated into two sets of five. 
Yam aka 
Propositions played a major role in ancient Indian logic, but terms were considered 
more important. One work devoted to an analysis of terms is the Yamaka. The Yamaka 
clarifies the meanings of terms by taking pairs of terms and comparing one term with another 
using a regular procedure. The logical principles involved in this procedure are not 
formulated. There is no evidence of any Greek influence to be found in the Yamaka. 
Milindapafiba 
The Milindapafiha is a work in which Greeks playa prominent role. It is written in the 
form of a dialogue between King Milinda and a Buddhist monk named Nagasena. King 
Milinda is none other than the Indo-Greek king Menander (c.160 BC). Some claim that 
Nagasena is also a Greek. The Milindapafiha does not contain any logical material and so the 
question of whether it has been influenced by Greek logic does not arise, although the work 
certainly shows that the Greeks were in India and interacted with the Buddhists. 
1.2.3 The medical tradition (chapter four) 
One of the earliest formulations of logical principles is preserved in the Caraka Saf!1hitii 
(Caraka's Compendium), the oldest surviving work in the traditional Indian medical system 
(Ayurveda). It was written around the first or second century AD. The Caraka SalJ1hitii 
contains a list of 44 technical terms used in logic and debate. Caraka's discussion of these 
terms describes debate in general, the structure of a proof, assertions, epistemology, types of 
statement, as well as faults, fallacies and points at which a debate is lost. 
According to the Caraka SalJ1hitii, a proof consists of five parts: a proposition, reason, 
example, application and conclusion. There is a separate psychological state associated with 
each part of a proof: doubt with the proposition, purpose with the reason, scepticism with the 
example, inquiry with the application, and resolution with the conclusion. These two sets of 
five terms correspond to the ten-part proof that Vatsyayana described. The difference is that 
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Caraka does not consider the five psychological states to be parts of the proof. Caraka 
describes another four epistemic terms: perception, inference, tradition, and analogy. These 
are the traditional four means of valid cognition (pramii1;a). Caraka describes the term 
rejoinder (uttara) as a contrary statement that denies similarity when similarity has been 
asserted, or vice versa. This term is probably the forerunner of two similar terms, refutation 
(du~m;a) and futile rejoinder (jati), each of which is described in the following two chapters. 
Vidyabhu~aJ:ta argues that the five-part proof was influenced by Aristotle's syllogism, 
but there is no evidence to support this claim. It is true that the terms from an Aristotelian 
syllogism can be used to form an Indian proof in a relatively straightforward way, and this 
process can also be reversed to form a syllogism from the elements in a proof. But this does 
not prove that the five-part proof was based on the Greek syllogism. The relevant members of 
a proof do not meet the criteria for a syllogism as defined by Aristotle. Caraka's proof and 
Aristotle's syllogism are in fact completely unrelated, and their respective requirements do 
not apply to one another. The proof described in the Caraka Saf!lhita is related to the eady 
Indian systems of forming arguments with ten components. Caraka's five members of a proof 
(proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion), plus the five psychological states 
associated with a proof (doubt, purpose, scepticism, inquiry and resolution), correspond to the 
ten components that the ancient Indian logicians used. The five-membered proof is not unique 
to Caraka, as can be seen in the following chapters. 
1.2.4 A lost Buddhist text (chapter five) 
The Upayahrdaya (Essential Methods) was written around the first or second century 
AD. It is one of the earliest formulations of logical principles found in Buddhist literature. 
The work is preserved in Chinese translation and has come to notice only in the last hundred 
years. It is based on a list of terms as is the Caraka Saf!lhita. In fact, many of the same terms 
found in Caraka's list appear in the Upayahrdaya. There is nothing to directly link the two 
works, neither work quotes from or refers to the other in any way, but the similarity in 
terminology and the style of logic indicates that both authors are describing a common 
system. This same system is also found in the Nyaya Siitra (Logic Aphorisms), described in 
the next chapter. The Upayahrdaya therefore provides an important link in the development 
in Indian logic between the Caraka Saf!lhita and the Nyaya Sutra. The Upayahrdaya was 
written at a time in Indian history when the possibility for Greek influence certainly existed, 
but there is no evidence of any Greek influence to be found in the Upayahrdaya. The work 
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presents a slightly more developed form of the same system that Caraka describes - a system 
that has its origins in the Indian tradition of debate, not in anything introduced from Greece. 
The Upiiyahrdaya discusses ten terms: instance (or example), theory, commendable 
speech, defective speech, inference, appropriate statements, fallacious reasons, adoption of a 
fallacious reason, points of defeat and refutations. The first two terms are described in the 
very same ways as they are in the Caraka Saf!1hitii. The next two, commendable and defective 
speech, are practically the same as in Caraka's explanation. Both the Caraka Saf!1hitii and the 
Upiiyahrdaya divide inference into three, but the Upiiyahrdaya classifies inference based on 
the way in which the evidence is related to the conclusion, whereas Caraka classifies 
inference based on time. Caraka makes no mention of appropriate speech. Fallacious reasons 
are divided into eight, all eight of which are also found in the Caraka Saf!1hitii, although 
Caraka describes only three of them as fallacious reasons, or fallacies (ahetu) as he calls them. 
The adoption of a fallacious reason is not mentioned by Caraka. There is general agreement 
on the points of defeat. Caraka lists fifteen points of defeat, seven of which appear amongst 
the twenty points of defeat described in the Upiiyahrdaya. 
The five-part proof is not discussed in the Upiiyahrdaya, although the author is certainly 
well aware of proofs consisting of these five parts since he discusses one such proof in the 
fourth chapter of the Upiiyahrdaya. This chapter is devoted to a discussion of twenty 
refutations (du$Wta). Caraka's description of rejoinders (uttara) is very similar to these 
refutations. Caraka does not describe any types of rejoinder, but two of Caraka's terms appear 
as the names of refutations in the Upiiyahrdaya. The discussion on these refutations provides 
valuable information on the conditions that the author of the Upayahrdaya considers 
necessary for a proof to successfully establish its conclusion. The first three refutations argue 
against the view that a proposition is established on the basis that the example and the subject 
share the property specified in the reason. The next six refutations argue that the reason does 
not establish the proposition in one particular proof, i.e. 'the self is permanent, because of 
being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' . The remaining refutations describe other faults 
related to the subject in the same proof. 
The system of logic described in the Upiiyahrdaya is a more well-developed version of 
the one that appears in the Caraka Saf!1hitii. One significant difference between these two 
works is that the Upiiyahrdaya discusses twenty refutations which are conspicuously absent in 
the Caraka Sarrzhitii. These are much discussed in later Indian works. 
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There is no Greek influence in the Upayahrdaya. It simply follows the same system of 
logic and debate that is found in the Caraka Sa1?1hita. The Upayahrdaya was written by a 
Buddhist whereas Caraka follows the Sarpkbya system, but their respective treatments of 
logic are clearly part of the same system. This same system of logic and debate is also found 
in the next two works. 
1.2.5 Ancient Indian philosophy (chapter six) 
Background 
The Vaise$ika Sidra (Category Aphorisms) and the Nyaya Sidra (Logic Aphorisms) 
share a common system of metaphysics and their respective schools of thought later merged 
into one. They date from around the first or second century AD, with the Vaise$ika Siitra 
probably being the older of the two. The Vaise$ika Sutra contains only a small amount of 
material on logic. This work has been included here because of its description of inference. 
The Nyaya Sutra deals extensively with logic and debate. It is based on a list of technical 
terms that resembles the list found in the Caraka Sa1?1hita. The five-part proof is traditionally 
associated with the Nyaya Sutra, although its origins actually lie in the ancient system of 
debate that used ten-step arguments. 
McEvilley argues that there was Greek influence in the development of the five-part 
proof. His main argument supporting this claim is that the five-part proof appears in the 
Nyaya Siitra complete and without any evidence of prior developmental stages. The analysis 
carried out in this chapter shows that the five-part proof evolved out of an earlier system of 
debate without outside influence. First the description of inference in the Vaise$ika Sutra is 
compared with similar descriptions in the Upayahrdaya and in the Caraka Sa1?1hita. Next the 
logical material in the Nyaya Sutra is compared with similar material in the Vaise$ika Sutra, 
the Upayahrdaya and the Caraka Sal!1hita. All the terms that have counterparts in earlier 
works are noted in the order in which they occur in the Nyaya Sutra. There are nearly 90 
terms described in the Nyaya Sutra and over half of these have counterparts in earlier Indian 
works. This shows that the general system of logic described in the Nyaya Sutra, and the five-
membered proof in particular, are not new to the Nyaya Sutra but came from an earlier Indian 
tradition. This demolishes McEvilley's main argument that Greek influence is required in 
order to explain the advent of the five-membered proof in the Nyaya Sutra. 
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V aise~ika Sfitra 
The Vaise~ika Siitra describes six categories: substance, attribute, action, universal, 
particularity and inherence. These same six categories are also found in the Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii. 
The Vaise~ika Sutra does not discuss the five-membered proof, nor does it describe a list of 
logical terms. The logical significance of this work lies in its description of inference. The 
author mentions only two means of valid cognition, perception and inference, whereas both 
the Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii and the Upiiyahrdaya accept four means of valid cognition. Its definition 
of perception is the same as that found in the Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii. 
The Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii classifies inference into three types based on time and the 
Upiiyahrdaya also classified inference into three types, but the Upiiyahrdaya bases its 
classification on the way in which the evidence is related to the conclusion. The Vaise~ika 
Sutra, by contrast, first classifies inference into two and then makes an in-depth analysis of 
the relations between objects. The significance of relationship is that it provides the 
justification for inference. That is, inference occurs provided the reason is related to the 
conclusion. If this relationship fails to hold then the reason is incorrect and no inference 
occurs. This description of inference has more in common with the Upiiyahrdaya than with 
the Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii. There is nothing in this discussion to suggest any Greek influence. 
Nyaya Sfitra 
The Vaise~ika Sutra presents its discussion on inference within a system of metaphysics 
that advocates real relationships between real objects. The same system of metaphysics is also 
followed in the Nyiiya Sutra. The Nyiiya Sutra discusses logic and debate under sixteen terms. 
These are: means of valid cognition, objects of valid cognition, doubt, purpose, example, 
theory, members of a proof, reasoning, decision, debate, disputation, wrangle, fallacious 
reason, equivocation, futile rejoinder and points of defeat. When the discussion on these 
sixteen terms is compared with discussions on similar terms in other Indian works, it is clear 
that there are Indian precedents for the logical material found in the Nyiiya Sutra. 
The first of the sixteen terms in the Nyiiya Sutra, the means of valid cognition, is 
divided into four: perception, inference, analogy and testimony. The same four are also found 
in both the Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii and the Upiiyahrdaya, whereas the Vaise~ika Sutra accepts only 
two: perception and inference. The Nyiiya Sutra divides inference into three. This division is 
interpreted in two ways: firstly, as a division based on time as in the Caraka Sa1'Jlhitii, and 
secondly, as a division based on the way in which the evidence is related to the conclusion, as 
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in the Upayahrdaya and the Vaise.Jika Siitra. The second interpretation is also similar to the 
division of inference found in the ancient Sihl1hkya system as it is described in the $a#itantra 
(Science of Sixty Topics) by Vr~aga1).a (c. 100-300 AD), and also in the Jaina work called the 
Anuyogadvara (Means of Examination) by .Aryarak~ita (c. I 00 AD). (The names for these 
three types of inference appear to have originated in the ancient Mlmarrsa school. They can 
be found in the MlmalJ1sa Sutra (c. second century BC) which is attributed to Jaimini.) 
The second term discussed in the Nyaya Sutra is object of valid cognition. This term is 
not found in the other works discussed above, although some of the material discussed in this 
section of the Nyaya Sutra may have Buddhist origins. The Nyaya Sutra describes the same 
five-part proof (under the seventh term, member) as Caraka describes. It also discusses the 
same five psychological states associated with the five-part proof. These are: term three 
doubt, term four purpose, term five example, term eight reasoning and term nine decision. 
The association between these five and the five members of a proof is not made clear. The 
Nyaya Sutra divides the sixth term, theory, into four - the same four that are found in both the 
Upayahrdaya and the Caraka Saf!lhita. 
The next three, debate, disputation and wrangle (terms ten, eleven and twelve) are 
practically the same as those in the Caraka Saf!lhita, except that Caraka classifies the latter 
two terms (disputation and wrangle) as subdivisions of the first (debate), whereas the Nyaya 
Sutra describes all three as independent terms. The Vaise.Jika Sutra, the Upayahrdaya and the 
Caraka Saf!lhUa all describe various types of incorrect reason. There are many points in 
common between their respective descriptions and the description offallacious reason (the 
thirteenth term) in the Nyaya Sutra. The Nyaya Sutra discusses three types of equivocation 
(term fourteen) and argues against an opponent who claims that the third type of equivocation 
is included in the first type. The Caraka Saf!lhita and the Upayahrdaya both divide 
equivocation into two types, and Kajiyama claims that the opponent referred to in the Nyaya 
Sutra is the author of the Upayahrdaya. The Vaise.Jika Sutra does not discuss equivocation. 
The fifteenth term in the Nyaya Sutra is futile rejoinder. Almost half of the twenty-four 
futile rejoinders listed in the Nyaya Sutra are also found in the Upayahrdaya as refutations. 
The refutations in the Upayahrdaya appear to have been renamed futile rejoinders in the 
Nyaya Sutra. These two terms probably have their origins in what Caraka calls a rejoinder. 
Caraka describes rejoinder as a statement that denies similarity when similarity has been 
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asserted, or vice versa. The Nyaya Siitra describes futile rejoinder in a similar way, i.e. as an 
objection by means of similarity and dissimilarity. 
The sixteenth term in the Nyaya Sutra is point of defeat. Approximately twenty points 
of defeat are listed in the Upayahrdaya. Half of these also appear in the Nyaya Sutra as points 
of defeat. The Caraka Saytlhita lists fifteen points of defeat. Two thirds of the points of defeat 
listed in the Nyaya Sutra are also found in the Caraka Saytlhita. There are no discussions on 
futile rejoinders or points of defeat in the Vaise~ika Sutra. 
There are over 70 terms described in the Nyaya Sutra as subdivisions of the sixteen 
main terms. About half of these are also found in the Caraka Saytlhita, often with similar 
descriptions although not always classified in exactly the same ways. The logical material in 
the Caraka Saytlhita and the Upayahrdaya establishes that there were prior stages in the 
development of the logical material found in the Nyaya Sutra. There is no evidence that the 
Nyaya Sutra used either the Caraka Saytlhita or the Upayahrdaya as its source, but the 
similarities between these works make it clear that they all follow the very same tradition of 
logic and debate. They all use very similar terminology and generally describe it in similar 
ways. Many of the futile rejoinders discussed in the Nyaya Sutra are replies to objections 
raised in the Upiiyahrdaya. Given this fact and the degree of organisation in each work, the 
probable chronological order of these three works is first the Caraka Saytlhita, followed by the 
Upayahrdaya and then the Nyaya Sutra last. 
Greek influence 
There is nothing in the Nyaya Sutra that provides any evidence of Greek influence. In 
fact, the relationship it has with earlier Indian works indicates that its ideas on logic arose 
from the Indian tradition of debate. This undermines the need to invoke Greek influence in 
order to explain the logical material in the Nyaya Sutra. McEvilley accepts that the five-part 
proof did not come from the Aristotelian syllogism as claimed by Vidyabhu~ar;ta, but he still 
insists that it came from the Greeks. He argues that the five-part proof came from the 
Epicurean system of logic. McEvilley's main reasons for this are that the five-part proof as 
described in the Nyaya Sutra is without precedent in the Indian tradition and the only known 
source in the world at that time was the Epicurean system. Further, he says that Epicurean 
teachers were active in Afghanistan and quite possibly in northwest India also. This argument 
is countered by two points: firstly there is no mention of a five-part proof in any extant Greek 
work, and secondly, there are Indian sources for the five-part proof that pre-date the Nyaya 
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Sutra. These sources support the view that the five-part proof evolved from the ten-part proof. 
The ten-part proof is itself a product of the tradition of debate in ancient India. 
1.2.6 Buddhist dialectics (chapter seven) 
Nagarjuna 
The term Buddhist dialectics refers to the second of the two types of logic in ancient 
India. The first type of logic, described in the Nyaya Sutra, focused on establishing matters of 
fact using structured proofs governed by rules. The second type of logic focused on refuting 
matters of fact using a system of dialectics that employs consequences (prasaJiga). The most 
well-known representative of the second type of logic is Nagarjuna. McEvilley claims that the 
advent of NagaIjuna' s system of dialectics was due to Greek influence. His reasons for this 
are the same as those he used to argue for Greek influence in the first type of logic, i.e. there 
is no evidence of developmental stages for Buddhist dialectics within Indian literature, there 
are Greek precedents for Buddhist dialectics and the Greeks were in India at the right time to 
influence Buddhist logicians. This chapter describes Nagarjuna's system of dialectics and 
shows that it had developmental stages within the Indian logical tradition. This removes the 
need to invoke Greek influence in order to account for the advent of Buddhist dialectics. 
Vaidalya Prakara.,a 
McEvilley claims that NagaIjuna is unaware of the five-membered proof and that if he 
had known about it he could not have avoided a dialectical confrontation with it. However, 
Nagarjuna did exactly this in his Vaidalya Prakara1Ja (Commentary on the Pulverization). 
McEvilley makes no mention of this work. In the Vaidalya Prakara1Ja, Nagarjuna refutes 
each of the sixteen terms described in the Nyaya Sutra. In particular, he spends seventeen 
sutras arguing against the five-membered proof. First he argues against the five members 
jointly, then against each member individually, and finally he rebuts a defence of the five 
members. This shows that, contrary to what McEvilley claims, NagaIjuna is very well aware 
of the five-membered proof. 
Dialectics 
Nagarjuna's method of refuting the five members of a proof, and the other terms in the 
Nyaya Sutra, involves forming conditionals with the opponent's position as the antecedent 
and with an unacceptable position as the consequent. Nagarjuna uses these conditionals to 
argue that if a position is accepted then one of a limited number of consequents must also be 
accepted. He then argues that each consequent is unacceptable to his opponent and thus the 
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original position must be abandoned. The characteristics of this style of argument are that it 
involves refutation only and employs consequences. There are precedents for each of these 
characteristics in the Indian logical tradition. 
Regarding the first characteristic, there are precedents for the style of argument that 
involves refutation only. Both the Nyaya Sidra and the Caraka SaJ?1hita describe the term 
wrangle (vital}qii) as debate where each party endeavours to refute an opponent's position 
without attempting to establish their own. The debates in both the Kathavatthu and the 
Vijiianakaya are also negative in the sense that they attempt to refute an opponent without 
attempting to establish an alternate position. Further, the so-called hair-splitters who lived in 
the days of the Buddha devised arguments so that no matter what position an opponent took, 
they had reasons to refute it. 
Regarding the second characteristic, the Indian precedents for using consequences 
(prasaJiga) are the futile rejoinders (jati) in the Nyaya Siitra, the refutations (du~al}a) in the 
Upayahrdaya, and the rejoinders (uttara) in the Caraka SaJ?1hita. The works that contain 
precedents for the style of argument involving consequences and refutation only show that 
these two aspects of Nagarjuna' s system of dialectics had developmental stages in the Indian 
logical tradition and this counters the need to invoke Greek influence in order to account for 
Nagarjuna's use of them. Even ignoring these precedents, it is an extremely weak argument to 
claim that Indians could not possibly have come up with a negative style of argument using 
consequences, and this form of argument must therefore have been introduced by the Greeks. 
MUla Madhyamaka Karika 
McEvilley's claims regarding the origins of Buddhist dialectics focus on Nagarjuna's 
famous Mula Madhyamaka Karika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way). McEvilley 
argues that NagaIjuna's system of dialectics has Greek origins since it appears in his Mula 
Madhyamaka Kfirika without prior developmental stages. Also, the philosophical view that 
Nagarjuna argues against in this work has Greek origins since it appears in the Sarvastavadin 
Abhidharma works without prior developmental stages. Further, the controversy between 
Nagarjuna and the Sarvastavadin Abhidharma view reflect a similar controversy in the Greek 
tradition. However, Indian precedents exist for both Nagarjuna's dialectics and for the view 
he opposes, and thus there is no need to invoke Greek influence in order to account for these. 
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Abhidharma 
Nagarjuna's main opponents in the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika are Buddhists who 
follow a body of literature called the Abhidharma (higher knowledge). The Abhidharma 
works originally evolved from lists of tenns that date from the days of the Buddha, i.e. before 
the Greeks first arrived in India. These lists were intended to provide definitive summaries of 
the Buddha's teachings. Explanatory material was added to fonn various expositions and 
these works formed the Abhidharma sections of the various versions of the Buddhist Canon. 
Two complete Abhidharma collections are extant: one that belongs to the Sarvastivadin 
school of northwest India, and another that belongs to the Theravadin school of south-east 
Asia. These two schools owe their origins to the missions Asoka sent to their respective areas 
in the middle of the third century BC. Asoka's missions took with them a common core of 
ideas that is now found in both Abhidharma traditions. One cornmon idea is that elements of 
existence (dharmas) possess an essential nature (Sanskrit: svabhiiva, Pali: sabhiiva). This is 
the view that Nagarjuna argues against in his Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika. 
According to McEvilley, it is the Sarvastivadins who claim that elements of existence 
possess an essential nature and they do so because of Greek influence. The view of an 
essential nature certainly exists in the Sarvastivadin tradition since it is described in such 
works as the Vijiiiinakiiya (Consciousness Group), the Mahiivibhii:yii (Great Commentary), the 
Abhidharmahrdaya (Essence of Higher Knowledge) and the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of 
Higher Knowledge). However, the same view also appears in the Theravadin tradition. 
Evidence for this is found in the Patisambhidiimagga (Path of Discrimination), the 
Buddhavaf!1sa (Lineage of the Buddhas), the Petakopadesa (Instructions to Students of the 
Pitakas), as well as in a number of Theravadin commentaries. Since this view is common to 
both the Sarvastivada and the Theravada schools, it is most likely part of a common core of 
ideas that existed amongst Indian Buddhists before the independent development of these two 
schools. This shows that Nagarjuna was not reacting to a Greek idea in the Sarvastivadin 
Abhidharma, but was in fact arguing against an Indian theory held by the followers of various 
Abhidharma traditions. 
Tetralemma 
McEvilley also claims that the dialectical method that NagaIjuna uses to refute the 
views of the Abhidharma tradition came from the Greeks since it appears in the Mula 
Madhyamaka Kiirika without prior developmental stages. A distinctive feature of this method 
is the fourfold scheme of predication (catu:ykoti), nowadays called the tetralemma. McEvilley 
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points out that a similar fourfold scheme was taught by Pyrrho of Elis (c.365-c.27 5 Be). 
However, the tetralemma was used in India as early as the days of the Buddha (discussed in 
chapter two). McEvilley concedes that there may be an Indian version of the tetralemma, but 
claims that Nagarjuna's interpretation of it as a negation was due to Greek influence. The 
problem with this claim is that the tetralemrna is not a negation, nor was it redefined into a 
negation in the Madhyamika school as McEvilley claims. Nagarjuna uses the tetralemrna both 
positively and negatively. The tetralemrna is in fact a fourfold scheme of predication, and it 
has a history of use in India dating back to the days before the Greeks first arrived in India. 
Eleatics 
McEvilley also claims that Nagarjuna' s arguments are similar to those of the Eleatics, 
suggesting thereby that Nagatjuna's arguments against motion, for instance, have a Greek 
origin. Whatever similarities this form of argument may have with Zeno's arguments, it is not 
without precedent in the Indian tradition. Bhattacharya describes how Nagatjuna's arguments 
are based on grammatical concepts that date back to Patafijali (c.2nd century Be), if not to 
Pa:Q.ini himself (c.350 Be), and Hayes agrees. Warder notes that similar arguments are found 
in the Patisambhidamagga. The date of the Patisambhidamagga is probably 349 Be, i.e. 
before Alexander's visit in 326-325 Be. The combination of this evidence completely 
demolishes McEvilley's claim that the array of Greek dialectical forms turns up in India, 
mature, complete, and without evidence of developmental stages, in the school of Buddhist 
thought called Madhyamika. 
1.2.7 Greek works in India (chapter eight) 
Astronomy 
The final chapter considers the argument that the Greeks are known to have influenced 
Indian astronomy and thus they must have influenced Indian logic as well. This is supported 
by the fact that there was a massive amount of trade between Alexandria and India for 
centuries. The constant and frequent voyages between Indian ports and the Red Sea ports 
serving Alexandria made it possible for Greek works on astronomy to be taken to India and 
thus Greek works on logic may have been taken to India also. However, this argument does 
not prove that Greeks definitely influenced Indian logic. It shows only that they could have 
done so and that claims of Greek influence in Indian logic should therefore be taken seriously. 
McEvilley claims that Greek works on logic must have found their way into India 
through the sea trade that existed between India and Alexandria during the first two or three 
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centuries AD. These trade links have been documented in Greek records and confirmed by 
archaeological discoveries in India. Greek works on astronomy were apparently taken to India 
in this way and, according to McEvilley, Greek works on logic most probably were also. 
However, there is no evidence to support this claim. 
In the case of Indian astronomy, there is good evidence for Greek influence. This can be 
seen in the acknowledgements by Indian authors, and in the references to westerners and to 
astronomical works with Greek-sounding titles. Also, there is some correspondence between 
the concepts and techniques used in Greek and Indian systems of astronomy. However, if 
Indian logic had been influenced in the same way then there should be similar types of 
evidence to support this. But there is no such evidence. 
This thesis does not prove that there is absolutely no Greek influence in Indian logic. 
What it proves is that the claim that logic appeared in Indian literature complete and without 
developmental stages, is false. It does this by setting out all the stages in the development of 
Indian logic in chronological order from the very earliest records up to the time of the Nyoya 
Sidra and Nagarjuna. This shows that McEvilley's argument that only Greek influence can 
account for logic in India is not convincing. Thus the case for Greek influence in Indian logic 
remains unproven. Further, the existence of developmental stages dating back to the days 
before the Greeks first arrived in India makes it highly likely that Indian logic developed 
completely independent of any Greek influence. 
1.3 Technical notes 
These notes explain the conventions used in the thesis. The presentation should be self-
explanatory for most readers since it does not assume any knowledge of Indian logic, nor 
knowledge of any of the languages, philosophies, religions, history or literature of India. All 
significant terms are described on the first occurrence of their use and their Sanskrit or Pali 
equivalents provided where appropriate. Indian language titles are also translated into English 
on the occasion of their first use. All the sources are identified and referenced in footnotes, 
and full bibliographic details are listed in the bibliography at the end of the work. 
Bibliography 
The bibliography is in two sections: traditional sources and modem sources. The 
traditional sources are listed alphabetically by title. Many of these titles remain in the 
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language in which the work is most commonly known. A translation of the title follows in 
brackets. English language translations are listed under each title in chronological order. 
The modern sources are listed alphabetically by author in the normal manner. English 
translations of traditional sources also appear in the list of modern sources. Where more than 
one publication year is given for a source, the underlined year indicates the edition used in 
references. 
Quotations 
Quotations from traditional sources are referenced in footnotes giving details of the 
original source and the source of the English translation used. The most recent English 
translations are normally used. Some quotations are presented in a paraphrased form where 
the original quotation is too long to quote in full. 
Square brackets in translations 
Square brackets enclose material added by the translator even when round brackets have 
been used in the edition from which the quotation was taken. 
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Chapter two: The earliest records 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the origins of fidian logic. The literary sources for this 
examination are the works found in the various versions of the Buddhist Canon. These works 
describe the events of the Buddha's life which were originally preserved in an oral tradition 
and then later set down in writing. Although these traditional accounts were not written 
during the Buddha's lifetime, they are nevertheless, the oldest records available that describe 
the philosophical thinking engaged in by the Buddha and his contemporaries. These works 
contain information about debate, lists of topics debated, a classification scheme for 
statements, and a fourfold scheme of predication nowadays called the tetralemma (catu~koti). 
There is no Greek influence in this material, although the early Greek sceptics had ideas that 
appear to be similar to the fidian tetralemma. 
2.1 Early Indian logic 
2.1.1 Background 
Buddha 
The Buddha's dates are the subject of some uncertainty, I but many believe he died 
around 486 Be. Some claim the date is earlier while others claim it is later. If 486 BC is the 
correct date then the Buddha would have been a contemporary of Pythagoras of Samos 
(c.570-c.497 BC) and of Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.540-c.480 BC). This date also means that 
the Buddha would have died 16 years before Socrates (470-399 BC) was born and 58 years 
before Plato (428-348 BC) was born. Aristotle (384-322 BC) and Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 
BC) would have been born a century or more after the Buddha. Many Greeks came to north-
western parts of ancient India when Alexander the Great (356-323 BC) visited in 326-325 
BC, but this would have been some 160 years after the Buddha. Those who argue for a later 
date still place the Buddha's death well before Alexander's visit. Whatever the correct date 
may be, the Buddha probably lived before the Greeks came to fidia and before many of the 
famous Greek logicians were born. 
The traditional accounts of the Buddha's life were originally preserved in an oral 
tradition and then set down in writing some centuries after Alexander's visit. This leaves open 
1 For a review of the Buddha's dates see Bechert 1991-97. 
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the possibility that Greek ideas may have been incorporated into the oral tradition and then 
included in these eady Buddhist works appearing as purely Indian ideas dating from a time 
well before the Greeks carne to India. 
There are various versions of the Buddhist Canon preserved in a number of Asian 
languages. Some of the works in these collections describe the way logic was understood in 
ancient India before Alexander's historic visit. A distinctive feature of this logic is the 
fourfold scheme of predication or tetralemma. The tetralemma is used to express the ways in 
which the predicate applies to the subject in a statement. It is commonly found in these early 
Buddhist works and it was subsequently used by Buddhist philosophers in their analyses of 
philosophical issues. The origin of the tetralemma is the subject of dispute. The tetralemma 
also exists in the Greek philosophical tradition and it is argued that its appearance in the 
Indian philosophical tradition was due to Greek influence. Alternatively, it may have an 
Indian Oligin, either amongst the eady Buddhists or amongst the Buddha's contemporaries, 
possibly Safijaya. 
Sanjaya 
Safijaya Belatthiputta (Sarpjayin Vaira{lputra)I is mentioned in a number of early 
Buddhist works as one of the six famous teachers of ancient India. These works suggest that 
Safijaya was an older contemporary of the Buddha. The Kosala Sal!lyutta (Connected 
Discourses with the Kosalan)2 describes Safijaya and five other theorizers (titthakarfii as 
being the founders of well-established schools when the Buddha was still young and new to 
the life of a teacher. Another work, the Sutta Nipfita (Collection of Suttas),4 lists Safijaya as 
one of the six famous teachers, all of whom are described as being very old at a time when the 
Buddha was both young in years and new to his life as a teacher. In the Catu$pari$atsutra 
(Foundation of the Buddhist Order),5 it mentions that Safijaya had recently died when the 
Buddha was still relatively new to his life as a teacher. In the Mahfisakuludayi Sutta (Greater 
Discourse to Sakuludayin),6 the wanderer Sakuludayin explains to the Buddha how the 
I See Vogel 1970, 25 note 29. 
2 Sutta 3 of Saf(lyutta Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids 1917-30,1,93-127; Bodhi 2000,1,164-194. 
3 See Rhys Davids 1917-30, 1, 93 note 3. 
4 Surta Nipiita (3.6), trans. Hare 1945,75-84; Norman 1992,55-61. 
5 Trans. Kloppenborg 1973,91. 
6 Sutta 77 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,2,203-222; Bodhi 1995,629-647. 
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followers of Safijaya and the other five teachers were often in dispute with their leaders. The 
issues over which they disagreed are not mentioned. 
Fourfold scheme of denial 
No works from Saiijaya's school survive today. What little is known about his ideas is 
learnt from early Buddhist works. Saiijaya is renowned for his refusal to accept any position 
on an issue. There are examples of this in an early Buddhist work entitled the Fruits of the 
Homeless Life. MacQueen lists seven versions of this work. l In the P~ili version, entitled the 
Siimaiifiaphala Sutta,2 a king asks Saiijaya whether there is another world (life after death), 
whether there are any results experienced from good and bad deeds (kamza), and whether a 
Tathagata continues to exist after death. "Tathagata" is probably a pre-Buddhist term and is 
sometimes translated as "saint" (literally, one who has thus gone). In reply to these questions: 
Safijaya Belatthiputta said: "If you ask me: 'Is there another world?' if I thought so, I 
would say so. But I don't think so. [1] I don't say it is so, and [2] I don't say otherwise. 
[3] I don't say it is not, and [4] I don't not say it is not. 
What is significant here is that Saiijaya replies to the question using a fourfold scheme 
of denial. The same passage continues: 
If you ask: 'Isn't there another world?' ... 'Both?' '" 'Neither?' ... 'Is there fruit and 
result of good and bad deeds?' 'Isn't there?' ... 'Both?' ... 'Neither?' ... 'Does the 
Tathagata exist after death?' 'Does he not?' ... 'Both?' ... 'Neither?' ... I don't not say it 
is not.,,3 
After asking the first question (Is there another world?) in the positive, there is a second 
question in the negative: 'Isn't there another world?' to which Saiijaya replies with the same 
fourfold scheme of denial (indicated by the ellipse) as he used to answer the first question. 
Since Safijaya has refused to accept either that there is or that there is not another world, two 
more questions are asked: 'Is there both another world and not another world?' and 'Is there 
neither another world nor not another world?' Saiijaya also replies to these two questions with 
the same fourfold scheme of denial. The same pattern of four questions is used again to ask 
Saiijaya whether he accepts that there are results from good and bad deeds and whether he 
accepts the continued existence of the Tathagata after death. Saiijaya replies to these questions 
with the same fourfold scheme of denial that he used to answer the former questions. 
I MacQueen 1988, 12-18. 
2 Sutta 2 of Dfgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,1,65-95; Walshe 1987,91-109. 
3 Dfgha Nikiiya (i 58-59), trans. Walshe 1987, 97. 
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The Sanskrit title of the Fruits of the Homeless Life is the SrfimmJyaphala Siitra. There 
are four versions of this work extant in Chinese translation. In one version, entitled the Sha 
Men Kuo Ching,l the same passage occurs in a slightly different form: 
Great King, if asked: "Is there present and visible resultant fruit and reward for the 
sramal)a's life?" I would reply to the matter as follows: "[1] As for this matter, it is 
factual; [2] this matter is otherwise. [3] This matter is not otherwise and [4] not not 
otherwise." 
Great King, if asked: "Is there no present and visible resultant fruit and reward for the 
sramal)a's life?" I would reply to the matter as follows: "[1] As for this matter, it is 
factual; [2] this matter is otherwise. [3] This matter is not otherwise and [4] not not 
otherwise." 
Great King, if asked: "Does there both exist and not exist present and visible resultant 
fruit and reward for the sramat)a's life?" I would reply to the matter as follows: "[1] As 
for this matter, it is factual; [2] this matter is otherwise. [3] This matter is not otherwise 
and [4] not not otherwise." 
Great King, if asked: "Does there neither exist and not exist present and visible resultant 
fruit and reward for the sramal)a's life?" I would reply to the matter as follows: "[1] As 
for this matter, it is factual; [2] this matter is otherwise. [3] This matter is not otherwise 
and [4] not not otherwise.,,2 
In this passage, Safijaya asks about the rewards for the srama1}a' s life in four different 
ways and answers each form of the question in four ways. In the P~ili version of this passage, 
Safijaya uses a fourfold scheme of denial in reply to each of the four questions, i.e. (1) I don't 
say it is so, and (2) I don't say otherwise. (3) I don't say it is not, and (4) I don't not say it is 
not. In the Chinese version quoted above, Safijaya uses a similar fourfold scheme to reply, but 
each alternative is accepted rather than denied, i.e. (1) As for this matter, it is factual; (2) this 
matter is otherwise. (3) This matter is not otherwise and (4) not not otherwise. MacQueen 
argues that the Pali version of the work has "preserved the most ancient state of the text.,,3 
The fourfold pattern used to form the four questions is also used to form sets of four 
statements. For instance, regarding the continued existence of the Tathagata after death, the 
set of four statements is: 
1. The Tathagata does exist after death 
2. The Tathagata does not exist after death 
3. The Tathagata both does and does not exist after death 
4. The Tathagata neither does nor does not exist after death 
I Sutra 27 of the Chinese Dzgha Agama, trans. MacQueen 1988, 30-50. 
2 Trans. MacQueen 1988, 43. 
3 MacQueen 1988, 195. 
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Using' A' to stand for the predicate, the forms of these four statements are: 
1. The subject is A 
2. The subject is not A 
3. The subject is both A and not A 
4. The subject is neither A nor not A 
The predicate in these four statements is (1) affirmed, (2) denied, (3) both affirmed and 
denied, and (4) neither affirmed nor denied of the subject. The subject in each of these four 
statements remains the same. This fourfold scheme of predication is the famous catu~koti, 
nowadays called variously the tetralemma, the quadrilemma, the fourfold negation and the 
four-cornered negation. It consists of four statements which taken together exhaust the ways 
in which the predicate applies to the subject. 
Fivefold scheme of denial 
There is another scheme of denial which can be interpreted as a fivefold scheme, but 
this scheme has not produced a corresponding fivefold scheme of predication. An example of 
the fivefold scheme of denial appears in the Sandaka Sutta (To Sandaka).l Here the Buddha 
explains how a certain person is dull and confused: 
Because he is dull and confused, when he is asked such and such a question, he engages 
in verbal wriggling, in eel-wriggling: [1] 'I don't say it is like this. [2] And I don't say it 
is like that. [3] And I don't say it is otherwise. [4] And I don't say it is not so. [5] And I 
don't say it is not not SO.'2 
This person replies with five statements of denial whereas Safijaya uses only four. It is 
unclear exactly who this unnamed person is, since he is simply referred to as dull and 
confused. He is also charged with engaging in eel-wriggling (amarii-vikkhepa) or 
prevarication, and this charge suggests a convenient term, the "eel-wriggler", with which to 
refer to this unnamed person. 
The so-called eel-wriggler's five statements of denial are interpreted two ways.3 The 
first interpretation dismisses the first statement as a general statement of denial corresponding 
to Safijaya's initial 'I don't think so' ,4 and then takes the remaining four statements as 
corresponding to Safijaya's fourfold scheme of denial. 
I Sutta 76 of Majjhima Nikaya, trans. Horner 1954-59, 2,192-203; Bodhi 1995, 618-628. 
2 Majjhima Nikaya (i 520-521), trans. Bodhi 1995,625. 
3 Jayatilleke 1963, 135-138. 
4 Quoted above from the Dzgha Nikaya (i 58-59), trans. Walshe 1987, 97. 
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The second interpretation takes the first four statements as corresponding to Safijaya's 
fourfold scheme of denial and then adds the remaining statement to make a fivefold scheme. 
Although these five statements can be interpreted as involving a fivefold scheme of denial, 
there is no corresponding fivefold scheme of predication to be found in the early Buddhist 
works. 
The unnamed eel-wriggler that the Buddha refers to here is probably not Safijaya. The 
Buddha was no doubt familiar with Safijaya's views, since the Mahasaccaka Sutta (Great 
Discourse to Saccaka)l mentions that the Buddha debated with Safijaya and the other famous 
teachers of his time. Also, Sariputta and Moggallana,2 two of the Buddha's most distinguished 
followers, were originally followers of a teacher called Safijaya. The Mahavagga (The Great 
Book)3 describes how both Sariputta and Moggallana joined the Buddhist order early in the 
Buddha's career as a teacher and brought with them some 250 of Safijaya's followers. The 
Safijaya mentioned in the Mahavagga is probably the same as Safijaya Belatthiputta, one of 
the six famous teachers of the Buddha's time. A similar statement is also found in the 
Catu~pari~atsiitra (On the Foundation of the Buddhist Order).4 
The fact that Safijaya's two leading followers became the two main disciples of the 
Buddha and brought with them 250 of Safijaya's followers suggests that some of Safijaya's 
ideas could have found their way into the Buddhist tradition. The practice of using the 
tetralemma is an example of one such idea. Thus, the tetralemma may have originated with 
Safijaya, but equally it may have originated with the Buddhists or it may have been in 
common use during the Buddha's lifetime. It is used by Buddhists to describe Safijaya's 
views, but since there is only the Buddhist description of Safijaya's views available, it is 
unclear whether the tetralemma originated with Safijaya's or whether it originated elsewhere 
and was simply used by the Buddhists to describe Safijaya's views. 
J Sutta 36 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,1,291-305; Bodhi 1995,332-343. 
2 Sariputra (Upati1?ya) and Maudgalyayana (Kolita). 
3 Part of the Vinaya-Pitaka (i 23-24), trans. Rhys Davids, Oldenberg 1881-85,1,144-151; Horner 1938-66,4, 
52-57; Warren 1973,87-91. 
4 Trans. Kloppenborg 1973, 6-98, see especially 96. Cf. the Pravra)yiivastu of the Tibetan Miilasarviistiviida 
Vinaya, trans. Vogel 1970, 20-35, plus the Chinese Miilasarviistiviida Vinaya, 39-45. 
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Other fourfold schemes 
There are other fourfold schemes found in early Buddhist works that are not the typical 
tetralemma. For instance, the Buddha describes four types of things in the Book of the Fours, 
one of the books of the Anguttara Nikiiya (Collection of Expanding Groups): 
And: 
Monks, these four persons are found existing in the world. What four? [1) He who is bent 
on his own profit, not another's; [2] he who is bent on another's profit, not his own; [3] 
he who is bent on the profit of both; [4) he who is bent on the profit of neither.1 
Monks, there are these four rain-clouds. What four? [1] The thunderer not the rainer. [2] 
The rainer not the thunderer. [4] The neither thunderer nor rainer. [3] The both thunderer 
and rainer. These are the four.2 
And again: 
Monks, there are these four snakes. What four? [1] The venomous but not fierce, [2] the 
fierce but not venomous, [3] the one that is both, [4] the one that is neither.3 
This scheme of predication is one where the same subject has (1) some characteristic, 
(2) another characteristic, (3) both of these characteristics, and (4) neither characteristic. 
Using 'A' and 'B' to stand for two different predicates, the logical form of this scheme is: 
1. The subject is A 
2. The subject is B 
3. The subject is both A and B 
4. The subject is neither A nor B 
The pattern in these four statements is one where (1) A is affirmed, (2) B is affirmed, 
(3) both A and B are affirmed, and (4) neither A nor B are affirmed of the same subject. In the 
fourfold scheme of predication nowadays called the tetralemma there is only one predicate not 
two, and it is (1) affirmed, (2) denied, (3) both affirmed and denied, and (4) neither affirmed 
nor denied of the same subject. 
Another fourfold scheme involves two subjects. For instance, in the Book of the Fours: 
Monks, there are these four pools of water. What four? [1] The shallow which looks deep, 
[2] the deep which looks shallow, [3] the shallow that looks shallow, and [4] the deep 
which looks deep. These are the four.4 
I Anguttara Nikiiya (ii 96), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36,2, 105. Cf. Thera, Bodhi 1999, 104. 
2 Anguttara Nikiiya (ii 101), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36,2,109. 
3 Anguttara Nikiiya (ii ] 10), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36,2, 115. 
4 Anguttara Nikiiya (ii 104), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36,2, 112. 
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Numbers 1 and 3 have 'shallow pool' for their subjects, and numbers 2 and 4 have 
'deep pool' for their subjects. There are two predicates, 'looks deep' (symbolised by 'A') and 
'looks shallow' (symbolised by 'B'). The pattern here is: 
1. Subject one is A 
2. Subject two is B 
3. Subject one is B 
4. Subject two is A 
This fourfold scheme is also not the scheme nowadays called the tetralemma. 
The Book of the Fours contains many such groups of fours which are simply a common 
method of enumerating alternatives. In fact, given their frequency, they appear to be the 
standard way in which the early Buddhists enumerated alternatives. 
Not a multi-valued logic 
The tetralemma does not imply a multi-valued logic with the values true, false, both true 
and false, and neither true nor false. The early Buddhist works use only two-valued logic. As 
J ayatilleke points out, this is clear in the Anguttara Nikiiya. The Buddha says (paraphrased): 
'1 know what has been seen, heard, and so forth in the world,' and 
If I were to say: 'I do not know these things,' then that would be false, and 
If! were to say: 'I both know and do not know these things,' then that would be false, and 
If! were to say: 'I neither know nor do not know these things,' then that would be false. l 
That is, the Buddha is saying here that since the first statement is true, it follows that 
each of the three remaining statements is false. There is no suggestion here that since the first 
statement is true, the second statement (not knowing) would be false, the third statement (both 
knowing and not knowing) would be both true and false, and the fourth statement (neither 
knowing nor not knowing) would be neither true nor false. Rather, it establishes that only two 
truth values are accepted and if one of the four statements is true, then each of the other three 
statements is false. This conclusion is also supported by the advice the Buddha gives (in 
verse) in the Anguttara Nikiiya on how to answer questions: 
Hard to overcome, to vanquish hard, profound, 
Invincible is such a one, and skilled 
To see the meaning, be it true or false; 
Wise to reject the false, he grasps the true.2 
I Aizguttara Nikiiya (ii 24), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36, 2, 35-51 (see p. 27). Note that a negative is missing 
from the original text and from Woodward's translation, see Jayatilleke 1963,346 note 1. 
2 Aizguttara Nikiiya (ii 46), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36,2,54. 
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Although only two truth values (true and false) are found in the early Buddhist works, 
there are some statements to which true and false do not apply. Examples of such statements 
are found in the lists of the 62 wrong views and the ten undeclared points. 
2.1.2 The 62 wrong views and the ten undeclared points 
The list of 62 wrong views indicates what some the Buddha's followers considered to 
be the main topics of philosophical dispute. This list suggests that there was an understanding 
of logical principles during the Buddha's lifetime, that the tetralemma was commonly used in 
philosophical debate, and that Safijaya was only one of a number of so-called eel-wrigglers. 
The ten undeclared points are a sub-set of the 62 wrong views. The Buddha explained that 
true and false do not apply to these ten statements and this same reasoning can be applied to 
the 62 wrong views. 
The first 12 wrong views 
The Buddha describes 62 wrong views in the Brahmajiila Sutta (The Supreme Net).! 
Wrong views 1-8 are about the self (soul)2 and the world (universe). 1-4 regard the self and 
the world as eternal, and 5-8 regard them as partly eternal and partly not eternal. The last in 
each group of four (i.e. wrong views 4 and 8) are said to be held by those who are addicted to 
logic and reasoning: "Here a certain ascetic or Brahmin is a logician, a reasoner. Hammering 
it out by reason, following his own line of thought, he argues,,3 for his views. This indicates 
that logic was a discipline employed by some ascetics or Brahmins during the Buddha's time. 
Wrong views 9-12 are about the world. They are held by those who claim that the world 
is (1) finite, (2) infinite, (3) both finite and infinite, and (4) neither finite nor infinite. These 
four wrong views are presented according to the pattern followed in a tetralemma. That is, 
some say the world is finite, others say it is infinite. Some claim that the world is both since it 
is "finite up-and-down, and infinite across".4 The fourth view is held by those who are 
addicted to logic and reasoning. These logicians find reasons to fault the view that the world 
is finite, as well as reasons to fault the view that the world is infinite. They then argue that the 
world cannot be both finite and infinite since that view attracts the combined faults that each 
I Sutta I of Dfgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921, 1, I-55; Wa1she 1987, 67-90. 
2 Pali, altii; Sanskrit, iilman. 
3 Dfgha Nikiiya (i 16, i 21), trans. Walshe 1987,74,78. 
4 Dfgha Nikiiya (i 23), trans. Walshe 1987,79. 
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view has individually. Thus they conclude that the world is neither finite nor infinite. Here 
again there is evidence for the discipline of logic existing in ancient India. 
The eel-wrigglers 
Wrong views 13-16 are held by the so-called eel-wrigglers, those who prevaricate 
refusing to accept any position. The Buddha says: 
There are, monks, some ascetics and Brahmins who are Eel-Wrigglers [amara-
vikheppika]. When asked about this or that matter, they resort to evasive statements, and 
they wriggle like eels on four grounds.] 
The "four grounds" refers to the four wrong views 13-16. The first three wrong views 
(13-15) are views about whether something (this or that matter) is good or bad. In each of 
these three cases the eel-wriggler concerned gives a fivefold scheme of denial: 
When asked about this or that matter, he resorts to evasive statements and wriggles like 
an eel: [1] "I don't say this, [2] I don't say that. [3] I don't say it is otherwise. [4] I don't 
say it is not. [5] I don't not say it is not.,,2 
The five evasive statements found here are the same as those given by the unnamed eel-
wriggler in the Sandaka Sutta who is probably not Safijaya. But the reason for making such 
statements is not simply because these eel-wrigglers are dull and confused, as was the case in 
the Sandaka Sutta. Rather, the reasons are three: in the first case (wrong view 13) the eel-
wrigglers fear they may tell a lie; in the second case (wrong view 14) they fear becoming 
attached to their views; and in the third case (wrong view 15) they fear being defeated in 
debate by "practiced debaters, like archers who can split hairs, who go around destroying 
others' views"? In these three cases the eel-wrigglers fear that either lying, attachment, or 
defeat in debate will disturb their peace of mind and be a hindrance to attaining tranquillity. 
The fourth wrong view (16) is the view about the following topics: another world (life 
after death), beings born spontaneously (without a cause), and the continued existence of the 
Tathagata after death. This eel-wriggler is simply dull and stupid, and: 
Because of his dullness and stupidity, when he is questioned he resorts to evasive 
statements and wriggles like an eel: "If you ask me whether there is another world - if I 
thought so, I would say there is another world. [1] But I don't say so. [2] And I don't say 
otherwise. [3] And I don't say it is not, and [4] I don't not say it is not." 
I Dlgha Nikiiya (i 24), trans. Walshe 1987, 80. 
2 Dfgha Nikiiya (i 25), trans. Walshe 1987, 80. 
3 Dlgha Nikiiya (i 26), trans. Walshe 1987, 80. 
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The four evasive statements made by this eel-wriggler closely match the fourfold 
scheme of denial used by Safijaya in the Samaiiiiaphaia Sutta.1 The same passage continues: 
"Is there no other world? ... " "Is there both another world and no other world? ... " "Is 
there neither another world nor no other world? ... " "Are there spontaneously-born 
beings? ... " "Are there not...?" "Both ... ?" "Neither ... ?" "Does the Tathagata exist after 
death? Does he not exist after death? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does 
he neither exist nor not exist after death? ... " "If I thought so I would say so ... I don't say 
it is not. ,,2 
The topics found here are slightly different from those mentioned by Safijaya in the 
Samaiiiiaphaia Sutta. The topic 'beings born spontaneously' listed here is not mentioned by 
Safijaya in the Samaiiiiaphaia Sutta. Also the topic 'results of good and bad actions' which 
Safijaya mentions does not appear here? Nevertheless, the use of the same fourfold scheme of 
denial and the similarity of topics suggests that the fourth eel-wriggler is probably Safijaya. 
The differences between this fourth eel-wriggler and the former three are that the fourth 
eel-wriggler makes four evasive statements about specific topics (life after death, etc.) 
because he is dull and stupid. The former three eel-wrigglers, by contrast, make five evasive 
statements about non-specific topics because they fear that any endorsement would hinder 
their chances of attaining tranquillity. If the fourth eel-wriggler is in fact Safijaya then the 
former three are probably not followers of Safijaya. Thus there is good reason to believe that 
Safijaya was not the only so-called eel-wriggler and that there were in fact a number of 
schools in ancient India which, like Safijaya, refused to take a position on any issue. 
The remaining wrong views 
Wrong views 17 and 18 regard the self and the world as having arisen by chance 
(without a cause). The remaining 44 views all concern the self (or soul). The first 32 wrong 
views (19-50) are arranged in groups of four according to the pattern used in a tetralemma. 
Wrong views 19-34 are held by those who claim that the self after death is conscious 
and (i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) both is and is not, or (iv) neither is nor is not material (19-22), finite 
(23-26), of uniform perception (27-30), or wholly happy (31-34). Wrong views 35-42 are held 
by those who claim that the self after death is unconscious and (i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) both is 
and is not, or (iv) neither is nor is not material (35-38), or finite (39-42). Wrong views 43-50 
1 Quoted above from the Dfgha Nikaya (i 58-59), trans. Walshe 1987,97. 
2 Dlgha Nikaya (i 27), trans. Walshe 1987, 81. 
3 That is, it is missing from the Walshe translation, although it is included in the Rhys Davids translation. 
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are held by those who claim that the self after death is neither conscious nor unconscious and 
(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) both is and is not, or (iv) neither is nor is not material (43-46), or finite 
(47-50). These three groups of views consider the self to be (1) conscious, (2) unconscious, 
and (3) neither conscious nor unconscious after death. The fourth alternative, the view that the 
self is both conscious and unconscious after death, is not discussed.! These eight tetralemmata 
presented here show that the tetralemma was a common device used in philosophical 
discussion in ancient fudia. 
Wrong views 51-57 are held by those who claim that the self ceases to exist after death, 
and wrong views 58-62 are held by those who claim that the self attains liberation (nihhfina). 
All 62 wrong views were held by the Buddha's contemporaries. The Buddha is in effect 
saying that the views on a particular subject are four. There are those who think this, and 
those who think that. There are those who claim it is both, and those who claim it is neither. 
There are only these four alternatives and all four are wrong. This suggests a contradiction, 
which naturally led to the Buddha being asked for his opinion on the same topics. 
Ten undeclared points 
The so-called indeterminate (avyfikatfini) or undeclared points appear in a list of ten 
statements. The Buddha refused to accept any of these undeclared points as true or false. 
These ten are: 
1. The world is eternal 
2. The world is not eternal 
3. The world is finite 
4. The world is infinite 
5. The self (soul) is the same as the body 
6. The self (soul) is different from the body 
7. The Tathagata does exist after death 
8. The Tathagata does not exist after death 
9. The Tathagata both does and does not exist after death 
10. The Tathagata neither does nor does not exist after death 
This list of ten statements appears in a number of early Buddhist works? Other versions 
of this list exist and they expand some points by including the 'both' and 'neither' alternatives 
where they are not found in the list of ten points. 
I Potter ed. 1965-99,7,571 note 54, notes where these views are found in the Upani$ads. 
2 See for instance Udana (6.4), trans. Woodward 1935,81-83; Ai1guttara Nikaya (ii 41), trans. Woodward, Hare 
1932-36,2,47-48. 
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Most of the 62 wong views are about the self (soul) and the world (universe), and these 
same topics also appear in the list of ten undeclared points. In both lists, the views are 
generally classified into four, which corresponds to the pattern used in a tetralernrna. 
On the one hand, the Buddha claims that all four views on some topic are wrong, and on 
the other hand, when he is asked for his own views on the same issue, he refuses to answer. 
The reason why the Buddha said that all four views are wrong is not because the correct view 
should be expressed in a statement with a fifth logical form. Rather, he claims that all four 
views are wrong because the statements expressing those views are misleading statements. 
When the Buddha was questioned on these same topics he refused to answer, claiming that it 
is a mistake to answer misleading questions. The Buddha makes this clear in his description 
of the four types of question. 
2.1.3 Four types of question 
There are four different ways to answer questions. l These are listed in the Sang'iti Sutta 
(Chanting Together):2 
Four ways of answering questions: the question 
[1] to be answered directly [ekarrlsa-vyakaralJiyo paiiho] , 
[2] requiring an explanation [vihhajja-vyakarmJiyo paiiho] , 
[3] requiring a counter-question [patipuccha-vyakarmJiyo paiiho] , 
[4] to be set aside [thapanlYo paiiha].3 
Each way of answering a question is associated with a corresponding type of question. 
Thus there are four types of question, each type to be answered in its own way. The Buddha 
mentions these four types of question in the Anguttara Nikaya: 
Monks, there are these four ways of answering a question. What four? There is [1] the 
question which requires a categorical reply; [3] that which requires a counter-question; 
[4] that which requires to be waived; and there is [2] the question which requires a 
discriminating reply. These are the four.4 
I See Bharadwaja 1984,304 ff.; repr. Bharadwaja 1990,47 ff. 
2 Sutta 33 of Dlgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3,201-249; Walshe 1987,479-510. 
3 Dfgha Nikiiya (iii 229), trans. Walshe 1987,492. See also Solomon 1976-78, 1, 31. 
4 Anguttara Nikiiya (ii 46), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36,2,53-54. 
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Each type of question must be answered in its own way, and it is considered a mistake 
to answer a question in any other way. The Buddha makes this clear in the Aliguttara Nikiiya: 
Now, monks, if this person, on being asked a question, [1] does not give a categorical 
reply to a question requiring it: [2] does not give a discriminating reply to a question 
requiring it: [3] does not reply by a counter-question to a question requiring it, and [4] 
does not waive a question which should be waived, - then, monks, such a person is 
incompetent to discuss.! 
The four types of question expressed as statements produce four types of statement. The 
four types of statement are not specifically mentioned in the early Buddhist works. Each of 
the four types of answer corresponds to one of the four types of question, and each of the four 
types of question corresponds to one of the four types of statement: 
Answer: 
1. Directly 
2. With an explanation 
3. With a counter-question 





to be waived 





Reading across the top line of these three lists, a competent debater must answer 
directly with 'yes' or 'no' to a question requiring a categorical reply. Such questions 
correspond to straightforward, unambiguous statements. The second type of question requires 
a qualified reply or explanation, and the third type must be clarified with a counter-question. 
The statements in these two cases are vague and ambiguous, respectively. In the fourth case 
(bottom row) a competent debater must not answer the question. Such questions correspond to 
misleading statements. 
If someone should answer a question in an inappropriate manner then that person is not 
competent to discuss or debate. That is, those involved in philosophical discussion must first 
correctly identify the type of question being asked and then respond to it in the appropriate 
manner. It is a mistake to answer a question of one type with a reply for another type. In 
particular, it is a mistake to answer the fourth type of question with any of the first three types 
of reply. Such questions must not be answered. 
A categorical determination, i.e. true or false, can be made about straightforward, 
unambiguous statements. Vague and ambiguous statements are not clearly true or false as 
they stand. Misleading statements cannot be determined as true or false. It is misleading to 
! Ailguttara Nikaya (i ] 97), trans. Woodward, Hare ]932-36, 1, 178-179. 
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say that they are true and it is also misleading to say that they are false. The reason that true 
and false do not apply to misleading statements is because such statements do not have 
legitimate subjects. The statements in the list of ten undeclared points are misleading because 
their subjects are illegitimate. Questions formed from misleading statements must not be 
answered but must be waived or set aside. Therefore, when the Buddha was questioned on the 
ten undeclared points he did not declare them to be true or false. 
Statements require a legitimate subject 
The Buddha explains in a number of places the reasons why it is a mistake to answer 
questions that should be set aside. The Ciilamiilunkya Sutta (Shorter Discourse to 
Malunkyaputta)l describes how Malunkyaputta asks the Buddha to declare his position on the 
ten undeclared points. The Buddha explains to Malunkyaputta that it is a mistake to want to 
determine such things as whether the world is eternal when there are more pressing matters at 
hand. It is like a man shot with a poisonous arrow wanting to know what type of wood and 
feathers had been used to make the arrow when the most pressing need is to remove the 
arrow. This parable suggests that the important thing here is to rectify the problem regarding 
these misleading questions rather than analyse irrelevant details, but it does not explain what 
the problem is with these questions. 
The misleading questions that the Buddha refused to answer are listed in the ten 
undeclared points. These questions have three subjects, i.e. the world, the soul, and the 
Tathagata. These three are also the subjects of most of the 62 wrong views. The subjects in 
the ten undeclared points are: 
1. The world (universe), undeclared points 1-4 
2. The self (soul), undeclared points 5-6 
3. The (soul of the) Tathagata, undeclared points 7-10 
The subjects in the 62 wrong views are: 
1. The world (universe), wrong views 9-12 
2. The self (soul), wrong views 19-62 
3. Both the self and the world, wrong views 1-8 and 17-18 
4. Neither the self nor the world, wrong views 13-16 (held by the eel-wrigglers) 
The world is the subject of undeclared points 1-4 and wrong views 9-12. The self is the 
subject of undeclared points 5-6 and wrong views 19-62. In addition, the self and the world 
together form the subject of wrong views 1-8 and 17-18. Thus the self and the world, 
I Sutta 63 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,2,97-101; Bodhi 1995,533-536. 
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individually and jointly, are the subjects of all the undeclared points except the last four (7-
10) and all the wrong views except 13-16. 
When the world or the self are used as the subject of a statement then that statement is 
said to be misleading, and when a question is formed from such a statement then that question 
must be set aside. The reason for this is that a statement (or question) must have a legitimate 
subject, and the subjects in these cases (the world or the self) do not qualify as legitimate 
subjects. The subject of a statement is the subject as it is understood by the person claiming 
the statement is true or false. Those who claim that these statements are true or false conceive 
of the self and the world incorrectly and thus the statements are considered to be misleading. 
The world and self misconceived 
The Buddha explains how the world is misconceived in the minds of most people in the 
Kacciiyanagotta Sutta, part of the Nidiina SaJ?lyutta (Connected Discourses on Causation): 1 
This world, Kaccana, for the most part depends upon a duality-upon the notion of 
existence and the notion of non-existence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as 
it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of non-existence in regard to the world. 
And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there 
is no notion of existence in regard to the world.2 
The notions of existent and non-existent mentioned here are sometimes referred to using 
the terms eternalism and annihilationism. Both are extreme views about the world and neither 
of them is correct. "For the most part" means "for most people". The Buddha is saying here 
that most people conceive of the world in one of these two incorrect ways. Thus, the Buddha 
considers most people to have an incorrect conception of the subject in questions like 'Is the 
world finite?' and 'Is the world infinite?' If the Buddha replies affirming either of these two 
questions he will affirm in the mind of the person asking the question, a view of the world 
that he (the Buddha) does not hold. It is much the same when the self is the subject. 
In the Abyiikata SaJ?lyutta (Connected Discourses on the Undeclared)3 the wanderer 
Vacchagotta asked the Buddha two questions, 'Is there a self?' and, 'Is there no self?' The 
Buddha did not answer either question but remained silent. 
I The first chapter of Nidanavagga (Book of Causation) in the Sal!lyutta Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids 1917-30,2, 
1-94; and Bodhi 2000, 1, 533-620. 
2 Sar!lyutta Nikiiya (ii 17), trans. Bodhi 2000, 1,544. See also Rhys Davids 1917-30,2, 11-12; and Ka1upahana 
1986, 10-11. 
3 Sutta 44 of SaJ!lyutta Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids 1917-30,4,265-283; Bodhi 2000, 2, 1380-1395. 
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When asked by Ananda why he had not answered Vacchagotta, the Buddha said: 
"If, Ananda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, 'Is there a self?' I had 
answered, 'There is a self,' this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins 
who are eternalists. And if, when I was asked by him, 'Is there no self?' I had answered, 
'There is no self,' this would have been siding with those ascetics and brahmins who are 
annihilati onists." 
"If, Ananda, when I was asked by the wanderer Vacchagotta, 'Is there a self?' I had 
answered, 'There is a self,' would this have been consistent on my part with the arising of 
the knowledge that 'all phenomena are nonself [selfless]?'" 
"No, venerable sir." 
"And if, when I was asked by him, 'Is there no self?' I had answered, 'There is no self,' 
the wanderer Vacchagotta, already confused, would have fallen into even greater 
confusion, thinking, 'It seems that the self I formerly had does not exist now' .,,1 
Here the Buddha explains that the questions 'Is there a self?' and 'Is there no self?" are 
both questions to be waived, and it is therefore a mistake to answer them. That is, it is a 
mistake for the Buddha to affirm that there is a self because that would be understood by 
Vacchagotta as supporting the extreme view of an eternal self, and also contradicts the 
Buddha's view that all phenomena are selfless? It is also a mistake for the Buddha to deny 
that there is a self because that would be understood by Vacchagotta as supporting the 
extreme view of nihilism and imply that the self comes to an end. These questions are 
misleading because if the Buddha were to make an affirmative reply to either question his 
reply would be understood by Vacchagotta as supporting a position on the subject that the 
Buddha does not in fact support. 
True and false do not apply to misleading statements 
The misconceived notions of the world and of the self do not qualify as legitimate 
subjects for questions or statements. Questions about the world and the self asked by those 
who harbour misconceptions about these subjects are misleading questions and should be set 
aside. When the world or the self are the subjects of statements then those statements are 
misleading statements to which true and false do not apply. In the Potthapiida Sutta (About 
Potthapada)3 the Buddha explains to Potthapada that he does not accept any of the ten 
undeclared points as true or false. 
I Sa7!1yutta Nikaya (iv 400-401), trans. Bodhi 2000, 2, 1394. 
2 The Buddha says here that not only do persons lack a self (pali, atta; Sanskrit, atman) or soul, but in fact all 
phenomena lack a self, i.e. lack self-existence. 
3 Sutta 9 of DTgha Nikaya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-]921,1,244-264; Walshe 1987, 159-170. 
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Potthapada asks the Buddha: 
'Well, Lord, if this question of self and perceptions is difficult for one like me - tell me: 
Is the world eternal? Is only this true and the opposite false?' 
'Potthapllda, I have not declared that the world is eternal and that the opposite view is 
false.' 
'Well, Lord, is the world not eternal?' 
'I have not declared that the world is not eternal and that the opposite view is false.'] 
Here the Buddha is saying that he does not accept that each statement is true and its 
opposite false, and for the opposite statement he says the same. That is, true and false do not 
apply to these statements. It is therefore wrong to claim that any of these statements is true, 
and those who do so hold wrong views. 
The eel-wrigglers 
In the list of wrong views there are just four that have neither the self nor the world as 
the subject, i.e. wrong views 13-16. These four views are held by the so-called eel-wrigglers. 
The first three wrong views (13-15) mention only that the eel-wrigglers concerned make 
evasive statements about whether something is good or bad. The subjects are not specified. 
The Buddha says only that when asked about this or that matter, they resort to evasive 
statements. The subjects of these three wrong views are probably perfectly legitimate subjects 
about which the eel-wrigglers should be able to make a categorical determination. Since they 
hold the view that no position can be maintained on these subjects, their views are deemed to 
be wrong. This leaves only wrong view 16. 
The last remaining wrong view (16) is held by an eel-wriggler (possibly Safijaya) who 
makes evasive statements about the following topics: another world (life after death), beings 
born spontaneously (without a cause), and the continued existence ofthe Tathagata after 
death. These topics involve the concept of a self or soul surviving death. This eel-wriggler 
claims that no position can be maintained on these topics, and in particular, claims that no 
position can be maintained on whether or not the Tathagata exists after death. The Tathagata 
is also the subject of the last four undeclared points (7-10), points that the Buddha also 
refused to either affirm or deny. The Buddha explains that his reason for refusing to either 
affirm or deny any of the four forms of the question on the continued existence of the 
Tathagata after death is because the predicate of the question does not apply to the subject of 
J Dlgha Nikiiya (i 188), trans. Walshe 1987, 164. 
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the question. The Buddha mentions this in the Abyakata SaJ?lyutta.1 Here the Buddha tells a 
king that the predicate 'exists after death' does not apply to the subject 'Tathagata:' 
'The Tathiigata exists after death' does not apply; 
'The Tathiigata does not exist after death' does not apply; 
'The Tathiigata both exists and does not exist after death' does not apply; 
'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death' does not apply.2 
There is no explanation why the predicate does not apply to the subject. But in the 
Aggivacchagotta Sutta (To Vacchagotta on Firei the Buddha provides more detail. Here 
Vaccha questions the Buddha (Gotama): 
"When a bhikkhu's mind is liberated thus, Master Gotama, where does he reappear [after 
death]?" 
"The term 'reappears' does not apply, Vaccha." 
"Then he does not reappear, Master Gotama?" 
"The term 'does not reappear' does not apply, Vaccha." 
"Then he both reappears and does not reappear, Master Gotama?" 
"The term 'both reappears and does not reappear' does not apply, Vaccha." 
"Then he neither reappears nor does not reappear, Master Gotama?" 
"The term 'neither reappears nor does not reappear' does not apply, Vaccha.,,4 
All of this leaves Vaccha confused, so the Buddha questions Vaccha: 
"If someone were to ask you, Vaccha: 'When that fire before you was extinguished, to 
which direction did it go: to the east, the west, the north, or the south?' - being asked 
thus, what would you answer?" 
"That does not apply, Master Gotama. The fire burned in dependence on its fuel of grass 
and sticks. When that is used up, if it does not get any more fuel, being without fuel, it is 
reckoned as extinguished." 
"So too, Vaccha, the Tathagata has abandoned that material form by which one 
describing the Tathiigata might describe him; he has cut it off at the root, made it like a 
palm stump, done away with it so that it is no longer subject to future arising ... ,,5 
Vacchagotta conceives of 'Tathagata', the subject in these questions, as a self or soul. 
He thinks of the question 'Does the Tathagata reappear?' as 'Does this soul reappear?' Any 
reply that the Buddha gives will be understood by Vacchagotta to be about the subject as he 
(Vacchagotta) understands it. Rather than answer the questions put to him, the Buddha instead 
1 Sutta 44 of Sa1?lyutta Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids 1917-30,4,265-283; Bodhi 2000, 2, 1380-1395. 
2 Sa1?1yutta Nikiiya (iv 379), trans. Bodhi 2000, 2, 1383. 
3 Sutta 72 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59, 2, 162-167; Bodhi 1995,590-594. 
4 Majjhima Nikiiya (i 486), trans. Bodhi 1995,592. 
5 Majjhima Nikiiya (i 487), trans. Bodhi 1995,593. 
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attempts to explain to Vacchagotta that 'reappear', the predicate in these questions, does not 
in fact apply to the subject as Vacchagotta thinks of it (i.e. as a soul). The Buddha is in effect 
saying to Vacchagotta, 'This soul that you think of as the Tathagata does not exist. This non-
existent soul does not reappear in the next life, nor does it end with this life. Reappearing does 
not apply to a non-existent soul.' If the Buddha were to say 'The Tathagata does reappear' or 
'The Tathagata does not reappear', Vacchagotta would be misled into thinking that the soul 
reappears in the next life, or the soul ceases with this life. Both these answers would be 
understood by Vacchagotta as confirming the existence of the soul. Since the affirmation or 
denial of such questions misleads those who misconceive the subject, such questions should 
be set aside. This is not mere ambiguity where both meanings are correctly understood. Those 
questions can be clarified with a counter-question. These are questions where the subject is 
understood in only one (incorrect) way. 
The statement, 'the Tathagata does reappear' is also misleading in the sense that if this 
statement is said to be true then it is understood by most people to mean that the soul 
continues to existence after death, and if this statement is said to be false then it is understood 
by most people to mean that the soul ceases to exist at death. True and false do not apply to 
this statement because the subject (as understood by most people) does not exist. When the 
predicate 'reappear' does not apply to the subject (the soul of the) 'Tathagata' then it is a 
mistake to claim that the statement is true, and it is also a mistake to claim that the statement 
is false. Thus this statement, just like the question 'Does the Tathagata reappear?' is 
misleading. 
The so-called eel-wriggler (in wrong view 16) refuses to affirm any position on the 
question of the continued existence of the Tathagata after death, just as the Buddha does. But 
unlike the Buddha, the eel-wriggler is unaware that these questions are misleading. The eel-
wriggler simply refuses to maintain any position on these questions out of dullness and 
stupidity. According to the Buddha, it is a mistake to be simply evasive about misleading 
questions. These questions must be recognised as ones where the predicate does not apply to 
the subject and then set aside for that reason. Thus, this eel-wriggler's view to be simply 
evasive on the question of the continued existence of the Tathagata after death is considered 
to be a wrong view. 
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2.1.4 Early Buddhist logic 
The conclusions that can be drawn fonn this discussion on early Buddhist logic are that 
philosophical speculation and debate were common in the days of the Buddha. The lists of 62 
wrong views and the ten undeclared points show that much of this speculation was about this 
world, i.e. the universe, and the next world, i.e. the soul's continued existence after death. The 
explanation found in the early Buddhist works suggests the logical principles that were 
accepted by the early Buddhists. These principles are that statements can have at most, four 
logical fonns. These are where a subject is, is not, both is and is not, or neither is nor is not 
some predicate. Statements can be true or false. If anyone of the statements amongst the four 
logical forms is true then the other three statements are false. Sometimes all four statements 
are said to be wrong, not because all four are false, but because true and false do not apply to 
some statements. There are four types of statement: unambiguous, vague, ambiguous, and 
misleading statements. True and false do not apply to misleading statements. The four types 
of statement correspond to four types of question, those requiring a categorical, 
discriminating, counter-question, and no reply. Each type of question must be answered in the 
appropriate manner. Misleading questions must be recognised for what they are and set aside. 
It is unacceptable to be evasive about misleading questions and wriggle like an eel. 
There is very little information about what logical principles may have been used in 
debate. The early Buddhist works often refer to logicians and debate. These debates were 
probably conducted according to some rules. The existence of such rules is suggested in the 
Anguttara Nikiiya when Buddha describes the person who is competent to debate: 
If this person on being asked a question [1] does not abide by conclusions, whether right 
or wrong, [2] does not abide by an assumption, [3] does not abide by recognised 
arguments, [4] does not abide by usual procedure, - in such case, monks, this person is 
incompetent to discuss. But if he does an these, he is competent to discuss.! 
The word "discuss" here refers to philosophical discussion or debate. The four things 
that must be abided by when debating suggest that some rules applied in a debate, but there is 
no further explanation as to what these four actually involve. 
I Anguttara Nikiiya (i 197), trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36, 1, 179. The same sutta continues with more 
conditions that are required in order to be competent to discuss. 
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2.1.5 The Buddha's attitude to reasoning 
Warning against debate 
The Buddha lived at a time when philosophical discussion was popular and debate 
seems to have developed into a kind of sport. Some debaters apparently enjoyed destroying 
the views of others and debated for no reason other than to defeat an opponent. The Buddha 
describes such debaters in the Mahiislhaniida Sutta (Great Lion's Roar):} 
Kassapa, there are some ascetics and Brahmins who are wise, skilled, practised in 
disputation, splitters of hairs, acute, who walk cleverly along the paths of views.2 
The "splitters of hairs" (vii!avedhiriipii) found here suggests another term, the "hair-
splitters", with which to refer to such debaters. This term "hair-splitter" probably does not 
mean to make overly subtle distinctions, as it would in English. The term should be 
understood as meaning a debater with great skill, one who is like an archer able to hit a mark 
as small as a single hair. The same passage is also found in the Brahmajiila Sutta: 
There are ascetics and Brahmins who are wise, skilful, practiced debaters, like archers 
who can split hairs, who go around destroying others' views with their wisdom? 
This passage is also found in both the Cii!ahatthipadopama Sutta (Shorter Discourse on 
the Simile of the Elephant's Footprint)4 and in the Dhammacetiya Sutta (Monuments to the 
Dhamma):5 
Sir, I have seen here certain learned nobles who were clever, knowledgeable about the 
doctrines of others, as sharp as hair-splitting marksmen; they wander about, as it were, 
demolishing the views of others with their sharp wits. 
This passage continues explaining their tactics used in debate: 
If he is asked like this, he will answer like this, and so we will refute his doctrines in this 
way; and if he is asked like that, he will answer like that, and so we will refute his 
doctrine in that way.6 
I Sutta 8 of Dfgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921, 1,223-240 (Kassapa Sihaniida Surta); 
Walshe 1987, 151-157. 
2 Dfgha Nikiiya (i 162), trans. Walshe 1987, 151-152. 
3 Dfgha Nikiiya (i 26), trans. Walshe 1987, 80. 
4 Sutta 27 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59, 1, 220-230; Bodhi 1995,269-277. 
5 Sutta 89 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,2,301-307; Bodhi 1995,728-733. (See Majjhima Nikiiya 
i 122-123.) 
6 Majjhima Nikiiya (i 176), trans. Bodhi 1995, 269-270. 
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The tactics of the so-called hair-splitters are to devise arguments so that no matter what 
position an opponent takes they have a reason to disprove it. They seem not to be followers of 
any particular school of thought, but are simply skilful at refuting the views of others. Their 
aim is simply victory over an opponent rather than the establishment of truth. The Buddha 
warned against this style of debate in the Sutta Nipata: 1 
Desirous of debate, plunging into the assembly, they reciprocally regard one another as 
fools. Dependent upon other [teachers], they cause a dispute, desirous of praise, saying 
[they are] experts. 
Engaged in discussion in the middle of an assembly, wishing for praise, he becomes 
apprehensive, but [his argument] having been refuted, he becomes dejected. He is angry 
because of the censure [he receives]; he seeks weak points [in others]. 
If the examiners of the questions say that the one's argument is inferior [and] refuted, the 
one whose argument is inferior laments [and] grieves. He wails, 'He has overcome me.' 
These disputes have arisen among [other] ascetics. Among them there is the elation [of 
victory] and the depression [of defeat]. Seeing this too, one should abstain from dispute, 
for there is no other aim but praise and profit. 
Or if, on the other hand, he is praised there, having made a [good] speech about the 
dispute in the middle of the assembly, he laughs on that account and is elated, having 
attained the goal as was his intention. 
That elation will be the cause of distress for him, but [nevertheless] he speaks proudly 
and conceitedly. Seeing this too one should not dispute, for the experts say that purity is 
not [gained] thereby.2 
These "examiners of questions" are probably an examining body or an individual whose 
task it is to decide who has won the debate. This results in praise for the victor and dejection 
for those defeated. The Buddha advised his followers to avoid debating in this way because 
the purpose is simply to gain praise by seeking to belittle others. 
Warning against accepting a view for the wrong reasons 
The Buddha also warned against accepting some view for the wrong reasons, including 
reasoning. In the Aliguttara Nikaya the Buddha advised the KaHimas: 
Do not, Kalamas, arrive at conclusions [1] owing to hearsay, owing to tradition, owing to 
rumour, owing to distinction in canonical works, [2) on account of speculation, on 
account of methodical reasoning, [3) owing to a study of appearances, after 
contemplation and acquiescing to an opinion, because of plausibility, nor by thinking "the 
ascetic is our revered teacher.,,3 
1 Sutta Nipiita (4.8), trans. Hare 1945,123-124; Norman 1992,96-97. 
2 Sutta Nipiita (825-830), trans. Norman 1992, 96. 
3 Anguttara Nikiiya (i 188), trans. Hayes 1988, 49. 
47 
Chapter two: The earliest records 
There are three groups of reasons mentioned here. The Buddha first warns against being 
misled by those who merely repeat hearsay, tradition, rumour or canonical works. Such 
people do not have first-hand knowledge about what they proclaim, but simply repeat what 
others have told them. The Buddha explains this in the Subha Sutta (To Subha): 1 
And the ancient brahmin seers, the creators of the hymns, the composers of the hymns ... 
even these ancient brahmin seers did not say thus: 'We declare the result of these five 
things having realised it ourselves with direct knowledge.' 2 
A similar passage occurs in the Tevijja Sutta (Threefold Knowledge).3 The Buddha's 
advice is to not rely on what others repeat, but rather to rely on one's own direct knowledge. 
In the second group of reasons the Buddha warns against being misled by those who argue for 
some theory since their reasoning can be wrong. He explains to Sandaka in the Sandaka 
Sutta4 that some teach their views (dhamma) by reasoning, but this can be unreliable: 
Again, Sandaka, here a certain teacher is a reasoner, an inquirer. He teaches a Dhamma 
hammered out by reasoning, following a line of inquiry as it occurs to him. But when a 
teacher is a reasoner, an inquirer, some is well reasoned and some is wrongly reasoned, 
some is true and some is otherwise.5 
The Buddha's advice here is not to reject all reasoning, but rather not to rely on the 
reasoning of others. 
The last group of wrong reasons to accept some view includes mere assumption and 
opinion, or simply out of respect for some teacher. All these reasons are unreliable. In the 
Mahiita7Jhiisankhya Sutta (Greater Discourse on the Destruction of Craving),6 the Buddha 
specifically mentions respect for some teacher: 
"Bhikkhus, knowing and seeing in this way, would you speak thus: 
'The Teacher is respected by us. We speak as we do out of respect for the teacher'?" 
"No, venerable sir." 
"Knowing and seeing in this way, would you speak thus: 
'The Recluse says this, and so do [other] recluses, but we do not speak thus'?" 
"No, venerable sir." 
"Knowing and seeing in this way, would you acknowledge another teacher?" 
I Sutta 99 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,2,386-398; Bodhi 1995, 808-818. 
2 Majjhima Nikiiya (ii 200), trans. Bodhi 1995, 811. 
3 Sutta 13 of Dfgha Nikaya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921, 1,300-320; Walshe 1987, 187-195. 
(See Dlgha Nikiiya i 238-239.) 
4 Sutta 76 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59, 2, 192-203; Bodhi 1995,618-628. 
5 Majjhima Nikiiya (i 520), trans. Bodhi 1995,624-625. 
6 Sutta 38 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,1,311-324; Bodhi 1995,349-361. 
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"No, venerable sir." 
"Knowing and seeing in this way, would you return to the observances, tumultuous 
debates, and auspicious signs of ordinary recluses and brahmins, taking them as the core 
[of the holy life]?" 
"No, venerable sir." 
"Do you speak only of what you have known, seen, and understood for yourselves?" 
"Yes, venerable sir.,,1 
The Buddha's advice here is to rely on one's own understanding and not to accept 
things simply out of respect for some teacher. 
The Buddha on reasoning 
The Buddha's attitude to reasoning is suggested by his advice here. He does not 
completely reject logical reasoning, but he does warn against debating in the assemblies 
trying to belittle others just to gain praise. He places great emphasis on developing one's own 
understanding rather than relying on tradition, respect for some teacher, or the reasoning of 
others. Developing one's own understanding would involve reasoning, amongst other things, 
and the logical principles involved in this reasoning are presumably similar to those described 
above. 
2.2 Origin of early Indian logic 
2.2.1 Reasoning in India before the Buddha 
There are no works dating from the Buddha's time which contain formulations of 
logical principles. Ancient Indians during the time of the Buddha were no doubt familiar with 
disciplines governed by rules. The world's earliest extant grammar, Pa1).ini's A~tiidhyiiYl 
(Eight Chapters), abstracts and formulates rules for the Sanskrit language with a degree of 
sophistication that is far in advance of any other culture in this early time. pa1).ini is believed 
to have lived around the time of the Buddha or perhaps shortly after,2 but his work shows a 
degree of development that suggests that grammar was not a new discipline in Pa1).ini' s day. If 
the rules formulated for grammar are any guide as to how ancient Indians may have 
formulated rules for logic, then there may well have been works containing formulations of 
logical principles. But if there were such works, nothing of them survives today. 
I Majjhima Nikaya (i 265), trans. Bodhi 1995,357-358. 
2 Agrawala 195]. 
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Philosophical speculation and debate existed in India long before the time of the 
Buddha. Evidence for this can be found in the Upani~ads. The oldest of these works belongs 
to the eighth and seventh centuries Be,l i.e. they are pre-Buddhist. The Upani~ads follow the 
tradition of the Vedas, an ancient body of literature compiled between 2000 and 1000 Be. 
Discussion or debate (viikoviikya) is one of the academic disciplines listed in the Chiindogya 
Upani~ad.2 Accounts in the BrhadiirmJyaka Upani~ad describe debates that took place at 
King Janaka's court. On one occasion King Janaka offered a thousand cows with gold 
attached to their horns as a prize to be decided by debate. Yajfiavalkya claimed this prize. On 
another occasion Yajfiavalkya went to King J anaka and declared he had come for animals and 
for subtle questions, i.e. to debate. Yajiiavalkya then proceeded to instruct the king? 
Some debates found in the BrhadiirmJyaka Upani~ad warn the person asking questions 
not to continue asking beyond a certain point or their head would fall off (or split apart).4 Two 
the early Buddhist works, the Ambattha Sutta (About Ambattha)5 and the Culasaccaka Sutta 
(Shorter Discourse to Saccaka),6 mention similar warnings. A person answering questions 
must reply by the third time a question is asked or their head would split apart.7 The similarity 
between these warnings suggests a common tradition. The early Buddhists no doubt adopted 
the existing tradition of Indian debate. Witzel argues that such references point to the early 
beginnings of the Indian tradition of debate which may have originated with rituals recorded 
in the Vedas. 8 Jayatilleke also traces the origins of Indian debate to the Vedas: 
The debate in the Indian context seems to have its historical origins in the Vedic 
institution of the brahmodya (or brahmavadya). A brief glance at the history of the 
brahmodya seems profitable in so far as it gives a picture of the origin and development 
of the debate. The earliest brahmodyas are riddles or religious charades which are to be 
found in the "Rgveda (1.164,8.29) or the Atharvaveda (9.9,10). They frequently occur in 
the Brahmal)as.9 
I Radhakrishnan, Moore, 1957, 37. 
2 Chiindogya Upani:;ad, trans. Swahananda 1956, (7.1.2) 481-482, (7.2.1) 488-489 and (7.7.1) 505. 
3 Brhadiirm:zyaka Upani:;ad, trans. Madhavananda 1934, (3.1.1-10) 285-298, and (4.1.1) 398. 
4 Brhadiirm:zyaka Upani:;ad, trans. Madhavananda 1934, (3.6.1) 342-343, and (3.9.26) 387-388. 
5 Sutta 3 of Dfgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,1, 108-136; Walshe 1987, 111-124. (See 
Dlgha Nikiiya i 95.) 
6 Sutta 35 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,1,280-291; Bodhi 1995,322-331. (See Majjhima Nikiiya 
i 231.) 
7 See also head-splitting as a threat in Sutta Nipiita (983, 987-990), the Buddha's reply (1025-1026), trans. 
Norman 1992,112-113,115. 
8 Witzel 1987. See also McEviIley 2002, 408-409. 
9 Jayatil1eke 1963,43. See also 45 and 231. 
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The tradition of philosophical debate that the Buddha inherited definitely pre-dates the 
arrival of the Greeks in India and it most likely began even before Greek philosophy began. 
Reasons have been put forward to argue for Greek influence in the development of Indian 
logic in general, and Buddhist logic in particular, but any claim that the Indian tradition of 
philosophical debate originally came from Greece can be rejected on purely chronological 
grounds. Indian and Greek philosophical speculation were probably quite independent of each 
other prior to Alexander's visit (described below). Any influence that may have travelled 
from Greece to India would be after the Indian tradition of debate had been established, not 
before. The evidence found in the eady Upani:jads indicates that a tradition of debate existed 
in India even before Thales of Miletus (sixth century Be). Thales is known as the first Greek 
philosopher. He lived in Miletus, an Ionian Greek city on the coast of Asia Minor, a century 
or two after the earliest Upani:jads were compiled.1 
Greek know ledge of India and Indian philosophical traditions began with Alexander's 
historic visit to India in the fourth century Be. Before this time, the Greeks knew very little 
about India. From Alexander's visit onwards the Greeks maintained a close association with 
India which lasted for some 500 years. 
2.2.2 The arrival of the Greeks in India 
The arrival of the Greeks in India can be accurately dated using Greek records. Before 
this time there would have been little opportunity for the exchange of ideas between Greece 
and India, but after this time there was ample opportunity. In fact there is some evidence to 
support the view that the tetralemma, so often found in Buddhist works, may have influenced 
the early Greek sceptics. 
Alexander the Great 
Alexander the Great (356-323 Be) became king of Macedonia in 336 Be at the age of 
20 when his father Philip was assassinated. Two years later he set out with an army of 
Macedonians and Greeks to conquer the Persian Empire. Alexander successfully defeated the 
Achaemenid dynasty and marched eastward across Asia taking control of all their territories. 
Once he had control of Bactria (northern Afghanistan), Alexander turned his attention to 
India. In early 326 Be Alexander marched from the Kabul valley into north-western India 
I Warder 1956,54, says (following Ruben) that first true philosopher was Uddalaka, who was perhaps 50 years 
older than Thales, the first Greek philosopher. 
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with a large number of reinforcements. His first stop was in Taxila (Sanskrit: Tak~asila), a 
famous centre of learning in ancient India. It is situated about 20 miles northwest of present-
day Rawalpindi (northern Pakistan). The king of Taxila joined Alexander to fight against the 
Indian king Porus (Poros). They defeated Porus at the Jhelum river, one of the five tributaries 
of the Indus. Alexander gave orders for a fleet of ships to be built there and then continued his 
conquest eastward. When he reached the Beas river, an eastern tributary of the Indus, his 
soldiers refused to go any further, insisting that they had conquered the entire Persian Empire. 
They returned to the Jhelum river and then sailed down the Jhelum into the Indus river and to 
the coast. They conquered the lands to the east and west of the Indus until they reached the 
ocean. Alexander left India late in 325 Be. 
Alexander was in India for less than two years during which time he gained control of 
north-western India - roughly present-day Pakistan and the Punjab. Alexander's army was 
accompanied by a large number of people including the wives and families of soldiers, 
potential settlers, and scholars like philosophers and historians. Alexander founded cities as 
he went which became the new homes for settlers. He built docks on the rivers to facilitate 
trading, presumably intending to unify his vast empire not only politically but also 
commercially. The Indian territories were divided into administrative areas some with 
European governors and some with Indian. These were protected by military garrisons which 
included Macedonian and Greek soldiers. Although Alexander was in India for only a short 
time, he left behind many settlers living in newly founded cities protected by garrisons. 
The 9ymnosophists 
The philosophical environment that the Greeks found when they entered India was 
probably similar to the one described in the early Buddhist works. Those who engaged in 
philosophical speculation were called gymnosophists by the Greeks. In Taxila, Alexander sent 
Onesikritos, a follower of Diogenes the Cynic, to question two such gymnosophists and make 
a report on their doctrines. Onesikritos recorded his conversations with them in his history of 
Alexander, now preserved in fragments in the writings of other authors. l 
The gymnosophists are described as going naked and enduring extreme physical 
hardship. The younger of the two gymnosophists, Kalanos (Calanos or Sphines), eventually 
left India with Alexander's party only to later burn himself to death. The older gymnosophist 
I Plutarch's Lives, 2, 521. 
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was called Dandamis (Mandanes). According to Plutarch's (c.45-c.120 AD) Life of 
Alexander, Alexander's passion for learning was demonstrated by his "veneration of 
Anaxarchus, ." and his particular care and esteem of Dandamis and Calanus."l McCrindle has 
collected together all the passages in the classics concerning Kalanos.2 These two 
gymnosophists are unlikely to be Buddhists and may be J ainas. 
Plutarch describes Alexander's interview with some other Indian gymnosophists.3 
These gymnosophists had persuaded an Indian king to revolt against Alexander, and the 
Greeks captured ten of them. Since they were "reputed to be extremely ready and succinct in 
their answers" Alexander asked them difficult questions declaring he would put to death first 
the one who gave the worst answer. Alexander seemed to take delight in such encounters 
perhaps because of his training as a youth under Aristotle. 
Aristotle's nephew Callisthenes (Kallisthenes) who had been brought up and educated 
by Aristotle also accompanied Alexander on his campaign in India. Callisthenes was 
implicated in a plot to assassinate Alexander and was either hanged or died in captivity. 
Plutarch (referring to Chares) says that Callisthenes was kept in chains for seven months and 
died about the time Alexander was wounded in India,4 i.e. when Alexander's army was 
travelling down the Indus to the coast. Other philosophers of note who accompanied 
Alexander to India are Anaxarchus (the Democritean) and his pupil Pyrrho of Elis. 
Anaxarchus (c.380-c.330 BC) was renowned for his sharp tongue and feuded with 
Callisthenes during their time with Alexander. 5 On his return journey from India, Anaxarchus 
was thrown into a mortar and pounded to death with pestles by his old enemy the Cypriot 
tyrant Nicocreon.6 Pyrrho returned safely to Greece from his trip to India. 
I Plutarch's Lives, 2, 469. 
2 McCrindle 1893, 386-392. 
3 Plutarch's Lives, 2, 520-521. 
4 Plutarch's Lives, 2,512-513. See also McCrindle 1893, 392. 
5 Plutarch's Lives, 2, 510. 
6 Diogenes Laertius, 2,471-473. 
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2.2.3 The tetralemma in Greece 
Pyrrho influenced by Indians 
Pyrrho (c.365-c.275 BC) gathered a following in Elis after his return from India. 
Diogenes Laertius (c. early 3rd century AD) describes Pyrrho in his Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers as having been influenced by Indians during his trip to India with Anaxarchus: 
According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter; then he studied under 
Stilpo's son Bryson: thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers. Afterwards he 
joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even 
forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a 
most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and 
suspension of judgment. I 
Diogenes Laertius also refers to a work by Antigonus, a younger contemporary of Pyrrho: 
This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him. At first he was a 
poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the 
gymnasium at Blis. He would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely 
showing himself to his relatives; this he did because he had heard an Indian reproach 
Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he 
himself danced attendance on kings in their court.2 
Burnet commenting on this passage says: "We see that those who knew Pyrrho well 
described him as a sort of Buddhist arhat, and that is doubtless how we should regard him.,,3 
Pyrrho left no written works. He is known through his followers, especially Timon. 
Timon (c.322-c.232 BC) eulogized Pyrrho in his works. A passage from a work by 
Aristoc1es of Messene (late first century BC) preserved in Eusebius of Caesarea' s (c.264-
c.339 AD) Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation of the Gospel) describes Pyrrho's views: 
There have been some among the ancients, too, who have issued this utterance, whom 
Aristotle has argued against. Pyrrho of Blis was also a powerful advocate of such a 
position. He himself has left nothing in writing; his pupil Timon, however, ... saying 
about each single thing that it no more [1] is than [2] is not or [3] both is and is not or [4] 
neither is nor is not.4 
I Diogenes Lael1ius (IX 61), trans. Hicks 1925,2,475. 
2 Diogenes Laertius (IX 62-63), trans. Hicks 1925,2,475-477. 
3 Burnet 1920, 229. 
4 Praeparatio Evangeiica (XIV 18.1-3), trans. Bett 1994, 140. See also De Lacy 1958,69; Long, Sedley 1987, 1, 
14-15; and McEvilley 2002, 453. 
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These four bear a striking resemblance to the fourfold scheme of predication or 
tetralemma (also called the quadrilemma) so often used in the early Buddhist works. 1 Flintoff 
claims that: 
... here we have in a passage that goes perhaps as close to Pyrrho as anything that we 
have, the quadrilemma, a mode of thinking hitherto without precedent in Greek 
philosophical or indeed any other thinking. '" But interestingly just at this point where he 
seems to be most original in relation to Greek thought, he is quite commonplace as 
. measured by Indian.2 
The "ancients ... whom Aristotle has argued against" (mentioned in the Praeparatio 
Evangelica) may refer to Aristotle's unnamed opponents in his Metaphysics. Aristotle says: 
For he says neither [1] 'yes' nor [2] 'no'; but [3] 'yes and no'; and again he denies both of 
these and says [4] 'neither yes nor no'? 
This unnamed opponent is probably not Pyrrho for chronological reasons.4 If Pyrrho left 
India with Alexander in 325 Be and Aristotle died three years later in 322 Be, then this 
leaves very little time for Pyrrho to return to Greece and disseminate the new ideas he picked 
up in India and for them to appear in the Metaphysics. It is more likely that there were Greeks 
before Pyrrho who argued in the way objected to by Aristotle in the Metaphysics. 
Pyrrho's views died out after Timon's death (c.232 Be) only to be revived by 
Aenesidemus (lst century Be) and later championed by Sextus Empiricus (fl. c.200 AD). 
Sextus Empiricus also adopts the four logical forms of statements. Frenkian identifies 14 
instances where Sextus employs them and quotes the following four examples:5 
Moreover, the "something" which is, they declare, the highest genus of all, is either [1] 
true or [2] false or [4] neither false nor true or [3] both false and true.6 
For this is a genus which stands above all others and is itself subordinate to no other. 
This, then, is either [1] true or [2] false or at once [3] both true and false or [4] neither 
true nor false. 7 
Thus presentation, in the doctrine of the Stoics, is hard to define. In presentations, also, 
there are many and various distinctions, of which it will be enough to record the 
I Bett 1994, 160. 
2 Flintoff 1980, 92-93. 
3 Metaphysics (IV 4, lO08a 30-35), trans. McKeon 1941,742. See also Bett 1994, 160. 
4 McEviIJey 2002, 496 says: "perhaps Pyrrho". 
5 Frenkian 1957, 119. 
6 Outlines of Pyrrhonism (II 86), trans. Bury 1933, 207. 
7 Against the Logicians (II 32), trans. Bury 1935,255. 
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following. Some of them are [1] probable, some [2] improbable, some at once [3] both 
probable and improbable, some [4] neither probable nor improbable. 
And of the probable presentations some are [1] true, some [2] false, some [3] both true 
and false, some [4] neither true nor false. 1 
The early Buddhist works discuss only true and false. That is, straightforward, 
unambiguous statements are only either true or false. True and false are said to not apply to 
misleading statements and consequently there is no discussion of them as being true, false, or 
any combination of these. If there is an element of Buddhist or Indian influence here it is in 
the use of the fourfold scheme of predication (tetralemma), not in any multivalued logic. 
Frenkian points out that the last two of the four examples quoted here were given by 
Sextus as sayings of the Stoics. The ideas in these two passages, he says, "belong to the 
Stoics, but the form of the quadrilemma has nothing to do with Stoic philosophy.,,2 McEvilley 
challenges this view claiming that the Stoics discussed statements that are both true and false. 
He says: "skeptical mottoes verging on the fourfold negation had been common in Greece for 
centuries", but he is unable to provide one clear example where all four forms of predication 
(his fourfold negation) apply to a single subject in any Stoic source.3 Frenkian argues that this 
points to the undoubted Indian origin of the quadrilemma or tetralemma,4 and Flintoff agrees.5 
Indian origin of Greek scepticism 
Sextus Empiricus is the major surviving source for Greek scepticism. The Indian eel-
wrigglers, especially Safijaya, are also referred to as sceptics by modern commentators.6 
Opinion is divided over whether or not this fourfold scheme of predication was originally 
developed by sceptics like Safijaya. According to Raju, it was Safijaya who first formulated 
what he calls the four-cornered negation? Keith also claims that Safijaya seems to have been 
the first to formulate the four possibilities of existence, non-existence, both, and neither, and 
the Buddha makes lavish use of this device. 8 In contrast to these opinions, J ayatilleke claims 
that "the credit for adopting this scheme should not go to Safijaya alone, but should be shared 
1 Against the Logicians (I 24]-244), trans. Bury ]935,131. 
2 Frenkian ] 957, 123. 
3 McEvilIey 2002, 496-497. 
4 Frenkian ]957, 12]. 
5 Flintoff 1980,92-93. 
6 Basham ]951,17, claims Safijaya is not a sceptic but an agnostic. See also Keith 1923,303. 
7 Raju 1954, 694. 
8 Keith 1923,303. 
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by all these Sceptical schools of thought." He continues: "It also appears to be equally 
plausible that it was the Buddhists who were the first to innovate and adopt this fourfold 
scheme." Jayatilleke rejects Keith's claim saying: "We cannot therefore agree with Keith, 
when he dogmatically gives the credit to Safijaya for being the 'first to formulate the four 
possibilities', when we know nothing about Safijaya apart from the accounts we get of him in 
the Buddhist texts.,,1 For McEvilley, "it is impossible to separate the wording of the Buddhist 
authors from that of the Skeptic being reported on.,,2 The original author of this fourfold 
scheme of predication remains unclear, but it is certainly a very common feature of the early 
Buddhist works and was subsequently used by many Buddhist logicians. 
If the views of Safijaya or the Buddha did influence Pyrrho when he was in India then 
this suggests that Greek scepticism may well have been influenced by Indian scepticism. 
Many modern scholars hold the view that Pyrrho was influenced by Indian scepticism. 
Patrick, for instance, says: 
We have in Pyrrho's teachings the earliest well attested instance of Indian influence on 
Greek philosophy. This influence was a consequence ofPyrrho's residence in India in the 
retinue of Alexander the Great, as a member of the royal court, where we are told that he 
associated with Gyrnnosophists and Magi. 3 
But Patrick concludes: 
In a final estimate, however, of the influence of Buddhism on Pyrrhonism, we must 
characterize it as comparatively slight. Traces of oriental influence may be conspicuous in 
Pyrrhonism, but they are traces, not essentials. Pyrrho's previous study and natural 
disposition had prepared him to assimilate something of what he learned of oriental 
philosophy, but the influence of Buddhism upon him was largely in method rather than in 
the essentials of belief. 4 
Woodcock describes Pyrrho's philosophy as "nearer in essentials, and even in details, to 
doctrines current in India among Jain and Buddhist teachers than any Greek system of thought 
before the neo-Plantonists. The Pyrrhonian philosophy may well have been the most 
significant immediate gift that Alexander's expedition brought to Greece from India."s Conze, 
following Robin and others, says that "the sceptic philosophy was something quite new to 
Greece, and that none of the preceding indigenous Greek developments led up to it. One can 
I Jayatilleke 1963, 138. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 495; see also 412. 
3 Patrick 1929,57; see also Patrick ]931,535. 
4 Patrick ]929,63-64. 
5 Woodcock 1966,26-27. 
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therefore infer with some probability that Pyrrhon acquired his views in India or Iran".1 Barua 
agrees saying: "If it be admitted that Pyrrho of Elis had imbibed his sceptical bias from an 
Indian school of sceptics, one can at once see that the sceptical propaganda such as those of 
Saiijaya were the antecedents of critical philosophies alike in India and in Europe.,,2 
McEvilley, on the other hand, disagrees with these views. He claims, "Pyrrho must have 
imbibed the main attitudes of his philosophy from Greek teachers, before the visit to India.,,3 
His arguments rest on the point that Pyrrho could have gathered various elements together 
from Greek sources as early as Democritus (middle 5th - 4th century Be) and combined these 
to form the tetralemma. According to McEvilley: 
. .. it is possible that Indian influence could have intruded somewhere in the long 
evolution of this formula from Democritus to Pyrrho. But clearly there is no need to 
I . 4 postu ate It. 
And, similarly he says: 
... we cannot rule out the possibility that Pyrrhon brought back some bits or pieces of 
thought or formulation which seemed useful in terms of attitudes he already held. An 
obvious candidate is the fourfold negation as preserved by Pyrrhon and Sextus.5 
A case for influence 
The fourfold scheme of predication is explicitly formulated and frequently found in the 
early Buddhist works. The so-called eel-wrigglers who refuse to accept or deny any of these 
four statements pre-date Pyrrho and the ancients that Aristotle argues against. Also, the use of 
these four in Buddhist works is very common whereas by contrast they are not so commonly 
found in Greek works. Pyrrho's refusal to affirm any of these four fits well with views that he 
would have found in India. Other Greeks may have formulated these four and also denied all 
four independent of Pyrrho, and Pyrrho could even have been aware of this. But the use 
Pyrrho made of the fourfold scheme of predication and the denial of all four by Sextus 
corresponds very closely to views found in ancient Indian philosophy. 
1 Conze 1951, 141. See also Reale 1985,3,310-312. 
2 Barua 1921,331-332. 
3 McEvi1ley 2002,492. See also McEvilley 1982, 19. 
4 McEvi1ley 2002,497. 
5 McEvi1ley 1982,22-23. 
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Other ideas that influenced Pyrrho's lifestyle could also have corne from India, I but this 
is not to say that all of Pyrrho' s ideas without exception are exclusively Indian, only that 
some of them may be and the tetralemrna is one such possibility. 
This position depends on two points: firstly the early Buddhist works must contain 
frequent and explicit formulations of the tetralemrna, which is easily established. The second 
point is that the contents of the early Buddhist works must belong to a period earlier than 
Pyrrho's visit to India, which is not so easily established. The problem is that the early 
Buddhist works now found in the various versions of the Buddhist Canon were not written 
down until well after Pyrrho' s visit. This leaves open the possibility that the tetralemma was 
first developed in Greece and then introduced into India by the Greeks and subsequently 
incorporated into these early Buddhist works purporting to be from an earlier time in India. 
To support this argument, there is the fact that the Buddha mentions the Greeks when he 
debates with AssaHiyana about the caste system in the Assaliiyana Sutta (To AssaHiyana):2 
What do you think, AssaHiyana? Have you heard that in Yona and Kamboja and in other 
outland countries there are only two castes, masters and slaves, and that masters become 
slaves and slaves masters?3 
The Buddha mentions Y ona and Kamboja as examples of countries that do not have 
castes that are determined by birth. Horner notes that "Y on a" is probably the Pali equivalent 
for Ionia or Bactria, and the Ionians are the Bactrian Greeks.4 Alexander conquered Bactria 
just before he invaded India in 326 BC, which is after the Buddha had died. This 
chronological problem could be explained away by arguing that the Buddha's dates are too 
early, or Alexander's dates too late, or that there were Greeks in Bactria during the Buddha's 
lifetime. The dates are difficult to change, but the third argument is more easily attempted. 
It appears that Greeks visited India before Alexander's historic visit in 326-325 BC. 
Herodotus (484-424 BC) has preserved in his History a passage from a work by Skylax of 
Caryanda. Skylax was the first to write about India in Greek. His work now exists only in 
fragments, and one reference is preserved in Aristotle's Politica.5 Herodotus quotes Skylax on 
his voyage down the Indus. Darius the king of Persia (522-486 BC) sent Skylax to explore the 
I See Frenkian 1957, Flintoff 1980. 
2 Sutta 93 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,2,340-349; Bodhi 1995,763-770. 
3 Majjhima Nikiiya (ii 149), trans. Bodhi 1995,764-765. 
4 Horner 1954-59,2,341 note 4. See also Bodhi 1995, 1296 note 872. 
5 Smith, Ross eds 1921 (VII 14, 1332b 20-25). For other fragments see Arora 1996, 111-112. 
59 
Chapter two: The earliest records 
Indus river down to its mouth around 518-515 Be. The passage ends: "After this voyage was 
completed, Darius conquered the Indians, and made use of the sea in those parts".1 
Darius annexed the Indus valley and made it the twentieth satrapy of the Persian 
Empire. Greeks were involved in the administration of the Persian Empire and this brought 
northwest India into contact with Greeks. The earliest surviving Sanskrit grammar, Pat;tini's 
A#iidhyiiy'iwhich dates from about 350 Be, also mentions the Greeks. It contains a 
grammatical rule (IV 119) involving the word Yavana. "Yavana" or "Y ona" is derived from 
the old Persian "Yauna" meaning the Ionian Greeks of Asia Minor, but it was used in India 
(during this period) simply to mean any Greek. The grammatical reference to the word 
Y avana also suggests that Greeks were known in India when northwest India was under 
Persian rule? Pat;tini was a native of northwest India and his commentator Katyayana says that 
the feminine form Yavaniin'i is used for instance in Yavaniin'ilipi, the Greek script. The Greek 
script was possibly known through Greek legends on coins.3 This suggests that Greeks were 
known in India during the Buddha's lifetime and hence the reference to Greeks in the 
Assaliiyana Sutta.4 
Although the Greeks may well have been known in India before Alexander's visit, there 
is still the problem that Pyrrho or other Greeks who came with Alexander could have 
introduced the tetralemma into India. It could then have found its way into the early Buddhist 
works appearing to be something which had occurred in India at a much earlier time. There is 
no evidence that this actually happened. In fact there is evidence that it did not happen. There 
is some question as to whether all of the events described in the early Buddhist works are 
actual historical events. Hayes, for example, says that the early Buddhist works are "a large 
literary creation, which is fictional but based loosely on historical events."s But there is little 
doubt about the tetralemma. It is not limited to a few obscure references as it is in Greek 
works. In fact, given the frequency, clarity and uniformity of its use in the early Buddhist 
works, given that it is the defining characteristic of the ancient eel-wrigglers so prominently 
1 Herodotus (IV 44), trans. Rawlinson 1910,320-321. 
2 Rapson 1922,540. 
3 Agrawala notes that Keith reported, "There is also a striking piece of evidence that Greek writing was known in 
North India before Alexander's time: coins have been found with Greek inscription of pre-Alexandrian date." 
Quoted by Buhler in his Indian Palaeograp!Jy, p. 27. See Agrawala 1951, 278. 
4 See also Dasgupta 1935. 
5 Hayes 1988,42. 
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discussed in these works, and given that it was the standard way to present the logical 
alternatives in philosophical discussion, it is difficult to imagine how the tetralemma could 
have been unknown in the Buddha's time and only introduced later from Greece. The early 
Buddhist works do not refer to Greece or Greeks in connection with the eel-wrigglers or any 
philosophical speculation. In fact the Greeks that carne with Alexander remained in control of 
northwest India for only a few short years. 
The Buddha is believed to have lived well before Alexander's historic visit in 326-325 
Be and thus there is little possibility of any Greek influence during this early period of Indian 
history. Also, the Indian tradition of philosophical debate that the Buddha inherited began 
well before Greek philosophy and it is thus quite independent of any Greek influence. The 
period after Alexander's visit provides greater opportunity for Greeks to influence Buddhist 
logic. This is examined in the following chapter. 
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This chapter examines some early examples of Buddhist logic and what influence, if 
any, the Greeks may have had in its development. Four literary sources are used for this 
examination. These are the Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy), the Vijiianakaya 
(Consciousness Group), the Yamaka (Pairs), and the Milindapafiha (Milinda's Questions). 
These works cover the period from after Alexander's visit in the fourth century BC down to 
the first century Be. Greeks were present in India during these times and some Geeks became 
Buddhists, thus the opportunity for the Greeks to influence Buddhist logic certainly existed 
during this time. 
3.1 Historical background 
3.1.1 Greek impressions of India 
Alexander left India late in 325 BC within two years of entering the country. He 
appointed governors, including Philip, supported by military forces to govern the conquered 
regions of India. The Greeks who remained in India did not like it there and within a few 
months of Alexander's departure, the Greek forces under Philip mutinied and Philip was 
killed. 1 Alexander died of fever in Babylon in June 323 BC less than two years after leaving 
India. The turmoil that followed Alexander's death provided the opportunity for the Indian 
forces to drive the Greeks back across the Indus. Within two years of Alexander's death, 
Greek power east of the Indus had been extinguished. The Indian forces were led by an Indian 
king the Greeks called Sandracottos. 
Sandracottos was none other than Candragupta. He is credited with driving the Greeks 
out of India and founding the Maurya dynasty. He was probably born in the Punjab and may 
even have met Alexander in India. Soon after Alexander's death, Candragupta led an uprising 
that expelled the remaining Greek forces and thereby made Candragupta sovereign of the 
Punjab and the Indus valley. He next marched against Magadha (Central India) and took the 
capital Pataliputra (modern Patna). Candragupta then had control over the regions of both the 
Indus and the Ganges. 
I Rapson 1922, 386. 
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Meanwhile, Seleucus Nikator finally gained control of Alexander's dominions in Asia. 
In 305 or 304 BC, Seleucus attempted to resume Alexander's campaign in India. He crossed 
the Indus but it is unclear whether Candragupta and Seleucus actually met in battle. A treaty 
was agreed to, where Seleucus ceded to Candragupta the regions west of the Indus to the 
southern slopes of the Hindu Kush (northern Afghanistan). These regions included Kabul and 
Kandahar. In return Candragupta presented Seleucus with 500 elephants. A matrimonial 
alliance may have formed part of the treaty. If it did then a daughter or female relative of 
Seleucus would have been given in marriage to Candragupta or one of his sons. Seleucus then 
withdrew to the regions west of the Hindu Kush and Candragupta controlled the lands from 
the east of the Hindu Kush right across northern India. Seleucus also sent Megasthenes as his 
ambassador to Candragupta's capital. 
Megasthenes is believed to have visited Candragupta's capital at Pataliputra a number 
of times from about 302 to 296 Be. He produced a work entitled the Indika which became the 
main source of information on India for classical writers. It now survives only in fragments 
scattered amongst the works of other authors. McCrindle has gathered the surviving fragments 
together. Megasthenes discuses Indian philosophy among many other subjects in his Indika. A 
fragment preserved in Clement of Alexandria's (150-215 AD) Stromateis (Miscellany) says: 
That the Jewish race is by far the oldest of all these, and that their philosophy, which has 
been committed to writing, preceded the philosophy of the Greeks, Philo the Pythagorean 
shows by many arguments, as does also Aristoboulos the Peripatetic, and many others 
whose names I need not waste time in enumerating. Megasthenes, the author of a work 
On India, who lived with Seleukos Nikator, writes most clearly on this point, and his 
words are these:- "All that has been said regarding nature by the ancients is asserted also 
by philosophers out of Greece, on the one part in India by the Brachmanes, and on the 
other in Syria by the people called the Jews."] 
This same passage is also found in the works of two other authors which McCrindle 
notes.2 Clement appears to understand Megasthenes as supporting his view that Jewish and 
Indian philosophy are older than Greek philosophy. Clement continues: 
Philosophy, then, with all its blessed advantages to man, flourished long ago among the 
barbarians, diffusing its light among the Gentiles, and eventually penetrated into Greece. 
Its hierophants were the prophets among the Egyptians, ... and among the Indians the 
Gymnophists, and other philosophers of barbarous nations.3 
I Fragment XLII. McCrindle 1877b, 244. Reprinted in McCrindle 1877 a, 103. 
2 Fragments XLII.B and XLII.C. See McCrindle 1877b, 244. Reprinted in McCrindle 1877 a, 104. 
3 Fragment XLIII. McCrind1e 1877b, 244. Reprinted in McCrindle 1877 a, 104. 
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The Geography of Strabo (c.63 BC-19 AD) contains some of what Megasthenes says 
about Indian philosophers: 
Megasthenes makes a different division of the philosophers, saying that they are of two 
kinds - one of which he calls the Brachmanes, and the other the Sarmanes. The 
Brachmanes are best esteemed, for they are more consistent in their opinions. 
The opinions held by Brahmans are described as being similar to those held by Greeks: 
On many points their opinions coincide with those of the Greeks, for the Brachmanes say 
with them that the world was created, ... that it is of a spheroidal figure, ... that in 
addition to the four elements there is a fifth ... Concerning generation, and the nature of 
the soul, and many other subjects, they express views like those maintained by the 
Greeks. They wrap up their doctrines about immortality and future judgement, and 
kindred topics, in allegories, after the manner of Plato. Such are his statements regarding 
the Brachmanes. 
Regarding the sramm}as (ascetics),} Strabo says: 
Of the Sarmanes he tells us that those who are held in most honour are called the 
Hylobioi. ... Next in honour to the Hylobioi are the physicians.2 
Strabo describes ascetic philosophers: 
The Pramnai are philosophers opposed to the Brachmanes, and are contentious and fond 
of argument.3 
These fragments indicate that the first Greeks to visit India found Indian philosophy to 
be very much like their own. Regarding the age of these systems, the Greeks apparently 
considered Indian philosophy to be older than Greek philosophy. Some Greeks even adopted 
Indian systems, Buddhism in particular, and then played a part in the spread of Buddhism in 
the third century Be. 
3.1.2 Greek Buddhists 
Candragupta reigned for about 24 years, c.324-300 Be. He was succeeded by his son 
Bindusara in the early years of the third century BC. Bindusara was called Amitrochates by 
the Greeks. He maintained friendly relations with Seleucus who sent Dej'machus to succeed 
I Warder 1956,44 describes srama1}a (Pali: sama1}a) as applying to teachers who were not Brahma1)as which 
includes most if not all schools other than those following the Vedas. See also Warder 1971, 31. 
2 Fragment XLI. McCrindle 1877b, 243-245. Reprinted in McCrindle 1901,65-67. See McCrindle 1893,358-
359 (Appendices, Note W. Indian Sages). See also Rapson 1922,420. 
3 McCrindle 1901, 76 (see note 2). Rapson 1922, 421, says: "This should not be emended to Sramllai, ... The 
people intended are undoubtedly the priimii1}ikas, the followers of the various philosophical systems, each of 
which has its own view as to what constitutes pramii1}a, a 'means of right knowledge'." 
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Megasthenes as ambassador at Bindusara's court around 296 BC. Seleucus died about 280 BC 
and was succeeded by his son Antiochus Soter. As evidence of the friendly relations between 
the Indian and Greek monarchs, there is an interesting account preserved in the writings of 
Athenaeus. Bindusara requested Antiochus to send him figs, wine and a philosopher to teach 
him to argue, but was told that philosophers were not for sale amongst the Greeks. 1 
Bindusara's reign lasted about 25-28 years, after which he was succeeded by his son Asoka 
around 270-273 Be. There is some speculation that a matrimonial alliance was part of the 
treaty agreed to by Candragupta and Seleucus and so Asoka may have had a Greek mother or 
grandmother. There is no definite proof of this, however, since polygamy was common.2 
Asoka was perhaps the greatest king of ancient India. He extended his empire by 
conquering Kaliliga (Orissa), but the sight of the miseries of war caused him to abandon his 
ways and adopt Buddhism. He issued royal proclamations exhorting all to follow the Buddhist 
code of ethics. These so-called Rock Edicts were inscribed on rocks and stone pillars 
throughout his empire. Asoka was active in constructing roads, digging wells, and building 
hospitals, including animal hospitals. He gave up hunting, discouraged the killing of animals, 
designated some wild animals not required for food as protected animals, built many Buddhist 
shrines and sponsored Buddhist councils. 
An important council was held in Asoka's capital at Pataliputra around 250 Be.3 After 
this council, Asoka sent nine Buddhist missions to various places throughout his empire. Two 
of these nine missions were led by Greeks. Dhammarakkhita (Dharmarak~ita) went to the 
western land of Aparantaka (Gujarat) which had a Greek governor at the time and probably a 
significant Greek community as well. The other Greek, Maharakkhita (Maharak~ita), went to 
'Y ona Country' or 'Greek Country' .4 This Greek Country no doubt refers to a region of 
Asolca's empire where many Greeks lived, probably in the northwest around Kabul and 
Kandahar. These regions were originally part of Alexander's empire but had been ceded to 
Asoka's grandfather Candragupta by Seleucus. Karttunen suggests the region of Kandahar 
(southern Afghanistan) as most likely since two of Asoka' s Rock Edicts have been found 
1 Rapson 1922, 432-433. 
2 Rapson 1922,431. 
3 A number of dates ranging from 255 BC to 246 BC have been suggested for this council by various authors. 
4 Karttunen 1997, 267 (sources in note 84). 
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there inscribed in Greek.1 These inscriptions were meant for the Greek community that must 
have been there since Alexander's visit some 75 years earlier. Many Greeks are believed to 
have been living in Kashmir and Gandhara (northern Pakistan) at the time, and the early 
Buddhist works show that Asoka sent a mission led by Majjhantika to that area also. 
Buddhism seems to have appealed to the Greeks, perhaps because there was no 
distinction made between race or caste in Buddhism.2 Many Greeks living in northwest India 
must have became Buddhists. The MahiivalJlsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon (4th century 
AD) records how a large number of Buddhist monks came from Alasanda (Alexandria) the 
city of the Yon as (Greeks) to attend a festival in Sri Lanka in the second century BC.3 Geiger 
notes that the Greek city was probably one founded by Alexander near Kabul.4 If the Greeks 
did play an active role amongst Buddhists, it is possible that they also played some role in the 
Buddhist Council at Pataliputra, and possibly also in the production of the Kathiivatthu, the 
major document compiled as a result of the Pataliputra Council. 
3.2 The Kath§vatthu 
3.2.1 The work 
According to tradition the Kathiivatthu (Points of Controversy) was compiled at a 
Buddhist council held in Asoka's capital Pataliputra (Patna) around 250 BC.5 This council 
was convened in order to settle disputes which had arisen regarding the proper interpretation 
of the Buddha's teachings. Moggaliputta-tissa (Upagupta), Asoka's spiritual advisor, acted as 
president at the council and he is credited with compiling the Kathiivatthu. 
The existing version of the work documents over 200 controversial points which are 
arranged in 23 chapters in the English translation by Aung and Rhys Davids.6 There is some 
doubt as to whether or not all of these topics were in the original version of the work. Some 
topics may have been added to the original collection.7 It is equally possible that some of the 
1 Wheeler 1968, 65-70; Karttunen 1997,267-268. 
2 Woodcock 1966,55. 
3 Translated in Geiger 1912, 194 (XXIX 39-40). 
4 Geiger 1912,194 note 3. 
5 Warder 1958,94; and Matila11998, 34, suggest that the Kathiivatthu probably belongs to the 2nd century Be. 
6 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915. 
7 Nyanatiloka 1938, 37; Warder 1970, 289; Warder 1971, 82; and Frauwallner 1995, 86. 
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topics were controversial well before the council and therefore contributed to the reasons for 
holding the council.} The discussion below assumes that a document was drawn up in India in 
the third century BC that contained some of the topics in the extant version of the 
Kathiivatthu. The interest is not in which particular topics existed at what particular time, but 
in the system of logic used in the debates recorded in the work. 
The Kathiivatthu not only records the controversial points but also records the way in 
which they were originally debated. The work presents a series of arguments with a strict 
adherence to a dialectical system.2 The logical rules are not formulated, but the systematic 
procedure followed throughout the work suggests the existence of a logical system. This 
makes the Kathiivatthu one of the best sources for the system of logic used in India in the 
third century BC. 
Rhys Davids explains that only the first topic is translated with all its detailed questions 
and answers exactly as it appears in the P::ili original. This serves as a model for the dialectical 
method used throughout the work? The remaining topics appear with only the substance of 
the controversial point translated into English. The ever-recurring formulae of refutation and 
counter-refutation found in the Pali original has been omitted from the English translation. 
The translation of the first topic with all its details is used below as a model for the system of 
debate found throughout the Kathfivatthu. 
3.2.2 The system of debate 
Style of debate 
A debate begins with each party declaring a position and ends when one party is 
defeated. To defeat an opponent one party must force the other to abandon their original 
position. In order to force an opponent to abandon their original position each party argues 
that the opponent's position leads to unacceptable consequences. The consequence of a 
position is considered unacceptable either because it is simply illogical or because it is 
incompatible with the original position. An admission by either party that they have 
abandoned their original position brings the debate to a definite conclusion. 
I Kalupahana 1992, 132. 
2 Randle 1930, 14 note 2, has "insufferably tedious". 
3 Rhys Davids in Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, Iii. 
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The aim of each debater, therefore, is simply to force an opponent to abandon their 
original position. One party tries to prove that an opponent's position is wrong while the other 
party attempts to defend that position. When one party is faced with overwhelming evidence 
contradicting their position then they have no option but to abandon that position. No attempt 
is made to defeat an opponent by presenting arguments which support some position other 
than the one endorsed by an opponent. No amount of argument in support of an alternative 
position would persuade a stubborn opponent to abandon their own position. However, one 
devastating argument against some position should persuade a reasonable opponent to 
abandon that position. The consequence of this style of debate is that arguments are typically 
always negative, i.e. always against some position. 
Structure of a debate 
The debate on the first topic is divided into primary and secondary debates. The primary 
debate focuses on the main issue, i.e. whether or not one term A is another term B. The 
secondary debates examine the terms used in the primary debate. The primary debate consists 
of eight sections. These are whether or not: 
1. A is B (in fact) 
2. A is not B (in fact) 
3. A is B everywhere (in space) 
4. A is B always (in time) 
5. A is B in everything (in particular objects)1 
6. A is not B everywhere (in space) 
7. A is not B always (in time) 
8. A is not B in everything (in particular objects) 
These eight sections consist of four pairs; the first two consider whether or not A is in 
fact B, firstly in the affirmative and then in the negative. The next three sections (3 - 5) are all 
affirmative and consider whether or not A is B in all circumstances: i.e. in all places, on all 
occasions, and relative to all things. The last three sections (6 - 8) consider the negatives of 
the previous three sections. The pattern of debate in each of these eight sections is the same, it 
consists of an argument with five parts: 
1. The way forward (anuloma) 
2. The way back (patikamma) 
3. The refutation (niggaha) 
4. The application (upanayana) 
5. The conclusion (niggamana) 
I Randle 1930, ] 3, has "in all cases" rather than "in everything". 
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The name for each step in the five-part argument does not occur in the original work. 
These names are found in commentaries which date from a later period. However the 
arguments are arranged in the original strictly according to these five steps. The pattern of 
argument used in the five steps is the same in each of the eight sections making up the 
primary debate. The same pattern of argument is also used in the secondary debates. Thus an 
examination of the five-part argument used in the first of the eight sections in the primary 
debates exemplifies the model used throughout the entire work. The focus in this examination 
is on the form of the five-part argument rather than on the content of those arguments. 
3.2.3 Symbolisation 
The first debate in the Kathavatthu is between a Theravadin (follower of one of the 
Buddhist schools) and a Puggalavadin (someone who believes in the existence of a person, 
understood as a personal entity or soul).1 The form of argument used in these debates is more 
easily discussed when the arguments are reduced to their logical components and presented 
symbolically. This obscures the content of the argument but clarifies its form. The method of 
symbolisation is discussed before the actual arguments found in the first debate are presented. 
The first debate involves the following three terms: 
1. The soul. 
2. Known as a real and ultimate fact. 
3. Known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known. 
These three terms are used in two propositions: 
1. The soul is known as a real and ultimate fact. 
2. The soul is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known. 
Using letters 'A', 'B' and 'C' to represent terms, these two propositions are symbolised by: 
1. A is B 
2. A is C 
Propositions are not symbolised by a single symbol, such as the letter 'p' or 'q'. 
Symbols are used for each term in a proposition so that it is clear when the same term occurs 
in more than one proposition. Each party in the debate questions the other, asking: 
1. IsAB? 
2. Is A C? 
J Kalupahana 1992, 134 ff., translates "Puggalavadin" as "Personalist". 
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When a party replies "no" to a question, the denial is understood as applying to the 
whole proposition rather than to a term within the proposition. The '-' sign is used for 
negations. It has the usual meaning of 'it is not the case that' . Brackets are used to indicate the 
scope of the negation. For example, the brackets in '- (A is B)' are used to indicate that the 
whole proposition 'A is B' is negated. Terms within propositions are also negated. For 
instance: 
1. The soul is not known as a real and ultimate fact. 
2. The soul is not known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known. 
These two propositions are symbolised by: 
1. A is - B 
2. Ais - C 
The negation within these propositions applies to the second term only. This is another 
reason not to symbolise a proposition with a single symbol. 
3.2.4 The five-part argument 
The five-part argument discussed below forms the first of the eight sections (the 
affirmative) in the primary debate on the first controversial topic (the existence of the soul). 
Each step involves a short argument. The original text for each step is quoted in full and then 
the argument is symbolised using the method described above. The pattern of argument 
employed in each step is described and then the logical principles involved are discussed last. 
The names of the proponent (Theraviidin) and the respondent (Puggalaviidin) have been 
added to the English translation for clarification. These names do not appear in the P1ili 
original. 
Step 1. The way forward 
In the first step of the five-part argument, the proponent asks the respondent to declare 
their position and then the proponent presents an argument against the respondent's position. 
[1] Theravadin: Is the soul known as a real and ultimate facd 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Theravadin: Is the soul known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known? 
Puggalavadin: No, that cannot be truly said. 
Theravadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
1 Following the style of translation in Ganeri 2001a, 487-491, as opposed to Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 8 ff. 
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[2] If the soul is known as a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also 
say, the soul is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known. 
[3] That which you say here is wrong, namely, that we should say, "the soul is known as a 
real and ultimate fact", but we should not say, "the soul is known in the same way as any 
other real and ultimate fact is known." 
[4] If the latter statement cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement should not 
be admitted either. 
[5] In affirming the former, while denying the latter, you are wrong. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) (A is B) but - (A is C) 
And the Theravadin presents this counter-argument: 
(2) H (A is B) then (A is C) 
(3) - ((A is B) but - (A is C» 
(4) H - (A is C) then - (A is B) 
(5) - ((A is B) and - (A is C» 
Assertions like "we should not say" or "you are wrong to say" are treated as negations 
that apply to the whole proposition. The connective 'if ... then ... ' remains without being 
symbolised since it is unclear what relation is intended here, whether some kind of 
implication or the logical consequence relation. The other connectives, the conjunctions 'and' 
and 'but', are not symbolised simply to maintain consistency of style. 
The pattern of argument in the way forward runs as follows: the Puggalavadin accepts 
the first proposition but not the second (both in line 1). The Theravadin then argues: if the 
first then the second (2), which is contrary to your position (3). And if not the second then not 
the first (4), thus your position is wrong (5).1 
Step 2. The way back 
In the second step of the five-part argument, the roles of the two parties are reversed. 
The respondent now asks the proponent to declare their position on the same issue and then 
the respondent presents an argument against the proponent's position. 
[1] Puggalavadin: Is the soul not known as a real and ultimate fact? 
Theravadin: No, it is not known [i.e. the Theravadin agrees that the soul is not so known]. 
I The convention of referring to propositions as "the first" and "the second" is not found in the Pttli version of the 
Kathiivatthu. It was used by the Stoics. See Kneale, Kneale 1962, 158-176. 
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Puggalavadin: Is the soul not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is 
known? 
Theravadin: No, that cannot be truly said. 
Puggalavadin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: 
[2] If the soul is not known as a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should 
also say, the soul is not known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is 
known. 
[3] That which you say here is wrong, namely, that we should say, "the soul is not known 
as a real and ultimate fact", but we should not say, "the soul is not known in the same 
way as any other real and ultimate fact is known". 
[4] If the latter statement cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement should not 
be admitted either. 
[5] In affirming the former, while denying the latter, you are wrong. 
The Theravadin declares that: 
(1) (A is - B) but - (A is - C) 
And the Puggalavadin presents this counter-argument: 
(2) If (A is - B) then (A is - C) 
(3) - ((A is - B) but - (A is - C)) 
(4) If - (A is - C) then - (A is - B) 
(5) - ((A is - B) and - (A is - C)) 
The pattern of argument in the way back runs as follows: the Theravadin accepts the 
first proposition but not the second (both in line 1). The Puggalavadin then argues: if the first 
then the second (2), which is contrary to your position (3). And if not the second then not the 
first (4), thus your position is wrong (5). 
The Puggalavadin in fact uses the very same pattern of argument as the Theravadin has 
used in the way forward. Thus we find the same form of argument in step 2 as that found in 
step 1. The only difference is that the roles of the two parties are reversed and some terms are 
negated. 
Step 3. The refutation 
In the third step of the five-part argument (the rejoinder), the respondent re-asserts the 
refutation used in step 2. 
[1] Puggalavadin: But if you imagine we should affirm that the soul is not known as a real 
and ultimate fact, but we should not also affirm that the soul is not known in the same 
way as any other real and ultimate fact is known, then you, who have actually assented to 
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the very proposition 1 contained in that negative question, must certainly be refuted in the 
following manner: let us then refute you, for you are well refuted! 
[2] If the soul is not known as a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should 
have said [also] that the soul is not known in the same way as any other real and ultimate 
fact is known. 
[3] What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement should be affirmed, but 
the latter should not be affirmed. 
[4] If the latter statement is not affirmed, then neither truly can the former be affirmed. 
[5] That which you say here; [the former] should be affirmed, but not [the latter], this 
statement is wrong. 
The Puggalavadin presents the Theravadin's position: 
(1) (A is ~ B) and ~ (A is ~ C) 
And then re-asserts this refutation: 
(2) If (A is ~ B) then (A is ~ C) 
(3) ~ ((A is - B) but ~ (A is ~ C» 
(4) If ~ (A is ~ C) then ~ (A is ~ B) 
(5) - ((A is ~ B) but ~ (A is ~ C» 
The pattern of argument in the refutation runs as follows: the Puggalavadin argues that 
if you accept the first proposition but not the second (both in line 1), then you are refuted by 
the following argument: if the first then the second (2), which is contrary to your position (3). 
And if not the second then not the first (4), thus your position is wrong (5). 
This refutation is simply a restatement of the same argument previously used in the way 
back (step 2). The only difference is that here in step 3, the Theravadin's position is stated by 
the Puggalavadin. 
Step 4. The application 
In the fourth step of the five-part argument (the sequel), the respondent rejects the 
proponent's counter-argument found in step 1. 
[1] Puggalavadin: If this refutation is faulty, then look at the parallel procedure in your 
own argument [against us]. Thus, according to us 'A is B' was true, but 'A is C' was not 
true. Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been 
refuted. [You say] you have refuted us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument 
ran: 
[2] If we affirmed 'A is B', we must also affirm' A is C' 
1 Note the use of the word "proposition" (Pali: pa(iFii1ii, Sanskrit: pratiji1ii) here and in the next two steps. 
73 
Chapter three: Early works on debate 
[4] If we did not admit the truth of 'A is C' , neither could we admit the truth of 'A is B' 
[5] That we were wrong in assenting to 'A is B' while denying 'A is C'. 
The Puggalavadin re-affirms his position: 
(1) (A is B) and ~ (A is C) 
And rejects the Theravadin's refutation, which is: 
(2) If (A is B) then (A is C) 
(3) ~ «A is B) but ~ (A is C» 
(4) If ~ (A is C) then ~ (A is B) 
(5) ~ «A is B) and ~ (A is C» 
Line 3 in the Theravadin's refutation (used in step 1) appears to be missing in the 
original text. It is added here for consistency. The pattern of argument in the application runs 
as follows: the Puggalavadin reaffirms his position, i.e. to accept the first proposition but not 
the second (both in line 1), and then he rejects the Theravadin's refutation, which is: if the 
first then the second (2), omits line 3, i.e. 'which is contrary to your position'. And if not the 
second then not the first (4), thus your position is wrong (5). 
Again this refutation is simply a restatement of the same argument previously used in 
the way forward (step 1). The only difference is that here in step 4 the Theravadin's refutation 
is stated by the Puggalavadin (and line 3 has been omitted, perhaps inadvertently). 
Step 5. The conclusion 
In the fifth step of the five-part argument the respondent claims the proponent's 
counter-argument has failed and that his own counter-argument has succeeded. 
Puggalavadin: No [I repeat], we are not to be refuted thus: 
[1] Namely, that my proposition [A is B] compels me to assent to your position [A is C). 
[2] Your pronouncement that my proposition [A is B] coupled with my rejection [- (A is 
C)] is wrong. 
[3] That if I reject' A is C', then I must also reject' A is B'. 
[5] That I must affirm both or none. 
This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand, that my rejoinder 
[step 3] was sell done, and that my sequel to the argument [step 4] was well done.] 
I Material in square brackets has been added by myself. 
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The Puggalavadin rejects the Theravadin's arguments, which are: 
(1) If (A is B) then (A is C) 
(2) ~ «A is B) and ~ (A is C)) 
(3) If ~ (A is C) then ~ (A is B) 
(4) ~ «A is B) and ~ (A is C)) 
(5) Either «A is B) and (A is C)) or ( ~ (A is B) and ~ (A is C)) 
And claims instead that the rejoinder (step 3) and the sequel (step 4) prove the Theravadin's 
position is wrong. 
Line 4 has been added here to complete the pattern of argument found in the previous 
steps although it does not appear in the original text. The pattern of argument in the 
conclusion runs as follows: the Puggalavadin rejects the Theravadin's arguments, which are: 
if the first then the second (1), so the first and not the second, is wrong (2). And if not the 
second then not first (3), omits line 4, i.e. 'so again the first and not the second, is wrong'. 
Therefore, either the first and the second, or not the first and not the second (5). 
Summary of the five-part argument 
This completes the five-part argument which forms the first of the eight sections in the 
primary debate. In summary these five steps are: 
1. The way forward: the respondent declares a position and the proponent presents a 
counter-argument. 
2. The way back: the proponent declares a position and the respondent presents a 
counter-argument. 
3. The refutation: the respondent asserts a refutation of the proponent's position. 
4. The application: the respondent rejects the proponent's counter-argument. 
5. The conclusion: the respondent claims that the proponent's counter-argument has 
failed and that the refutation has succeeded. 
The remaining seven sections 
The same five steps are used in all eight sections of each primary debate. These eight 
sections consist of four pairs. The first section (described above) debated whether A is B. The 
second section debates whether A is not B. In the second section the roles of the two parties, 
the proponent (Theraviidin) and the respondent (Puggalaviidin), are reversed and 'known' and 
'not known' are also reversed in their arguments. However, the same five steps are used and 
the form of the arguments remains the same as it was in the first section. The first pair of 
sections therefore consist of ten steps, five for and five against some position. In the 
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remaining six sections 'everywhere', 'always', and 'in everything' are added. These are first 
debated in the affirmative in three sections and then again in the negative in the last three 
sections. Each of these three pairs also consists of ten steps. 
3.2.5 The secondary debate 
The secondary debates examine the terms used in the primary debates. The first of the 
secondary debates is whether or not the soul is the same as the body. The argument runs as 
follows: 
[1] Theravadin: Is the soul known as a real and ultimate fact, and is the body also known 
as a real and ultimate fact? 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Theravadin: Is the body one thing and the soul another? 
Puggalavadin: No, that cannot be truly said. 
Theravadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
[2] If the soul and the body are each known as a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good 
sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct things. 
[3] You are wrong to admit the former proposition and not the latter. 
[4] If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be affirmed. 
[5] To say that the soul and the body are both known as real and ultimate facts, but they 
are not mutually distinct things, is false. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) (A and B are C) and ~ (A and B are D) 
And the Theravadin presents this counter-argument: 
(2) If (A and B are C) then (A and B are D) 
(3) ~ ((A and B are C) and ~ (A and B are D» 
(4) If ~ (A and B are D) then ~ (A and B are C) 
(5) ~ ((A and B are C) and ~ (A and B are D» 
The pattern of argument is the same as that found in the primary debates. The 
Puggalavadin accepts the first proposition but not the second (both in line 1). The Theravadin 
then argues: if the first then the second (2), which is contrary to your position (3). And if not 
the second then not the first (4), thus your position is wrong (5). 
The same arguments are then repeated but with 'body' replaced by 'feelings', then again 
with 'perceptions', and so on. After the primary and secondary debates on the soul are 
completed other topics are debated. These debates are extremely numerous but all follow the 
standard form of argument exemplified by the five-part argument described above. 
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3.2.6 Analysis of the form of argument 
Elements of propositional logic 
What has attracted the attention of modern interpreters is that the standard form of 
argument found throughout the Kathavatthu appears to employ logical principles commonly 
associated with propositional logic. 
And: 
In step 1, the way forward for instance, there are two sub-arguments: 
(1) (A is B) but ~ (A is C) 
(2) If (A is B) then (A is C) 
(3) ~ ((A is B) but ~ (A is C)) 
(1) (A is B) but ~ (A is C) 
(4) If ~ (A is C) then ~ (A is B) 
(5) ~ ((A is B) and ~ (A is C)) 
The first line is required in both sub-arguments. It consists of two propositions. The 
second line implies that one of these propositions contradicts the other, and the third line 
forms the conclusion. The lines which are normally required in a proof are added below 
(numbered with Roman numerals) to show clearly all of the steps typically used in a proof in 
propositional logic: 
(1) (A is B) but ~ (A is C) 
(i) A is B 
(2) If (A is B) then (A is C) 
(ii) A is C 
(iii) ~ (A is C) 
asserted by the Puggalavadin 
derived from line 1, by 'and' elimination 
asserted by the Theravadin 
derived from lines (i) and 2, by modus ponens 
derived from line 1, by 'and' elimination 
(iv) (A is C) and ~ (A is C) 
(3) ~ ((A is B) but ~ (A is C)) 
derived from lines (ii) and (iii), by 'and' introduction 
derived from lines 1 and (iv), by reductio ad absurdum 
The second part of the argument involves the same pattern seen in the first part: 
(1) (A is B) but ~ (A is C) asserted by the Puggalavadin 
(v) ~ (A is C) derived from line 1, by 'and' elimination 
(4) If ~ (A is C) then ~ (A is B) asserted by the Theravadin 
(vi) ~ (A is B) derived from lines (v) and 4, by modus ponens 
(vii) A is B derived from line 1, by 'and' elimination 
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(viii) (A is B) and - (A is B) 
(5) - «A is B) and - (A is C» 
derived from lines (vi) and (vii), by 'and' introduction 
derived from lines 1 and (viii), by reductio ad 
absurdum 
If these are indeed the steps assumed by the debaters then modus ponens and reductio 
ad absurdum are involved. The same reductio ad absurdum is easily derived using modus 
tollens rather than modus ponens. But this would make the second sub-argument more 
complicated than necessary, plus it would be unnatural to deal with the propositions in the 
first line in the reverse order. The form of line 4 also suggests modus tollens is not involved. I 
Validity of this form of argument 
The same pattern of argument displayed in these two sub-arguments is found in all the 
first four steps of the five-part argument. Two sub-arguments also appear in the conclusion: 
(1) If (A is B) then (A is C) 
(2) - «A is B) and - (A is C» 
(3) If - (A is C) then - (A is B) 
(4) - «A is B) and - (A is C)i 
(5) Either «A is B) and (A is C» or ( - (A is B) and - (A is C» 
The Puggalavadin's position, i.e. to accept the first proposition (A is B) and reject the 
second (A is C), is assumed in this step. When that line is added, the two sub-arguments are 
clearly the same as those found in the previous four steps: 
And: 
(i) (A is B) but - (A is C) 
(1) If (A is B) then (A is C) 
(2) - «A is B) and - (A is C» 
(i) (A is B) but - (A is C) 
(3) If - (A is C) then - (A is B) 
(4) - «A is B) and - (A is C» 
This leaves one additional line in the conclusion: 
(5) Either «A is B) and (A is C» or ( - (A is B) and - (A is C» 
I Schayer 1933a, 97; and Bochenski 1961,423, suggest that a tenn-Iogical version of modus tollens is involved. 
2 Line 4 does not appear in the original but is added here to complete the pattern of argument. 
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These two sub-arguments combined with the final line form a kind of dilemma. The 
pattern of argument here is: 
Sub-argument 1: 
If you are right to accept the first then you are wrong to reject the second. 
Sub-argument 2: 
If you are right to reject the second then you are wrong to accept the first. 
Final line: 
Either way, you must abandon your position and either accept both or reject both. 
The dilemma symbolised is: 
Sub-argument 1: If (A is B) then (A is C) 
Sub-argument 2: If - (A is C) then - (A is B) 
Final line: Either ((A is B) and (A is C)) or ( - (A is B) and - (A is C)) 
The connective 'if ... then ... ' has not been symbolised since it is unclear what relation 
is intended here. The connective appears to be material implication, that is, a relation between 
two statements where one statement P materially implies another statement Q. This relation is 
symbolised by ':J', and 'P :J Q' is defined as being true just in case P is false and Q is true. 
With this understanding of the 'if ... then ... ' connective, the standard truth table test can be 
applied to the argument. 
AisB Ais C Sub-arg 1 Sub-arg 2 Final line 
P Q p:JQ and -Q:J-P (P and Q) or (- P and - Q) 
1 T T T T T T 
2 '/ <B: c. 1:.1:',:;' I~=~~T·· .. · ' T , .T .. "." i ··· ... ··It,.S •. : .•.• ' ..•...•......• '. . ... 
3 T F F F F F 
4 F F T T T T 
The truth table test reveals two things. First, sub-arguments 1 and 2 are logically 
equivalent and thus one sub-argument is in fact redundant. Second, the argument is not valid 
since it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. That is, in line 2 where 
the statement 'A is B' is false and 'A is C' is true, the conjunction of the premises is true and 
the conclusion is false. Either the connective used in these arguments is not material 
implication or the ancient Buddhist logicians were unaware of the paradox of material 
implication. 
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This analysis of the arguments used in the Kathavatthu shows that not only modus 
ponens and reductio ad absurdum but also a kind of dilemma are features of the standard 
form of argument found throughout the work. This suggest that these were in common use in 
India during the period when the work was originally compiled (around 250 Be). 
3.2.7 The type of logic used 
Propositional logic and term logic 
The type of logic used in the Kathavatthu includes elements from both term logic and 
propositional logic. The analysis above focused on propositions rather than on terms since 
propositions feature more prominently in the standard form of argument employed in the 
Kathavatthu. The arguments in the work are expressed fully in words without any kind of 
symbolisation to indicate that propositions rather than terms are the basic elements in an 
argument. However, expressions such as "it should not be said that" show that the negation 
applies to the whole proposition rather than to just the first term within the proposition. Such 
expressions function like brackets placed around a proposition. 1 When a question is answered 
with "yes" or "no" the whole proposition is accepted or rejected. Even the word "proposition" 
(Pali: pa{ififiii, Sanskrit: pratijfia) is used in these debates.2 This clearly establishes that the 
system of logic used in the Kathavatthu involves propositional logic. 
The use of terms is also a prominent feature of the system of logic found in the 
Kathavatthu. The secondary debates analyse the terms found in the primary debates. This 
analysis takes a number of forms. The fourfold method of comparison (catukka-nyaya-
sarrzsandana) analyses the logical relationship between two terms by comparing one term with 
the other. For instance, the difference between the body (material quality) and the soul (self) 
is analysed by asking the following four questions: 
1. Is the body the soul? 
2. Is the soul in the body? 
3. Is the soul separate from the body? 
4. Is the body in the soul?3 
1 Warder 1963,64. 
2 See steps 3,4 and 5 in section one of the primary debate, and the sample of the secondary debate above. 
3 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 19; and VidyabhU~al)a 1920,239. See also Warder 1963,60. 
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This fourfold method of comparison analyses the logical relationship between two terms 
by comparing one term with the other in order to establish whether: 
1. A is (identical to) B 
2. B is in A 
3. B is separate from A 
4. A is in B 
Another method of analysing terms found in the secondary debates involves the 
fourfold scheme of predication or tetralemma. The four questions asked here are for instance: 
1. Is he who does the act the same as he who experiences the effect? 
2. Are doer and experiencer two different persons? 
3. Are they the same and also different persons? 
4. Are they neither the same nor different persons?1 
This analysis seeks to establish whether the agent of an action is (i) the same as, (ii) 
different from, (iii) both the same as and different from, or (iv) neither the same as nor 
different from the person who experiences the subsequent effects of that action. This method 
of analysis employs the familiar pattern used in the tetralemma. 
The negative used to negate terms excludes any third possibility. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the secondary debates about whether the person (self or soul) could be neither 
conditioned nor unconditioned: 
Is the person conditioned? 
Nay, that cannot truly be said .... 
Is the person unconditioned? 
Nay, that cannot truly be said .... 
Is he neither? 
Nay, that cannot truly be said .... 
Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the conditioned and the unconditioned, 
there is another, a third alternative.2 
This suggests that the negative in the term "unconditioned" is understood as excluding 
all that is conditioned and including all else other than the conditioned, leaving no possibility 
for there to be a third alternative (neither conditioned nor unconditioned). The analysis of 
terms in the secondary debates clearly shows that the system of logic in the Kathavatthu also 
involves term logic. 
1 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915,48. 
2 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915,54-55. 
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Difference between term and propositional logic 
The difference between term and propositional logic is that term logic typically deals 
with single propositions which either affirm or deny a predicate of a subject. Terms are used 
for both the subject and the predicate. For instance, in the proposition 'A is B', the term 'B' is 
the predicate which is either affirmed or denied of the subject 'A'. The negation 'not' applies 
to terms, e.g. 'A is not B'. The single proposition' A is B' is analysed in terms of the logical 
relationship that exists between its component parts, i.e. between the terms 'A' and 'B'. The 
truth value of the proposition 'roses are red' for instance, is determined by the logical 
relationship that exists between the terms 'rose' and 'red'. In term logic it makes no sense to 
enquire into the truth values of the components of a proposition. The term 'rose' is not 
something to which a truth value sensibly applies. Therefore, the truth value of a proposition 
in term logic is not determined by the truth values of its component parts, i.e. the terms, since 
terms do not have truth values. 
Propositional logic, on the other hand, typically deals with complex propositions which 
consist of component propositions plus connectives. For instance, in the complex proposition 
'P or Q', both 'P' and 'Q' stand for propositions which are joined by the connective 'or'. The 
negation 'not' applies to whole propositions. It could be external, as in 'not (P or Q)' , or 
internal, as in 'P or not Q'. The proposition 'P or Q' is analysed in terms of its component 
parts, i.e. the individual propositions 'P' and 'Q', as well as the connective 'or'. The truth 
value of the complex proposition 'roses are red or violets are blue', for instance, is determined 
by the truth values of the individual propositions 'roses are red' and 'violets are blue', as well 
as the function of the connective 'or'. Unlike in term logic, it does make sense in 
propositional logic to enquire into the truth values of the components of a complex 
proposition. The proposition 'roses are red' is something to which a truth value sensibly 
applies. Therefore, the truth value of a complex proposition in propositional logic is 
determined by the truth values of its component parts, i.e. the component propositions, since 
propositions do have truth values. 
The Kathiivatthu does not use the terminology of truth values, but the acceptance or 
rejection of propositions clearly indicates that propositions are considered to be true or false. 
Aung and Rhys Davids use the words "true" and "false" in their translation of the work. The 
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standard form of argument has replies such as; "No, that cannot truly be said." 1 Step four 
includes statements that claim one proposition is true and another is not true? Step three 
includes the statement; "What you affirm is false,,,3 and the secondary debates include 
statements like: "To say that the person and material quality are both known as real and 
ultimate facts, but that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.,,4 There is no discussion 
in the work on propositions which are both true and false, or neither true nor false. 
A mixture of both term and propositional logic 
The standard form of argument found throughout the Kathiivatthu contains simple 
propositions which either affirm or deny a predicate of a subject, both of which consist of 
terms. The truth or acceptability of such propositions is determined by the logical relationship 
that exists between terms. This is indicative of term logic. However, if the logic in the work 
was purely term logic then the acceptability of an argument would be determined by the 
logical relationship that exists between the terms in the premises and conclusion, and this is 
not the case. The acceptability of arguments in the work is determined by the logical 
relationship that exists between the propositions which make up the premises and conclusion. 
This is indicative of propositional logic. Thus, term logic is involved when the acceptability 
of propositions is considered, but propositional logic is involved when the acceptability of 
arguments is considered. In general the system of logic used in the Kathiivatthu contains 
elements of both term logic and propositional logic. 
Modern commentators (mentioned below) focus either on terms or on propositions in 
their descriptions of the logic found in the Kathiivatthu. Aung in the Prefatory Notes (before 
the translation of the work) presents the first two propositions symbolically as 'A is B' and 'C 
is D,.5 This suggests that four terms are involved rather than the three terms actually found in 
the work.6 Other authors also distinguish four terms in their presentations.7 The point here is 
not the number of terms involved but the fact that terms are identified as the variables 
I Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 9ff. 
2 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 11. 
3 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 10. 
4 Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 15. 
S Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, xlviii. 
6 See the standard form of argument discussed above. 
7 Keith 1923,304; Misra 1968, 62; Jayawickrama 1979, xx-xxi; Gillon 1998,762; and Ganeri 200la, 488-489. 
See also Jayatilleke 1963,412 note 4. 
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symbolised by letters. Other commentators focus on propositions rather than terms. Schayer 
claims that the Kathavatthu contains anticipations of propositional logic. 1 He rejects Aung's 
use of nominal variables and argues that the elements with which the logic of the work 
operates are propositional variables. Schayer presents the standard form of argument 
symbolically as: 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
And the Theravadin presents the counter-argument: 
(2) p::J q 
(3) ~ (p & ~ q) 
(4)~q::J~p 
(5) ~ (p & ~ q)2 
Schayer interprets the 'if ... then ... ' connective as material implication and goes on to 
say that the author of the Kathavatthu undoubtedly has in mind that the following theses are 
equivalent: p ::J q, ~ (p & ~ q), and ~ q ::J ~ P (i.e. lines 2, 3 and 4). Schayer claims that the 
equivalence between p ::J q and ~ (p & ~ q), known as the definition of implication, and the 
equivalence between p ::J q and ~ q ::J ~ p, known as the law of transposition, were very likely 
known by the author of the work.3 However there is no real evidence to support Schayer's 
claim. The fact that these propositions appear as lines in the argument suggests that the author 
thought that line 2 for instance supports line 3, but this does not prove that the author thought 
of these propositions as logically equivalent. 
Bochenski disputes Schayer's claim that the Kathavatthu contains anticipations of 
propositional logic. He includes terms in his presentation of the standard form of argument. 
Line 2, for instance, is presented symbolically as: if A is B, then A is C, rather than as p::J q. 
Bochenski concludes that the work contains a term-logic analogue of the definition of 
implication and a kind of law of transposition, and points out that there is no abstract 
1 Schayer 1933a, 96. 
2 This system of representing whole propositions with a single symbol is also used by: Jayatilleke 1963,413-
415; Warder 1963, 67-68; Ichimura 1980, 7-15; Watanabe 1983, 159-174; and Ichimura 1999,4-9. 
3 Schayer 1933a, 96-97. See also Jayatilleke 1963, 412 note 3, for another source. 
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formulation of propositional rules. 1 The Kathavatthu in fact presents a system of logic that is 
not exclusively term logic nor is it exclusively propositional logic. This same system of logic 
is also found in another work from the same period, the Vijfianakaya. 
3.3 The Vijfjanakaya 
3.3.1 The work 
The Vijiianakaya (Consciousness Group) is attributed to Devasarman whose dates have 
been estimated anywhere between 200 BC and 75 AD.2 This would place the work after the 
Kathavatthu. The Vijiianakaya was translated into Chinese by Hiuen-Tsang in 649 AD and 
now survives only in Chinese translation. Very little of this work has been translated into 
English.3 The work belongs to the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism centred in Kashmir. The 
Vijiianakaya is renowned for propounding the view that phenomena exist in all three times, 
hence the name Sarvastivada, which comes from sarvam asti (everything exists). The 
Kathavatthu argues against this view and holds that phenomena exist only in the present. 4 The 
relationship between the Vijiianakaya and the Kathavatthu is unclear,5 but both works argue 
against the existence of a person (or soul), using a very similar form of argument. 
The Vijiianakaya is composed of six chapters (skandhas) based on an analysis of the six 
types of consciousnesses.6 The second chapter, On Persons (pudgala-skandha), has nine 
sections, the first of which consists of a discussion on the transmigration of the person 
(pudgala).7 This section closely resembles the first section of the Kathavatthu (described 
above) in that both use a very similar style of argument for the same purpose, i.e. to refute the 
existence of the person. 
I Bochenski 1961,422-423 
2 Potter ed. 1965-99,7,367. 
3 Partial translation in Watanabe 1983, 175-203; and a fragment by Bronkhorst 1985b, 108-109. The first two 
chapters have been translated into French by de la Vallee Poussin 1925 'La controverse du temps et du pudgala 
dans Ie Vijfianakaya' in Etudes asiatiques oubliees a l'occasion du 25e anniversaire de l'Ecole-jrancaise de 
I'Estreme Orient, Paris, 1, 343-376. Contents summarised in Potter ed. 1965-99,7,367-374; and in Frauwallner 
1995,28-31. 
4 Aung, RhysDavids 1915, 84-104,108-110,237-238 and 242. 
5 See Bronkhorst 1993. 
6 Listed in Takakusu 1904-05, 107-108; and Watanabe 1983, 175. Contents of the chapters are summarised in 
Pottered. 1965-99,7,367-374; and Frauwallner 1995, 28-31. 
7 TaishO 26.537a-26.538b. Trans. Watanabe 1983,177-180. 
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The debate in the Vijiiiinakiiya focuses on whether or not the person who dies is the 
same as the one who is born again in some other form. According to the teachings of the 
Buddha referred to in the Vijfiiinakiiya, there are five states (gatis) into which a person may be 
born. These five are: purgatory (niraya), animal (tiryagyoni), the dead (pitryavi$aya), god 
(devii) and human (manu$ya).l The example used in the Vijiianakaya is where a person is 
born as an animal from the state of purgatory. The example used in the arguments below is 
where a human being dies and is reborn as an animal. This minor change makes the argument 
easier to follow and does not effect the logic involved. 
A translation of the text for each of five arguments is presented below in a paraphrased 
form (based on Watanabe's translation) and then each argument is symbolised using the same 
method of symbolisation as was used above in the discussion on the Kathavatthu. The names 
of the proponent (Siinyatavadin) and the respondent (Puggalaviidin), as well as the numbers 
for the parts of the argument, have been added for clarification, although these do not appear 
in the original text. The name Puggalavadin is used for those who accept the existence of the 
person and the name Siinyatiivadin is used for those who deny its existence. Both parties are 
Buddhists. The author of the Vijiianakaya denies the existence of the person. 
Style of argument 
1. The first argument: 
[1) Sunyatavadin: Did the Buddha say that there are five different states? 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Sunyatavadin: Is the person who dies born as an animal? 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Sunyatavadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
[2] If you say there are five different states then you should not say that the person who 
dies is born as an animal. 
[3] What you say here is unreasonable. 
[4] If you say that the person who dies is born as an animal then you should not say there 
are five different states. 
[5) It is unreasonable to say: There are five different states. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) A and B 
I Translations from Watanabe 1983, 178. 
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And the Sunyatavadin presents the counter-argument: 
(2) If A then ~ B 
(3) ~ (A and B) 
(4) IfB then ~ A 
(5) ~ A 
The pattern of argument runs as follows: the Puggalavadin accepts two propositions 
(both in line 1). The Sunyatavadin then argues: if the first then not the second (2), which is 
contrary to your position (3). If the second then not the first (4), thus, not the first (5). Here 
lines (3) and (5) differ, whereas these two lines are the same in the Kathiivatthu. A very 
similar pattern is repeated in the other four arguments. 
2. The second argument: 
[1] Sunyatavadin: Is the person who dies born as an animal? 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Sunyatavadin: Is the person who dies the animal that is born? 
Puggalavadin: No. 
Sunyatavadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
[2] If you say that the person who dies is born as an animal then you should say that the 
person who dies is the animal that is born. 
[3] What you say here is unreasonable. 
[4] If you do not say that the person who dies is the animal that is born then you should 
not say that the person who dies is born as an animal. 
[5] It is unreasonable to say: The person who dies is born as an animal. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) A and ~ B 
And the Sunyatavadin presents the counter-argument: 
(2) If A then B 
(3) ~ (A and ~ B) 
(4) If ~ B then - A 
(5) ~A 
3. The third argument: 
[1] Sunyatavadin: Is this person that animal? 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Sunyatavadin: Is a human an animal? 
Puggalavadin: No. 
Sunyatavadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
87 
Chapter three: Early works on debate 
[2] If you say that this person is that animal then you should say that a human is an 
animal. 
[3] What you say here is unreasonable. 
[4] If you do not say that a human is an animal then you should not say that this person is 
that animal. 
[5] It is unreasonable to say: This person is that animal. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) A and - B 
And the Sunyatavadin presents the counter-argument: 
(2) If A then B 
(3) - (A and - B) 
(4) If - B then - A 
(5) - A 
4. The fourth argument: 
[1] Sunyatavadin: Is this human different from that animal? 
Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Sunyatavadin: Does this person cease and different one become an animal? 
Puggalavadin: No. 
Sunyatavadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
[2] If you say that this human is different from that animal then you should say that this 
person ceases and different one becomes an animal. 
[3] What you say here is unreasonable. 
[4] If you do not say that this person ceases and different one becomes an animal then you 
should not say that this human is different from that animal. 
[5] It is unreasonable to say: This human is different from that animal. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) A and - B 
And the Sunyatavadin presents the counter-argument: 
(2) If A then B 
(3) - (A and - B) 
(4) If - B then - A 
(5) -A 
5. The fifth argument: 
[1] Sunyatavadin: Can it be said whether this person is either the same as or different 
from that animal? 
Puggalavadin: No. 
Sunyatavadin: Can it be said whether this person ceases and a different one becomes an 
animal? 
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Puggalavadin: Yes. 
Sunyatavadin: Acknowledge your refutation: 
[2] If you cannot say whether this person is either the same as or different from that 
animal then you also cannot say whether this person ceases and different one becomes an 
animal. 
[3] What you say here is unreasonable. 
[4] If you can say whether this person ceases and different one becomes an animal then 
you can also say whether this person is either the same as or different from that animal. 
[5] It is unreasonable to say: It cannot be said whether this person is either the same as or 
different from that animal. 
The Puggalavadin declares that: 
(1) ~ A andB 
And the Sunyatavadin presents the counter-argument: 
(2) If - A then - B 
(3) ~ (~A and B) 
(4) IfB then A 
(5) ~ (-A) 
Analysis of the style of argument 
There is a striking resemblance between this style of argument and the one used in the 
Kathiivatthu. Both involve arguments with five parts, except that the Kathiivatthu is more 
systematic and regular in its formulation of these. The pattern common to both these works is: 
1. The opponent accepts two propositions. 
The refutation is: 
2. If the first then not the second. 
3. The first and the second, is wrong. 
4. If not the second then not the first. 
5. Therefore, you original position is wrong. 
This pattern is repeated with minor variations throughout both works. It was no doubt 
the accepted form of argument in the period when the Kathiivatthu and the Vijiiiinakiiya were 
originally composed. The Vijiiiinakiiya is a Sarvastivadin work, whereas the Kathiivatthu is a 
Theravadin work. These two schools owe their origins to the missions that King Asoka sent 
out in the middle of the third century BC. The style of argument common to these two works 
most probably dates from a time before the independent development of these two schools, 
i.e. before Asoka's missions in the middle of the third century BC. 
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3.3.2 Greek influence in the Kathavatthu and the Vijfianakaya 
The analysis of the arguments in the Kathiivatthu and the Vijfiiinakiiya suggests that the 
ancient Indian logicians did not distinguish between term logic and propositional logic. This 
distinction is found in the works of ancient Greek logicians. Aristotle (384-322 BC) taught a 
system of term logic and the Stoics, especially Chrysippus (280-207 BC), taught a system of 
propositional logic. The exact date that the Kathiivatthu and the Vijfiiinakiiya were originally 
composed is difficult to determine with any certainty. What is clear is that these works reflect 
a style of argument that belongs to a period in Indian history that is earlier than the earliest 
extant works containing formulations of logical principles. 
The traditional view that the Kathiivatthu was compiled in 250 BC would place it 72 
years after Aristotle had died and at a time when Chrysippus, who lived to age 73, was still at 
the relatively young age of 30. The Vijfiiinakiiya is thought to be a slightly later work than the 
Kathiivatthu. Both term logic and propositional logic seem to have appeared in India and in 
Greece at a similar time.! The difference is that Greek texts containing formulations of term 
logic and formulations of propositional logic have survived, whereas what little has survived 
from a similar period in Indian history does not contain formulations of logical principles, 
only examples of the application of those principles. Whether or not works containing such 
formulations existed in India in the third century BC is uncertain,2 but the fact that these 
principles were well understood is clearly evident in the extant works from the period. 
There is nothing in either the Kathiivatthu or the Vijfiiinakiiya to suggest that the logic 
they use is anything other than what was in common use in the period when they were 
composed. It is significant that neither work contains an explanation of the logical principles 
employed in debate. Their respective authors saw fit to explain in some detail the reasons for 
and against various controversial points but they did not see any need to explain the logical 
principles employed to establish those reasons. The fact that there is no explanation of these 
logical principles is entirely consistent with the view that these authors considered such 
principles to be familiar to their readers and therefore not in any need of explanation. This 
supports the view that the method of debate and the logical principles it employs were in fact 
standard for the period, and probably well known to Indian scholars of the third century Be. 
1 Bochenski 1961,423. 
2 Stcherbatsky 1930-32, 1, 28 claims that there probably was debate manuals in this early period. 
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It could be argued that the logic employed in these two works was in fact influenced by 
the Greeks and the reason why they do not contain an explanation of this logic is that Greek 
logic, or an Indian adaptation of Greek logic, had become common knowledge by the time 
these works were composed. The problem with this argument is that there is nothing in these 
works to suggest that the logical principles they employ are from a foreign source. There is 
also nothing uniquely Greek about the style of debate or the logic involved. The arguments 
are long and cumbersome with frequent repetition. This repetition may have some persuasive 
power in a spoken debate but it has no logical significance in an argument. Redundancy in an 
argument is not typical of Greek logic, whereas frequent repetition is a common feature of 
ancient Buddhist works. The style of debate found in the Kathiivatthu and the Vijiiiinakiiya 
appears to be typically Indian with no obvious sign of Greek influence. 
This analysis of arguments in the Kathiivatthu and in the Vijiiiinakiiya focused on 
propositions rather than on terms, since propositions playa more prominent role in 
determining the acceptability of arguments in these ancient debates. But the early Buddhist 
logicians were not much concerned with analysing propositions and the logical relationship 
between propositions. They were much more concerned with terms. These scholars drew up 
lists of terms in an attempt to make a precise classification of phenomena. Each term stood for 
a particular category of phenomena and what was included in each category determined the 
correct use of the term. The correct denotation of terms became an important topic of debate 
for the eady Buddhists. One work devoted to clarifying the meanings of terms is the Yamaka. 
3.4 The Yamaka 
3.4.1 Analysis of the Yamaka 
The date and author of the Yamaka (Pairs) are unknown although its contents suggest 
that it dates from about the second century Bel and may have evolved over some time.2 The 
terminology used in the work indicates that it was composed when certain words had taken on 
technical meanings within systems of classifying phenomena. These words are used as terms 
that stand for categories of phenomena. That is, a term is understood as referring to a class, 
the members of which compose the extension of the term. The correct use of a term is 
) Warder 1958, 94. 
2 Rhys Davids, Foley 1911-13,1, xviii. See also Frauwallner 1995,52,216 note 24. 
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determined by the class of phenomena to which the term refers. The Yamaka is an attempt to 
clarify the meanings of terms by taking pairs of terms and comparing one term with another 
using a regular formula. The formula involves a series of questions and answers aimed at 
determining to what extent the extension of one term is included within the extension of 
another term. The technique of analysing pairs of terms is strictly adhered to throughout the 
entire work and this suggests the origin of the title Yamaka, which means pairs. The work is 
preserved in Pali and has not been translated into a Western language. The contents of the 
Yamaka have been summarised in English by Nyanatiloka1 and by Lang.2 
In general, when the extension of one term is compared with that of another, the logical 
difference between these terms can be classified into four types of relationship. These are: 
1. Mutually inclusive, i.e. the extension of each term includes that of the other. 
2. Mutually exclusive, i.e. the extension of each term excludes that of the other. 
3. The extension of one term is completely included within the extension of the other, 
i.e. the class of things to which one of the terms applies is completely included in 
the class of things to which the other term applies, but not the reverse. 
4. The extension of each term is only partly included in the extension of the other, i.e. 
the class of things to which each term applies is partly but not completely included 
in the class of things to which the other term applies. 
These four types of relationship are not mentioned in the Yamaka, but a similar fourfold 
method of comparing terms (catukka-nyaya-saf(lsandana) is used it the secondary debates in 
the Kathavatthu (discussed above) and it was probably known to the author of the Yamaka. 
Warder provides some support for this when he says: "the Yamaka, incidentally, presupposes 
the logic ofthe Kathavatthu ... ,,3 
What does appear in the Yamaka is a series of questions asked in the affirmative and in 
the negative. The logical forms of the affirmative questions are: 
1. Is all A B? 
2. IsallBA? 
J Nyanatiloka 1938, 66-93. 
2 In Potter 1965-99, 7, 327-336. 
3 Warder 1982, xxxii, see also xxxvi. 
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Both questions are formed from a universal affirmative proposition. According to 
Warder, the quantifier 'all' is not always expressed in the work but it is certainly understood. 1 
Warder's description of the logical forms of the affirmative questions are: 
1. Whatever is A, is all that B? 
2. Whatever is B, is all that A? 
Misra describes the logical forms of the affirmative questions as:2 
1. If any x is A, is any x B? 
2. If any x is B, is any x A? 
The logical significance of these ways of formulating the affirmative questions may be 
treated as equivalent. The work provides answers to these questions. If the answer is "yes" to 
at least one of the two questions then the relationship between the two terms is clear. That is, 
if the answer is "yes" to both questions, then the two terms are mutually inclusive. If the 
answer is "yes" to one question and "no" to the other, then the extension of one term is 
completely included within the extension of the other, but not the reverse. However, if the 
answer to both questions is "no" then the relationship between the two terms remains unclear. 
Additional questions are required to determine the correct relationship. The questions found in 
the work contain the negations of both terms. The logical form of these negative questions is: 
3. Is all not A not B? 
4. Is all not B not A? 
Unfortunately these two questions do not help to determine the relationship between the 
terms, since (3) 'all not A is not B' is logically equivalent to (2) 'all B is A', and (4) 'all not B 
is not A' is logically equivalent to (1) 'all A is B'. For instance, if all A is B then all not B is 
not A, and if all not B is not A then all A is B. The author has in fact simply asked two more 
questions that are logically equivalent to the first two questions. The additional questions 
required are ones where one term only is negated. The logical form of the four questions that 
completely determine the relationship between two terms are: 
1. Is all A B? (or: Is all not B not A?) 
2. Is all B A? (or: Is all not A not B?) 
3. Is all A not B? (or: Is all B not A?) 
4. Is all not B A? (or: Is all not A B?) 
I Warder 1963, 66-67. Warder explains that the universal is expressed in the first chapter of the Yamaka, but in 
other chapters it is omitted probably as an abbreviation. The commentary supplies the universal for all chapters. 
2 Misra 1968, 60. 
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If the answers to questions 1 and 2 are "no" then the terms are either mutually 
exclusive, or the extension of each term partly includes the extension of the other. If the 
answer to question 3 is "yes" then the terms are mutually exclusive, and if the answer to 
question 3 is "no" then the extension of each term partly includes the extension of the other. 
When the questions are asked in this order question 4 becomes redundant, but it is included 
here to indicate the forms of all four questions. 
The work fails to make a complete examination of all the relationships that are logically 
possible when any two terms are compared. The fact that the work does not make such an 
analysis suggests that the main purpose of the work is not an analysis of relationships 
(between terms). Rather its main purpose is to determine the correct meanings of particular 
terms by comparing their extensions with those of other similar terms. The author is mostly 
concerned with terms that are very similar in meaning and easily confused. Examples of such 
terms are wholesome phenomena (kusala-dhamma) and wholesome roots (kusala-mula), and 
form (rupa) and form aggregate (rupa-khandha). The meanings of these terms are made clear 
by noting that in each case the extension of the first term completely includes the extension of 
second term, but not the reverse. That is, in both of these cases the answer to the question 'is 
all A B?' is "yes", and answer to the question 'is all B A?' is "no". When the answer is "no" 
an example is provided to illustrate an instance of one term that is not an instance of the other 
term. Warder mentions on a number of occasions that the main purpose of these exercises is 
to prepare students for debate by alerting them to the logical traps that arise from words being 
used in more than one sense or figuratively.] 
3.4.2 Greek influence in the Yamaka 
Rhys Davids in the introductory notes to the PiHi edition of the Yamaka claims that the 
analysis of term and concept is carried out by way of the logical process of conversion, and 
says that "the world probably contains no other such study in the applied logic of conversion 
as the Yamaka.,,2 This view is echoed by Norman and Keith. Norman says that "the Yamaka is 
a book on applied logic,,,3 and Keith says that "in the Yamaka again the distribution of terms 
is known and the process of conversion is elaborately illustrated, but without trace of 
I Warder 1963, 66; Warder 1970,290; and Warder 1971, 89. 
2 Rhys Davids, Foley 1911-13, xvi. 
3 Norman 1983, 105. 
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appreciation oflogical theory."l Jayatilleke objects to these claims arguing that the logical 
method employed in the Yamaka does not involve distribution or conversion in the proper 
technical sense of these terms.2 
The terms distribution and conversion are used in Western logic. In general, a term is 
distributed when it refers to or stands for all the members of its extension. The term 'A' is 
distributed in the proposition 'all A is B' if it refers to all members of the term 'B'. The 
conversion of a proposition can mean simply another proposition in which the terms have 
been reversed, e.g. 'all A is B' and 'all B is A'. Here the subject and predicate terms in the 
first proposition are reversed in the second proposition. The process of conversion in a more 
technical sense, however, refers to a mode of immediate inference from one proposition to 
another with the subject and predicate terms reversed? For example, the immediate inference 
from 'all A is B' to 'some B is A,.4 
Distribution does in fact occur in the Yamaka. For instance, the question 'is all A B?' 
does seek to establish whether or not the term 'A' is distributed in the proposition 'all A is B', 
i.e. whether or not the term 'A' refers to all members of the term 'B'. Both Warder5 and Lang6 
describe the logical method employed in the Yamaka as an analysis of the distribution of 
terms in propositions. The presence of conversion in the work is more confused. The fact that 
the second question 'is all B A?' has the terms from the first question 'is all A B?' in the 
reverse order could be taken as evidence of simple conversion. However, conversion in the 
more technical sense of an immediate inference from 'all A is B' to 'some B is A' for 
instance, does not occur in the work at all. When the answer to the question 'is all A B?' is 
"yes", there is no claim that some B is therefore A. Rather the question 'is all B A?' is asked 
in an effort to establish the relative difference between the extensions of each term. 
When the logical method employed in the Yamaka is described as one involving the 
systematic use of distribution and conversion it could give the impression that some Greek 
influence may be found in the work. But there is none to be found. The examples of simple 
1 Keith 1923, 304. See also Warder 1973, 86. 
2 Jayatilleke 1963,306-310. See also Misra 1968,60. 
3 Stebbing 1930, 63. 
4 The validity of this argument requires the existential assumption that there are As. 
s Warder 1963, 60, 66; and Warder 1970, 290. 
6 In Potter 1965-99, 7,327. 
95 
Chapter three: Early works on debate 
conversion can be dismissed since they signify nothing. Conversion in the more technical 
sense does not occur in the work at all. Only on the point of distribution could there be any 
grounds for considering Greek influence. However, to argue that the analysis of whether a 
term is distributed in a proposition constitutes evidence of Greek influence is an extremely 
weak argument and easily countered by pointing out that distribution also occurs in 
KathG.vatthu. 1 
The Yamaka is remarkable for its exhaustive analysis of the difference between terms. 
This work was no doubt composed for the purpose of establishing the correct meanings of 
terms as they were used in Buddhist philosophy. There is no obvious Greek influence to be 
found in the work, but one work in which Greeks do playa role is the famous Milindapafiha. 
3.5 The Milindapaiiha 
3.5.1 Historical background 
Within a year or two of the Buddhist Council being held in Asoka's capital Pataliputra, 
i.e. around 250-248 BC, both Bactria (northern Afghanistan) and Parthia (Iran south-east of 
the Caspian Sea) revolted and broke away from the Seleucid Empire ruled over by the 
Hellenic King Antiochus n Theos of Syria (reigned 261-246 BC). Parthia was not influenced 
by Greek culture to the same extent as Bactria. Bactria was in fact a Hellenic state, and the 
Bactrian Greeks were renowned for their skill in making coins. Engravers produced 
remarkably lifelike portraits of their subjects. Rapson says that their coins are purely Greek in 
style, in language, and in weight.2 Around 200 BC, the Bactrian Greeks minted coins using a 
variety of metals including nickel (or nickel alloy) imported from China, a metal unknown in 
Europe until the 18th century.3 Much of what is known about the Greeks in Bactria is learnt 
from their coins. 
Bactria extended from the Hindu Kush mountain range north to the Oxus valley and had 
its capital in Bactra (modem Balkh in northern Afghanistan). The southern border of Bactria 
met the northern border of Asoka' s domains in southern Afghanistan. Asoka died around 236 
or 232 BC after a reign of some 36 or 37 years and the Maurya Empire founded by Asoka's 
grandfather Candragupta then began to disintegrate. With the break-up of the Maurya Empire, 
I Aung, Rhys Davids 1915, 179,265,356,361, and 363. 
2 Rapson 1922, 545. 
3 Tarn 1938,87; Woodcock 1966, 73; and Sagar 1992, 102. 
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there was a succession of foreign invasions in northwest India. These carne from northern 
Afghanistan over the Hindu Kush into the Kabul valley and the Punjab, and from southern 
Afghanistan over the Brahiii mountains into Sind (Indus valley in southern Pakistan). The 
invaders in the first two centuries BC were: the Greeks (Yavanas or Yonas), the 
Scythians (Sakas), and the Parthians (Pahlavas ).1 
The significant Greek invaders of India are firstly Alexander in 326-325 BC, followed 
by the Bactrian prince Demetrius, son of Euthydemus (died c.190 BC). Demetrius attacked 
northwest India in the beginning of the second century Be. His conquests in India earned him 
the title 'King of the Indians'. Another Greek invasion was lead by Eucratides who had seized 
the Bactrian throne from the house of Euthydemus around 170 or 165 BC and entered 
northwest India some time before 162 Be. Demetrius died about 165 BC and Eucratides was 
murdered around 155-150 BC by one of his sons, perhaps Plato,2 or perhaps Helioc1es. 
Helioc1es succeeded Eucratides and he was the last Greek king to rule Bactria. When the 
Greeks retreated south around 125 BC, Greek rule north of the Hindu Kush ceased forever. 
In southern Afghanistan and northwest India there were many Greek princes who 
belonged to the two rival houses of Euthydemus and Eucratides. The fact that there were two 
royal houses of Bactrian Greeks ruling in India at the same time is known from the numerous 
coins they minted. These Indo-Greek rulers minted coins with both Greek and Indian 
language legends, and also with both Greek and Indian religious symbols. Some of these 
coins seem to have remained in use for at least two centuries. A Greek merchant, possibly 
from Egypt, wrote the Peri plus Maris Erythraei (Circumnavigation of the Red Sea) as a guide 
for merchants trading in the sea ports from Egypt to India. The Periplus was written in the 
middle of the first century AD, and its author says that Greek coins (drachmas) minted by the 
Indo-Greek rulers of India were still being used at that time: 
Inland behind Barygaza3 there are numerous peoples: ... And beyond these is a very 
warlike people, the Bactrians, ... Because of this, there are to be found on the market in 
Barygaza even today old drachmas engraved with the inscriptions, in Greek letters, of 
Apollodotus and Menander, rulers who came after Alexander.4 
I Rapson 1922, 540. 
2 Woodcock 1966, 92. 
3 Rhys Davids identifies Barygaza with modern Baroach on the Gujarat coast, see Rhys Davids 1890-94, 1, xx. 
4 Trans. Casson 1989,81. 
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Menander was the greatest of the Greek kings to rule in India. His coins are more varied 
and have been found over a wider area than those of any other Indo-Greek ruler in India. He 
was born in a village near Alasanda (Alexander) of the Yon as (Greeksi probably close to 
Kabul around 180 Be. Menander reigned after Demetrius had died, i.e. from about 160 Be. 
The territories conquered by the Bactrian Greeks, especially Menander, exceeded those 
conquered by Alexander and may have temporarily included Pataliputra, Asoka's old capital. 
Menander made his capital in Sagala or Sakala (modern Sialkot) in the Punjab. He was a great 
patron of Buddhism, much like Asoka. Plutarch describes how Menander's ashes were fought 
over when he died (c.130 Be): 
But when a certain man named Menander, who had been a good king of the Bactrians, 
died in camp, the cities celebrated his funeral as usual in other respects, but in respect to 
his remains they put forth rival claims and only with difficulty came to terms, agreeing 
that they should divide the ashes equally and go away and should erect monuments to him 
in all their cities.2 
The account in Plutarch describing how Menander's ashes were claimed by a number of 
cities closely resembles the account in the Mahiiparinibbiina Sutta (Great Passing)3 which 
describes how the Buddha's ashes were claimed by rival groups. The monuments Plutarch 
mentions are Buddhist stiipas which contain religious items. Menander is remembered not 
only in Greek literature but also in Indian literature. The Indo-Greek king Menander is in fact 
the King Milinda, one of the leading characters in the Buddhist classic the Milindapanha. 
3.5.2 The Milindapanha 
The Milindapanha (Milinda's Questions) is written in the form of a dialogue between 
King Milinda (Menander) and a Buddhist monk called Nagasena. There are longer and shorter 
versions of the work. The shorter version was probably written first and then additional 
material was subsequently added to it to form what is now the longer version. The author of 
the earlier part is unknown but this work must have been written while Menander was still 
highly regarded in India. Since Menander died about 130 Be, the earlier part was probably 
written in the first century Be. The later part of the work would have been written soon after, 
perhaps as late as the first century AD. Its author is also unknown. 
1 Mililldapaiiha (82), trans. Rhys Davids 1890-94, 1, 127; Horner 1963-64, 1, 114. 
2 Moralia (821, D, E), trans. Babbitt 1927, 10, 277-279. 
3 Sutta 16 of Dlgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids 1881, 1-136; Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,2,78-191; 
Walshe 1987,231-277. See Dlgha Nikiiya ii 164-168. 
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The longer version, containing both the earlier and later parts, is preserved in Pali and it 
has been translated into English twice. 1 The English translations divide the work into seven 
sections, the first three of which include the earlier part and the remaining four sections are 
the later additions. The earlier part has an introduction followed by two sections entitled 
'Milinda's Questions'. These end with the notice: here ends 'Milinda's Questions,.2 The 
following sections contain 40 dilemmas that are written in quite a different style. When these 
sections were added, the introduction listing the topics in the later sections was also expanded. 
Skilling describes all the known versions of the Milindapanha.3 The earlier part of the 
work, probably written in a north-western Prakrit, was taken to Sri Lanka and translated into 
Pali in the first century AD. There is a Pali version consisting of just the earlier part and this is 
thought to be a translation of the original version. The later part of the work may have been 
composed in Pali in Sri Lanka or it may have been composed in India and then translated into 
Piili in Sri Lanka. The Milindapanha was also translated into Chinese twice, first in the third 
century AD (now lost) and then again during the period 317-420 AD (now in two versions). 
The later part of the work found in the Piili version is not present in these Chinese versions. 
Extracts were also translated into Chinese in the fifth century AD, possibly from Sanskrit. A 
Sanskrit version was also cited by Vasubandhu (c.400-480 AD)4 in the final chapter of his 
Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya (Autocommentary to the 'Treasury of Higher Knowledge,).5 
3.5.3 Greek influence in the Milindapafiha 
Tarn's hypothesis 
Tarn accepts that the long version of the Milindapanha now preserved in Piili falls into 
two parts: the early and the later parts. Tam's hypothesis6 concerns only the earlier part of the 
Milindapanha. Tarn claims that the early part of the work is based on a Greek version of 
'Milinda's Questions' and this Greek work also influenced the Letter of Pseudo-Aristeas.7 
1 In Rhys Davids 1890-94; and in Horner 1963-64. Some sections translated in Warren 1973. 
2 See Rhys Davids 1890-94,1,99; Horner 1963-64, 1, 124. 
3 Skilling 1998,92-96. 
4 Frauwallner 1961, 131. 
5 Trans. Stcherbatsky 1920,45-47; Pruden 1988-90,4, 1332-1333; Duerlinger 1989, 157-158; and Skilling 1998, 
96-97. 
6 Tarn 1938,414-436 (Excursus, The Milindapaiiha and Pseudo-Aristeas). 
7 See Swete 1900, 519-574 for the text of the letter in Greek, and 501-518 for an English introduction; and 
Bartlett 1985, 11-34 for an English translation and commentary. 
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Tam argues that a Greek work (the Alexander Questions) describing how Alexander 
questioned Indian gymnosophists during his visit to India in the fourth century Be was used 
as a model for two other Greek works. These two works both describe how a foreign 
historical king questions fictitious philosophers belonging to the writer's own race. First, the 
Alexander Questions were used as a model for a Greek work written in the third century Be 
that describes how the historical King Ptolemy IT questioned a group of fictitious Jewish 
elders on philosophical issues. Tam calls this work the Questions of Ptolemy II. The 
Alexander Questions were also used in India as a model for a work where the historical King 
Menander questions a fictitious Buddhist monk called Nagasena about philosophical issues. 
Tam calls this work the Original Questions of Milinda. 
The Original Questions of Milinda was written in Greek soon after Menander's death, 
i.e. before 100 Be, and it then found its way to Alexandria in Egypt where it was read by 
Pseudo-Aristeas around 100 Be. Pseudo-Aristeas saw how the author of the Original 
Questions of Milinda had used a king's questions to produce a work to further the cause of 
Buddhism. He then wrote the Letter of Pseudo-Aristeas incorporating the Questions of 
Ptolemy II in order to further the cause of Judaism. Pseudo-Aristeas chose Ptolemy IT because 
there was already a document in existence, the Questions of Ptolemy II, where a famous king 
questioned Jews. Similarly, the Buddhist author of the early part of the Milindapafiha chose 
Menander because there was already a document in existence, the Greek Original Questions 
of Milinda, where a famous king questioned a Buddhist sage. 
Tam claims that the Buddhist author wrote the early part of the Milindapafiha no later 
than the first century Be when Greek was colloquially spoken in India and Indians knew 
Greek works.} The questions in the Original Questions of Milinda would have been changed 
to better suit the purpose of furthering the cause of Buddhism, and some time later another 
Buddhist writer expanded the introduction and added the extra questions to make up the 
Milindapafiha as it is known today. Tam argues for his hypothesis by pointing out that 
various aspects of the early part of the Milindapafiha can be explained only by supposing a 
Greek original, and a number of similarities between the early part of the Milindapaiiha and 
the Letter of Pseudo-Aristeas can be explained only by supposing that Pseudo-Aristeas had 
read the Original Questions of Milinda. 
I Tarn 1938,435. 
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Support for Tarn 
Woodcock supports Tarn's hypothesis that the Milindapafiha was based on a Greek 
original and that Pseudo-Aristeas wrote his Letter in imitation of this Greek work. Woodcock 
points out that Plutarch describes how Menander's ashes were buried in monuments (stiipas) 
and so "Greek texts relating to Buddhist doctrine must by this time have begun to reach the 
Western world."} Unlike Tarn, however, Woodcock argues that Nagasena was not a fictitious 
character but was in fact a Greek Buddhist monk and a disciple of the Greek monk 
Dhammarakkhita who had been sent to Aparantaka (Gujarat) by Asoka after the Buddhist 
Council in 250 Be. This view has some support in the introduction to the Milindapafiha 
(Milindapafiha 16-18) which describes how Nagasena goes to the Asoka monastery in 
Pataliputta to study with Dhammarakkhita. Menander is thought to have died about 120 years 
after the Buddhist Council in Pataliputra. This makes it unlikely but not impossible for 
Nagasena to have been a direct disciple of Dhammarakkhita. In spite of this chronological 
problem Woodcock claims that: 
If we once admit the possibility of Nagasena having been a Greek Buddhist monk, the 
Platonic flavour of the Questions of King Milinda becomes immediately explicable; 
Nagasena knew his Plato in the original, and made a deliberate and brilliant use of the 
Socratic method to expound the Buddhist truths to Menander in a form that he, too, would 
find familiar. Not only is the Platonic form there; one senses equally much of the Platonic 
spirit, particularly in the exasperating smugness with which Nagasena, like Socrates, is 
capable of sustaining his argument by sheer logical legerdemain. If we once grant that 
Nagasena talking to Menander was Greek talking to Greek, and recorded first by a Greek 
scribe, from whose version a later PaIi text was prepared and modified to suit Indian 
literary traditions, then the form and the very raison d'etre of the Milindapaiiha become 
more comprehensible ... 2 
Woodcock is certainly not alone in his support for the view that the Milindapafiha 
resembles a Greek or Platonic dialogue. For instance, Jairazbhoy says: 
The book, Questions of Milinda, whose form of interrogation and answer compellingly 
recalls the dialogues of Plato ... 3 
Similarly Sedlar says: 
The Questions itself can be regarded as a true product of Hellenistic syncretism: 
apparently modelled in some respects upon a Greek dialogue ... 1 
1 Woodcock 1966, 95. 
2 Woodcock 1966, 96. 
3 J airazbhoy 1963, 51. 
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And Pesala also says: 
The style of the Milinda Pafiha is very much like a Platonic dialogue, Nagasena playing 
the part of Socrates and winning over King Milinda to the Buddhist view point by his 
sound reasoning and his fitting similes.2 
No doubt there are many others who hold similar views. Such views strongly suggest 
that the Milindapafiha contains evidence of Greek influence in its philosophical ideas and also 
in its logical techniques. However, the actual content of the Milindapafiha does not support 
such a hypothesis, as will be shown by a close analysis of the early part of the work, and then 
an analysis of the later part of the work. 
3.5.4 The earlier part of the Milindapanha 
The earlier part of the Milindapafiha includes some of the introduction, plus the next 
two sections entitled 'Milinda's Questions'. This part of the work was written after Menander 
(c.180-c.130 Be), probably in the first century Be, i.e. about three hundred years after Plato 
(c.428-348 Be). The work first introduces the main characters and then sets the scene for the 
questions. Nagasena agrees to debate with Milinda provided this can be done according the 
way the learned converse: 
When the learned are conversing, sire, [1] a turning over [of a subject] is made and an 
unravelling is made and [2] a refutation is made and a redress is made and [3] a specific 
point is made and a specific point is made against it, and the learned are not angry in 
consequence - it is thus, sire, that the learned converse.3 
The procedure followed in philosophical discussion or debate is described as one where 
these three pairs of points are involved. There is no explanation as to what each point 
includes, but this mention indicates that some procedure was followed in debates. The work in 
fact does not follow these conventions at all. There is no pattern of argument corresponding to 
these three pairs of points in the work. The questions begin with some minor verbal sparring: 
The King said: "Revered Nagasena, I will ask." 
"Ask, sire." 
"You have been asked by me, revered sir." 
"It has been answered, sire." 
"But what was answered by you, revered sir?" 
"But what was asked by you, sire?,,4 
I Sedlar 1980, 64. 
2 Pesala 1991, ix. 
3 Mililldapaiiha (28-29), trans. Horner 1963-64, 1, 39. See also Rhys Davids 1890-94, 1,46. 
4 Milindapmlha (29), trans. Horner 1963-64,1,39. 
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What follows is simply a series of questions and answers. The typical pattern for these 
is exemplified by the following short discussion: 
Revered Nagasena, what is the distinguishing mark of applied thought? 
Fixing [the mind], sire, is the distinguishing mark of applied thought. 
Make a simile. 
As, sire, a carpenter fixes a well turned piece of wood in a socket, so, sire, is fixing [the 
mind] the distinguishing mark of applied thought. 
You are dexterous, revered Nagasena. I 
The pattern found in these questions is one where the king asks a question, Nagasena 
answers, the king requests a simile, and Nagasena explains his answer by way of an analogy. 
More discussion occurs in some questions and occasionally further similes are requested and 
supplied. Nagasena's answers do not consist of regularly structured arguments. They are 
simply presented in a conversational style. The questions end with Milinda and Nagasena 
congratulating each other on their discussion. 
Since the dialogue as a literary form was common in ancient India, its use in the early 
part of the Milindapafiha cannot be taken as evidence of Greek influence. Nagasena does not 
play the part of Socrates as some claim. Nagasena typically answers questions rather than 
asking them. He never asks Milinda for the necessary and sufficient conditions that define the 
subject of discussion, nor does he ever try to point out self-contradictions in Milinda's 
answers. The style of questioning and the use of argument by analogy2 found in the early part 
of the Milindapafiha are completely in accordance with what is found in the early Buddhist 
works. These describe the Buddha as answering questions put to him by kings, and the 
Buddha often employs argument by analogy. These dialogues are quite unlike Platonic 
dialogues. There is in fact nothing in the early part of the Milindapafiha that indicates any 
influence from Greek philosophical or logical traditions. Whatever evidence there may be for 
Greek influence in the Milindapafiha must be sought in the later part of the work. 
3.5.5 The later part of the Milindapafiha 
An example question 
The later part of the Milindapafiha includes the additions to the introduction and the 
forty questions which make up the last four sections of the work. This material was probably 
1 Milindapmlha (62), trans. Horner 1963-64, 1, 85-86. 
2 Pali: upamii, opamma in the Milindapmlha. 
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added within a century of the earlier part being written, i.e. in the first century AD. In the 
expanded version of the introduction, Milinda is described as a man of many skills: 
Many were the arts he had mastered, that is to say: the revealed tradition, secular lore, the 
Sarpkbya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaise~ika systems, accountancy, music, medicine, the four 
Vedas, the Purat;las, the oral traditions, astronomy, conjuring, logic [hetu], spells, fighting, 
poetry, reckoning on the fingers, in a word, the nineteen [arts]. A disputant hard to equal, 
hard to overcome, he was acclaimed chief of the leaders of the numerous schools of 
thought.1 
The word "logic" here is Homer's translation of "hetu" which means literally cause or 
reason. Rhys Davids translates the word "hetu" in this same passage as "causation" rather 
than as "logic".2 If "hetu" as it is used here does mean reasoning or logic then it indicates that 
logic, or perhaps debate, was recognized as an important skill to master at the time when the 
later part of the work was composed. 
The forty questions which make up the last four sections of the work are quite different 
from the questions in the early part of the work. The earlier questions are straightforward 
requests for Nagarsena to explain the Buddhist position on various points. The answers to 
these questions are usually quite short and often involve similes. The later questions on the 
other hand are presented in the form of dilemmas (me1JeJakapafiha). Homer notes that the term 
means literally "questions belonging to the ram, or questions made of ram's horns". 3 The 
answers to these questions also differ from the earlier ones in that they are much longer and 
more detailed. The typical pattern for these dilemmas is exemplified by the following short 
example. Here Milinda asks Nagasena to explain why the Buddha did not answer questions 
on the so-called undeclared points. 
This question, revered Nagasena, will have two ends on one of which it must rest: either 
that of not knowing or that of keeping something secret. 
The two consequences are: (i) that the Buddha did not answer because he did not know 
the correct answer, or (ii) that he did not answer because he kept some things secret. Neither 
of these are acceptable to Nagasena. Milinda argues that Nagasena must accept one of these: 
For if, revered Nagasena, the Lord said: 'In regard to the Tathiigata's teachings, Ananda, 
there is no "teacher's fist",' well then, it was through not knowing that he did not answer 
the Elder Malunkyaputta. 
I Milindapmlha (3-4), trans. Horner 1963-64, 1, 5. 
2 Rhys Davids 1890-94, 1, 6. Rhys Davids notes that Trenckner also translates "hetu" as "logic", see also note 1. 
3 Horner 1963-64, 1, 3 note 4. 
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That is, ifthe Buddha has not kept any teachings secret (concealed in his fist) as he 
claimed, 1 then he did not answer because he did not know the correct answer. 
But if though he knew he did not answer, well then, in the Tathagata's teachings there 
was a 'teacher's fist.' 
On the other hand, if the Buddha knew the correct answer and still did not give an 
answer, then the Buddha has kept some things secret. 
This too isa double-pronged question; it is put to you; it is for you to solve.2 
Milinda challenges Nagasena to solve the problem of answering this double-pronged 
(ubhatokotika) question. Nagasena replies: 
Sire, there are four ways of answering questions. What four? [1] There is the question to 
be answered with a definite [reply], [2] there is the question to be answered with an 
analysis, [3] there is the question to be answered with a counter-question, [4] there is the 
question to be set aside. 
These four are the same as those found in the early Buddhist works (discussed in 
chapter two). The same passage continues with examples of the four types of questions: 
[1] And what, sire, is a [type of] question to be answered with a definite [reply]? Is 
material shape [form] impermanent? is a [type of] question to be answered with a definite 
[reply] .... 
[2] What is a [type of] question to be answered with an analysis? But if material shape is 
impermanent ... ? is a [type of] question to be answered with an analysis .... 3 
[3] What is a [type of] question to be answered with a counter-question? But now, is 
everything discriminated by the eye? is a [type of] question to be answered with a 
counter-question. 
[4] What is a [type of] question to be set aside? Is the world eternal? ... [etc., lists the 
undeclared pointst is a [type of] question to be set aside. 
Nagasena explains to Milinda that the Buddha did not answer questions on the these 
points because such questions are ones that must be set aside. The passage ends with 
Nagasena giving the reason why the Buddha did not answer questions that are to be set aside: 
For what reason was it a question to be set aside? There was no cause or reason for 
answering it, therefore it was a question to be set aside. There is no utterance or speech of 
the Buddhas, the Lords, that is without reason, without cause. 
I In the Digha Nikiiya (ii 100), and Sa,!lyutta Nikiiya (v 153). 
2 Milindapaiiha (144), trans. Horner 1963-64, 1,201-202. 
3 Watanabe 1983, 83, has: "Is matter really impermanent?" 
4 The undeclared points are here listed as twelve rather than the usual ten. The two that have been added are: the 
world is both finite and infinite, and the world is neither finite nor infinite. 
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There is no mention here that answering such questions would be misleading, only that 
the Buddha does not speak unless there is some purpose or benefit in doing so. 
It is good, revered Nagasena; so it is, therefore do I accept it.! 
This question ends with Milinda accepting Nagasena's answer. 
The pattern found in these later questions is one where Milinda asks a question in the 
form of a dilemma and Nagasena answers with a detailed explanation. The questions that 
Milinda asks are on points found in the early Buddhist works and Nagasena' s answers 
resemble a commentary explaining these points in the form of a dialogue. The questions in the 
later part of the work end with Milinda handing over his kingdom to his son and taking up the 
homeless life of a Buddhist recluse. 
Greek influence 
The reasons to reject Greek influence in the earlier part of the Milindapanha also apply 
to the later part of the work. One distinctive difference between the earlier and later questions 
is that the later questions are dilemmas. But the use of dilemmas is not evidence of Greek 
influence since the dilemma as a dialectical method is well known in ancient Buddhist 
literature. Dilemmas are found in the Kathavatthu (discussed above) and also in other early 
Buddhist works. For instance, in the Abhayarajakumara Sutta (To Prince Abhaya),2 Nigal).tha 
Nataputta formulates a dilemma for Abhaya to use to refute the Buddha (Gotama). Then 
Nigal).tha Nataputta tells Abhaya that: 
When the recluse Gotama is posed this two-horned question by you, he will not be able 
either to gulp it down or to throw it up? 
There is in fact nothing in either the earlier or later parts of the Milindapanha that 
would indicate influence from the Greek philosophical or logical traditions. Tarn's hypothesis 
that the Milindapanha was based on a Greek original has been challenged,4 but it would make 
little difference even if Tarn was right. The Milindapanha contains very little logical material 
and what little it does contain is similar to that found in other ancient Buddhist works. 
1 Milindapaiiha (144-145), trans. Horner 1963-64, 1,202-203. See also Solomon 1976-78,1,31-32. 
2 Sutta 58 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,2,60-64; Bodhi 1995,498-501. 
3 Majjhima Nikaya (i 393), trans. Bodhi 1995,498. 
4 Gonda 1949; Keith 1940,220-224. 
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Bronkhorst accepts that there is no evidence of Greek influence to be found in the text 
itself, but argues that the very existence of the Milindapafiha indicates that the Greek tradition 
of debate did influence the Buddhists of the Gandhara region. He says: "What I propose is 
that the Buddhists of North-West India adopted the method of rational debate and inquiry 
from the Greeks .... Once the tradition of rational inquiry had been established, it was 
apparently capable of continuing on its own, and even spread all over India.,,1 He supports 
this claim by arguing that "no tradition of rational inquiry (in the sense here intended, 
manifested by critical debate and attempts to create coherent views of reality) existed in India 
before the period we are considering.,,2 
However, there is evidence of a tradition of rational inquiry existing in India before the 
period being considered, and this tradition does attempt to create coherent views of reality. 
Evidence for this tradition is found in works belonging to the Buddhist, J aina and other 
traditions of ancient India. These ancient logicians developed a style of argument consisting 
of ten members. 
3.6 Ten member arguments 
The form of argument used in ancient India often involved ten components. This is seen 
first in the style of debate used in the Kathavatthu. The primary debates began with a five step 
argument for a proposition like 'A is B'. The five steps are: the way forward, the way back, 
the refutation, the application and the conclusion. These were followed with the same five 
steps in an argument for the opposite proposition, 'A is not B'. These ten steps made up the 
first pair of sections in an eight section primary debate. The other three pairs of sections 
consist of the same ten steps. 
The J aina tradition also used a form of argument involving ten members, but the date of 
its original architect remains uncertain. The ten member argument is described by 
Bhadrabahu, but there was more than one Bhadrabahu. Bhadrabahu the elder is traditionally 
thought to have lived in the 4th century Be? Bhadrabahu the younger may have lived in the 
first century Be. 4 Yet another date for Bhadrabahu is the sixth century AD. 1 Whether or not 
I Bronkhorst 1999, 22-23. 
2 Bronkhorst 1999, 24. 
3 VidyabhU~al)a 1917,164; and Warder 1958, 94. 
4 Ingalls 1955, ] ]0. 
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this later Bhadrabahu is Bhadrabahu the younger is unclear. The form of argument consisting 
of ten members has been translated by Vidyabhu~a1).a2 and Solomon.3 The essence of these ten 
members is as follows: 
1. Proposition (pratiji1ii) 
To refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues. 
2. Limitation of proposition (pratiji1ii-vibhakti) 
Only in the Jaina tradition. 
3. Reason (hetu) 
Because those who do so are loved by the gods and honoured by men. 
4. Limitation of reason (hetu-vibhakti) 
Only those who refrain from taking life abide in the greatest of virtues. 
5. Counter position (vipak.Ja) 
The gods love those who sacrifice animals and men honour their fathers-in-law. 
6. Exclusion of counter position (vipak.Ja-prati.Jedha) 
Those who sacrifice animals are not loved by the gods and are not worthy of honour. 
7. Example (dr.Jtiinta) 
Like the saints (arhat) and ascetics (siidhu) who don't even cook their own food lest 
they take life. 
8. Doubt (iiSaJ1kii) 
Householders cook for the saints and ascetics and thus the latter cause as much harm 
as do householders. 
9. Exclusion of doubt (iisankii-prati.Jedha) 
Householders do not cook for the saints and ascetics since they arrive unannounced 
and at irregular times. 
10. Conclusion (nigamana) 
Therefore to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues because those who do 
so are loved by the gods and honoured by men. 
Step 1 presents a proposition, and Step 2 qualifies this proposition. Step 3 states a 
reason to support the proposition, and Step 4 declares that the reason is conclusive. Step 5 
challenges the conclusiveness of the reason by claiming that there are instances of the reason 
that apply to the opposite position, i.e. there are those loved by the gods and honoured by men 
who do not abide in the greatest of virtues. Step 6 defends the reason by rejecting the claim 
that instances of the reason apply to the opposite position. Step 7 is an instance of the reason 
supporting the proposition, i.e. an example of those loved by the gods and honoured by men 
1 VidyabhU~ar.ta 1917, 165; and Shah 1967, 31. 
2 VidyabhU~aJ::ta 1920, 166-167; repro in Bochenski 1961,423-425. 
3 Solomon 1976-78, 1,403-404, the Sanskrit is reproduced in note 48, pp. 428-429. See also Warder 1971,117; 
and Ingalls 1955, 110. 
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who do abide in the greatest of virtues. Step 8 challenges the example by claiming that this 
instance of the reason does not support the proposition, i.e. the example of those loved by the 
gods and honoured by men do not refrain from taking life. Step 9 defends the example by 
rejecting the claim that this instance of the reason does not support the proposition. Step 10 
declares that the reason proves the proposition. 
Bhadrabahu also describes another slightly different set of ten members used to form 
arguments. This style of argument involving ten components is indicative of logic in a very 
early period of Indian history. Later refinements reduced the number of members to their 
essentials. Bhadrabahu also admits that an argument can consist of five, three or even just two 
members.} This suggests that the Bhadrabahu who described arguments involving ten 
members may have lived later in history. However, the system of forming arguments with ten 
members was used by other logicians in the early period. 
Vatsyayana (c.450-500 AD) in his commentary (Nyiiya Bhii$ya) on the Nyiiya Sutra 
(Logic Aphorisms) explains that some ancient logicians2 formed arguments with ten 
components.3 These ten are: 
1. Inquiry (jijiiiisii) 
2. Doubt (sa'!lsaya) 
3. Belief in the possibility of a solution (sakya-priipti) 
4. Purpose (or intention) (prayojana) 
5. Dispelling doubt (sa'!lsaya-vyudiisa) 
6. Proposition (pratijiiii) 
7. Reason (hetu) 
8. Instance (or example) (udiiharal}a) 
9. Application (upanaya) 
10. Conclusion (nigamana) 
The first five of these members are psychological factors associated with an argument. 
Vatsyayana describes inquiry as the desire to know what is not yet known. Doubt is the cause 
of inquiry. It entertains two contradictory positions, only one of which will be established. 
Belief in the possibility of a solution is the determination that the cognitive instruments 
I Shah 1967,31. 
2 Dhruva 1920, 263-266, claims that these ancient logicians were the early MTmaJTIsakas. 
3 Nyiiya Bhi1~ya on Nyaya Szitra (1.1.32), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,316. Note: page numbers misprinted. See Keith 
1921,85-86; Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya 1967-68, 1,107-108; Solomon 1976-78,1,402; and 
Gangopadhyaya 1982,39. 
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(prama1}a) are capable of (correctly) cognising their respective objects (prameya). Purpose is 
the intention to correctly establish something, which is the result of an argument. Dispelling 
doubt is the removal of uncertainty by refuting the counter position. The last five members are 
the actual statements used to establish something (sadhaka-vakya). In this system all ten 
components are considered part of the argument. 
The ten components that Vatsyayana describes differ from Bhadrabahu' s two methods 
of forming arguments with ten members. Vatsyayana is therefore not referring to Bhadrabahu 
but to some other ancient logicians. The Yuktid'ipika, a commentary on Isvara1q~t;ta's (c.350-
450 AD) Siif!lkhya Kiirikii written by an unknown author around the 6th century AD, 
describes a system of forming arguments with ten members that is almost the same as the one 
described by Vatsyayana.1 These references suggests that some of the earliest systems of 
Indian logic formed arguments using ten components. These date from a period after the 
Kathiivatthu (third century Be) and continued to be used even in much later times. The 
ancient logicians may have written works describing their systems, but nothing of them 
survives. Stcherbatsky thinks that probably there were such manuals in this early period: 
The opening debate of the Kathiivatthu on the reality of a soul is conducted with so high a 
degree of artificiality and every kind of dialectical devices that it suggests the probable 
existence of special manuals in which the art of debate was taught.2 
The next chapter looks at the earliest extant works containing material on the logic used in 
debate. 
1 Trans. Kumar, Bhargava 1990-92, 1, 181-186. Chakrabarti 1951, 193; cf. Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya 
1967-68,1,108. 
2 Stcherbatsky 1930-32, 1, 28. 
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Chapter four: The medical tradition 
This chapter examines one of the earliest formulations of logical principles found in 
Indian literature. It is preserved in the Caraka Saf!1hita (Caraka's Compendium),l the oldest 
surviving work in the traditional Indian medical system (Ayurveda). The Caraka Saf!1hita 
contains a list of 44 technical terms used in logic and debate. Caraka's explanation of these 
terms provides a rare glimpse into early Indian logic. There is ample evidence of Greek 
influence in areas like sculpture and coin making during the period when Caraka wrote 
(around the first or second century AD) and thus the possibility of Greek influence in 
Caraka's logic cannot be discounted. The system of proofs described in the Caraka Saf!1hita is 
compared with Aristotelian syllogisms to show that Caraka was not influenced by the Greeks. 
The possibility of some Greek influence finding its way into Caraka's logic would still remain 
if it could be shown that there is Greek influence in Caraka's system of medicine. However, 
there is no evidence for Greek influence in the medical system that Caraka describes. 
4.1 Historical background 
4.1 .1 The Kushans 
During Menander's lifetime, conflict in Central Asia led to the mass migration of 
nomad hordes who eventually entered India. Chinese historians document a war that broke 
out in the border regions of the Chinese Empire about 165 BC in which the Yiieh-chih 
(Yuezhi) were defeated by the Hsiung-nu (Xiongnu). The Yueh-chih were forced westward 
where they encountered and defeated the Wu-sun. The Yueh-chih then continued their 
westward migration until they had displaced the Sakas (Scythians) from their lands around the 
J axartes valley in Central Asia. The Sakas were forced south around 140 Be and they are 
often described as driving the Greeks out of Bactria, something Tarn considers to be a myth. 2 
According to Plutarch, Menander died in camp (see above), and this may have been while he 
was on a military campaign against a Saka invasion.3 If the Sakas did conquer Bactria then 
their conquest was short-lived because the Wu-sun soon avenged their previous defeat at the 
hands of the Yueh-chih by driving them out of their newly acquired Saka lands. This also 
I Trans. Mehta 1949; Sharma 1981-94; and Kaviratna, Sharma 1996. Meu1enbe1d lists the Sanskrit editions 
(1999-2000, IB, 3-6) and the Sanskrit commentaries (1999-2000, lA, 180-200) for the Caraka Sa'!lhita. 
2 Tarn 1938, 284. 
3 Rawlinson 1916, 82. 
111 
Chapter four: The medical tradition 
forced the Ytieh-chih south into Bactria. The Chinese historians report that in 125 BC the 
Ytieh-chih had settled in the Oxus valley with their headquarters north of the river but with 
authority over all Bactria.1 The Ytieh-chih then abandoned their nomadic way of life and 
remained in Bactria for at least a century. 
Rapson describes the Sakas or Scythians as nomads inhabiting the northern regions of 
Europe and Asia.2 They had been driven south by the Ytieh-chih until they had their migration 
checked by the Pahlavas or Parthians around Herat (western Afghanistan). They then travelled 
south-eastward and entered Sind (Indus valley in southern Pakistan) around the end of the 
second century Be. At this time they were a mixture of Saka and Parthian people. In the 
beginning of the first century BC they moved north up the Indus river, led by their king 
Maues. They seized Gandhara from the Greek king Apollodotus and established their capital 
in Taxila (near Rawalpindi, northern Pakistan). Maues was succeeded by Azes I who was a 
Parthian. Greek rule then ended in Gandhara, except for an area around Peshawar and the 
Kabul valley ruled by Hermaeus. Hermaeus was the last Greek king in India and when he died 
around 30 BC his territory also passed into Parthian control. At the same time the Romans 
conquered Egypt, marking a similar end to Greek supremacy in the West. 
Although Greek rule had ended in India, Greek influence continued for some time. The 
Saka and Parthian rulers appear to have greatly valued the skills of the Greeks. They retained 
Greek mint-masters and engravers to produce their currency. They used the Greek script in 
their coin legends, they adopted Greek political systems in their administration, and no doubt 
Greek communities continued to prosper in their territories as they had done under Greek 
kings. The fact that Greek continued to be used on coins for more than 200 years after the last 
Greek king indicates that the Greeks remained a significant minority in India long after they 
lost political power. The new rulers simply replaced their Greek predecessors and continued 
with the Indo-Greek establishment. 
Meanwhile, in Bactria the Ytieh-chih had divided into five principalities and at least a 
century later,3 the Kushan section of the Ytieh-chih gained supremacy under their leader 
Kadphises 1. Then, like the Bactrian Greeks before them, the Ytieh-chih led by the Kushans 
1 Levi 1903,418. 
2 Rapson 1922,564. 
3 Levi 1903,417,419. 
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conquered the territories south of the Hindu Kush, i.e. the Afghan provinces around Kabul 
and Kandahar. Kadphises I became the first Kushan chief of Kabul and his coins suggest that 
he may also have been a Buddhist.1 The Kushans then extended their control from the Kabul 
valley into northwest India taking all of Gandhara from the Indo-Parthian dynasty. Kadphises 
I was succeeded by his son Kadphises IT, who was probably not a Buddhist, and he was in 
tum succeeded by the famous Kani~ka who was a Buddhist. 
4.1.2 Kanil?ka 
Kani~ka's reign 
Kani~ka made his capital in Peshawar (northern Pakistan). He gained control over the 
regions of both the Indus and Ganges valleys, and may also have annexed Kashmir. The 
Kushans controlled the lower Indus valley through Parthian princes and western India through 
both Saka and Parthian princes. The Kushan empire extended from the Oxus in Central Asia 
to the Ganges in the east. The eastern extreme of their empire remains uncertain. They 
controlled this empire until the third century AD, although Kushans continued to rule parts of 
Afghanistan until the ninth century. The era beginning in 78 AD was known as the Saka era, 
in spite of the fact that it was the Kushans who were in control. The Saka era, also called the 
Indo-Scythian or the Kushan era, was followed by the Gupta era which began in 320 AD. 
Kani~ka's dates are the subject of considerable controversy. Opinions range over a four 
century period from the first century BC to the third century AD, although current research 
makes the earlier and later extremes appear unlikely. These opinions have been summarised 
by various authors.2 The earlier date proposes that Kani~ka' s reign started the Vikrama era in 
58 BC, but this is now doubted. The later date of the third century AD is not well supported 
and is complicated by the fact that there was more than one Kani~ka. Also, placing Kani~ka 
before the first century AD or after the second century AD creates problems synchronising 
with other events in history. The two leading theories are first that Kani~ka's reign started the 
Saka era in 78 AD, and second that Kani~ka's reign began around 127 AD.3 Astronomical, 
numismatic and epigraphic evidence supports the latter of these two dates. A date of around 
100 AD will be adopted here as a working hypothesis. 
J Majumdar 1951,138. See also Sagar 1992,164. 
2 See for instance Winternitz 1933,2,611-614; Sagar 1992, 168-173; and Basham ed. 1968. 
3 Fa1k 2001. 
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Kani~ka was the greatest Kushan emperor and a renowned patron of Buddhism. He is 
likened to Asoka and even convened a Buddhist council in Kashmir much as Asoka had done 
in Pataliputra.1 The Kashmir council was attended by some 500 monks from all parts of India 
and it produced the encyclopaedic work entitled the Mahiivibhii~ii.2 There are conflicting 
reports on who acted as president at the council. Vasumitra played a prominent role and 
Asvagho~a also took part in the proceedings. 
Greeks during Kani~ka's time 
There were no doubt many Greeks and Indo-Greeks living in Kani~ka's domains and 
their skills are reflected in the buildings, coins and sculptures dating from Kani~ka's time. 
Kani~ka constructed a magnificent pagoda in his capital Peshawar to enshrine the relics of the 
Buddha. Woodcock describes the pagoda as consisting of a five-story stone base supporting 
thirteen wooden stories, the whole structure standing 638 feet high. It was one of the wonders 
of the ancient world. The architect who designed and built the pagoda for Kani~ka was the 
Greek Agesilas. 3 Kani~ka' s coins contained images of the Buddha as well as other (non-
Buddhist) deities testifying to his liberal attitude towards religions. Originally the Buddha was 
not depicted in human form, but by Kani~ka's time it was common practice do so. Kani~ka's 
coins figure the Buddha standing clad in Greek costume and also with him seated in Indian 
fashion.4 These are some of the earliest surviving images of the Buddha. 
Greek sculptors were employed to decorate the Buddhist temples and monasteries in 
Gandhara. Rawlinson claims that the Kushans were responsible for "the importation of a large 
number of Greek sculptors from Asia Minor, to decorate the Buddhist monasteries, stiipas, 
and other religious buildings,"S but qualifies this with, "it is uncertain whether they employed 
Bactrian Greeks or outsiders to execute the remarkable Gandhara sculptures.,,6 These 
sculptures were based on Greek artistic styles but used Buddhist SUbjects. hnages of the 
Buddha were based on the Hellenic god Apollo. From the second to the fifth centuries, Greek 
and Greek-taught artists produced large quantities of the so-called Graeco-Buddhist art of 
1 Described by Taranatha, see Chattopadhyaya 1970,91-95. 
2 Summarised by Ichimura et al. in Potter 1965-99, 7, 511-568. Watters 1904-05,274-276 argues that the 
Mahavibhii~a was not produced following Kani~ka's council. 
3 Woodcock 1966, 132. See also Rawlinson 1916, 165. 
4 Smith 1919, 132. 
5 Rawlinson 1916,165. See also Rawlinson 1914, 233. 
6 Rawlinson 1916,84. 
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Gandhara. Greek influence in the art of Gandhara is one of the most prominent features of 
Greek influence in Indian culture and it came after Greek political power had ended in India. 
The Kushan rulers used Greek in the legends of their coins for some 200 years. The 
Greek in Kani~ka' s coins is slightly modified and it became progressively more degenerate 
thereafter until it ceased to be used by about the third century AD.} The use of Greek is taken 
as aJikely indication of the prominence of Greeks in Indian society, and the disappearance of 
Greek from Kushan coin legends probably coincides with the disappearance of Greeks from 
India. The Greeks did not leave India but were gradually absorbed into the local population 
through intermarriage. 
During the Kushan era when Greeks played a prominent role in Indian society there 
would have been ample opportunity for Greek influence to find its way into Indian arts and 
sciences. Greek influence is certainly evident in the sculpture and coins of this period, and it 
could equally have found its way into other disciplines. The Indian medical system is one 
such discipline that some argue may have been influenced by the Greeks. 
4.2 The Indian medical system 
The traditional Indian medical system preserves one of the earliest formulations of 
Indian logic. It is found in the Caraka Sa7!lhitii. Caraka's date and identity remain uncertain. 
Meulenbeld has made a comprehensively survey of scholarly opinion regarding these issues.2 
4.2.1 Caraka 
Caraka was a physician from northwest India, probably Kashmir,3 who is credited with 
compiling a medical treatise which now bears his name. According to Chinese sources, 
Kani~ka's physician was called "Caraka" and this suggests that Kani~ka's physician was the 
author of the Caraka Sa7!lhitii. This would date the work between the first century BC and the 
second century AD, with the same degree of uncertainty as surrounds Kani~ka's date.4 Both 
Takakusu5 and Uvi6 relied on Chinese sources to claim that Caraka was Kani~ka's physician 
I Woodcock 1966, 131. 
2 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 93-115. 
3 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 100. 
4 The arguments for Caraka's dates are reviewed by Meulenbeld 1974,403-404; and 1999-2000, lA, 105-115. 
5 Takakusu 1896, lix. 
6 Levi 1903,382. Note that this is an English translation of Levi's 1896 French article. 
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and Asvagho~a was his spiritual councillor.1 Asvagho~a was the author of the Buddhacarita 
(Deeds of the Buddha)? Levi goes on to claim that "the Greek influences thought to be found 
in Caraka's teaching are easily explained, if he lived at the time, and at the court, of the Indo-
Scythians, when Hellenism seemed to be conquering the old brahmanical civilisation.,,3 
Whether Kani~ka' s physician was the same person as the author of the Caraka SaY(lhitii 
has been questioned. Meulenbeld discounts the Chinese sources and claims that "solid 
evidence for linking the Caraka of the Chinese sources with the author of the CarakasaY(lhitii 
is entirely lacking.,,4 Many of those who argue against this identification do so because they 
wish to place Caraka earlier than Kani~ka. The issue is complicated by the fact that the word 
"Caraka" was also used to refer to a sect of roving (cara) mendicants who practised medicine. 
Filliozat and Sharma both claim that the author of the Caraka SaY(lhitii was a member of this 
sect of roving physicians.s Sharma also argues that the Caraka who compiled the Caraka 
Sa1J1hitii was not Kani~ka' s physician because Kani~ka was a Buddhist whereas Caraka was 
not, because Caraka was a roving physician and therefore unlikely to remain in a king's court, 
and because Asvagho~a mentions the physician Atreya in his Buddhacarita,6 but makes no 
mention of Caraka who would have been his colleague.7 Sharma concludes that Caraka 
should be placed around 200 Be. 8 Filliozat places Caraka in the second or first century BC.9 
The arguments against Kani~ka' s physician being the author of the Caraka Sa7?1hitii do 
not prove that Caraka and Kani~ka lived at different times. The reasons both for and against 
Caraka being Kani~ka' s physician appear inconclusive and the identity and date of the author 
of the Caraka SaJ?1hitii remains in doubt. Added to this uncertainty is the issue of exactly how 
much of the Caraka Sa1J1hitii is the work of Caraka. What is more important, therefore, is to 
establish the date of those parts of the Caraka SaJ?1hitii that contain material on logic. 
I Barnett (in Rapson et al. 1913, 943) says that though Asvagho~a was a contemporary ofKani~ka there is no 
good evidence that he ever had any correspondence with Kani~ka. 
2 Trans. Johnston 1935-36; and Schotsman 1995. 
3 Levi 1903,384. 
4 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 106. The various arguments against the identification of Kani$ka' s physician with 
the author of the Caraka SaJphitii are listed pp. 105-106. 
5 Filliozat 1964,18,21; Sharma 1992b, 180-181; and Sharma 1992c, 165. See also VidyabhU$a:t:la 1920,25-26. 
6 Johnston 1935-36, 2, 10; and Schotsman 1995, 10. 
7 Sharma 1981-94, 1, ix-x. See also Sharma 1992b, 192 n. 44. 
8 Sharma 1981-94, 1, xii; and Sharma 1992b, 185. 
9 Filliozat 1964, 22. 
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4.2.2 Caraka's Compendium 
Structure of the work 
The Caraka Saf!lhitii, although named after Caraka, is not entirely his own work. 
Caraka based his compendium on an earlier work by Agnivesa1 who recorded the oral 
teachings of Atreya (Punarvasu).2 This is mentioned at the beginning and end of each chapter 
in the Caraka Saf!lhitii. Caraka begins each chapter by declaring that he will expound the next 
topic "as propounded by Lord Atreya", and ends them by stating that the present topic "in the 
treatise [tantra] composed by Agnivesa and redacted by Caraka,,3 is now complete. That is, 
the Caraka Saf!lhitii testifies to the fact that it is a reconstruction of Agnivesa's original work 
which contains the medical teachings of Atreya. 
According to the early Buddhist works preserved in Pali, Atreya taught in Taxila during 
the time of the Buddha. The Buddha's own physician, lIvaka Komarabhacca,4 is described in 
the Mahiivagga as having studied medicine under Atreya in Taxila for seven years.s This 
suggests that Atreya was an older contemporary of the Buddha and based on this evidence, 
Hoemle places Atreya in the sixth century BC.6 Keith claims this is doubtfu1.7 Sharma 
maintains that the Atreya who taught Jlvaka is different from the Atreya who taught 
Agnivesa, and suggests a date of around 1000 BC for Atreya.8 Filliozat also rejects Hoemle's 
claim and argues that identifying these two Atreyas raises serious difficulties.9 
The Caraka Saf!lhitii lists Atreya's six pupils as: Agnivesa, Bhela (or Bhe<;la), Jatl1ka11)a, 
Parasara, Harita and K~arapal).i, and states that each of them compiled their own compendium 
(saf!lhitii) of Atreya' s teachings. 10 Amongst these works, only the compendia of Agnivesa and 
Bhela have in some sense survived. The Bhela Saf!lhitii (Bhela's Compendium) survives in a 
1 See Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 124-130, for a discussion on Agnivesa. 
2 See Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 120-123, for a discussion on Atreya. 
3 See for instance the beginning and end of the first chapter translated in Sharma 1981-94, 1, 3 and 14. 
4 See Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 693. 
5 The Mahiivagga (8.1.6), trans. Rhys Davids, Oldenberg 1881-85, 2, 175; Horner 1938-66, 4, 382; and 
summarised in Hardy 1880, 246. See also translations from Tibetan sources of similar accounts in Rockhill 1884, 
65; and von Schiefner 1906, 94-99. 
6 Hoernle 1893-1912,1, lvii; Hoernle 1907b, 8; Hoernle 1908a, 29; Hoernle 1908b, 997; and Hoernle 1909,878. 
See also Sharma 1992b, 179 and 180. 
7 Keith 1908, 136. 
8 Sharma 1981-94, 1, vii-viii. 
9 Filliozat 1964, 10-11. 
10 Caraka Sa1?lhitii (1.1.30-40), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,5-6. 
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single incomplete manuscript! which is a revision of Bhela' s original work by an unknown 
author? This revision may have been done as late as the seventh century AD.3 The 
arrangement of the Bhela Sa1J1hitii and the number of chapters are the same as the Caraka 
Sa1J1hitii, but the Bhela Sa1J1hitii is more concise and uses simpler language.4 
The Agnivda Sa1J1hitii (AgniveSa's Compendium) now exists only in the redacted form 
of the Caraka Sa1J1hitii. Hoernle argues that the original Agnivda Sa1J1hitii may have existed 
as late as the eleventh century when Cakrapanidatta5 (c. 1060 AD) quoted from it in his 
commentary on the Caraka Sa1J1hitii.6 Hoernle also points out that Agnivesa's work is referred 
to in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii as a tantra rather than a sa1J1hitii and this suggests that "AgniveSa 
wrote a series of such treatises on the several branches of medicine as taught by his master 
Atreya in the ancient 'University' of Taxila, in the extreme north-west of India. What Caraka 
did was to combine the substance of these treatises into a single Sa1J1hitii, or Compendium.',7 
The Caraka Sa1J1hitii as it exists today consists of eight sections with a total of 120 
chapters, but not all of these chapters are attributed to Caraka. The last third of the Caraka 
Sa1J1hitii as it now exists is attributed to D:f<;lhabala, another physician from Kashmir. 8 
D:f<;lhabala's dates are also uncertain. Meulenbeld suggests 300-500 AD,9 but there appears to 
be no real consensus on D:f<;lhabala's date. lO D:f<;lhabala added 17 chapters to section Six,l1 plus 
all of the chapters in the last two sections. D:f<;lhabala states this in two places in the Caraka 
Sa1J1hitii.12 Thus the present Caraka Sa1J1hitii consists of three different layers. Firstly, the 
Caraka Sarrlhitii contains the teachings of Atreya as recorded by one of his pupils, Agnivesa. 
Secondly, Agnivesa's work was revised by Caraka, and then thirdly, the final two and a half 
1 Trans. Krishnamurthy 2000. 
2 Hoernle 1893-1912,1, lviii. 
3 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lIA, 24. 
4 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IIA, 13. 
5 CakrapaIJi, Cakradatta or Cakra. 
6 Hoernle 1907b, 1-2. Sharma 1992b, 179 has: "at least up to the 15th century AD." 
7 Hoernle 1908b, 997-998. Hoernle 1909, 879. See also Kaviratna, Sharma 1996, 1, x. 
8 Hoernle 1908a, 32ff. 
9 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 141 and 349. 
10 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IB, 230-231 note 610, lists the opinions of various scholars. 
11 For discussion on which chapters were added by Dt<Jhabala see Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, lxvii; Hoernle 1908b, 
1002; Hoernle 1909,888; Sharma 1992b, 186-187 and Meulenbeld 1974,411. 
12 Caraka SWnhi1ii (6.30.289-290), trans. Sharma 1981-94,2,529; and Caraka SalJlhitii (8.12.36-40), trans. 
Sharma 1981-94,2,681. See Hoernle 1908a, 30-31. 
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sections were added to the end of Caraka' s work by Dr<;lhabala. Dr<;lhabala's contribution is 
nowadays practically forgotten and the whole work is commonly referred to as Caraka' s 
Compendium (Caraka Sarrthitii). Hoernle argues that the older parts of the Caraka Sarrthitii 
which are attributed to Caraka can be dated by the Bower Manuscript. 
Bower Manuscript 
The so-called Bower Manuscript is named after Lt. H. Bower who bought it in Eastern 
Turkistan in 1890. The manuscript was discovered in a stupa by two local men searching for 
treasure. The document and its contents are described by Hoernle in the introduction to his 
edition and translation of the manuscript, l and also by Meulenbeld.2 The pages are birch bark 
and Hoernle argues that palaeographic evidence suggests the text was copied by scribes from 
north-western India in the fourth century AD? The manuscript was probably carried to 
Eastern Turkistan by the spread of Buddhism before paper was used in India. The Bower 
Manuscript is thought to have belonged to Yasamitra, a Buddhist monk named in the 
manuscript and who was probably buried in the stupa where the manuscript was found.4 
The Bower Manuscript consists of seven separate documents, the second of which is a 
medical work entitled the Niivanltaka (Creami written by an anonymous author.6 Meulenbeld 
suggests that this title "points to the work being an extract from earlier treatises and its being 
compared to the butter extracted from milk.,,7 According to Hoernle, the copy of the 
Niivanltaka found in the Bower Manuscript was made in the fourth century AD, although the 
work was originally composed much earlier. Hoernle suggests a "considerable interval, 
perhaps two or three centuries, between its composition and the copy in the Bower MS,"s and 
thus "the date of the composition of the Niivanltaka is probably much earlier than that of the 
writing of the Bower MS.,,9 He bases this claim on the characteristics of the copy found in the 
Bower Manuscript which indicates that it had already passed through a succession of copies 
1 Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, i-xcv. 
2 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lIA, 3-12. 
3 Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, xlvii-lvi. Scharfe 1999, 615, says current research favours the period between the 
beginning and middle of the sixth century. 
4 Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, xxx. 
5 Scharfe 1999,616, has: "Made from Butter". 
6 Trans. Hoernle 1893-1912, 1,77-180. 
7 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lIB, 5 note 25. 
8 Hoernle 1909, 859. See also Hoernle 1893-1912,1, lvii. 
9 Hoernle 1909, 858. 
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since its original composition. Hoernle claims that the upper limit for the original composition 
of the Niivanltaka is the second century ADI and its lower limit is the fourth century. 2 
The Niivanltaka and other parts of the Bower Manuscript contain numerous medical 
formulae that are found in those parts of the Caraka Saf(lhitii attributed to Caraka and not in 
the parts attributed to Drc,lhabala.3 Hoernle argues that Caraka's date must therefore be 
between that of Kani~ka, whose upper limit he places in the first century BC,4 and the 
composing of the Niivanltaka in the second or third century AD.s Meulenbeld rejects this 
argument on the grounds that Caraka is not referred to by name in the Niivanltaka and claims 
that "the author of the Niivanltaka drew upon the floating medical tradition and early treatises 
that have not been preserved,,,6 rather than upon the Caraka Saf(lhitii itself. 
Buddhist influence 
There is some Buddhist influence in those parts of the Caraka Saf(lhitii attributed to 
Caraka and this places an upper limit on Caraka's date. Sharma has made a summary of the 
Buddhist influences found in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii.7 Meulenbeld agrees that "traces of 
Buddhist thought are clearly discernible in the Carakasa1J1hitii and belong to the layer 
antedating Drqhabala's revision."s This shows that Caraka reconstructed Agnivesa's work 
when Buddhist ideas were influential. Sharma considers this to be during the third or early 
second century BC.9 The Caraka Saf(lhitii also contains many things in common with the 
Buddhist classic the Milindapafiha. lO 
The various claims and counter-claims regarding Caraka's date have not been settled. 
Meulenbeld's conclusion is that the philosophical material found in the Caraka Saf(lhitii 
"suggests that the author called Caraka cannot have lived later than about AD 150-200 and 
J Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, lxi. 
2 Hoernle 1893-1912, 1,1vii. 
3 Hoernle 1893-1912,1, lix; and Hoernle 1909,871-872. 
4 Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, lxi. 
5 Hoernle 1893-1912, 1, lxi. Hoernle 1909, 885-886. 
6 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IIA, 11-12. See also Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lIB, 14-15 note 198. 
7 Sharma 1992b, 182-184. 
8 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 111. This is rejected by Mitra 1974, 65. 
9 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 111. 
JO See Mookerji 1947,471-472; Mitra 1974,48; and Sharma 1992a, 121-122. 
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not much earlier than about 100 BC."} These dates, coincidentally, are precisely the range of 
dates most commonly accepted for Kani~ka. 
4.2.3 Caraka's logic 
The material on logic and debate in the Caraka Saf!1hita is found in sections one and 
three, neither of which were added by Drghabala. Drghabala's additions are 17 chapters to 
section six and all the chapters in the last two sections, seven and eight. In the light of this, it 
would appear safe to totally ignore the uncertainty surrounding Drghabala's date since it has 
no bearing on the date of the logical material found in the work. However, Hoernle argues 
that Drghabala not only added material to the end of Caraka' s work, but he also revised 
Caraka's portion of the work. Evidence for this is found at the end of the first section of the 
Caraka Saf!1hita. The last chapter of this section includes a summary of the entire work 
naming all eight sections with their total of 120 chapters: 
Thus is said - The treatise has been completed in Sloka [SUtra], Cikitsita, Indriya, Kalpa, 
Siddhi, Nidana, Vimana and SarIra sthanas. Out of them the first two with thirty chapters 
each, the latter three with twelve chapters each and the last three with eight chapters each. 
The scope of the sections will be said in the respective sections. Now hear the one 
hundred twenty chapters with their titles and order.2 
Hoernle claims that this summary must have been added by Drghabala since it includes 
those sections that Drghabala declares to be his own additions.3 The implication of this 
unacknowledged change is that there could be other such changes to Caraka's portion of the 
work. In particular, Drghabala could have added or altered the logical material without 
leaving any indication of this. However, it is not at all certain that this summary was written 
by Drghabala. Two possible scenarios could account for Caraka writing the summary. 
Firstly, Caraka could have written the summary intending to include all these chapters 
in his reconstruction of Agnivesa' s treatise, but was unable to complete the task for some 
reason. This possibility becomes all the more plausible if Agnivesa' s treatise contained eight 
sections with 120 chapters which Caraka was following as the model for his reconstruction. 
But this hypothesis cannot be confirmed since Agnivesa's original treatise is no longer extant. 
1 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 114. See also a list of dates purposed by various authors in Meulenbeld 1999-2000, 
lA, 115. 
2 Caraka Sm.nhita (1.30.34-35), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 243. 
3 Hoernle 1908a, 37; and Hoernle 1908b, 1001-1002. Scharfe 1999,618 also claims that Dr<.lhabala is 
responsible for some amount of rewriting of the whole text. 
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Secondly, Caraka could have written the summary and also finished the task of 
redacting Agnivesa's treatise complete with all 120 chapters. Later, some of these chapters 
could have become lost only to be reconstructed by Dr<,lhabala. Dr<,lhabala says at the end of 
each of his chapters in the present Caraka SalJlhitii: thus ends the chapter on some topic "in 
the treatise composed by Agnivesa, redacted by Caraka and reconstructed by Dr<,lhabala as it 
was not available."} It is unclear what Dr<,lhabala's reasons were for claiming that a particular 
chapter had been redacted by Caraka but was unavailable. Dr<,lhabala must have had some 
information regarding the number, names and contents of the missing chapters in order to 
claim that they had been redacted by Caraka but were unavailable. He could have used the 
very summary in question, or Agnivesa's original treatise, or some other work as the source 
for the missing chapters. Whatever Dr<,lhabala's sources may have been, he seems to be 
replacing missing chapters rather than adding entirely new ones.2 All this points towards the 
summary in question not being written by Dr<,lhabala. 
There are, however, variations in the Sanskrit manuscripts of the Caraka SalJlhitii and 
thus some changes have been made to the various copies of the work over the centuries. This 
is not at all surprising considering these manuscripts were copied by hand multiple times. But 
these variations are not sufficient to establish that the logical material is a later addition. Also 
the style of logic found in the work points to it belonging to an early period and this also 
counts against the logic having been added Dr<,lhabala. The question is, therefore, whether the 
logical material was added by Caraka or whether it was part of Agnivesa's original treatise. 
Agnivesa and his five colleagues each recorded the oral teachings of Atreya in their own 
compendia (see above). Only two of these works survive - the compendium of Agnivesa in 
the form of the Caraka SalJlhitii and the compendium ofBhela, the Bhela SalJlhitii. If the 
logical material found in the Caraka SalJlhitii existed in Agnivesa's original work before 
Caraka's reconstruction then there should be some similar material in the Bhela SalJlhitii. 
However, the Bhela SalJlhitii does not contain any information on logic. It mentions only that 
a good physician should be "dextrous in logic" (tarka-kusala),3 but provides no further 
information. The fact that the Bhela SalJlhitii does not discuss logic whereas the Caraka 
SalJlhitii does, lends support to Sharma's claim that the logical material now found in the 
I See for instance Caraka Sar!1hitii (8.12.12), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 2, 683. 
2 See Sharma 1992b, 186. 
3 Bhela Sm!1hitii (1.9.32), trans. Krishnamurthy 2000, 43. 
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Caraka SaTflhitii was not in Agnivesa' s original work but was added by Caraka during the 
process of redacting AgniveSa's compendium (Agnivesatantra). Sharma says: 
Thus it can be conjectured that the original Agnivesatantra might be more or less similar 
to the Bhela-sa1!lhita in size and contents. All the additions and improvements made, 
particularly logic, development of the basic concepts and philosophical discourses in the 
light of Buddhism etc. may go to Caraka's credit.! 
The logical material found in the Caraka SalJ1hitii was most probably added by Caraka. 
Thus the dates for Atreya and Agnivesa, and also for Dr~habala, can be safely ignored. 
Caraka's main subject was medicine, not logic, and the material on logic constitutes only a 
very small part of the Caraka SalJ1hitii. This logical material was most likely gathered up by 
Caraka from some source and adapted to suit the purposes of training physicians. 
The period suggested for Caraka is from 100 BC to 200 AD. The logical material in the 
Caraka SaTflhitii is thus representative of logic in India after the Kathiivatthu (third century 
BC) but before other more systematic treatments of logic (discussed in the next two chapters). 
The chronological order of works on logic is not affected by placing Caraka anywhere within 
the period from the last century BC through to the first century AD. 
4.3 Logic in the medical tradition 
The logical material is found in two sections of the Caraka SaTflhitii. Firstly, it is in 
section one (sutrasthiina) on fundamentals, in chapter 11 (tisrai$m:11ya) on the three desires? 
This chapter has a discussion on the four methods of examination which includes inference. 
Secondly, it is in section three (vimiinasthiina) on specific features, in two places: in chapter 4 
(trividharogavijiiiin'iya) on the three sources of knowledge, which also includes inference,3 
and in chapter 8 (rogabhi$agjit'iya) on the study and teaching of medicine.4 Chapter 8 
discusses 44 technical terms dealing with various aspects of debate.s The following discussion 
follows the order of these 44 terms in chapter 8, and includes material from other places in the 
Caraka Sa7Jlhitii when the same material occurs in the list of 44 terms. 
! Sharma 1992b, 186. 
2 Caraka Sal!1hitii (1.11.17-25), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,72. 
3 Caraka Sm!1hitii (3.4.1-5), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 325-326. 
4 Caraka Sal!1hitii (3.8.16-66), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 356-369. 
5 Caraka Sm!1hitii (3.8.27-66), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 359-369. See also Vidyabhii~alJa 1920,31-35; 
Dasgupta 1922-55,2,377-388; Solomon 1976-78, 1,78-86; Warder, 1971, 128-133; Shekhawat 1984,225-234; 
Gokhale 1992,2-9; and Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 34-35. 
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These 44 terms are in one continuous undivided list. Related terms appear together in 
the list and this suggests a classification of these terms into six categories: (1) terms 1-7 are 
about debate in general, (2) terms 8-14 determine the structure of a proof, (3) terms 15-17 are 
about assertions, (4) terms 18-26 are epistemic terms associated with proofs, (5) terms 27-32 
are types of statement, and (6) terms 33-44 are about faults, fallacies and the points at which a 
debate is lost. 
4.3.1 Debate (terms 1-7) 
The first term in the list is debate, but before the list begins there is a general 
introduction to the list which also describes philosophical discussion or debate.! In this 
introduction Caraka describes two types of discussion (saytlbha$a), friendly and hostile. 
Opponents in a debate may be either superior, inferior or equal to oneself. The assembly 
where debates are held maybe divided from two points of view. Firstly, regarding learning, 
an assembly may be either learned or ignorant, and secondly, regarding attitude, an assembly 
may be friendly (sympathetic), neutral or hostile. Caraka gives advice on how to conduct a 
discussion in the various types of assembly against various types of opponent. This advice 
includes tricks and techniques to defeat opponents depending on the situation.2 
Following this general introduction, there is debate as the first term in the list. Debate 
(vada) or academic discussion is of two types: positive (jaZpa) and negative (vitaJ}cja). 
Positive or constructive debate is where each party opposes their opponent's view and 
endeavours to establish their own view. Negative or destructive debate is where each party 
endeavours to demolish an opponent's view without attempting to establish their own view. 
The next six terms in the list are philosophical terms: substance (dravya), attribute 
(gu~w), action (karma), universal (siimanya), particularity (vise$a) and inherence (samavaya). 
The same six terms appear in the Vaise$ika Siitra (Category Aphorisms) in the same order.3 
These terms are also discussed elsewhere in the Caraka Saytlhita.4 Their relevance to debate is 
not explained, but they would no doubt be topics of debate. They are also mentioned as 
examples of theories (siddhanta) below. 
I Caraka SaJ?lhita (3.8.15-26), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 356-359. 
2 See Prets 2000, 369-371, and 375. 
3 Vaise~ika Siitra (1.1.4), trans. Sinha 1911,9. 
4 Caraka SaJ?1hita (1.1.27-29 and 48-52), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 5 and 6-7. 
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4.3.2 Structure of a proof (terms 8-14) 
The next seven terms determine the structure of a proof. The first term, proposition 
(pratijfia), is defined as the assertion of what is to be established.1 A proposition consists of a 
subject and a property, e.g. 'person is permanent'.2 A proposition is established by a proof 
(sthiipanii). A proof establishes a proposition with a reason (hetu), example (dr~tiinta), 
application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana). These four, plus the proposition, form a 
five-part schema or proof. The proposition is required in a proof since without it there would 
be nothing to establish. In order to establish the proposition 'person is permanent' for 
instance, the proof is: 
(1) Person is permanent 
(2) Because of being uncreated 
(3) Like space 
(4) Just as space is uncreated and permanent, so is a person 






This is the earliest extant formulation of the famous five-part proof.3 It is preserved in 
Caraka's work, although he is probably not its original author. Caraka most probably took the 
five-part schema, along with the other terms in this list, from some work on debate.4 There is 
evidence of debate in India dating from before the time of the Buddha, well before the Greeks 
came to India. Thus the origin of the tradition of debate in general is entirely Indian. The 
question examined below is whether there is any Greek influence in this five-part schema. 
The proof of a contrary proposition is called a counter-proof (prati-~thiipanii). A 
counter-proof consists of the very same five-part schema. For instance, the counter-proof of 
the proposition 'person is permanent' is: 
(1) Person is impermanent 
(2) Because of being perceptible by the senses 
(3) Like a pot 
(4) Just as a pot is perceptible by the senses and impermanent, 
so is a person 
(5) Therefore, impermanent 






2 Person (puru~a) here is thought of as self or soul. Permanent (nitya) is also translated as eternal. 
3 See VidyabhU~al!a 1920,42; and Gokhale 1992,4. Cf. McEvilley 2002, 406 and 408, where he claims that the 
Nyaya Siitra contains the earliest extant Indian exposition of the syllogism or the five-part proof. McEvilley 
2002,510, dates the Nyaya Sutra around the first century Be. 
4 Solomon 1976-78,1,87; and Walser 1998, ]96-]97. 
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A counter-proof is also a proof. In these two examples, both proofs purport to establish 
a proposition that is the opposite of the other. Thus one of the proofs must fail to establish its 
proposition if the other is to succeed. l This suggests another classification of proofs, i.e. 
proofs that establish their propositions and those that do not, or successful and unsuccessful 
proofs. Caraka describes the form of a proof, namely the five-part schema, but he does not 
describe the conditions under which a proof is successful in establishing its proposition. For a 
proof to be successful, each part of a proof must play its role in the correct manner, i.e. each 
of the five parts of a successful proof must be free from fault. Caraka discusses faulty reasons 
(below) which implies that reasons free from these faults are correct reasons. This suggests 
that each of the five parts of a proof can be classified into faulty and faultless, or correct and 
inconect, e.g. correct and incorrect reasons. The rules for a successful proof are described 
below after the discussion on the 44 terms is complete. 
Caraka describes the four remaining parts of a proof in a very general way. The roles 
these four play in a proof have been added here based on the description of other terms. 
Reason is described as the cause of understanding (upaZabdhikiirm:za). These are four: 
perception (pratyal~a), inference (anumiina), tradition (aitihya), and analogy (aupamya).2 
That which is understood in these four ways is reality (tattva). That is, the reason in a proof 
provides the grounds to correctly understand the proposition. These grounds must be known 
by either perception, inference, tradition or analogy, since only these four are reliable. 
An example is described as something understood by both ordinary people and the 
learned alike, and as illustrating the property in question. For instance, fire is hot, water is 
liquid, earth is firm, the sun is illuminating, and the Satpkhya is illuminating just like the sun. 
The last example is metaphorical, i.e. the Satpkhya (system of philosophy) is an example of 
illuminating (i.e. making things clear) just like the sun illuminates all things. The purpose of 
this last example is unclear. It may be to demonstrate the variety of acceptable examples, or it 
may be simply to extol the virtues of the Satpkhya system. The example in a proof illustrates 
the grounds that the reason provides. That is, an example is an instance of the reason that is 
known to have the property in the proposition and can therefore be used as a guide for the 
properties other instances of the reason must have. 
1 Cf. Prets 2001, 550. 
2 These four are discussed below in the section on epistemology_ 
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Regarding the last two terms used in a proof, application and conclusion, Caraka says 
only that these have been explained under proof and counter-proof. However, there is no 
specific explanation of application and conclusion under those terms, only examples of each. 
Caraka may mean that application and conclusion can be understood from their use in the 
proof and counter-proof above. The application part of a proof states that the example is an 
instance of the reason and has the property specified in the proposition, and this also applies 
to the subject. The conclusion states 'thus the property' , i.e. it follows from this that the 
property applies to the subject. 
In summary, a proof has five parts. First there is a proposition consisting of the subject 
and a property. The reason provides grounds that support this proposition. The example is an 
instance of the reason known to have the property in the proposition. The application 
compares the example with the subject, and the conclusion declares that the property applies 
to the subject, i.e. the subject has the property in question. 
4.3.3 Assertions (terms 15-17) 
The next three terms concern assertions or hypotheses. The first is rejoinder (uttara) 
which is described as a contrary statement that denies similarity when similarity has been 
asserted, or vice versa. 1 That is, a rejoinder is a statement supported by a counter-example that 
contradicts another statement. For instance, in reply to the claim: "disorders are similar to 
their causes, like a cold caused by a cold wind", an opponent should reply: "disorders are not 
similar to their causes, like a fever caused by a cold wind". In the case of a cold (influenza), a 
cold wind causes a disorder with symptoms like shivering which are similar to the experience 
of a cold wind. In the case of a fever, a cold wind causes a disorder with symptoms such as 
sweating which are not similar to the experience of a cold wind. Each of these two statements 
is a rejoinder for the other. The term rejoinder (uttara) that Caraka describes may be the same 
as refutation (du~aJ!a) and futile rejoinder (jilti) which are described in the next two chapters. 
The second term is theory (siddhilnta) which is a conclusion established by expert 
examination and reason. Four kinds of theory are listed. These are: (l) a universal theory 
(sarvatantra-siddhilnta) which is accepted by all within medical science, e.g. 'there are 
diseases', and 'there are remedies for curable diseases'; (2) a restricted theory (partitantra-
siddhilnta) which is held only by particular schools, e.g. in our school, 'there are five sense 
I Cf. Prets 2000, 372 note 13; and Prets 2001, 549-550. 
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organs', but for others, 'there are six sense organs'; (3) an implied theory (adhikarm}a-
siddhiinta) which is implied by another statement, e.g. 'the results of actions (kanna), 
liberation, the self, and rebirth' are implied by the statement, 'the liberated (person) does not 
experience the results of actions (kanna) because of the absence of desire'. The last type of 
theory is (4) a hypothetical theory (abhyupagama-siddhiinta) which is a theory assumed for 
the sake of argument, although it has not been proven, tested, taught, or even based on reason, 
e.g. I propose that 'substance is primary', or I propose that 'attributes are primary'. 
The third term is word (sabda) or sound which is described as a collection of letters. 
This term appears to refer to a group of words rather than to just one single word. The term 
sabda is also translated as verbal testimony and is used here to refer to an assertion. Four 
types are listed. The first two types of words are: (1) words referring to the observable 
(dr:ftiirtha), e.g. sense objects are perceived when the sense organs exist, and (2) words 
referring to the unobservable (adr:ftiirtha), e.g. there is liberation. The next two types of word 
are: (3) those corresponding to reality (satya), e.g. there are remedies for curable diseases, and 
(4) those not corresponding to reality (anrta), i.e. the opposite of the former. The last two 
types are often translated as true and false. I These four appear to be two divisions of two, 
although Caraka does not actually say as much. 
4.3.4 Epistemology (terms 18-26) 
The next nine terms in the list are all epistemic terms associated with proofs. The first 
four terms (18-21) describe the four ways in which the reason in a proof is known. The 
remaining five terms (22-26) describe the five psychological states associated with a proof. 
The first four epistemic terms are perception (pratyakja), inference (anumiina), tradition 
(aitihya), and analogy (aupamya). These same four terms were mentioned above in the 
discussion on reasons. Caraka explains these and similar terms in other places also, most 
notably in discussions on rebirth,2 on the three sources of knowledge,3 and on the three means 
of examination.4 
I See for instance Dasgupta 1922-55,2,383; Mehta 1949, 5, 334; Solomon 1976-78,1,80; Shekhawat 1984, 
231; and Kaviratna, Sharma 1996,2,364. 
2 Caraka SaJ!lhita (1.11.17-25), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. 
3 Caraka SaJ!1hita (3.4.1-5), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 325-326. 
4 Cm'aka SaJ!1hita (3.8.80-83), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 370-371. 
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In the discussion on rebirth, Caraka presents four means of examination (parl~ii): 
authoritative statements, perception, inference, and ratiocination.1 Here tradition (aitihya) is 
called authoritative statement (iiptopadda), analogy is not mentioned, and ratiocination 
(yukti) is added as a means of examination separate from inference. At the end of this 
discussion, Caraka declares that rebirth has been established by the four means of valid 
cognition (pramiilJa).2 Thus, these four means of examination are also called the four means 
of valid cognition.3 
Caraka also discusses three sources of knowledge about diseases (rogavise$avijniina): 
Out of these three sources of knowledge, first of all knowledge is obtained from 
authority. Thereafter examination proceeds with perception and inference because if there 
be no authoritative material beforehand what would one know from perception and 
inference? Thus, for those who have knowledge [from authority] the examination is 
twofold - perception and inference, but for others it is threefold including authoritative 
instruction.4 
The same three sources of knowledge are also called means of examination (parl~ii): 
There are two types of examination for those who have already acquired the [scriptural] 
knowledge - perception and inference. These two along with authoritative instruction 
constitute the [means of] examination. This examination is of two types or of three types 
including authoritative instruction.5 
Caraka also mentions perception, inference, and authoritative instruction as the three means 
physicians should use to ascertain the period of life left for a patient. 6 
In Caraka's system of epistemology, there are three means of examination used in the 
diagnosis of disease: authoritative statements, perception and inference. These three are also 
called the sources of knowledge about disease characteristics.7 In his discussion on rebirth, 
Caraka includes ratiocination as a means of examination separate from inference. These four 
are also called the four means of valid cognition. A slightly different system appears in the list 
of 44 terms. First, ratiocination is not listed as a separate term, and second, analogy is added. 
I Caraka Saf!1hitii (l.1l.17), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. 
2 Caraka Saf!1hitii (l.11.33), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,74. 
3 Caraka also mentions the means of valid cognition (pramii~1a) when defining authoritative statement 
(iiptopadda) (Caraka Saf!1hitii (3.4.4), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 325), and in his proof of the self (Caraka 
Swnhitii (4.1.45), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 401). 
4 Caraka Sal?lhitii (3.4.5), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 326. 
5 Caraka Sm!lhitii (3.8.83), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 371. 
6 Caraka Swnhitii (5.1.3), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,491. 
7 Caraka Sm!1hitii (3.4.3), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,325. 
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Three terms are common to both Caraka's system and the system found in the list of 44 terms: 
perception, inference, and tradition or authoritative statements. With the addition of Caraka's 
ratiocination and the list's analogy, this brings the number of epistemic terms discussed here 
to five: perception, inference, ratiocination, tradition or authoritative statement, and analogy. 
Perception (term 18) 
Perception (pratyak~a) in the discussion on the three sources of knowledge is briefly 
described as "that which is acquired with the sense organs and mind directly."} Similarly, in 
the list of 44 terms, perception is defined as knowledge acquired directly by the self (atman) 
and by the senses. For instance, the self directly perceives pleasure and pain, and the senses 
directly perceive objects like sounds.2 In the argument for rebirth, Caraka says: 
The knowledge which arises by the contact of self, sense organs, mind and sense objects, 
is explicit and only limited to the present is known as perception.3 
That is, four things are involved in perception. In the case of visual perception for instance, 
these four are the self, the eye sense organs, the mind, and the visible object. The conjunction 
of these four produces definite and immediate knowledge of a visible object. Caraka mentions 
here the requirement that the self be present which is unusual for two reasons. Firstly, its 
presence is not limited to perception since it is required in all sources of knowledge, and 
secondly, it is not mentioned in the discussions on the other sources of knowledge.4 
Inference (term 19) 
Inference (anumanai is defined in both the discussion on the three sources of 
knowledge and in the list of 44 terms as, "reasoning (tarka) supported by ratiocination 
(yukti)".6 This definition employs two terms, both of which have similar meanings. The first 
term, tarka (reasoning), is understood as a psychological process which is supported by the 
second term, yukti (ratiocination). Tarka is usually translated as reasoning.7 Ratiocination was 
I Caraka Saltlhitii (3.4.4), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 326. 
2 Cm'aka SalJ1hitii (3.8.39), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 363, 
3 Caraka SalJ1hitii (1.11.20), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,72. See translation in Filliozat 1993, 104. 
4 Filliozat 1993, 104. 
5 Inference is briefly mentioned in a number of other places in the Caraka Sa1!lhitii: 1.8.14; 1.11.7; 5.2.20; and 
5.4.4. 
6 Caraka Sal!lhitii (3.4.4 and 3.8.40), trans, my own. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 326 and 363 translates yukti as 
"invariable concomitance" which is the usual translation for vyiipti. See Walser 1998,195. 
7 See for instance Sharma 1981-94, 1, 326 and 363; Kaviratna, Sharma 1996, 2, 365; Walser 1998, 195; and 
Meu1enbeld 1999-2000, lA, 32. 
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used for yukti because it conveys the sense of combining relevant information together. This 
definition of inference suggests that ratiocination (yukti) is an integral part of inference, but in 
his argument for rebirth, Caraka claims that ratiocination is a means of valid cognition quite 
separate from inference (see below). 
In the list of 44 terms, there are three examples of inference: know ledge of bodily fire 
(agni) from the ability to digest, physical strength from the ability to exercise, and the 
auditory and other sense organs from the ability to hear sounds and sense other objects.} In all 
three cases, the presence of an effect is used as the evidence from which to infer the existence 
of a cause. 
Caraka also describes inference in his argument for rebirth: 
Inference is based on prior perception. It is of three types and is related to the three times. 
One can infer covered fire from the smoke, sexual intercourse from observing the foetus 
and the future fruit from seed. By observing the bearing of similar fruit, the learned infer 
the causation of the seed.2 
Here Caraka explains that inference depends on the prior perception of some evidence, and 
because it is a source of knowledge about things not immediately perceivable, it is separate 
from perception. There are three types of inference differentiated with respect to the three 
times, the present, past, and future. First, there is the inference of a present cause from a 
present effect, e.g. inferring the presence of a hidden fire from the perception of smoke. 
Second, there is the inference of a past cause from a present effect, e.g. inferring the past act 
of sexual intercourse from the perception of a foetus. Third, there is the inference of a future 
effect from a present cause, e.g. inferring future fruit from the perception of a seed after 
having observed fruit produced from seeds in other cases. 
Inference in Caraka's system relies on two things: on the prior perception of some 
evidence, and on ratiocination (yukti) regarding cause and effect. Three things follow from 
this. First, inference is always preceded by perception. Second, the object inferred is always 
something not perceivable (at that time and place) with the senses. Third, the object inferred is 
always a particular instance of some cause or effect. 
J Caraka Saf!1hita (3.8.40), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 363. See also Walser 1998, 195. For a longer list of 
examples see Caraka Swnhita (3.4.8), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 327-328. 
2 Cm'aka Sa'!lhita (1.l1.21-22), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. Cf. trans. in Schuster 1972,391 note 46. 
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These three types of inference show that inference is a means of knowledge about 
something co-existing with the evidence in the present, something that preceded the evidence 
in the past, or something that will follow the evidence in the future. There is no mention of 
inferring from the general to the particular, and there is nothing to suggest that inference 
involves a proof (sthiipanii). 
Ratioci nation 
Ratiocination (yukti) in Caraka's argument for rebirth is described as knowledge that 
effects depend on their causes. The examples of ratiocination that Caraka provides all involve 
a combination of multiple causes. Caraka says that crops for instance depend on a 
combination of water, cultivation, seed and favourable climate, and fire depends on a 
combination of that to be rubbed, the act of rubbing and the rubbing stick.! Caraka's 
description of ratiocination also mentions multiple causes: 
The knowledge which sees things produced by a combination of multiple causative 
factors is yukti [rationale]. It is true in the three times and is also helpful in achieving the 
three categories [virtue, wealth and enjoyment].2 
Caraka's examples and description of ratiocination both suggest that ratiocination 
always involves the relationship between an effect and multiple causes, unlike inference 
which involves the relationship between an effect and a single cause. This has led some to 
wrongly conclude that the difference between inference and ratiocination is determined by 
whether the psychological process is dealing with the relationship between an effect and a 
single cause or an effect and multiple causes.3 But it makes no sense to claim that an inference 
from an effect to a single cause is supported by the ratiocination that effects depend on 
multiple causes. Also, at the end of his argument for rebirth Caraka gives examples of 
ratiocination which involve only a single cause. 
Result comes out of the action performed and not of unperformed. There is no growth of 
a sprout without seed. Result is in consonance with action, no other [plant] grows from 
another seed. This is rationale [yukti].4 
1 Caraka Sa'!lhita (1.l1.23-24), trans. Shanna 1981-94, 1, 72. 
2 Caraka Sa'!lhita (1.l1.25), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. See also translations in Filliozat 1990,45; Sharma 
1992c, 163-164; Filliozat 1993, 107; and Meu1enbeld 1999-2000, 1B, 198 note 197. 
3 Sharma 1992c, 164; and Filliozat 1993, 109. 
4 Caraka Sa'!lhita (1.11.32), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 74. See also translation in Filliozat 1993, 108. 
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Here ratiocination or yukti (which Sharma translates as rationale) is described as 
knowledge that an effect arises only when its cause exists and not otherwise, e.g. no sprout 
grows without its seed. Also, a cause produces only its own specific effect, e.g. the seed of 
one type of plant never produces a different type of plant. That is, the relationship of cause 
and effect is one where effects are completely dependent on their respective causes, and 
causes produce only their own specific effects. It is knowledge of this relationship which 
plays a supportive role in inference. 
Much later in history, Santarak~ita (725-783 AD) and KamalasIla (740-795 AD) argued 
against Caraka's claim that ratiocination is a separate means of valid cognition (pram[iJ}a). 
First Santarak~ita explains Caraka's view on ratiocination: 
Something exists when another thing exists, does not exist when the other does not exist; 
therefore it is derived from the other. That is called yukti [ratiocination]. The sage Caraka 
says that it is a separate pramaf,la [means of valid cognition]. It is not an inference because 
there is no example of it. l 
In the commentary on this, KamalasIla explains that according to Caraka, ratiocination is 
knowledge of the relationship of cause and effect. This knowledge is not perception because it 
is conceptual (savikalpatva), and it is not inference because there is no instance (example) of 
another supportive ratiocination. That is, if this ratiocination were an inference, then 
according to Caraka's own definition of inference, such an inference would require yet 
another instance of ratiocination to playa supportive role, and so on indefinitely. Thus it is a 
separate means of valid cognition.2 
Santarak~ita and KamalasIla object to Caraka's view and argue that ratiocination is no 
different from inference.3 Caraka of course would reject their arguments and claim that 
ratiocination is different from inference because inference is always preceded by the 
perception of some evidence whereas ratiocination is not preceded by perception. Also, the 
object known by inference is always a particular instance of a cause or effect, e.g. a particular 
fire is known to be in a certain location by the perception of smoke in that location. The object 
known by ratiocination is the relationship of cause and effect in general, independent of any 
instance. Further, the ratiocination that effects are preceded by their own causes is what 
1 Santarak~ita's TattvaSG11graha (2692-2693), trans. Filliozat 1993, 109. 
2 Jha 1937-39, 2, 827. Cf. Solomon 1976-78, 1,464. 
3 Jha 1937-39,2,828-829. 
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supports the process of inferring that fire for instance exists where smoke is seen. No other 
school of thought in India accepts Caraka's view that ratiocination is separate from inference. 
Tradition or authoritative statement (term 20) 
The terms tradition (aitihya) and authoritative statement (aptopadda) can be discussed 
together. In the list of 44 terms, tradition is defined as "the traditional authoritative source of 
knowledge such as the Vedas etc."} In the three sources of knowledge, Caraka says: 
Authority is the statement of the apta [credible person]. Aptas are those who possess 
knowledge devoid of any doubt, indirect and partial acquisition, attachment and aversion. 
The statement of persons endowed with such merits is testimony [pramaI)a]; on the 
contrary, the faulty or otherwise statement of a drunkard, insane, fool and attached person 
does not come under testimony. 2 
In the argument for rebirth, Caraka again describes the statements of credible persons: 
Now the definition of authority - those who are free from rajas [passion] and tamas 
[ignorance] and endowed with strength of penance and knowledge, and whose knowledge 
is defectless, always uncontradicted and true universally in past, present and future, are 
known as apta [who have acquired all the knowledge], si~ta [expert in the discipline] and 
vibuddha [enlightened]; their word is free from doubt and is true because being devoid of 
rajas and tamas, how can they speak a lie?3 
The statements of such authorities can be written in scriptures: 
Authoritative scripture is the Veda or any other source of learning which is not in 
disagreement with the Veda, is composed by critical scholars, approved by noble persons 
and implemented for well-being of the people. This is authoritative scripture.4 
The statements of those who are free from all faults and endowed with all good 
qualities, and who are therefore completely trustworthy, are authoritative statements. When 
their statements are preserved in writing like the Vedas, they form authoritative scriptures. 
Knowledge from these sources handed down from generation to generation is called tradition. 
Caraka considers these to be an independent source of knowledge. 
Analogy (term 21) 
Analogy (aupamya) in the list of 44 terms is defined as "the statement of similarity 
between things".5 That is, analogy is a source of knowledge gained by comparing a familiar 
I Caraka Saf!1hita (3.8.41), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 363. 
2 Caraka Saf!1hita (3.4.4), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,325. 
3 Caraka Saf!1hita (1.1 l.l8-] 9), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,72. 
4 Caraka Saf!1hita (1.11.27), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 73. See translation in Filliozat 1993, 102. 
5 Caraka Sa1Jlhita (3.8.42), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 363. 
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object with an unknown one. For instance, knowledge that a patient is suffering from tetanus 
is gained by the analogy of a bow. A patient with tetanus (dhaJlustambha) suffers from 
prolonged contraction of voluntary muscles causing an arching of the body. The patient's 
posture resembles the shape of a bow (dhanu~a). By noticing the similarity between a 
patient's posture and the shape of a bow, a physician gains the knowledge that the patient in 
question is suffering from tetanus. 
Analogy is discussed only in the list of 44 terms and is not mentioned in the three 
sources of knowledge or in the argument for rebirth. In the list of terms it is mentioned along 
with perception, inference and tradition as one of the four ways in which a reason is known. 
Caraka makes it clear in his argument for rebirth that perception, inference, ratiocination and 
tradition are all means of valid cognition. The discussion on analogy in the list of 44 terms 
appears to be slightly different from Caraka's own views on the means of valid cognition. 
Five psychological states (terms 22-26) 
The remaining five epistemic terms in the list describe psychological states associated 
with a proof. That is, when a proof is presented by an opponent in a debate it takes the form of 
a statement consisting of five parts: proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion. 
These five are presented according to a set formula: 
The subject has the property, because of being the reason, like the example; just as the 
example is the reason and has the property, so is the subject; therefore the property. 
This statement is then considered by the respondent in a debate. The person who considers 
this statement does so by considering each of its five parts in turn. Thus a proof is a five-part 
statement presented by one person for another to consider. This involves a five-stage 
psychological process engaged in by the person considering the five-part statement. Each 
stage in this psychological process is associated with one part of the statement. The five 
epistemic terms are: doubt, purpose, scepticism, inquiry and resolution. Each of these is 
associated with an individual stage of a proof: doubt is associated with the proposition, 
purpose with the reason, scepticism with the example, inquiry with the application, and 
resolution with the conclusion. Caraka provides only a general explanation of these five 
epistemic terms without explaining their roles in a proof. This information has been added 
here based on explanations of other terms, particularly fallacious reasons (see below). 
The first term is doubt (saJ'!lsaya) which is described as a state of indecision that arises 
because there is evidence both for and against some view. For instance, there is evidence both 
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for and against there being premature death. Doubt is related to the proposition, the first part 
of a proof. That is, the person who considers the proposition is in a state of doubt since they 
believe that there is evidence both for and against the subject having the property in the 
proposition. In a successful proof the proposition must be in doubt because a proposition that 
is not in doubt does not require a proof. 
Purpose (prayojana) or intention is the reason to undertake a course of action. For 
instance, undertaking a course of medication with the intention of avoiding premature death. 
Purpose is related to the reason, the second part of a proof. That is, the person who considers 
the reason is someone intent on eliminating doubt about the proposition since this is the 
purpose of considering the proof. In a successful proof the reason must provide the grounds to 
eliminate doubt that the subject has the property, and a reason that does not provide such 
grounds fails in its purpose. 
Scepticism (sa-vyabhiciira) is a state of uncertainty, i.e. being unable to decide. For 
instance, thinking that some medication mayor may not be effective against a particular 
disorder. Scepticism is related to the example, the third part of a proof. That is, the person 
who considers the example is still sceptical about the proposition. This person knows that the 
example is an instance of the reason that has the property in question, but they remain 
sceptical as to whether or not the subject has this property. In a successful proof, the example 
marks the middle stage in a five-stage process and its associated scepticism marks the mid-
point in a process of moving from initial doubt to the final resolution of the proposition. 
Inquiry (jijiiiisii) is to be inquisitive about something. For instance, being inquisitive 
about the medicines described later in the Caraka SalJ1hitii. Inquiry is related to the 
application, the fourth part of a proof. That is, the person who considers the application 
inquires to see if what is known about the example can be applied to the subject. What is 
known about the example is that it is an instance of the reason that has the property. For this 
to have application to the subject, the subject must be an instance of the reason. In a 
successful proof the subject must be known to be an instance of the reason because without 
knowing this, what is known about the example cannot be known to apply to the subject. 
Resolution (vyavasiiya) is to determine (niscaya). For instance, deciding that this 
disorder is definitely due to wind and this is its remedy. Resolution is related to the 
conclusion, the fifth and last part of a proof. That is, the person who considers the conclusion 
is someone making the resolution that the property does apply to the subject, i.e. the subject 
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has the property. In a successful proof the conclusion must be accepted because the proof is 
not complete until a definite resolution has been made that the conclusion is correct. 
These five epistemic terms describe a proof in terms of a five-stage psychological 
process. The person for whom a proof successfully establishes the proposition begins with 
doubt that the subject has the property in question and then considers the reason with the 
intention of eliminating this doubt. They are still sceptical about the proposition when they 
note that the example is an instance of the reason that has the property. Next this person 
inquires into the application, i.e. whether the subject is an instance of the reason just like the 
example. Finally this person decides that the conclusion is correct, i.e. the property does apply 
to the subject. In this way the proof has successfully established the proposition for this 
person by taking them from their initial doubt to the final correct resolution. 
4.3.5 Types of statement (terms 27-32) 
The next six terms describe various types of statement. These are presented in three 
pairs of statements. The first pair of statements are implication and derivation. Implication 
(arthapriiti) is a statement that suggests something other than what is explicitly expressed. For 
instance, the statement 'don't eat during the day' implies 'eat at night'. Derivation 
(salJlbhava) is a statement that suggests the origin from which something came. For instance, 
the statements 'unwholesome things cause disease' and 'wholesome things promote health' 
both refer to the origin of things. An implication refers to a consequence, whereas a derivation 
refers to an original source. 
The next pair of statements are questionable and unquestionable statements. 
Questionable statement (anuyojya) is described as a statement that requires further 
clarification. For instance, a statement like 'this disorder must be purged' omits necessary 
detail and only invites the question 'by which type of purging?' Unquestionable statement 
(ananuyojya) is a statement that requires no further clarification. For instance, a statement like 
'this disorder is incurable' invites no further question. Questionable statements suffer from 
being too general, whereas unquestionable statements are comprehensive. 
The final pair of statements are interrogatives, questioning and counter-questioning. 
Questioning (anuyoga) is to examine, like that done between colleagues in order to improve 
their understanding and dialectical skills. For instance, on the issue that the self is permanent, 
someone asks, 'why is that?' Counter-question (pratyanuyoga) is to re-examine. For instance, 
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in response to a question someone asks, 'why ask that question?' Questioning asks the reason 
for a proposition, whereas a counter-question asks the reason for a question. 
4.3.6 Faults, fallacies and grounds for defeat (terms 33-44) 
The 12 remaining terms concern faults. Some of these are faults within a five-part proof 
and others are faults within debate, i.e. within a series of questions and answers. An analysis 
of these faults clarifies the definition of a successful proof. 
Faults (terms 33-35) 
The first term is defective speech (viikya-do~a), not faulty argument since debates were 
typically verbal rather than written. There are five faults of speech: 
1. Incompleteness (nyuna), i.e. omitting any of the five parts of a proof, or providing 
only one reason when many are required. 
2. Redundancy (adhika), which is the opposite of incompleteness, i.e. including 
information not relevant to the debate, or even when relevant, repeating the same sense with 
different words or repeating the same words. 
3. Meaningless speech (anarthaka), i.e. a string of syllables making no sense. 
4. Incoherent speech (apiirthaka), i.e. disordered string of unrelated but otherwise 
meaningful words. 
5. Contradictory speech (viruddha), i.e. a statement inconsistent with an example or an 
established conclusion of a proof, or incompatible with the basic tenets of one's own system. 
The second term, commendable speech (viikya-prasa1Jlsii), is the opposite of the former 
term and refers to statements free from the five faults of defective speech. Commendable 
speech should also be to the point (adhigata-padiirtha).l 
Equivocation (chala) or quibble is to deliberately misinterpret the meanings of words in 
a statement and then respond to their unintended meanings. There are two types of 
equivocation: (1) verbal equivocation (viik-chala), playing on the ambiguity of words, and (2) 
universal equivocation (siimiinya-chala), over-generalising the meanings of words. 
J See Prets 2000, 373 note 19. 
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Fallacies (term 36) 
Fallacy (ahetu) is a fallacious reason (hetvabhasa).l A proof with a fallacious reason 
does not successfully establish its proposition because the reason fails to serve its purpose. 
Caraka mentions three types of fallacy or fallacious reason. 
1. Reason similar to the point at issue (prakaralJa-sama) 
The first fallacious reason is one where the reason is similar to the point at issue. For 
instance, in a proof where the first two members are: 
(1) The self is distinct from the body and permanent Proposition 
(2) Because of having different characteristics to the impermanent body Reason 
the reason is similar to the point at issue because the property in the proposition has been used 
as the reason. That is, the reason 'having different characteristics to the impermanent body' is 
not sufficiently different from the property 'being distinct from the body and permanent' to be 
able to remove doubt about the proposition. 
In a proof that successfully establishes its proposition, the proposition must be in doubt 
because a proposition that is not in doubt does not require a proof. The requirement for a 
proposition to be in doubt (or able to be doubted) is simply that the proposition must not 
exclude the possibility of its being doubted. The proposition in the proof above is not at fault 
because it is possible to doubt whether the subject does or does not have the property, i.e. 
whether the self is or is not distinct from the body and permanent. An example of a faulty 
proposition is for instance, 'a permanent self is permanent'. This proposition is faulty because 
it is not possible to doubt whether a permanent self is or is not permanent. 
The reason in the proof above is faulty because there is not sufficient difference 
between the reason and the property in the proposition to allow the person who doubts 
whether the subject has this property to know that the subject has the (same) property in the 
reason. That is, 'having different characteristics to the impermanent body' is not sufficiently 
different from 'being distinct from the body and permanent'. Consequently, the person who 
doubts (and therefore does not know) that the self is distinct from the body and permanent 
also does not know that the self has different characteristics to the impermanent body. 
I Caraka uses the term hetviibhiisa as a synonym for ahetu, see COl'aka Sa,!1hitii (3.8.59), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 
1,368. Cf. Prets 2000, 374 note 21. 
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An obvious example of insufficient difference between the reason and property in the 
proposition is where the first two members of a proof are for instance: 
(1) The self is permanent 
(2) Because of not being impermanent 
Proposition 
Reason 
Here the person who doubts whether the self is or is not permanent does not know that the self 
is not impermanent. That is, the person who doubts the proposition in this proof must decide 
whether the self is permanent (and not impermanent), or whether the self is impermanent (and 
not permanent). Consequently this person does not know that the self is not impermanent, and 
therefore does not know that the reason applies to the subject. Thus, this reason is not able to 
remove doubt about the proposition. Similarly, the reason 'having different characteristics to 
the impermanent body' is not sufficiently different from 'being distinct from the body and 
permanent' to remove doubt about the proposition. 
Caraka's example above suggests that even though there is some difference between the 
reason and the property in the proposition, there is not sufficient difference. A correct reason 
in Caraka's system is therefore one that is not merely different from the property in the 
proposition, but one that is sufficiently different from the property in the proposition to allow 
the person who doubts the proposition to know that the reason provides the required grounds 
to establish that the subject has the property in the proposition. 
2. Reason similar to (the grounds for) doubt (sa1!lsaya-sama) 
The second fallacious reason is one where the reason is similar to the grounds for doubt. 
Doubt is described (above) as a state of indecision that arises because there is evidence both 
for and against some view. The person who doubts the proposition is therefore someone who 
believes that there is evidence both for and against the subject having the property. The 
second type of fallacious reason is one where the reason is at fault because it provides 
evidence not only for, but also evidence against, the subject having the property. The reason is 
therefore similar to the grounds for doubting that the subject has the property. The purpose of 
a reason is to eliminate doubt, whereas this reason is actually a cause for doubt. 
The example that Caraka gives is one where the first two members of a proof are: 
(1) This man is a physician 
(2) Because of knowing part of the Ayurveda1 
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The person who doubts this proposition believes that there is evidence both for and against 
this man being a physician. The reason in this proof, 'knowing part of the Ayurveda' , is also 
evidence both for and against the man in question being a physician. The reason is evidence 
for this man being a physician because physicians do know (at least) part of the Ayurveda, 
and the reason is also evidence against this man being a physician because some who are not 
physicians also know part of the Ayurveda. Thus the reason is grounds to doubt whether the 
man in question is or is not a physician. 
A correct reason in Caraka's system is one that eliminates doubt that the subject has the 
property for the person who is in doubt about the proposition. That is, the reason must provide 
grounds for, but not grounds against, the subject having the property, and these grounds must 
be known by the person who doubts the proposition. If the reason fails to provide the correct 
grounds then the person who doubts the proposition cannot know that the reason does provide 
such grounds. In Caraka's example, the reason 'those who know part of the Ayurveda' 
provides grounds both for and against the man in question being a physician, and this reason 
therefore fails to provide the correct grounds. The reason is therefore a fallacious reason 
similar to the grounds for doubting the proposition. 
3. Reason similar to the subject (vanJya-sama) 
The third fallacious reason is one where the instance of the reason is an object similar to 
the subject. That is, the instance of the reason used as the example is similar to the subject in 
that both the example and the subject require proofs in order to establish that each has the 
property in question for the person who doubts the proposition. The fact that the subject 
requires a proof that it has the property is of course acceptable since that is the very purpose 
of a proof. But the person who doubts the proposition must know that the example has the 
property without resorting to a proof. If a proof is required to establish that the example has 
the property, then the proof that the subject has the property would have to be put aside while 
a separate proof was dealt with first. Further, if the example in the second proof also required 
its own proof that it has the property in the second proof, then yet another proof would be 
required, and so on infinitely. The consequence of this is that nothing would ever be proven, 
since every proof would require yet another prior proof. Thus, one of the requirements for a 
successful proof is that the person who doubts the proposition must know, without a proof, 
that the instance of the reason given as the example has the property in the proposition. 
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All this suggests a fault with the example and not a fault with the reason, whereas 
Caraka's discussion here concerns the third type of fallacious reason. However, a faulty 
example disqualifies the reason because the example is a representative instance of the 
grounds that the reason provides to eliminate doubt about the proposition. If the person who 
doubts the proposition needs a proof to establish that the instance of the reason given as the 
example has the property in question, then this person does not yet know that this particular 
instance of the reason has that property. Thus the person who doubts the proposition does not 
yet know that the reason provides adequate grounds for, but not grounds against, the subject 
having the property in question. In this way the reason fails in its purpose of eliminating 
doubt about the proposition. Consequently, this reason is a fallacious reason where the 
instance of the reason used as the example is an object requiring a proof just like the subject. 
Caraka's example of the third type of fallacious reason is one where the first three 
members of the proof are: 
(1) Intellect (buddhi) is impermanent 
(2) Because of being intangible 




In this proof 'sound' is an instance of the reason (intangible) used as the example and which 
must be known to have the property, impermanent. That is, the person who doubts that 
intellect is impermanent must know without a proof that sound is impermanent, if an infinite 
regress is to be avoided. The use of sound to illustrate this type of fallacious reason indicates 
that, according to Caraka, the person who doubts that intellect is impermanent would 
definitely require a proof to establish that sound is impermanent. 
An obvious case where a proof is required to establish that the example has the property 
in question is where intellect is used as both the subject and the example in the proof above. 
That is, the person who doubts whether the subject (intellect) does or does not have the 
property (impermanent), would require a proof to establish that the example (intellect) has the 
property (impermanent). A correct example must therefore be an instance of the reason that is 
different from the subject. But an example that is merely different from the subject does not 
guarantee that the person who doubts that the subject has the property will know, without a 
proof, that the example has this property. If the person who needs a proof that the subject has 
the property is to know that the example has the property without a proof, then the fact that 
the example has the property must be more obvious than the fact that the subject has the 
property. 
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According to Caraka, sound is not more obviously impermanent than·is intellect, and 
anyone who requires a proof that intellect is impermanent would therefore require a proof that 
sound is impermanent. The reason why Caraka considers sound to be in greater need of a 
proof than intellect is because in Caraka's day the issue of whether or not sound is 
impermanent was very much debated. Followers of the Mlmarpsa school argued that sound is 
permanent while Buddhists and others argued that sound is impermanent. Caraka's point here 
is that in order for the reason to be effective in eliminating doubt about the proposition, the 
reason must provide adequate grounds to eliminate that doubt. These grounds are the 
instances of the reason known to have the property specified in the proposition. The example 
is taken as illustrating these grounds and the person who doubts the proposition must know, 
without a proof, that the example has the property in question. Failure to know that the 
example has the property calls into question the adequacy of the grounds to eliminate doubt 
for the person who doubts the proposition. A reason that fails to provide suitable grounds fails 
to effectively eliminate doubt and such a reason is consequently a fallacious reason. The fault 
with this type of reason is that an instance of the reason is like the subject in that it requires a 
proof that it has the property. 
These three fallacious reasons demonstrate the three ways in which a reason can fail to 
perform its function to eliminate doubt that the subject has the property for the person who 
doubts the proposition. A reason which is free from these three faults is presumably a correct 
reason in Caraka's system. A correct reason must be free from attracting the same doubt as 
that surrounding the subject, it must be grounds for, but not grounds against, the subject 
having the property, and it must be free from attracting the need of a proof like the subject. 
This completes the discussion on the three types of fallacious reason. 
Grounds for defeat (terms 37-44) 
Delayed statement (atltakiila) is a statement presented after the appropriate moment for 
its use has elapsed. This statement, even though it would have been acceptable at a previous 
point in the debate, is considered a fault when it is presented at a later stage in the debate 
because it lacks relevance to the current point of the debate. 
Criticism (upiilambha) is finding fault with the reason, such as one of the three faults 
described under fallacy above. For example, in a proof where the first two members are: 
(1) The self is distinct from the body and permanent Proposition 
(2) Because of having different characteristics to the impermanent body Reason 
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the reason is criticised for not being sufficiently different from the point at issue. This is an 
example of the first of the three fallacious reasons. 
Refutation (parihiira) is the rebuttal of criticism (upiilambha) by amending the faulty 
reason. For example, in response to the criticism that the reason is not sufficiently different 
from the point at issue, a new reason could be presented: 
(1) The self is distinct from the body and permanent 
(2) Because a body with a self always has signs 
of life, but never has any without a self 
Proposition 
Reason 
This new reason is free from the defect of not being sufficiently different from the point at 
issue and in this way the former criticism is refuted. 
Abandoning the proposition (pratijiiiihiini) is to renounce the original position. An 
original proposition is not considered to have been abandoned until its opposite has been 
explicitly accepted. For instance, once a proposition like 'the self is permanent' has been 
accepted, it is not considered to have been abandoned until the debate reaches the point where 
the opposite proposition, 'the self is impermanent' , is explicitly accepted. 
Admission (abhyanujiiii) is to concede an opponent's position, whether or not it agrees 
with one's own position. Wrong reason (hetvantara) is to give an incorrect reason instead of 
the correct one. Irrelevant statement (arthiintara) is to change the topic and discuss an 
unrelated issue. 
Points of defeat (nigraha-sthiina) determine the point at which a debate is lost. Caraka 
first describes three examples: 
1. saying things that cannot be understood even if stated three times, 
2. asking irrelevant questions when they should not be asked, and 
3. not asking relevant questions when they should be asked. 
Following these three examples, Caraka lists 12 more terms without descriptions: 
4. abandoning the proposition (pratijiiii-hiini), i.e. to renounce the original position, 
5. admission (abhyanujiiii), i.e. to concede an opponent's position, 
6. mis-timed statement (kiiliitlta-vacana), (no description),} 
J A similar term, mis-timed proof (apriipta-kiila), is listed as a point of defeat in the Upayahrdaya (number 16) 
without a description, and it is described in the Nyaya SZltra as a point of defeat occurring when the members of 
a proof are presented in the incorrect order. See Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.11), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 328-330. 
144 
Chapter four: The medical tradition 
7. fallacy (ahetu), i.e. to use a fallacious reason (note number 14), 
8. incompleteness (nyiina), i.e. to omit relevant information, 
9. redundancy (adhika), i.e. to include irrelevant information, 
10. unsuccessful (vyartha), (no description),! 
11. meaningless speech (anarthaka), i.e. to use a string of syllables making no sense, 
12. repetition (punarukta), (no description),2 
13. contradictory speech (viruddha), i.e. to make incompatible statements, 
14. wrong reason (hetvantara), i.e. to use an incorrect reason, and 
15. irrelevant statement (arthiintara), i.e. to change the topic of debate. 
All but three of the last 12 terms (number 6, 10 and 12) are terms that Caraka has 
already explained in this section on faults, fallacies and grounds for defeat. The difference 
between numbers 7 and 14 is unclear. AllIS terms are considered to be errors sufficiently 
serious to constitute defeat in a debate. This completes Caraka's discussion on the 44 terms 
used in debate. 
4.4 Caraka's proof compared with Aristotle's syllogism 
The five-part proof in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii is often compared to an Aristotelian 
syllogism. Vidyabhu~al!a claims that the five-part proof found in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii was 
greatly influenced by, if not based on, the syllogism as propounded by Aristotle. He says: 
From the stages in the development of the syllogism in Hindu Logic, as indicated above, 
it will appear that Aristotle's works migrated into India during three distinct periods. The 
first period extends roughly from 175 BC to 30 BC, when the Greeks occupied the north-
western parts of India and had their capital at Sakala, officially called Euthydemia 
(modern Sialkot) in the Punjab. The work of Aristotle of which we find a trace in this 
period is the Art of Rhetoric, which was evidently a favourite subject of study among the 
Indian Greeks, and from which the syllogism of five members as illustrated in the 
Caraka-sarphita, referred to above, seems to have been derived. It is worthy of note that 
the first trace in India of Aristotle's syllogism is met with in a work the author of which 
was the chief physician to King Kani~ka, who reigned in the Punjab, if not exactly in the 
city of Sakala, at any rate near to it.3 
I There is no mention of this term in the Upiiyahraya or the Nyiiya Siitra. 
2 This term is listed as a point of defeat in the Upayahrdaya (number 17) without a description, and it is 
described in the Nyaya Siitra as a point of defeat occurring when words or ideas are repeated without reason. See 
Nyaya Siitra (5.2.14-15), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,333-335. 
3 Vidyabhii$m:Ia 1918, 486; repro Vidyabhii$ar.Ia 1920, 511-512. See also McEvilley 2002, 510-511. 
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Vidyabhii~a:J:la claims that Caraka's description of proof (sthiipanii) and counter-proof 
(prati-$thiipanii)l corresponds to Aristotle's description in his Rhetoric of demonstrative 
enthymeme and refutative enthymeme, respectively.2 Aristotle divides enthymeme into one 
that proves and one that disproves,3 but Caraka's proof and counter-proof do not correspond 
to these. An enthymeme is an incomplete argument, i.e. one with a missing premise that the 
hearer is supposed to supply. Aristotle defines an enthymeme as a syllogism made up "of few 
propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these 
propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself.,,4 
Caraka's proofs and counter-proofs, on the other hand, must be complete with no parts 
missing. Caraka describes incompleteness (nyuna), the first type of defective speech 
(viikya-do$a), as omitting any of the five parts of a proof, or providing only one reason when 
many are required,s and he also lists incompleteness as a point of defeat (nigraha-sthiina).6 
The five-part proof is more often compared to a syllogism in general rather than to a 
syllogism with missing premises. This also is a mistake, but a less obvious one. In order to 
make an accurate comparison between Caraka's proof and Aristotle's syllogism it is 
necessary to first define these two more accurately. 
4.4.1 Caraka's proofs defined 
Caraka does not clearly define the five parts of a successful proof. This must be 
gathered together from his discussion on other terms. A proof consists of exactly five parts: 
proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion. A successful proof must contain 
only these five parts, arranged in the correct order. In addition, each part must be free from 
fault in order for the proof to successfully establish its proposition. A proof that lacks any of 
these features does not establish its proposition. 
A proposition consists of a subject and a property. A correct proposition must be in 
doubt. For a proposition to be in doubt, it must not exclude the possibility of its being 
doubted. That is, the subject and the property must be sufficiently different from one another 
I Tenns 9 and 10 in Caraka SalJlhitii (3.8.31-32), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 360-361. 
2 Vidyabhii~al)a 1918,473-474; repro VidyabhU~al)a 1920, 500-501. See also Matila11985, 2-3. 
') Rhetoric 1396b 23 (Book 2.22), trans. Smith, Ross eds 1924. 
4 Rhetoric 1357a 16f[' (Book 1.2), trans. Smith, Ross eds 1924. 
5 Term 33 in Caraka SaJ!lhitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,365-366. 
6 Term 44 in Cm'aka SalJlhitii (3,8.65), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,368-369. 
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to ensure that it is possible to doubt whether the subject does or does not have the property in 
question. This requirement does not mean that the proposition must always be doubted by 
everyone, only that it could be doubted by someone at some time. A proposition that could 
never be doubted by anyone at any time is an incorrect proposition since it requires no proof. 
The purpose of a reason is to provide evidence to eliminate doubt about the proposition. 
The requirements for a correct reason are three. Firstly the reason must provide grounds for, 
but not grounds against, the subject having the property. That is, there must be instances of 
the reason that have the property specified in the proposition, but no instances of the reason 
that do not have this property. Secondly, this must be known by the person who doubts the 
proposition. That is, the reason must not only be different from the subject, it must be 
sufficiently different from the subject to allow the person who doubts whether the subject has 
the property to know that instances of the reason have the property, and no instances of the 
reason do not have the property. The reason must also be sufficiently different from the 
property to allow the person who doubts that the subject has the property to know that the 
subject is an instance of the reason at the time of considering the application, i.e. before they 
decide that the subject has the property (see application below). Thirdly, the person must 
know that the reason provides the necessary grounds either by perception, inference, tradition 
or analogy, since only these four are reliable. That is, the person who doubts that the subject 
has the property must not require a proof to establish that an instance of the reason used as the 
example has the property, or there would be an infinite regress. 
An example is an instance of the reason that has the property. A correct example is an 
illustrative instance of the reason that is known to have the property by the person who doubts 
the proposition, and this must be known without relying on a proof. Thus the example must 
firstly be an instance of the reason that is sufficiently different from the subject to allow the 
person who doubts whether the subject has the property to know that the example has the 
property. Secondly, the fact that the example has the property must be more obvious than the 
fact that the subject has the property in order for the person who requires a proof to establish 
that the subject has the property to know that the example has the property without requiring a 
proof. 
The application contains all four elements used in a proof: the subject, property, reason 
and example. These elements are presented in a statement that the example is an instance of 
the reason that has the property, and this also applies to the subject. In order for this to apply 
147 
Chapter four: The medical tradition 
to the subject, the subject must be an instance of the reason. In a correct application, the 
subject must be known to be an instance of the reason by the person who doubts the 
proposition. Thus the reason must be sufficiently different from the property to allow the 
person who doubts the proposition to know that the subject is an instance of the reason before 
they decide that the subject has the property. 
A conclusion consists of a property. A correct conclusion must be the same as the 
property in the proposition, and the resolution must be made that this property applies to the 
subject, i.e. the subject has the property. When this resolution is made the doubt about the 
proposition is completely eliminated and the proof has successfully established the 
proposition. 
A proof in the system of logic preserved in the Caraka Sm]1hitii does not operate with 
propositions. The success of a proof is determined by the logical relationship that exists 
between the elements used in the proof and the epistemological considerations associated with 
the psychological process of establishing the proposition. These elements must be logically 
related to one another, and yet sufficiently different from one another to allow each to play its 
part in the psychological process of moving from the initial doubt about the proposition to the 
final resolution about the conclusion. 
The purpose of a proof is to establish its proposition. A successful proof satisfies the 
person who is in doubt about the proposition that the proposition is in fact beyond doubt. A 
proof does this by providing the justification for a person who doubts the proposition to 
abandon their doubt and resolve that the subject does in fact have the property in question. 
The person who makes this resolution can be confident that their decision is the correct one 
by considering the logical relationship that exists between the four elements used in the proof. 
4.4.2 Aristotle's demonstrations defined 
The five-part proof (sthiipanii) described in the Caraka Sarrrhitii is best compared not 
with syllogisms in general but with a particular type of syllogism, one that Aristotle calls a 
demonstration. Aristotle begins his presentation of syllogisms in the Prior Analytics: 
A premiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. I 
I Prior Analytics (1.1.24a15-16), trans. Smith, Ross, eds ] 908. 
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An example of a premiss is, 'humans are mortal'. A premiss contains terms: 
I call that a term into which the premiss is resolved, i.e. both the predicate and that of 
which it is predicated. 1 
A term can be either the subject or the predicate of a premiss. Both humans and mortal are 
terms in the premiss 'humans are mortal'. Premisses are used to form syllogisms: 
A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what 
is stated follows of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they 
produce the consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without in 
order to make the consequence necessary.2 
A syllogism is a statement consisting of two parts. In the first part, certain things are stated 
which make it necessary for something not stated to follow as a consequence. That is, what is 
stated in the second part is not stated in the first part, but it follows as a necessary 
consequence from what has been stated in the first part. 
Aristotle then begins his description of the different types of syllogism: 
After these distinctions we now state by what means, when, and how every syllogism is 
produced; subsequently we must speak of demonstration. Syllogism should be discussed 
before demonstration, because syllogism is the more general: the demonstration is a sort 
of syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration.3 
That is, here in the Prior Analytics Aristotle describes syllogisms and then in the Posterior 
Analytics he describes a particular type of syllogism called a demonstration. 
Aristotle describes syllogisms in three figures. The first figure has four moods: 
If A is predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must be predicated of all C. 
If A is predicated of no B, and B of all C, it is necessary that no C will be A.4 
Let all B be A and some C be B. Then ... it is necessary that some C is A. 
If no B is A, but some C is B, it is necessary that some C is not A.5 
It is evident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are perfect [for they are completed 
by means of the premisses originally taken] and that all conclusions are proved by this 
figure, viz. universal and particular, affirmative and negative. Such a figure I call the 
first.6 
1 Prior Analytics (1.1.24b 16-17), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
2 Prior Analyfics (l.1.24b18-22), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
3 Prior Analyfics (1A.25b26-31), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. See also Bochenski 1961, 72 ff. 
4 Prior AnalYfics (1.4.25b37-26a1), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
5 Prior Allalyfics (lA.26a24-26), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
6 Prior Analytics (lA.26b27-33), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
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Aristotle uses 'predicated of' and the copula 'is' interchangeably. The statement 'A is 
predicated of all B' is thus 'all B is A'. An example of the first figure is: 
If all humans are mortal, and all Greeks are humans, then all Greeks are mortal. 
There are three terms in this syllogism: mortal, humans and Greeks. Aristotle gives these 
three terms names: 
I call that term middle which is itself contained in another and contains another in itself: 
in position also this comes in the middle. By extremes I mean both that term which is 
itself contained in another and that in which another is contained. l 
In the example syllogism above, the term humans is called middle because it is contained in 
the extreme term mortal and also contains the extreme term Greeks. The two extreme terms 
are also given names: 
I call that term the major in which the middle is contained and that term the minor which 
comes under the middle.2 
The extreme term mortal is major because it contains the middle term, and the extreme term 
Greeks is minor because it is contained in the middle term. Next Aristotle explains what he 
means by one term being contained or included in another: 
That one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to 
be predicated of all of the first. And we say that one term is predicated of all of another, 
whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be 
asserted: 'to be predicated of none' must be understood in the same way? 
That is, human is included in the term mortal since mortal can be predicated of all humans, 
and mortal can be predicated of all humans since there is no instance of human of which 
mortal cannot be asserted. 
Aristotle's syllogisms are in the form of implications. These consist of an antecedent 
and a consequent. The middle term never occurs in the consequent. In the first figure the 
middle term is always the subject in the premiss where the major term is predicate, and 
predicate in the premiss where the minor term is subject. The consequent or conclusion 
contains two terms, the major and the minor term. Following the first figure, Aristotle 
presents two other figures which are not required for a comparison with Caraka's proof since 
they are not used in demonstrations. 
1 Prior Analytics (1.4.25b35-37), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
2 Prior Analytics (lA.26a22-23), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
3 Prior Analytics (1.1.24b27-30), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
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In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle describes the demonstration: 
By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, 
that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis as to 
the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premisses of demonstrated knowledge 
must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is 
further related to them as effect to cause. Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic 
truths will not be 'appropriate' to the conclusion. Syllogism there may indeed be without 
these conditions, but such syllogism, not being productive of scientific knowledge, will 
not be demonstration.! 
Aristotle also says that a demonstration is a syllogism in the first figure: 
Of all the figures the most scientific is the first. Thus, it is the vehicle of the 
demonstration of all the mathematical sciences, ... for the syllogism of the reasoned fact 
is either exclusively or generally speaking and in most cases in this figure ... the first 
figure has no need of the others, while it is by means of the first that the other two figures 
are developed, ... Clearly, therefore, the first figure is the primary condition of 
knowledge? 
Aristotle defines a demonstration as a syllogism in the first figure with premisses that 
meet three criteria. The premisses must be: (i) true and primary, i.e. basic and necessary 
truths, (ii) immediate, i.e. known independent of demonstration, better known than the 
conclusion, and known before the conclusion is known, and (iii) related to the conclusion in 
the appropriate manner. If these conditions are not met the syllogism is not a demonstration 
and will not result in scientific know ledge. 
The epistemic requirements of a demonstration have some things in common with the 
epistemic requirements of Caraka' s proofs. This makes the demonstration a better basis for 
comparison with a proof than syllogisms in generaL 
4.4.3 Proofs compared with demonstrations 
The terms found in a syllogism of the first figure can be used to form a proof, and this 
process can be reversed, i.e. the elements of a proof can be used to form a syllogism in the 
first figure. For instance, the terms used in a syllogism in the first mood, 'if all humans are 
mortal, and all Greeks are humans, then all Greeks are mortal' , i.e. mortal, human, and 
Greeks, can be used to form the following five-part proof: 
(1) Greeks are mortal 
(2) Because of being human 
1 Posterior Analytics 1.2.71 b16-24), trans. Smith, Ross, eds 1908. 
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(3) Like Egyptians 
(4) Just as Egyptians are human and mortal, so are Greeks 




The process involves identifying the three terms used in the syllogism and placing them 
in the correct place in a proof. The middle term, humans, is used in the reason and is also a 
property in the application. The minor term, Greeks, becomes the subject in the proposition 
and also appears in the application. The major term, mortal, becomes the property in the 
proposition, in the application, and in the conclusion. The universal 'all' used in the syllogism 
is dropped and an example (Egyptians) is added in the proof. 
The same process is involved in the other three moods in the first figure. The only 
difference is that in the second and fourth moods, the negative in 'no B is A' is first moved 
from the middle term B to the major term A and the universal 'all' is added to the middle 
term, i.e. 'all B is not A'. In the third and fourth moods, the particular 'some' remains with 
the minor term C, i.e. 'some Cis B'. Proofs can then be formed with the terms from the other 
three moods in the same way as was done with the first mood. This process can be reversed to 
form syllogisms from the elements used in a proof. 
Although it is possible to form a syllogism using the elements from a proof, the Indian 
proof does not correspond to an Aristotelian syllogism as is so often claimed. For instance, 
Blakey claims that: 
In comparing the European syllogism with the Hindu logic, it has been observed, that the 
three last propositions correspond exactly to our syllogism, with this single difference-
that the first, or major term, contains invariably an example.] 
Barlingay also claims that the only difference between the Indian and Greek syllogisms is that 
the Indian syllogism includes an example (d[${iinta) whereas the Greek syllogism does not: 
Statement of the dr~tanta in the body of the syllogism, then, is the only characteristic 
difference which distinguishes the Indian type of syllogism from the Greek.2 
Sharma claims that the last three members (example, application and conclusion) of the 
Nyaya (Indian) syllogism correspond to the Aristotelian syllogism: 
Hence if we leave out the first two members of the Nyaya syllogism which are contained 
in the last two, we find that it resembles the Aristotelian syllogism in the First Figure.3 
1 Blakey 1851, 384. 
2 Barlingay 1962, 164. 
3 Sharma 1960, 199. 
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Stcherbatsky claims that it is just the last two members (application and conclusion) that 
correspond to an Aristotelian syllogism: 
At a later date the Mlmal11sakas, probably under the influence of the Buddhist critique, 
made the concession that either the first three members or the last three were sufficient to 
establish the conclusion. In the last three, if we drop the example [dr~tanta], we will have 
a strictly Aristotelian syllogism, its first figure.! 
However, the last two or three members of a proof do not meet the criteria for a 
syllogism as defined by Aristotle. The example member can be included or ignored as it does 
not playa decisive role in proving that the Indian proof does not correspond to an Aristotelian 
syllogism. The last two members from the proof above are: 
(4) Just as Egyptians are human and mortal, so are Greeks 
(5) Therefore, mortal 
Application 
Conclusion 
In order for this to qualify as an Aristotelian syllogism it must contain the two essential 
parts of a syllogism. The conclusion in this proof is an abbreviation of 'mortal applies to 
Greeks', i.e. Greeks are mortal. It must therefore belong in the second part of a syllogism, the 
conclusion, and it must follow as a necessary consequence from what is stated in the first part. 
The application presents a difficulty. The first part of a syllogism must not state what is stated 
in the second, and the application states that what applies to Egyptians, i.e. they are human 
and mortal, also applies to Greeks. The problem lies in the second part of the application: 
Part 1: Just as Egyptians are human and mortal, 
so are Greeks (human and mortal) 
Part 2: Therefore, mortal (applies to Greeks) 
Application (Part 1) 
Application (Part 2) 
Conclusion 
The statement that Greeks are human and mortal in the second part of the application 
cannot be placed in Part 1 of a syllogism because it includes the statement that Greeks are 
mortal. But if it is placed in Part 2 then Part 1 lacks a statement that Greeks are human. Part 1 
also lacks the statement that all humans are mortal. Without these two statements in Part 1, 
the statement that Greeks are mortal in Part 2 does not follow as a consequence from what is 
stated in Part 1. Thus a proof does not constitute a syllogism as defined by Aristotle. Adding 
more of the five parts of the Indian proof does not help to produce an Aristotelian syllogism. 
The proof as described in the Caraka Sal!lhitii does not correspond to an Aristotelian 
syllogism. Rather, it is related to the early Indian systems of forming arguments with ten 
I Stcherbatsky 1930-32, 1,26. 
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components. Changing a proof in an attempt to make it conform to the pattern of a syllogism 
not only fails to form a legitimate syllogism but it also prevents a proof from successfully 
establishing its proposition. A proof that establishes its proposition does so for the person who 
is in doubt about the proposition. This person considers the proof with the aim of deciding 
whether the subject of the proposition does or does not have the property in question. Thus 
the proposition must be stated first and must be borne in mind by the person who is 
considering the remaining four parts of the proof. The process of considering the proof is a 
psychological process with requirements relevant only to the person who doubts the 
proposition. A proof must end with the resolution that the property in the conclusion does in 
fact apply to the subject. In this way the doubt about the proposition is eliminated. 
It is a mistake to apply the criteria required of an Aristotelian syllogism to Caraka's 
proofs or to Indian logic in general. It is even misleading to use Aristotelian terminology to 
explain Indian logic. Muller acknowledged this as early as 1853 when he said that ifhe had 
explained Indian logic using Aristotelian terminology then "all that is peculiar to Indian 
philosophy would have been eliminated, and the remainder would have looked like a clumsy 
imitation of Aristotle."] This view is supported by Kitagawa who says: "to interpret Indian 
logic using the terminology of Aristotelian logic, ... is not to represent Indian logic as it is, 
but merely to review Aristotelian logic as applied to Indian logic.,,2 
4.5 Greek influence in Indian medicine 
It could be argued that even though Caraka's proofs do not conform to the requirements 
of a syllogism, it is still very likely that the Greeks did influence Caraka's system of proofs 
because the Indian medical tradition (Ayurveda) in which Caraka's proofs are found was itself 
strongly influenced by the Greeks. That is, Caraka must have known about Greek medicine 
and he therefore probably knew about Greek logic as well. Caraka could have been inspired 
by Greek logic and may well have attempted to bring the same degree of rigour to Indian 
logic as he found in Greek logic. 
The problem with this argument is that there is no real evidence that Greek medicine 
influenced Indian medicine. Many argue that the similarities between the Greek and Indian 
I Muller 1853, 68. 
2 Kitagawa 1960, 390. 
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medical systems show that the Indians borrowed their ideas from the Greeks. Rawlinson for 
instance claims that Caraka borrowed from Hippocrates and Galen: 
The medical works of Caraka and Susruta borrow largely from Hippocrates and Galen, 
and if, as is usually stated, Caraka was court-physician to Kanishka, this is easily 
explicable. l 
One piece of evidence often used to argue for Indian borrowing from the Greeks is the 
supposed similarity between the oath described in the Caraka Sal!lhitii and the Hippocratic 
oath. Vogel claims that the two oaths are exactly the same: 
The oath which, according to Hippocrates, Greek physicians had to take at the time of 
entering on their professional duties, shows an almost verbal agreement with the rules 
prescribed for the Indian medical men as found in the works of Susruta and Caraka? 
Jairazbhoy also claims that Caraka's oath is the same as the Hippocratic oath: 
Another striking correspondence in Caraka is the prescribing of rules for the Indian 
doctor, which resembles very minutely the oath which the Greek physician, according to 
Hippocrates [d.c.370 BC], had to take upon entering his duties. The resemblance is not 
only in ideas but also in sentiments and expressions, as the juxtaposing of passages from 
Caraka and Hippocrates indicates? 
However, on closer inspection the two oaths are found not to be as similar as claimed. 
Regarding the size of the English translations of each oath, the Hippocratic oath has a little 
less than 400 words4 whereas Caraka's oath is nearly twice that size.5 Regarding the contents 
of each oath, the similarities are that both mention respect for one's teacher, to always benefit 
patients, not to attempt to seduce others, not divulge anything that should be kept secret about 
patients, and to live a morally pure life. The differences are that the Hippocratic oath includes 
the undertakings to teach one's own sons, the sons of one's teacher, and disciples bound by 
the oath, but no one else, not to give poisons or abortive remedies, and to refrain from 
surgery. These are not mentioned in the Caraka Sal!lhitii. Caraka's oath includes many things 
not mentioned in the Hippocratic oath, e.g. remaining celibate (while a student), keeping a 
beard, not eating meat, not possessing weapons, refraining from excessive drinking, not to 
treat certain people such as those disliked by the king or by other powerful people, not to treat 
I Rawlinson 1937,23; cf. Rawlinson ]916,172. 
2 Vogel ]9]2,40. 
3 lairazbhoy ]963, 79. 
4 Edelstein 1967,6. 
5 Caraka Sa1!lhitii (3.8.13-14), trans. Sharma] 981-94, 1, 354-356. See Mehta 1949, 1, 164-168, for other oaths 
in the Indian medical literature. 
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the wicked or those close to death, to refrain from boasting and to devote oneself to medicine. 
There is nothing in Caraka's oath to suggest that it was influenced by the Hippocratic oath 
and what similarities do exist between the two oaths are not surprising given that both oaths 
were taken by those intent on a career in medicine. 
Another common argument is that both the Greek and Indian medical systems are based 
on the theory of humours. The Greek system proposes four chief fluids of the body, i.e. blood, 
phlegm, choler (yellow bile), and melancholy (black bile), and the predominance of one was 
thought to determine a person's physical and mental qualities. The Indian system proposes a 
theory of three faults (tri-do~a) where imbalances in the amounts of wind (viita, vayu), bile 
(pitta) or phlegm (kapha, sle~man) are believed to cause diseases.1 
Vogel claims that since both humoral systems are very similar, India must have 
borrowed its version of the system from Greece: 
The Ayur-Veda, or medical science of ancient India, is based on the theory of the four 
humours, which, slightly modified, was borrowed from the Greeks. There is reason to 
assume that the loan took place in the period intervening between Hippocrates and 
Galienus, in other words between the 4th century Be and the 2nd century AD. It will be 
noticed that this very nearly coincides with the period of the close contact between India 
and Hellenistic Asia sketched above.2 
Although there are similarities between the two humoral systems and there was close 
contact between Indians and Greeks as Vogel describes, the Indian medical system in general 
and the humoral theory in particular are found in Buddhist sources that pre-date the arrival of 
the Greeks in India. There are numerous references to medical treatment found in the early 
Buddhist works preserved in Pali.3 Zysk explains that the Buddhist "monastic organisation 
provided a suitable vehicle for the first codification of medical knowledge",4 and it thus 
"played a significant role in the institutionalization of medicine".5 Zysk, following 
Frauwallner,6 dates the Vinaya (corpus of regulations for life as a renunciant) as belonging to 
I Zysk 1991, 29. Scharfe 1999, 618-625 lists and discusses Caraka's explanation of the three humours in the 
Caraka Smphitii. Caraka does not mention blood as a humour. 
2 Vogel 1912, 40. 
3 Anguttara Nikiiya (2.87, 5.110), Majjhima Nikiiya (1.187, 1.422, 3.90, 3.241), Smpyutta Nikiiya (4.229-230). 
See list of sources in Scharfe 1999, 612-615, and in Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IIA, 820-821. See also Yashpal 
1949; and Zysk 1982. 
4 Zysk 1990,123. 
5 Zysk 1991, 6. See review in Wez]er 1995. 
6 Frauwallner 1956, 67. 
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the first half of the fourth century BC, and says "we can safely conclude that the 
crystallisation of the classical system of India medicine was already well under way by that 
time."} That is, before the period of close contact between the Greeks and Indians as 
described by Vogel. Zysk says the "Buddhist monastic medicine represents the earliest extant 
codification of medical doctrines" in India.2 Regarding the Indian humoral system Zysk 
explains: 
Central to ayurveda is an etiology based on three "peccant" humors, or dmJas: wind, bile, 
and phlegm. Evidence of a complete formulation of this theory can be traced in Buddhist 
Piili literature, where the three humors and their combination are mentioned as causes of 
disease.3 
Caraka's humoral system has clear antecedents in Buddhist literature and thus the presence of 
the humoral theory in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii does not constitute evidence of Greek influence. 
Opinions vary on the origin of the humoral system and on the influence between the 
Indian and Greek medical systems. Some argue that Indian medicine influenced Greek 
medicine.4 J airazbhoy points out that a number of Indian medicinal plants are included in the 
pharmacological treatise De materia medica by the Greek physician Pedanius Dioscorides 
(cAO AD - c.90 AD) written around the year 77 AD.5 Others argue only that it is possible for 
Indian medicine to have influenced Greek medicine, or that there may have been borrowing 
on both sides.6 Keith claims that evidence tells conclusively against Greek borrowing from 
India.7 The evidence for Indian influence in Greek medicine is uncertain, but it is clear that 
there is no compelling evidence for Greek influence in Indian medicine. 8 
Conclusion 
Caraka wrote at a time when the opportunity for Greek influence certainly existed, but 
there is no evidence of any such influence to be found in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii. There is no 
evidence of Greek influence in either the logic or in the medical system that Caraka describes. 
There are Indian antecedents that can account for the origin of Caraka's views on both of 
I Zysk 1982,79. 
2 Zysk 1991, 84. 
3 Zysk 1991,119. 
4 Conger 1952, 109-110; Majumdar 1954, 3, 629; and Mukhopadhyaya 2000, 243. 
5 Jairazbhoy 1963,77-80. Supported by Mukhopadhyaya 2000,245. 
6 See Hoernle 1907b, iv; Muller 1933, 327; Basham 1954, 499; and Zysk 1991, 119. 
7 Keith 1908, 139. 
8 MacDonell 1900, 426; Smith, 1919, 143; and Clark 1937,353. 
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these sUbjects. Most of the infonuation on logic is found in the description of the 44 terms. 
Caraka is probably not the author of this list of terms because Caraka's own views on 
epistemology seem to vary slightly from the views on epistemology found in the list of 44 
terms. In the discussion on rebirth, Caraka presents four means of examination: authoritative 
statements (or tradition), perception, inference, and ratiocination. Here ratiocination is 
described as being separate from inference, a view unique to Caraka, and no mention is made 
of analogy. In the list of 44 terms, Caraka discusses the four traditional means of valid 
cognition: perception, inference, tradition, and analogy. This suggests that when Caraka 
describes the 44 tenus he is following the accepted system of his time rather than one of his 
own invention. 
The five-part proof in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii is discussed only in the list of 44 tenus. This 
form of argument is related to a ten-membered argument used by other ancient logicians in 
India. The five psychological states associated with a proof (doubt, purpose, scepticism, 
inquiry, and resolution), plus the five actual members of a proof (proposition, reason, 
example, application, and conclusion), correspond to the ten components that Vatsyayana 
claims ancient Indian logicians used (see above). The ten-membered system probably 
originated in the ancient system of debate and was then split into two sets of five. The five 
psychological members were set aside as not being part of the actual proof and this left the 
five traditional members that make up a proof. Many other terms in Caraka's list also appear 
to have originated in the tradition of debate in ancient India. There is no clear evidence of 
Greek influence in either Caraka's logic or his system of medicine and there are good reasons 
to accept both as having purely Indian origins. Early works on logic and debate follow the 
pattern of describing lists of terms. The next such work in chronological order after the 
Caraka Sa1J1hitii is the Upiiyahrdaya (Essential Methods). 
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5.1 Background to the work 
This chapter examines the Upiiyahrdaya (Essential Methods), one of the earliest 
surviving works on Indian logic. The main purpose of this discussion is to establish the next 
stage in the development of Indian logic after the Caraka Saf!1hitii. The Upiiyahrdaya was 
written by a Buddhist and it describes a system of logic similar to the one found in the Caraka 
Saf!1hitii. Both works are based on a list of technical terms. In fact, many of the terms found in 
the Caraka Saf!1hitii are also described in the Upiiyahrdaya, except that the Upiiyahrdaya 
supplies more information on some terms. The comparison between the logical terminology 
in the Upayahrdaya and the Caraka Saf!1hitii presented below shows that both works follow 
the same system of logic. This suggests that there was a common system of logic in ancient 
India, probably followed by a number of schools. Further, the way these terms are described 
indicates the Upiiyahrdaya represents a later stage in the development of Indian logic than the 
one found in the Caraka Saf!1hitii. 
The Upiiyahrdaya was written at a time in Indian history when the possibility for Greek 
influence certainly existed. However, there is no evidence of any Greek influence in the work. 
It presents a development of the same system that Caraka describes. This system has its 
origins in the ancient Indian tradition of debate and not in anything introduced by the Greeks. 
This adds further weight to the argument that Indian logic developed on its own, independent 
of any foreign influence. 
The Upiiyahrdaya was written around the first or second century AD. The Sanskrit 
original is lost, but a Chinese translation, the Fang pien hsin lun,t has been preserved. The 
Upiiyahrdaya was brought to the attention of the scholarly (English speaking) world only in 
1905 when Sastri referred to it under the title Upiiyakausa/ya and mentioned that it was a 
great polemical work devoted to an exposition of the Nyaya (logic).2 In 1929 Tucci 
retranslated the Chinese translation back into Sanskrit and gave it the name Upiiyahrdaya? 
The original title of the work is unknown and the work could be called the Prayogasiira. In 
J Nanji6 1247. 
2 Sastri 1905b, 178. 
3 Tucci 1929b. 
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any event, its title should not be the Upiiyakausalyahrdaya,l nor should it be confused with a 
completely unrelated work, the Upoyakausalya Siitra? 
The editor of the Sung version of the Chinese Tripitaka (Buddhist Canon) attributed the 
Upiiyahrdaya to Nag1iljuna, the famous Buddhist dialectician who founded the Madhyamaka 
(Middle Way) system of philosophy. Scholarly opinion is divided over this attribution. Both 
Sastri and Vidyabhu~aI;la accepted that the work is by Nagarjuna,3 whereas Ui rejected the 
attribution and claimed instead that the work is by some unknown Buddhist following the 
Abhidharma tradition who came after the Caraka Sarrzhitii.4 Tucci says there are "no grounds 
either for affirming or for denying its attribution to Nagarjuna."s Warder argues that the 
Upiiyahrdaya belongs to the Bahusrutlya school, an offshoot of the Mahasarpghika school of 
Buddhism.6 Nakamura follows Ui in not accepting that the work is by Nagarjuna,7 and 
Lindtner in his study on Nagarjuna' s writings lists the Upiiyahrdaya in the category of works 
most probably not by Nagarjuna.8 Ramanan also accepts that the Upiiyahrdaya is not by 
Nagarjuna since it has hardly any bearing on the principal theme of Nagarjuna' s works.9 
Kajiyama initially thought that the work was not by NagaIjuna, but subsequently changed his 
mind. He originally said: "It is now ascertained that this text belongs, not to NagaIjuna, but to 
some Hlnayana author perhaps anterior to Nagarjuna. ,,10 However, he later objected to Ui' s 
claim that the work was not by NagaIjuna,11 and more recently, he criticised Ui's reasons for 
claiming that the work is not by Nagarjuna and concluded: "Thus I find no reason to cancel 
the ascription of the text to Nagarjuna made by the editor of the Sung version of the Chinese 
I Tucci 1929a, 451-452; and Tucci] 929b, xi. 
2 Trans. in Chang 1983,427-468; and in Tatz 1994. 
3 Sastri 1905b, 178; and Vidyabhu~al)a ]920,259. 
4 In 1925, see Ichimura 1992, ]4; and Ichimura 1995,20. 
5 Tucci 1929a, 452. 
6 Warder 1970, 395 note 1; see p. 267 for a description of the views of the Bahusrutfya school. 
7 Nakamura 1980,243. 
8 Lindtner 1982, 17 note 44; see also p. 71 note 110. 
9 Ramanan 1966,34-35. 
10 Kajiyama 1965, 129. 
II Ichimura 1995, 20. 
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Tripitaka."l Ichimura agrees with Sastri, Vidyabhii~at;la and Kajiyama in accepting that the 
Upiiyahrdaya was written by Nagarjuna.2 
The author of the Upiiyahrdaya remains in some doubt, although there is general 
agreement that he was a Buddhist. The period during which the work was composed is 
suggested by the logical terminology found in the work. The Upiiyahrdaya uses many of the 
same tenns found in both the Caraka Sal!1hitii and the Nyiiya Sulra (Logic Aphorisms), 
described in the next chapter. None of these three works actually refers to the other by name, 
but their respective descriptions of common terms suggests that the Upayahrdaya probably 
came after the Caraka Saf!1hitii, but before the Nyiiya Sulra. This places the Upayahrdaya 
around the first or second century AD with as much certainty as surrounds the dates of the 
other two works. 
A comprehensive description of all the logical material in the Upiiyahrdaya has yet to 
be published, although some of its contents have been summarised a number of times.3 The 
only significant study of the work is by Kajiyama,4 who focuses on the author's identity. 
There are no extant commentaries on this work and the text itself lacks explanatory detail. It is 
written in a very compact style so often used in ancient Indian works. This style leaves it to 
the reader to deduce the logical significance of the points being made. The following account 
not only describes all the logical terminology found in the work, but it also explains the 
logical significance of these terms. This account is based on Tucci's Sanskrit reconstruction.5 
The Upayahrdaya is divided into four chapters. The first chapter describes eight terms: 
1. instance (udaharm:za), 
2. theory (siddhiinla), 
3. commendable speech (viikya-prasal!1sii), 
4. defective speech (viikya-do:ja), 
5. inference (anumana), 
6. appropriate speech (samayocita-vakya), 
7. fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa), and 
8. adoption of a fallacious reason (du:jfa-vakyanusarm:za). 
1 Kajiyama 1991, 109. 
2 Ichimura 1992,14; and Ichimura 1995, 20. 
3 VidyabhU~al)a 1920,259-261; Tucci 1929b, ix-xxx; Solomon 1976-78,1,185-189 and 245-247; Kajiyama 
1991, 109-113; and Matilal 1998, 74-80. 
4 Kajiyama 1991. 
5 English translation by Michael Spurr 2003 (unpUblished). 
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Chapter two describes: 
9. points of defeat (nigraha-sthiina). 
Chapter three discusses philosophical issues, and chapter four describes: 
10. refutations (du$alJa). 
5.2 Eight logical terms 
Instance (1) 
The first term, instance (udiiharalJa), I is described as something understood by both 
ordinary people and the learned alike,2 exactly as it is in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii? One small 
difference is that Caraka uses the term example (dr$tiinta) whereas the Upiiyahrdaya uses 
instance (udiiharalJa) for the third part of a proof. The Upiiyahrdaya describes two types of 
instance: affirmative or similar instance (anvayi-udiiharalJa) and negative or dissimilar 
instance (vyatireki-udiiharalJa), whereas Caraka mentions only one type which corresponds to 
the first of these two, the affirmative instance. 
The five parts of a proof are not discussed in the Upiiyahrdaya, but a proof consisting of 
the usual five parts is presented in the beginning of the fourth chapter. It is unclear whether 
the author of the Upiiyahrdaya accepts that all five parts are required in a proof.4 There is 
neither an endorsement nor a specific denial of the five-part proof in the Upiiyahrdaya. 
Certainly the first three parts of a proof would be accepted by the author, and the application 
and conclusion parts are not required in order to explain the two types of instance (example). 
The first three parts of a proof are for instance: 
(1) Sound is impermanent 
(2) Because of being a product 




A pot is the affirmative or similar instance since it is an instance of the reason that has 
the property in the proposition, i.e. a pot is a product that is impermanent. Ether is the 
negative or dissimilar instance since it is an instance of the opposite of the reason that does 
not have the property in the proposition, i.e. ether is a non-product that is permanent. It is 
1 VidyabhU~aJ:1a 1920,259. 
2 Warder 1971, 133 and 395; and Kajiyama 1991, 109. 
3 Term 12 (dr~tiinta) in Caraka SW!1hitii (3.8.34), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,361. 
4 Tucci 1929b, xix note 2, claims the application and conclusion parts of a proof were admitted by the author. 
See also Warder 1971, 133. 
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unclear whether the author accepts that both instances (examples) are required in a successful 
proof or whether either one of the two instances would be sufficient. The person who doubts 
the proposition must decide whether or not the subject has the property, i.e. whether or not 
sound is impermanent. To do this, the subject is compared with the two instances. If the 
proposition is to be affirmed then sound would be something produced like a pot, and if the 
proposition is to be negated then sound would be something unproduced like ether. 
Theory (2) 
The second term is theory (siddhanta). Four types are listed: 
1. universal theory (sarvatantra-siddhanta) - accepted by all schools, 
2. restricted theory (partitantra-siddhanta) - held only by particular schools, 
3. implied theory (adhikarm/a-siddhanta) - implied by another statement, and 
4. hypothetical theory (abhyupagama-siddhanta) - assumed for the sake of argument. 1 
These are exactly the same as the four types of theory described in the Caraka 
Saf!1hita.2 Theories are established by the four means of valid cognition (pramalJa): 
perception (pratya~a), inference (anumana), analogy (upamana) and scriptural tradition 
(agama). The last two of these four terms are slightly different from the ones used by Caraka. 
Firstly, the term upamana (analogy) is spelt "aupamya" in the Caraka Sa1J1hita, and secondly, 
the terms aitihya (tradition) and aptopadesa (authoritative statement) are used in the Caraka 
Saf!1hita whereas the Upayahrdaya uses agama (scriptural tradition). The meanings of these 
terms, however, are the same as their counterparts in the Caraka Saf!1hita. 
Commendable speech (3) 
Commendable speech (vakya-prasa1J1sa) is described as being free from both deficiency 
(nyuna) and redundancy (adhika) in the example, the reason and the proposition (i.e. in the 
first three parts of a proof), and which is also not repetitive (punar-ukta), meaningless 
(anartha-ukta) or incoherent (aparthaka).3 This description of commendable speech is 
consistent with proofs being composed of only three rather than five parts. 
1 VidyabhU~aI)a 1920,259. 
2 Term 16 in Caraka SQl?lhitii (3.8.37), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 362. 
3 lchimura 1995, 24; and Solomon 1976-78, 1,246. 
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Defective speech (4) 
Defective speech (vakya-do$a) is the opposite of the former term. Speech is defective if 
it involves any of the faults listed in commendable speech. The Caraka Sa1?1hita describes 
these same two terms as either involving or being free from five faults: deficiency, 
redundancy, meaninglessness, incoherence and contradiction.} The description of these two 
terms in the Upayahrdaya is practically the same as that in the Caraka Sa1?1hita except that 
the Upayahrdaya does not include contradiction (viruddha) in its list of faults,2 and the 
spelling of some Sanskrit terms varies slightly between the two works. 
Inference (5) 
Inference (anumana) is divided into three types: 
1. as before (piirvavat) is an inference from previous observation, e.g. inferring from 
the sight of some physical characteristic (a scar) previously observed on a child to 
the conclusion that the same person is present (as an adult), 
2. as the remainder (se$avat) is an inference from a known instance to the remainder, 
e.g. inferring from the taste of one drop of sea water to the conclusion that all the 
sea water is salty, and 
3. as observed in similar (instances) (samanyato-dr$ta) is an inference from what is 
observed in other similar cases, e.g. inferring from the observation of the sun in 
different locations to the conclusion that the sun, like other bodies that occupy 
different locations, is moving.3 
Caraka also divides inference into three, but he does not provide names for his three 
types of inference. He simply says that inference is of three types and is related to the three 
times.4 The terms and examples in the Upayahrdaya do not reflect a classification of 
inference based on time. The first type, as before, is an inference from what has been 
observed in the past to a conclusion about a present object; the second type, as the remainder, 
is an inference from what has been observed in one part to a conclusion about what is present 
1 Terms 33 and 34 in Caraka Sal!lhita (3.8.54-55), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,365-366. 
2 Contradiction (viruddha) is included in fallacious reasons (hetvabhasa) described below. 
3 Tucci 1929b, xvii-xviii; Schuster 1972,381; Solomon 1976-78,1,380; Matila11985, 30; and Gokhale 1992, 
226-227. Cf. VidyabhU$aJ;1a 1920,260. 
4 Caraka Sal!lhita (1.11.21-22), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. Cf. trans. in Schuster 1972, 39] note 46. 
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in the whole; and the third type, as observed in similar instances, is an inference from what 
has been observed in a number of cases to a conclusion about the present case.1 
The third type of inference differs from the first two in that its conclusion is about 
something not perceptible by, i.e. visible to, the person making the inference. In the example, 
the sun's movement cannot be seen by the person making the inference. It is known only 
through inference by comparing what is perceptible, namely the sun's occupying different 
locations, with what has been seen in other cases of bodies occupying different locations. In 
other cases, e.g. a person walking, movement is visible in a body that occupies different 
locations and thus the sun, which is seen to occupy different locations, is also known to be 
moving. 
The classification scheme for inference in the Upiiyahrdaya is quite different from that 
used in the Caraka Saf!lhitii. The Caraka Saf!lhitii classifies inference based on time, i.e. from 
the perception of some evidence in the present to a conclusion about something in either the 
present, past or future, respectively. The Upiiyahrdaya classifies inference based on the way 
the evidence is related to the conclusion, i.e. whether the inference is from past to present, 
from part to whole, or from similar cases to one case. This system of classification is reflected 
in the names given to each type of inference. These are: (i) as before, i.e. as in the past, so in 
the present, (ii) as the remainder, i.e. as in a part, so in the whole, and (iii) as observed in 
similar (instances), i.e. as in other similar cases, so in this case. The only similarity between 
the classification system in the Upiiyahrdaya and the Caraka Sal!1hitii is that both divide 
inference into three types. 
Appropriate speech (6) 
The next term, appropriate speech (samayocita-viikya), is described as speech relevant 
for the topic and for the occasion. For instance, when discussing tomorrow's weather it is 
appropriate to speak about today's sky.2 This term is not mentioned in the Caraka Sal!1hitii. 
1 Warder 1971,135. 
2 VidyabhU!?ar,ta 1920, 260. 
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Fallacious reason (7) 
Fallacious reasons (hetviibhiisa) are divided into eight: 1 
1. Verbal equivocation (viik-chala) 
A reason involving verbal equivocation is one that plays on the meanings of words. For 
instance, the word "nava" in Sanskrit can mean new or nine. In response to the statement that 
someone has a new (nava) blanket the opponent presents the proof 'this man does not have 
nine (nava) blankets, because of having only one blanket'. And in response to the reply that 
there is only one blanket, but it is a new blanket made of newly woven threads, the opponent 
presents the proof 'this blanket is not made of nine threads, because of having many 
(hundreds of) threads' . Other examples of verbal equivocation in the Upiiyahrdaya use the 
same Sanskrit word nava interpreted in other ways, as well as an example of equivocation that 
involves interpreting words in their literal sense when they were used in their figurative sense. 
For example, in response to the statement that the mountain is on fire, the opponent claims 
that the mountain is not on fire because grass and trees are burning rather than the mountain 
itself. These examples seem to suggest the variety of ways that verbal equivocation can occur. 
2. Universal equivocation (siimiinya-chala) 
A reason involving universal equivocation is one that over-generalises the meanings of 
words, e.g. the term emptiness is used in Buddhist ontology to mean that objects are empty of 
a certain characteristic or mode of existence. In response to the statement that the elements are 
empty, the opponent presents the proof 'the elements have no characteristics, because they are 
empty, like ether' . Here the meaning of the term empty has been extended to exclude all 
forms of existence rather than excluding just a certain mode of existence. This example is 
followed by a short discussion on the Buddhist theory of production. 
Only one example of universal equivocation is provided and the work says specifically 
that equivocation is two-fold, verbal and universal equivocation. This implies that the author 
of the Upiiyahrdaya does not accept a third type of equivocation. The Caraka Saf!1hitii also 
discusses the same two types of equivocation, except that Caraka describes these two types of 
equivocation as faulty statements rather than as faulty reasons.2 
J See VidyabhU~alJa 1920, 260; Warder 1971,133 and 136; Solomon 1976-78, 1,246-247, and 280; and 
Kajiyama 1991,109-110. 
2 Term 35 in Caraka Swnhitii (3.8.56), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,366-367. 
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3. Similar to (the grounds for) doubt (sarrzsaya-sama) 
A reason that is similar to the grounds for doubt is one that provides grounds to doubt 
the proposition. The purpose of a reason in a proof is to provide the grounds to eliminate 
doubt about the proposition, whereas this type of reason acts as a cause to doubt the 
proposition. For instance, in response to the question whether a tall upright object seen in dim 
light is a man or a post, an opponent may present the proof 'that object is a man, because of 
standing erect'. The person considering this proof is in doubt as to whether or not the object in 
question is a man. The reason (standing erect) is only more evidence to doubt the proposition 
(this object is a man) rather than being grounds to eliminate doubt about the proposition. 
This term is also used by the author of the Upiiyahrdaya to name one of the refutations 
(du~alJa), equivalence in doubt (sarrzsaya-sama), (number 15 below). This type of refutation 
argues against a faulty proof on the grounds that the reason in the proof is evidence both for 
and against the subject having the property in the proposition. The Caraka Salflhitii also uses 
this term (salflsaya-sama) to name one of its three fallacious reasons. l Caraka's description is 
similar to the description here in the Upiiyahrdaya. 
4. Mis-timed (kiiliitlta) 
A reason that is mis-timed is one that is presented after the opportune moment for its 
use has elapsed. For instance, someone first presents the proof, 'the Vedas are permanent, 
because of consisting of sound'. In reply to this, an opponent argues that it is unacceptable to 
~ 
claim that the Vedas are permanent on the grounds that they consist of sound when the 
defendant has not yet proved that sound is permanent. In order to meet this objection the 
defendant next presents a second proof, 'sound is permanent, because of being formless, like 
ether'. However, the reason in this second proof (being formless) is mis-timed. That is, the 
opportune moment for its use has elapsed. The defendant should have used this reason to 
prove that sound is permanent first and then use the fact that sound is permanent to prove that 
the Vedas are permanent and not the other way around. The author of the Upiiyahrdaya says 
in conclusion there is no point attempting to establish later what should have been established 
earlier, just as there is no point seeking water after the house has burnt down. 
I Term 36 in Caraka Sa,!lhita (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 367. 
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Caraka describes a similar term, delayed statement (atltakiila), in the same way, i.e. as a 
statement presented after the appropriate moment for its use has elapsed.1 Caraka also lists 
mis-timed statement (kiiliitlta-vacana) as a point of defeat, but without a description.2 The 
Upiiyahrdaya describes another term, mis-timed proof (apriipta-kiiZa), as one of the points of 
defeat (number 16 below). 
5. Similar to the point at issue (prakarmJa-sama) 
A reason that is similar to the point at issue is one that is not sufficiently different from 
the proposition to effectively eliminate doubt about the proposition. For instance, the reason 
in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of being distinct from the body, just as a pot is 
impermanent because of being distinct from ether' , is a reason that is similar to the point at 
issue. The author of the Upiiyahrdaya argues that if the self is permanent because of its being 
distinct from the body, then a pot would be permanent since it is also distinct from a (human) 
body. And if being distinct from the body is not sufficient reason for a pot to be permanent, 
then being distinct from the body would not be sufficient reason for the self to be permanent. 
The point at issue in this proof is whether the self is distinct from the body and permanent or 
whether the self is not distinct from the body and impermanent. A reason that merely insists 
on one of these two alternatives without providing any additional information does not 
provide the necessary grounds to eliminate doubt about the proposition. Caraka also describes 
a reason similar to the point at issue in the same way, even using a similar example? 
6. Similar to the subject (van:zya-sama) 
A reason that is similar to the subject is one where the instance of the reason used as the 
example stands as much in need of a proof that it has the property in the proposition as does 
the subject. For instance, in the proof, 'ether is permanent, because of being intangible, like 
mind (mana) and consciousness (vjiiiiina)" the example (either mind or consciousness) is an 
instance of the reason (intangible) that stands in need of a proof that it is permanent. The fact 
that the subject requires a proof to establish that it has the property in the proposition is of 
course acceptable since that is the very purpose of a proof. But the example must be an 
instance of the reason that is known to have the property in question by the person who 
1 Term 37 in Caraka Saf!1hita (3.8.58), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,367-368. 
2 Term 44 in Caraka SalJIMta (3.8.65), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,368-369. 
3 Term 36 in Caraka SalJlhita (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,367. 
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doubts the proposition without requiring a proof. If a proof is required in order to establish 
that the example has the property in question then this would lead to an infinite regress. 
Caraka also describes a reason similar to the subject in the same way, as the third fallacious 
reason.} 
7. Inconclusive (sa-vyabhicara) 
An inconclusive reason is one that is not limited to those things that have the property 
specified in the proposition. For instance, in the proof 'the four great elements (earth, water, 
fire and air) are impermanent, because of being apprehended by the senses, like the five 
objects (of the senses)' , the reason is inconclusive. That is, the reason 'being apprehended by 
the senses' is not limited to those things that are impermanent. This is because the sense 
mentioned in the reason is not limited to the five physical senses but also includes the mental 
sense. The author of the Upayahrdaya argues that the mental sense can apprehend things that 
are not impermanent. For instance, the hair of a tortoise and the smell of salt are apprehended 
by the mind (mental sense), but these are not impermanent since they do not even exist. The 
inconclusive reason is an obvious fault, but the two examples of things that are apprehended 
by the mental sense are somewhat unusual. The author of the Upayahrdaya must understand 
the reason 'being apprehended by the senses' to mean 'being an object of the senses' , and the 
imagined hair of a tortoise and the smell of salt must qualify as legitimate objects of the 
mental sense. Caraka describes the same term (sa-vyabhicara) as scepticism, the third 
epistemic term which is associated with the example, the third member of the proof? 
8. Contradictory (viruddha) 
A contradictory reason is one that provides grounds that are opposite to the property to 
be proven. There are two types of contradictory reason. The first involves a contradictory 
example (dr~tanta-viruddha), i.e. where the instance of the reason used as the example is 
contrary to the property in the proposition. For instance, in the proof, 'the self is permanent, 
because of being formless, like a bull', the example, a bull, is not permanent (the property in 
the proposition). The example is presented in a proof as a representative instance of the 
grounds that the reason provides to eliminate doubt about the proposition. If the example is 
faulty then the reason is considered to be a faulty reason. The second type of contradictory 
I Term 36 in Caraka Sa1Jlhita (3.8.57), trans. Sharma ]981-94, 1, 367. 
2 Term 24 in Caraka Sa1Jlhita (3.8.45), trans. Sharma] 981-94, 1, 364. 
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reason is one involving contradictory reasoning (yukti-viruddha). For instance, claiming that 
the actions of government, tending animals, hunting etc. are those of a priest, or learning, 
meditation and the like are those of a warrior. These activities are the very opposite of the 
customary activities of priests and warriors, respectively. This term is also discussed in the 
Upayahrdaya as one of the points of defeat (number 20 below) and as one of the refutations 
(number 13 below). Caraka describes this same term, contradictory speech (viruddha), as a 
statement inconsistent with an example or an established conclusion of a proof, or 
incompatible with the basic tenets of one's own system.! He also lists this term as a point of 
defeat? 
All eight terms used here in the Upayahrdaya as names of fallacious reasons are also 
found in the Caraka Sa7!lhita, although Caraka describes only three of these (numbers 3, 5 
and 6) as fallacious reasons (hetvabhasa) or what he calls fallacies (ahetu). The remaining 
five terms are not described by Caraka as fallacious reasons. Caraka describes numbers 1 and 
2 as the two types of equivocation. Number 4, mis-timed reason (kalatzta), appears in the 
Caraka Sa7!lhita as delayed statement (atztakala). Number 7, inconclusive reason, is described 
by Caraka as scepticism or uncertainty, and number 8, contradictory reason, is understood as 
contradiction and listed twice in the Caraka Salflhita; first as a type of defective speech and 
second as a point of defeat. The Upayahrdaya does not include this term (viruddha) in its list 
of defective types of speech (see above). 
Adoption of a fallacious reason (8) 
The last of the eight terms in chapter one is the adoption of a fallacious reason (du~ta­
vakyanusarm:za). This fault is committed when any of the eight types of fallacious reasons is 
used in a proof. Caraka does not discuss this term. 
5.3 Points of defeat 
Chapter two of the Upayahrdaya describes a number of points of defeat (nigraha-
sthana). This list appears to be indicative of the types of errors that are considered to be 
grounds for defeat rather than an exhaustive enumeration of every situation that would be a 
reason to forfeit a debate. Caraka lists 15 points of defeat,3 seven of which appear as points of 
1 Term 33 in Cm'aka SalJlhita (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,365-366. 
2 Term 44 in Caraka SCI1!lhita (3.8.65), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,368-369. 
3 Term 44 in Caraka SalJlhita (3.8.65), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,368-369. 
170 
Chapter five: A lost Buddhist text 
defeat in the Upayahrdaya. I Five of these are named with the same terms and two are simply 
described in the same way. Some other points are similar in both works although it is unclear 
whether or not they are the very same point. If the points that are merely similar are included 
then over half of Caraka's points of defeat are included in the Upayahrdaya. 
Approximately 20 points of defeat are discussed in the Upayahrdaya, although in one 
section a list ends with "and so forth" which indicates that the number of points is not fixed. 
Various claims are made in modem publications regarding the number of points of defeat in 
the Upayahrdaya,z The list of points is not organised into groups in the Upayahrdaya, but 
four groups of points are suggested by their order in the list. These are: errors in debate, errors 
in questions, errors in speech, and errors related to the proposition. 
Errors in debate (1-9) 
The first nine points of defeat are related to errors in debate. 
1. Faulty example. This occurs when the example (dr~tanta) in a proof is unacceptable. 
For instance, in the proof, 'sound is permanent, because of being formless, like ether', the 
example (ether) is unacceptable. In this proof, one property of ether (permanence) is attributed 
to the subject (sound) on the basis that ether and sound share the property in the reason 
(formlessness). This is unacceptable, just as in the proof 'sound is tangible, because of being 
produced, like a pot', it is unacceptable to attribute one property of a pot (tangibility) to the 
subject (sound) on the basis that a pot and sound share the property in the reason (being 
produced). Here the example (a pot) is faulty because a pot is a form whereas sound is 
formless and thus the tangibility of one cannot be attributed to the other. Similarly, in the 
former proof the example (ether) is faulty because ether is not produced whereas sound is 
produced and thus the permanence of one cannot be attributed to the other. When an 
unacceptable example is used in a proof then this fault constitutes a point of defeat and the 
debate is forfeited. 
In the proof like 'sound is impermanent, because of being produced, like a pot' , the 
example (a pot) is not at fault even though it is a form whereas sound is formless. That is, 
I Points of defeat 1, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 in the Caraka Sal!lhitii appear in the Upayahrdaya as 6, 3, 13, 14, 15, 
17 and 20, respectively. 
2 See VidyabhU~aI,la 1920,260; Warder ]971,134; Solomon ]976-78,1,246; and Kajiyama 1991,109. 
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even though sound is audible and a pot is not, a pot is still a suitable example in a proof that 
establishes the impermanence of sound, since both a pot and sound are products. 
2. Counter statement (viikya-vaiparltya). This occurs when one party attempts to 
establish a proposition using a reason and an example that count against the position in 
question rather than supporting it. 
There are seven more points of defeat listed without descriptions. 
3. Not questioning what should be questioned. 
4. Inability to answer a question that should be answered. 
5. Not understanding a statement even though it has been explained three times. 
6. Making a statement that cannot be understood by others even though it has been 
explained three times. 
7. Not understanding the point at issue and describing it incorrectly. 
8. Wrongly accusing an opponent of a fault. 
9. Not understanding what is understood by everyone else. 
Numbers 3 and 6 here are both listed in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii as points of defeat (i.e. as 
numbers 3 and 1, respectively). 
Errors in questions (10-11) 
The next two points of defeat concern errors in asking and answering questions. There 
are three types of questions, those related (or equivalent) to the statement (vacana-sarna, or 
viikya-sarna), those related to the meaning (artha-sarna) and those related to the reason (hetu-
sarna). 
10. Asking questions that are not related to any of these three types of questions. 
11. Giving inadequate answers to any of these three types of questions. 
Errors in speech (12-17) 
The next seven points of defeat are related to defective speech. These points appear in 
the Upiiyhrdaya without descriptions. 
12. Speaking so quickly that others cannot understand. 
13. Incompleteness (nyiina). 
14. Redundancy (adhika). 
15. Meaningless speech (nirarthaka). 
16. Mis-timed proof (apriipta-kiiZa). 
17. Repetition (punarukta), and so forth are points of defeat. 
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Numbers 13-15 appear in Caraka's list of defective speech.1 Caraka also lists these three 
and number 17 as points of defeat. This list appears to be indicative of such faults rather than 
an exhaustive list since it ends with "and so forth". 
Errors related to the proposition (18-20) 
The next two points of defeat are discussed together in the Upayhrdaya. 
18. Contradicting the proposition (pratijfia-virodha), i.e. to use a reason that counts 
against the proposition rather than supporting it. 
19. Renouncing the proposition (pratijfia-sannyasa), i.e. to give up a position by 
accepting its opposite. 
It is unclear whether the author of the Upayahrdaya means for these two points to be 
independent points of defeat or whether contradicting the proposition in fact counts as an 
instance of renouncing the proposition. 
20. Contradiction (viruddha) is also a point of defeat. This term is discussed on two 
other occasions in the Upayhrdaya. It is discussed as one of the eight fallacious reasons 
(hetvabhasa) and also as one of the twenty refutations (du~a1!a). Caraka lists contradiction as 
a defect of speech and also as a point of defeat. 
Chapter three of the Upayahrdaya discusses philosophical issues such as the Buddhist 
refutations of the existence of the self (atman) and refutations of the non-existence of 
liberation (nirva1!a).2 This material is omitted here. 
5.4 Refutations 
Background 
Chapter four of the Upayahrdaya describes 20 refutations (du~a1!a) of a faulty proof.3 
The author of the Upayahrdaya takes one particular proof and then describes 20 reasons why 
the proposition in this proof is not established. This discussion provides a good indication of 
the criteria required for a proof to be successful according to the author of the Upayahrdaya. 
The Sanskrit term used to name these 20 refutations is du~a1!a. This term does not appear in 
the Caraka Sarrzhita, although Caraka describes another similar term, uttara (rejoinder), as a 
I Term 33 in Caraka SalJ1hitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 365-366. 
2 Kajiyama 1991, 109. 
3 Cf. Vidyabhl1~aJ:la 1920, 261, where only eight are listed. 
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statement that denies similarity when similarity has been asserted, or vice versa.1 Caraka's 
example of a rejoinder is a statement supported by a counter-example that is used to refute 
another statement. Caraka's rejoinders (uttara) appear to be the same as the refutations 
(du~m:lQ) described in the Upiiyahrdaya. Caraka does not discuss any types of rejoinder, but 
two of Caraka's terms appear in the list of 20 refutations found in the Upiiyahrdaya. These are 
contradiction (viruddha) and equivalence in doubt (saytlsaya-sama), both of which Caraka 
describes as faulty reasons. 
The Sanskrit word "du~a1!a" (refutation) is what Tucci uses to translate the Chinese 
word "hsiang-yin". Kajiyama says: "the Chinese word 'hsiang-yin' is most likely to 
correspond to the Sanskrit prasaitga or prasaitga-jati.,,2 The word '1;rasQ11ga" is often 
translated as "consequence" and is used to refer to an unacceptable corollary of an opponent's 
position. The word "jiiti" is usually translated as "futile rejoinder". The Nyiiya Sutra (Logic 
Aphorisms) uses futile rejoinder (jiiti) to name a type of refutation that the author of the 
Nyiiya Sutra considers to be an unsuccessful attempt to refute a faultless proof. Almost half of 
the twenty refutations listed in the Upiiyahrdaya are included in the list of futile rejoinders in 
the Nyiiya Sutra. This suggests that refutation (du~a1!a) in the Upiiyahrdaya has been simply 
renamed futile rejoinder (jiiti) in the Nyiiya Sutra. 
There is an important difference between the refutations in the Upiiyahrdaya and the 
futile rejoinders in the Nyiiya Sutra. The author of the Upiiyahrdaya understands all the 
refutations in its list as successful refutations of a faulty proof, whereas the author of the 
Nyiiya Sutra understands all the futile rejoinders in its list as unsuccessful refutations of 
faultless proofs. However, some modern commentators appear to have taken the connotation 
of a futile rejoinder (jiiti) as it is understood in the Nyiiya Sutra and applied it to the 
refutations (du~a1!a) in the Upiiyahrdaya, and then attempted to describe the refutations in the 
Upiiyahrdaya as unsuccessful refutations, unsuccessful that is not just in their own opinion 
but unsuccessful in the opinion of the author of the Upiiyahrdaya? This is not to say that 
these refutations may not be criticised or described as unsuccessful. However, what is 
completely unacceptable is to describe these refutations as unsuccessful and present this 
description as the way in which the author of the Upiiyahrdaya understands such refutations. 
I Term 15 in Caraka Saf!1hita (3.8.36), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361. 
2 Kajiyama 1991, 108 note 7; cf. Katsura 2000b, 225-226. 
3 Kajiyama 1991, 108-109. 
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Tucci 1 and Vidyabhu~a1!a2 list these refutations without explanation, while Solomon3 
and Matilal4 each describe only those refutations that are unique to the Upayahrdaya, i.e. they 
leave aside those refutations whose names appear in both the Upayahrdaya and the Nyaya 
Sutra. Kajiyama also discusses a selection of these refutations in an attempt to prove that the 
author of the Upayahrdaya is Nagatjuna.5 Here all 20 refutations are described. 
A proof is presented at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the Upayahrdaya as the 
main target for these twenty refutations. This proof is: 
(1) The self (atman) is permanent 
(2) Because of being imperceptible by the senses 
(3) Like ether (akasa) 
(4) All that is imperceptible is permanent 






This proof has five parts although only the first three parts are required to explain the 
following refutations. These three parts contain the four elements in a proof, the subject, 
property, reason and the example or instance. The self or atman is sometimes translated as 
soul. Permanent is also understood as eternal. In order for the self to be permanent it must 
exist and a denial of its existence is also a denial of its being permanent. An object that is 
imperceptible by the senses cannot be seen, heard, smelt, tasted or touched. Imperceptible is 
sometimes translated as insensible. Ether or akasa is sometimes translated as space or sky. 
The order in which these twenty refutations appear in the Upayahrdaya suggests a 
grouping into three categories: refutations concerning the example (1-3), the reason (4-12), 
and the subject (13-20). 
Refutations based on the example (1-3) 
The view that the author of the Upayahrdaya argues against in the first three refutations 
is that the proposition in the proof above is established on the basis that the example (ether) 
and the subject (the self) share the property specified in the reason (being imperceptible by the 
senses). That is, some claim that since the example and subject share the property specified in 
the reason, they must also share other properties. In particular, they must share the property 
I Tucci 1929b, xxi-xxii. 
2 VidyabhU~aJ:1a 1920,261. 
3 Solomon 1976-78, 1, 185-189. 
4 Matilal 1998,61-80. 
5 Kajiyama 1991, 110-113, and comparative list p. 117. 
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specified in the proposition (being permanent) which the example is known to possess. Thus, 
the subject must have this property, and in this way the proposition (the self is permanent) is 
successfully established. 
The first two refutations argue that the example sharing the property specified in the 
reason is not a reliable basis upon which to conclude that the subject has this same property. 
These refutations are called: 
1. Equivalence in attribution (utkar~a-sama) 
2. Equivalence in exclusion (apakar~a-sama) 
The first refutation argues that if one property of the example can be attributed to the 
subject then so can another, and the second refutation argues the converse of this. That is, if 
one property that the example lacks can be excluded from the subject then so can another. 
The first refutation argues that if it is acceptable to attribute one property of the example 
to the subject then it is equally acceptable to attribute another property of example to the 
subject. For instance, in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by 
the senses, like ether', the property of permanence that the example possesses is attributed to 
the subject in order to establish the proposition. But if this is acceptable, then another property 
of the example, the property of being unconscious for instance, can also be attributed to the 
subject. Thus the proposition in the proof, 'the self is unconscious, because of being 
imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , could be established in the same way. If it is claimed 
that the property of being unconscious cannot be attributed to the self, then equally the 
property of permanence cannot be attributed to the self, and thus the original proposition (the 
self is permanent) is not established. 
The second refutation simply argues the converse of the first. That is, if it is acceptable 
to exclude from the subject one property that the example lacks then it is equally acceptable to 
exclude from the subject another property that the example lacks. For instance, in the proof, 
'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether', the property 
of impermanence that the example lacks is excluded from the subject in order to establish the 
proposition. But if this is acceptable, then another property that the example lacks, the 
property of being conscious for instance, can also be excluded from the subject. Thus the 
proposition in the proof, 'the self is unconscious, because of being imperceptible by the 
senses, like ether' , could be established in the same way. If it is claimed that the property of 
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being conscious cannot be excluded from the self, then equally the property of being 
impermanent cannot be excluded from the self, and thus the original proposition (the self is 
permanent) is not established. 
The point made in these two refutations is that simply knowing that the example and the 
subject share the property specified in the reason is not a reliable basis upon which to 
conclude that the example and subject also share the property specified in the proposition. If it 
is argued that this is a reliable basis upon which to establish the proposition then unacceptable 
propositions could be (wrongly) established in the same way. 
3. Equivalence in difference and non-difference (bhediibheda-sama) 
The third refutation builds on the first two refutations by arguing that if the example's 
having a property is the basis upon which to conclude that the subject also has this property, 
then the example itself would be disqualified from being an acceptable example. That is, the 
example in a proof must be different from the subject in order for the person who doubts the 
proposition to know that the example has the property in the proposition while still doubting 
whether the subject has this same property. Also, the example must be similar to the subject 
because the person who doubts the proposition must know that both the example and the 
subject have the property specified in the reason. Thus, an example in a proof that is either 
identical to the subject or totally unlike the subject is not an acceptable example. 
The third refutation argues that the proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, 
because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , is not established because ether is 
not an acceptable example. Ether is unacceptable because it would be either identical to, or 
totally distinct from, the self. That is, if the example's having a property is a reliable basis 
upon which to conclude that the subject has the same property then the subject must have all 
the properties that the example has. Further, if the example's lacking a property is a reliable 
basis upon which to conclude that the subject does not have this same property then the 
example must have all the properties that the subject has. Hence, the example and subject 
would have exactly the same properties and would be identical. Alternatively, if the example 
is not identical to the subject then the example must have some properties that the subject 
does not have. But then there would be no way of knowing whether or not the property in the 
proposition is one of these properties that the example has but the subject does not have. If 
this reasoning is extended to all the example's properties then there would be no properties 
that the example is known to share with the subject. Thus the example in this proof is either 
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identical to or totally distinct from the subject. In either case the example would be 
disqualified and the proposition (the self is permanent) would not be established. 
This third refutation raises an objection similar to that raised in the first two refutations. 
That is, the fact that the example shares a property with the subject is not a reliable basis upon 
which to establish the proposition. In contrast to the first two refutations, this third refutation 
argues that if this is the way that propositions are established then it would not be possible to 
establish propositions even in successful proofs. These three refutations criticise those who 
accept that the proposition above (the self is permanent) is established through the similarity 
between the example and the subject, although these three refutations are not limited just to 
this particular proof. They would apply to any proof. The following refutations, however, 
apply specifically to the proof above. That is, they argue that this particular proof fails to meet 
the logical requirements of a successful proof. 
Refutations based on the reason (4-12) 
The next six refutations argue against the view that the reason in the proof above 
establishes the proposition. This view holds that the reason (being imperceptible by the 
senses) establishes the proposition (the self is permanent) because the reason establishes the 
presence of this property (being permanent) in the example (ether) and, since the subject also 
has the property specified in the reason, the reason establishes the presence of this same 
property (permanence) in the subject. It is claimed that in this way the proposition is 
successfully established. 
The fourth and fifth refutations argue that the reason in the proof above is not able to 
establish the proposition because it is inconclusive. These two refutations are called: 
4. Refutation with a brief answer to a detailed question (prasnabiihulyam-uttariilpatii) 
5. Refutation with a detailed answer to a brief question (prasniilpatii-uttarabiihulyam) 
The fourth refutation merely points out that the reason in the proof, 'the self is 
permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , is inconclusive and thus 
it fails to establish the proposition. The fifth refutation makes the same point but it provides 
the details to support its claim that the reason is inconclusive. According to the author of the 
Upiiyahrdaya, there are two kinds of things not perceptible by the senses. Firstly (individual) 
atoms are not perceptible by the senses because of their very small size, and atoms are 
impermanent. The second kind is like ether which is permanent. Since some things that are 
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not perceptible by the senses are permanent and others impermanent, the fact that the self is 
not perceptible by the senses is not conclusive evidence that the self is permanent and thus the 
proposition in this proof (the self is permanent) is not established. These two refutations show 
that one requirement for the reason to successfully establish the proposition is that all things 
that have the property in the reason must also have the property specified in the proposition. 
The next two refutations argue firstly that although the reason does apply to both the 
example and the subject, this is not sufficient to establish the proposition. Secondly, if it is 
claimed that this is sufficient then unacceptable propositions could be (wrongly) established. 
These two refutations are called: 
6. Equivalent cause (hetu-sama) 
7. Equivalent effect (kiirya-sama) 
The sixth refutation argues that the reason in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because 
of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , does not demonstrate the similarity between 
ether and the self and thus it does not establish the proposition. This is because the reason in a 
successful proof must demonstrate that both the example and the subject are similar in terms 
of having the property specified in the proposition. The mere fact that the reason applies to 
both the example and the subject is not sufficient to establish this. The reason in a successful 
proof must apply only to those things that have the property specified in the proposition, i.e. 
being imperceptible by the senses must apply to only permanent things. Since the reason in 
this proof applies to things permanent (like ether) as well as to things impermanent (like 
atoms) it is not able to establish the proposition (the self is permanent) in this proposition. 
The seventh refutation argues that if it is claimed that the reason in this proof does 
establish the proposition then unacceptable propositions could be established in the same way. 
For instance, in the proof, 'the self and ether are impermanent, because of being composed of 
the five great elements, like a pot', the reason applies to the example (a pot) and to the subject 
(the self and ether). Further, a pot is impermanent and thus the self and ether must also be 
impermanent. Since the proposition in this proof is not established even though the reason 
does apply to both the example and the subject then similarly, the proposition in the proof, 
'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , is not 
established even though the reason applies to both the example and the subject in this proof. 
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These two refutations show that not only must both the subject and example have the 
property specified in the reason, but also the reason must demonstrate that both the example 
and the subject are similar in terms of having the property specified in the proposition. 
The next two refutations are called: 
8. Equivalence in pervasion (vyiipti-sama) 
9. Equivalence in non-pervasion (avyiipti-sama) 
These two refutations argue against the claim that not only does the reason establish the 
proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, 
like ether', but the reason's synonym, i.e. having an unlimited extension (in space), also 
establishes the proposition in this proof. That is, since ether is imperceptible by the senses it is 
permanent, and the self is like ether in that they both have an unlimited extension. Thus the 
self is permanent. 
These two refutations argue that being imperceptible by the senses is not synonymous 
with having an unlimited extension. The eighth refutation argues that all things (collectively) 
extend (throughout the world) without limit, but all things are not imperceptible by the senses. 
Thus the fact that the self has an unlimited extension is not conclusive evidence that the self is 
permanent. The ninth refutation argues the converse. That is, (individual) atoms are 
imperceptible by the senses but atoms do not have an unlimited extension, since they (each) 
have no extension at all. Further, atoms are impermanent and thus the fact that the self is 
imperceptible by the senses is not conclusive evidence that the self is permanent. Thus neither 
the reason (being imperceptible by the senses) nor its synonym, having unlimited extension, is 
able to establish the proposition that the self is permanent. These two refutations show that an 
inconclusive reason is not made conclusive by adding other properties that qualify the reason. 
The next three refutations argue that the reason in the proof above cannot establish its 
proposition because if the proposition in this proof is true then it would be impossible for any 
reason to establish a proposition. That is, the author of the Upiiyahrdaya argues that if the 
reason successfully establishes the proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of 
being imperceptible by the senses, like ether', then the opponent's ontological views would be 
correct. But if the opponent's ontological views are correct then the process of establishing a 
proposition would be impossible. Since the process of establishing a proposition is possible, 
the opponent's ontological views must be incorrect. If the opponent's ontological views are 
180 
Chapter five: A lost Buddhist text 
incorrect then the view that a self exists is also incorrect. Because it is impossible to establish 
an incorrect proposition, the proposition that the self is permanent can never be established. 
These three refutations differ from the other refutations in that they do not describe 
specific failings in the criteria required for a proof to be successful, rather they describe how 
the proof would fail if the proposition were correct. That is, those who accept the existence of 
the self do so because they accept the objective reality of not just persons, but of all things. 
This includes the components of a proof. Thus they claim that the proposition, reason and so 
forth all have an ontological status that the author of the Upayahrdaya argues would make it 
impossible for a reason to establish a proposition. This is the topic of the next three 
refutations. The first refutation is called: 
10. Equivalence in time (kala-sarna) 
The tenth refutation argues that an objectively real reason does not establish the 
proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, 
like ether' , because there is no time at which such a reason could possibly establish this 
proposition. The opponent's ontological views are that the reason which establishes, the 
activity of establishing and the proposition which is established are all objectively real 
objects. But an objectively real reason would have to exist either before, after, or at the same 
time as the proposition is established. However, none of these three options is possible and 
thus an objectively real reason could not establish the proposition. 
The first option is not possible because if the reason exists before the proposition is 
established then at the time of establishment there would no longer be any reason in existence 
to establish the proposition. The second option is not possible because if the reason exists 
after the proposition is established then at the time of establishment there would not yet be 
any reason in existence to establish the proposition. The third and final option is not possible 
because if the reason exists at the very same time as the established proposition exists then, 
since reason and establish proposition exist simultaneously, the reason could not be the cause 
of the establishment, just as one cow's horn cannot be the cause of the other horn. 
The next two refutations argue that if the reason and the established proposition had the 
ontological status claimed by the opponent then the very nature of these two entities would 
make it impossible for one to be the cause of the other. The two refutations are called: 
11. Equivalence in non-convergence (aprapti-sarna) 
12. Equivalence in convergence (prapti-sarna) 
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These two refutations argue that an objectively real reason could not establish the 
proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, 
like ether' , because such a reason would have to cause the proposition to be established either 
by connecting or by not connecting with the established proposition. However, it would be 
impossible for such a reason to establish the proposition in either situation. 
The eleventh refutation argues that if the reason does not connect with the established 
proposition then the reason could not establish the proposition, just as a fire cannot burn an 
object, or a sword cut an object, without connecting with that object. The twelfth refutation 
argues that if the reason does connect with the established proposition then the reason and 
established proposition would coalesce to form one entity and this would make it impossible 
for one to act upon the other. Thus, an objectively real reason could not establish the 
proposition whether it did or did not connect with the established proposition. 
Since on the one hand a reason is something that establishes its proposition, and on the 
other hand an objectively real reason could not establish its proposition, the reason in this 
proof cannot have any objective reality. Similarly, the activity of establishment and the 
proposition which is established also lack objective reality. Further, this reasoning can be 
extended to prove that all things lack objective reality. In particular, the objectively real entity 
called the self could not exist in any way, permanent or otherwise. Thus, the proposition in 
this proof (the self is permanent) is incorrect, and since incorrect propositions cannot be 
established, the reason in this proof cannot establish the proposition. 
These three refutations show firstly that a reason cannot establish a false proposition 
and secondly, a reason could not establish a proposition like 'reasons cannot establish their 
propositions' since a consequence of the proposition being true is that the very reason that 
establishes this particular proposition would then lack the ability to establish a proposition. 
Refutations based on the subject (13-20) 
The following eight refutations focus on the subject in a faulty proof. The first two 
refutations are called: 
13. Contradiction (viruddha) 
14. Non-contradiction (aviruddha) 
The thirteenth refutation argues that there is a predominance of evidence to support the 
self being impermanent and it is therefore a contradiction to claim that the self is permanent. 
That is, it is a contradiction to claim on the one hand that (most) everything that exists is 
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impermanent and then on the other hand claim that the self is not like most everything else 
and is therefore permanent. For instance, it is a contradiction to call a blanket that is mostly 
burnt an "unburnt blanket". Thus, the self should be impermanent like (most) everything else. 
The term contradiction (viruddha) is described by Caraka as one of the five faults listed 
under defective speech.} Caraka also lists this term under his points of defeat.2 The author of 
the Upayahrdaya does not include this term amongst the faults listed under defective speech, 
but does discuss the term in fallacious reasons and also lists it as one of the points of defeat. 
The fourteenth refutation argues that the proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, 
because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , is not established because the 
subject is not like the example. That is, if the self were like ether then they should have 
common properties, not contradictory properties. Thus if ether is not conscious then the self 
should not be conscious, and if the self is conscious then ether should also experience 
pleasure and pain. Since the subject and example possess contradictory properties, the 
proposition in this proof is not established. 
These two refutations show firstly that a claim regarding the subject cannot contradict 
the predominance of evidence and secondly, the subject must be like the example and thus the 
subject and example cannot possess contradictory properties. 
The next two refutations are called: 
15. Equivalence in doubt (saJ?1saya-sama) 
16. Equivalence in non-doubt (asaJ?1saya-sama) 
The fifteenth refutation argues that in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because of being 
imperceptible by the senses, like ether', the proposition is not established because the doubt 
about whether or not the subject has the property in the proposition is not completely 
eliminated by the reason. That is, the reason (being imperceptible by the senses) is like the 
property of existence in that it applies to things that are permanent (like ether) and it also 
applies to things that are impermanent (like atoms). Thus, the doubt concerning the subject, 
i.e. whether it is permanent or impermanent, is not completely removed by this reason. 
Consequently, the proposition is not established. 
1 Term 33 in Caraka Sa1!lhitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 365-366. 
2 Term 44 in Caraka SG1!1hitii (3.8.65), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 368-369. 
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This same term is described by Caraka as the second of his three fallacious reasons, i.e. 
where the reason is similar to the grounds for doubt. 1 The Upayahrdaya also includes this 
term as the third of its eight fallacious reasons (see above). 
The sixteenth refutation argues that the proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, 
because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , is not established because the 
required doubt about whether or not the subject has the property in question would be absent 
in this proof. That is, in order for the proposition to be established, the person who doubts the 
proposition must know that the subject has the property specified in the reason while still 
doubting whether or not the subject has the property in the proposition. But for this person to 
know that the self is not perceptible by the senses, they must apprehend the obstruction that 
prevents the self from being perceived by the senses. Since no such obstruction is ever 
apprehended, there would be no evidence that the self even exists. If no self was thought to 
exist then the question as to whether or not the self is permanent would not be doubted. Since 
there would be no doubt concerning the subject in this proof, the proposition would not 
require a proof. 
These two refutations show firstly that the proposition in a proof must be in doubt and 
secondly, in order for this proposition to be established, all doubt concerning the subject, i.e. 
whether or not it has the property in question, must be completely removed by the reason. 
The next refutation is called: 
17 Equivalent counter-example (prati-dr~tanta-sama) 
This refutation argues that the proposition in the proof, 'the self is permanent, because 
of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , is not established because if it were 
established then unacceptable propositions could be (wrongly) established the same way. For 
instance, the proposition in the proof, 'tree roots and underground water are permanent, 
because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether', would also be established. Since tree 
roots and underground water are not permanent, the proposition in the latter proof is not 
established. Thus, the proposition in the former proof is also not established. 
1 Term 36 in Caraka SW?lhita (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,367. 
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The next two refutations argue against invoking scriptural authority in order to establish 
the proposition that the self is permanent. These two refutations are called: 
18. Equivalent scriptures (sruti-sama) 
19. Different scriptures (sruti-bhinna) 
The eighteenth refutation argues against the claim that the self must be permanent 
because the opponent's scriptures speak of a self that is imperceptible by the senses. Since 
there are Buddhist scriptures that declare there is no self, and Jaina scriptures that say the self 
is impermanent, (different) scriptures make incompatible claims. Thus, scriptural authority is 
inconclusive and cannot establish that the self is permanent. 
The nineteenth refutation argues against the claim that only the opponent's scripture is 
authoritative and this one scriptures testifies to the fact that the self is permanent. That is, 
there is as much reason to accept one scripture as there is to accept another, and where one 
scripture says the self is permanent another says the self is impermanent. Thus, scriptural 
authority is inconclusive and cannot establish that the self is permanent. 
The final refutation is called: 
20. Equivalence in non-generation (anutpatti-sama) 
This refutation argues against the claim that the self is proven to be permanent by its 
very existence. This position is untenable just as is the real production of a tree. That is, a tree 
for instance is not produced after it exists since at that time the tree needs no production. Also, 
a tree is not produced before it exists, since at that time there is no tree (in the seed) which 
could be the object of any production. Without an object for production there can be no real 
production. Thus a tree is not really produced either after it comes into existence or before. 
Similarly, the reason (being imperceptible by the senses) cannot establish the self whether the 
self exists or not. That is, if the self does not exist then being imperceptible by the senses 
cannot cause this non-existent self to come into existent. Alternatively, if the self does exist 
then being imperceptible by the senses cannot prove the self exists. 
5.5 A common system of logic 
The Upayahrdaya describes ten main terms, all but two of which (numbers 6 and 8) 
have counterparts in the Caraka SQ1]1hitii. The conesponding terms from the Caraka Safllhitii 
are listed on the right with the term numbered according to its place in the list of 44 terms. 
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Upayahl."daya 
1. instance (udiihara~1a) 
2. theory (siddhiinta) 
3. commendable speech (viikya-prasaJ?1sii) 
4. defective speech (viikya-do~a) 
5. inference (anumiina) 
6. appropriate speech (samayocita-viikya) 
7. fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa) 
Caraka SaIphita 
12. example (dr~tiinta) 
16. theory (siddhiinta) 
34. commendable speech (viikya-prasaJ?1sii) 
33. defective speech (viikya-do~a) 
19. inference (anumiina) 
36. fallacy (ahetu) 
8. adoption of fallacious reason (du~ta-viikyiinusara7Ja) 
9. points of defeat (nigraha-sthiina) 44. points of defeat (nigraha-sthiina) 
10. refutation (du~a7Ja) 15. rejoinder (uttara) 
Three of the terms in the Upiiyahrdaya (numbers 1, 7 and 10) correspond to slightly 
different terms in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii, but their respective descriptions are the same or very 
similar. There are over 50 more terms described as the subdivisions of the ten main terms in 
the Upiiyahrdaya. About a third of these are also found in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii, often with 
very similar descriptions. The four means of valid cognition (pramii7Ja) described in the 
Caraka SaJ?1hitii are also found in the Upiiyahrdaya. 
Tucci lists these terms in the introduction to his Sanskrit reconstruction of the 
Upiiyahrdaya,l and correlates them with the terms described in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii and the 
Nyiiya Sutra (described in the next chapter). The similarity in terminology shows that the 
system of logic in the Upiiyahrdaya is the same as that found in the other two works. One 
significant difference between the Upiiyahrdaya and the Caraka SaJ?1hitii is that the 
Upiiyahrdaya discusses twenty refutations which are conspicuously absent in the Caraka 
SmJ1hitii. These are much discussed in the Nyiiya Sutra and later works, and they would no 
doubt have been included in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii if Caraka had known about them. This point, 
as well as the degree of organisation in the logical ideas found in these three works, indicates 
that their chronological order is probably the Caraka SaJ?1hitii first, followed by the 
Upiiyahrdaya second, and then the Nyiiya Sutra last. The Upiiyahrdaya therefore represents 
an intermediary stage in the development of Indian logic linking the earlier and later stages of 
the same system. This system of logic is also found in two other works from this period. 
These are the Vaise~ika Sutra and the Nyiiya Sutra, both discussed in the following chapter. 
I Tucci 1929b, xvi. 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines logic as it is described in the Vaise~ika Sutra (Category 
Aphorisms) and the Nyaya Sutra (Logic Aphorisms). These two works share a common 
system of metaphysics and their respective schools of thought later merged into one. The 
Vaise~ika Sutra contains only a small amount of material on logic, whereas the Nyaya Sutra 
deals extensively with logic and debate. The Nyaya Sutra describes many of the same 
technical terms that appeared in the Caraka Sm?1hita and it also replies to many of the 
refutations found in the Upayahrdaya. The five-membered proof is traditionally associated 
with the Nyaya Sutra, although its origins actually lie in the ancient tradition of debate. 
Ancient Indian logicians used a system of debate that involved ten steps. Examples of 
ten-step arguments are found in the Kathavatthu which uses a five-step argument in support 
of some position and then a five-step argument against the same position. Bhadrabahu and 
Vatsyayana each describe a different set of ten steps that were used to form arguments. 
Randle argues that the five-membered proof is related to these systems of ten steps: 
A truer parallel is to be found in the ten-membered debate (miscalled 'syllogism') as 
stereotyped by the Jaina logician Bhadrabahu, and probably in the ten-membered method 
which Vatsyayana attributes to certain methodologists (naiyayika).l 
Vatsyayana's ten steps appear in the Caraka Sal?1hita as the five-part proof and its 
associated five psychological states. The five-part proof that Gotama describes in the Nyaya 
Sutra is the same as that found in the Caraka Sal?1hita. The development of the five-part proof 
from the earlier ten steps occurred completely within the Indian tradition of debate with no 
sign of any Greek influence. McEvilley rejects this explanation of the origin of the five-part 
proof. He argues that: 
It has repeatedly been suggested that "Gotama's" five-limbed syllogism was derived from 
the ten-limbed pattern of debate that was more rhetorical than systematically inferential. 
This model has been taken as supporting the evolution of the syllogism out of the earlier 
debate in a purely Indian context, not needing outside influence. 
One problem with this view is that from a philological standpoint the Nyaya Siitras do not 
seem to preserve a developmental record of a coherent tradition. They do not show a 
development from a set of debating rules to a set of syllogistic rules so much as a 
conflation of textual records on these two subjects.2 
I Randle 1930, 14. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 515. 
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The development from a set of debating rules to a set of syllogistic rules that McEvilley 
refers to here is not found by examining the Nyaya Sutra alone. It appears when the logical 
terminology described in the Nyaya Sutra is compared with similar material found in earlier 
Indian works. The analysis carried out in this chapter supports the evolution of the five-part 
proof out of an earlier system of debate in a purely Indian context, i.e. without the need to 
invoke outside influence. 
First the description of inference in the Vaise~ika Sutra is compared with its description 
in the Upayahrdaya and the Caraka Sa1?1hita. Next the logical material in the Nyaya Sutra is 
compared with similar material in the Vaise~ika Sutra, the Upayahrdaya and the Caraka 
Sa1?1hita. All the terms that have counterparts in earlier works are described in the order in 
which they occur in the Nyaya Siitra. There are nearly 90 of these terms described in the 
Nyaya Sutra and over half of these correspond to terms in earlier Indian works. This shows 
that the system of logic described in the Nyaya Sutra, and the five-membered proof in 
particular, are not new to the Nyaya Sutra but came from an earlier Indian tradition. This 
tradition has its origins in the ancient tradition of debate that pre-dates the arrival of Greeks in 
India. This undermines McEvilley's main argument that Greek influence is required in order 
to explain the advent of Indian logic in general and the five-membered proof in particular. 
6.1 The Vaise#ka Siitra 
Introduction 
The Vaise~ika Sutra l is attributed to KaI).ada whose dates are unknown. The fact that 
material now found in the VaiSe~ika Sutra was known to Buddhists at the beginning of the 
current era suggests the work must have existed by about 100-150 AD.2 The Vaise~ika system 
itself may date from an earlier time.3 Bronkhorst notes that five versions of the Vaise~ika 
Sutra have been preserved, all of which belong to a time well after the early centuries of the 
current era. The sutras (aphorisms) in these versions vary, and their order appears to have 
been changed to facilitate different interpretations.4 
J Translated by Gough 1873; Sinha 1911; and Nozawa 1993 (Chapters I and 2 only). Summarised by Hattori in 
Potter ed. 1965-99,2,212-220. 
2 Hattori in Potter ed. 1965-99,2,211. 
3 Warder 1968, 330, places the Vaise~ika Siitra before the Caraka Sal!lhitii but after the Kathiivatthu. 
4 Bronkhorst 1996, 11. 
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Schuster argues that there may be strata of earlier and later material in the Vaise$ika 
Sutra.] The work as it now exist is arranged in ten lessons (adhyiiya) or chapters, each of 
which consists of two daily portions (iihnika) or lectures. Some editions do not divide the last 
three chapters into two portions. The numbering of the sutras is not always consistent 
amongst the various editions. 
The Vaise$ika Sutra is a work on metaphysics rather than on logic. The main topic of 
the work is the six categories (padiirtha) or things to which words refer. These are: substance 
(dravya), attribute or quality (gU1/a), action (karma), universal (siimiinya), particularity 
(vise~a) and inherence (samaviiya).2 These six are also listed in the Caraka Sa1?1hitii in the 
same order (see above)? There are nine substances: earth (Prthivl), water (iipas), fire (tejas), 
air (viiyu), ether (iikiisa), time (kiila), space or spatial direction (dis), self or soul (atman), and 
mind or the internal organ (manas).4 Substances are real things that possess attributes. There 
are 17 types of attribute such as colour, taste, etc.s Attributes exist only in substances and do 
not themselves possess attributes. 
Inference 
The Vaise$ika Sutra does not discuss the five-membered proof,6 nor does it describe a 
list of terms. The significance of this work lies in its description of inference. Kal}ada 
mentions only two means of valid cognition, perception and inference.7 Both the Caraka 
Sa1?1hitii and the Upiiyahrdaya accept four means of valid cognition; perception and inference, 
as well as verbal testimony and analogy.8 Kal}ada accepts the legitimacy of both verbal 
testimony and analogy but includes them in inference. 9 Kal}ada describes perception as 
cognition that is brought about by the contact of the soul (atman), the sense organ (indriya), 
I Schuster 1972, 366-367. 
2 VaiseoJika Sutra (1.1.4), trans. Sinha 1911,9. Cf. Aristotle's list often categories in Smith, Ross eds 1908-54,1, 
Categoriae, 1 a25-26. 
3 Terms 2-7 in Caraka Sa1?lhitii (3.8.29), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361. 
4 VaiseoJika Siitra (1.1.5), trans. Sinha 1911, 17. 
5 VaiseoJika Sutra (1.1.6), trans. Sinha 1911, 19; only 17 are listed in the VaiseoJika Sutra itself, seven more are 
added in the commentaries. 
6 VaiseoJika Sutra (9.2.2), trans. Sinha 1911,307, mentions 'member' (avayava) of a proof without further 
elaboration. 
7 VaiseoJika Sutra (10.1.3), trans. Gough 1873, 300. 
8 Note that Caraka also accepts reasoning (yukti) in place of analogy (aupamya, upamiina) as one of his four 
means of valid cognition. 
9 Verbal testimony is mentioned at 9.2.3 (trans. Sinha 1911, 310) and analogy at 9.2.5 (trans. Sinha 1911, 316). 
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the mind (manas) and the object (artha).l This definition of perception is the same as that 
found in the Caraka SalJ1hita.2 Inference is described in the Vaise~ika Sutra as cognition of an 
entity produced by perceiving a sign or mark (Zinga).3 KaJ).ada explains that the term used here 
(Zinga) is no different from reason (hetu), description (apadesa), proof (pramaIJa) and 
instrument (karaIJa).4 
There are two types of inference described in the Vaise~ika Sutra. First there is the 
inference of something that can be seen (dr~ta-linga). For instance, the perception of horns, 
hump, tail with a hairy end, and a dewlap, causes the inference that the object in question is a 
cow, i.e. the inference of the cow universal.s The second type of inference is of something 
that cannot be seen (a-dr~ta-linga). For instance, the perception oftouch causes the inference 
that air (or wind) exists, i.e. the sensation of something tactile causes the inference that some 
substance is present. 6 
The second type of inference is distinguished from the first by the fact that it is an 
inference of an imperceptible entity that is known only generally, whereas the first is an 
inference of a perceptible entity which is known specifically. In the example, air cannot be 
directly perceived by the senses and the inference is not of a particular substance, but only of 
some substance (in general) that can account for the sensation of touch. Another term for the 
second type of inference is literally 'seeing from the general' (samanyato-dr~ta).7 Ka1).ada 
uses this term in his discussion on the inference of air,8 and again in his discussion on the 
inference of the soul (or self).9 Ka1).ada describes the soul as imperceptible, and the inference 
of the soul as an inference only of some substance (in general) that can account for the 
substratum in which the qualities of desire and so forth inhere. 
This same term (samanyato-dr${a) is also used in the Upayahrdaya to name the last of 
its three types of inference. The example used in the Upayahrdaya is the inference that the 
I Vaise~ika Siitra (3.1.18), trans. Sinha 1911, ] 21. See trans. in Bronkhorst 1994, 668; and Hattori 1966, 107. 
2 Caraka SalJlhitii 0.11.20), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. 
3 Vaise~ika Siitra (9 .2.l), trans. Sinha 1911, 304. See also Solomon 1976-78, 1, 377; and Schuster] 972, 342. 
4 Vaise~ika Siitra (9.1.4), trans. Sinha ] 9] 1, 314. 
5 Vaise~ika Siitra (2.1.8), trans. Sinha 19] 1 , 61. 
6 Vaise~ika Siitra (2.] .9), trans. Sinha 1911, 62. 
7 See Matilall971, 101-102; and Nozawa 1991. 
8 Vaise~ika Siitra (2.1.16), trans. Sinha 1911, 69. 
9 Vaise~ika Siltra (3.2.7), trans. Sinha 19] 1,132. 
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sun is moving although this movement is not directly perceived by the senses (see above). 
The other two types of inference found in the Upiiyahrdaya are; as before (purvavat), an 
inference from previous observation, and as the remainder (se~avat), an inference from a 
known instance to the remainder. The last of these terms, as the remainder, is alluded to by 
Kat;liida in his discussion on the inference of ether. 1 Kat;liida's argument is that since sound 
(sabda) is an attribute it must inhere is some substance. Sound is not an attribute of any of the 
other eight substances, therefore it must be an attribute of ether, the only remaining substance. 
That is, the existence of ether is inferred from elimination (parise~iit), i.e. the exclusion of 
other alternatives, leaving ether as the only remaining substance. 
Relationship 
Inference in the Vaise~ika Sutra is based on real relations between objects. That is, in 
order for a reason (or mark) to be reliable it must be something that is neither identical with, 
nor completely unrelated to, what is inferred.2 Thus, the reason and what is inferred must be 
two different things that are related in some way. This relationship is described as something 
that is universally known.3 The Vaise~ika Siitra lists four types of relation in chapter three:4 
1. Conjunct (sa1J1yogi) 
2. Inherent (samaviiyi) 
3. Co-inherent (ekiirtha-samaviiyi) 
4. Contradiction (virodhi) 
A similar list appears in chapter nine:5 
1. Effect (kiirya) or cause (kiira1}a) 
2. Conjunct (safJIyogi) 
3. Contradiction (virodhi) 
4. Inherent (samaviiyi) 
1 Vaise~ika Siitra (2.1.27), trans. Sinha 1911, 76. 
2 Vaise~ika Siitra (3.1.7-8), trans. Sinha 1911,107-108. Cf. trans. in Hattori 1966,97. 
3 VaiSe~ika Siitra (3.1.14), trans. Sinha 1911, Ill. See trans. in Gangopadhyaya 1991,208. 
4 Vaise~ika Siitra (3.1.9), trans. Sinha 1911, 109. See trans. Gough 1873, 82; Faddegon 1918, 296; Hattori in 
Potter ed. 1965-99,2,215; Hattori 1966, 97; and Schuster 1972, 387 note 13. 
5 Vaise~ika Siitra (9.2.1 /9.18), trans. Sinha 1911, 304. See trans. Gough 1873, 280; Faddegon 1918, 296; Randle 
1930, 148-149; Hattori in Potter ed. 1965-99, 2, 219; and Schuster 1972, 386 note 5. See also Solomon 1976-78, 
1,370-371. 
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The only difference between these two lists, apart from their order, is that where the 
first list has co-inherent, the second has effect or cause. Gangopadhyaya treats these two as 
referring to different types of relation and so describes five types;l whereas Schuster treats 
them as the same, so making four types.2 Examples of the four types are: 
1. Conjunct, i.e. where one thing is related to another as its conjunct, e.g. as body is 
related to skin. Body and skin are neither the cause nor the effect of one another, but one is 
the constant conjunct of the other. 
2. Inherent, i.e. where one thing is related to another as an essential property, e.g. as 
extension is related to ether. The nature of ether is to be extended and thus extension is not 
related to ether as its constant conjunct, but as something inherent in ether. 
3. Co-inherent, i.e. where two things are related in some third thing, e.g. the colour of 
brown sugar and the taste of brown sugar. That is, since both colour and taste are inherent in 
brown sugar, each is related to the other through their co-inherence in brown sugar. The two 
things related in this way can be two effects or two causes. 
4. Contradiction, i.e. where two things cannot be together for some reason. There are 
four types of contrary relationship described in the Vaise~ika Sutra. 3 Each has an associated 
type of inference: 
(i) Presence from absence, i.e. inferring the presence of something contrary to a cause 
from the absence of its effect, e.g. inferring the presence of the wind that drives 
away rain clouds from the absence of rain. 
(ii) Absence from presence, i.e. inferring the absence of something contrary to a cause 
from the presence of its effect, e.g. inferring the absence of the wind that drives 
away rain clouds from the presence of rain. 
(iii) Absence from absence, i.e. inferring the absence of one thing from the absence of 
another that constantly accompanies it, e.g. inferring the absence of fire from the 
absence of soot on a pot. Since soot and fire always go together, it would bea 
J Gangopadhyaya 1991, 208-209. 
2 Schuster 1972, 344 and 387 note 13. 
3 Vaise,l'ika Siltra (3.1.11-13), trans. Sinha 1911, 11 0-111. Note that Gough 1873, 84-86; Sinha 1911, 110-11]; 
Ui 1917, ]57-158; and Gangodhyaya 1991,209, each mention only three types (number three 'absence from 
absence' is omitted). Hattori ]966,97-98; Schuster ]972, 344, 387 note 13, and 388 note 15; and Solomon 1976-
78, 1, 37] mention all four types. 
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contradiction for one to be present without the other, and thus the absence of one is 
inferred from the absence of the other. 
(iv) Presence from presence, i.e. inferring the presence of one thing from the presence of 
another contrary thing, e.g. inferring the presence of a (hidden) mongoose from the 
presence of an agitated snake. Since these two animals are incompatible, the 
presence of one is inferred from the present state of the other. 
Incorrect reasons 
The relationship between the reason and what is inferred is a requirement for a reason to 
be correct. If this relationship does not hold then the reason is incorrect and inference does not 
occur. The description of incorrect reasons (anapadda) in the Vaise~ika Siitra is in sutras 
3.1.14-17 according to the translations by Gough} and Sinha,2 and in sutras 3.1.9-12 
according to the translations by Hattori3 and Schuster.4 These sutras are interpreted in two 
different ways. They are interpreted as meaning; (i) that there are only two types of incorrect 
reason, or (ii) that there are three types of incorrect reason. The relevant sutras according to 
the first interpretation are (paraphrased): 
Correct reasons [apade.sa] are those where the required relationship [prasiddha] holds 
between the reason and what is inferred (3.1.14/9). Consequently, where this relation 
does not hold [aprasiddha] the reason is an incorrect reason [anapade.sa]. There are two 
types of incorrect reason: (i) non-existent or unreal [asat], and (ii) doubtful or dubious 
[sandigdha] (3.1.15/10). The examples of these two types are: (i) this is a horse because 
of having horns (3.1.16/11), and (ii) this is a cow because of having horns (3.1.17/12). 
This first interpretation indicates that the difference between correct and incorrect 
reasons is determined by the relationship between the reason and what is to be inferred. 
Incorrect reasons are defined as those lacking this relationship. The first type of incorrect 
reason (having horns) is not related to being a horse, since no horses have horns. The second 
type of incorrect reason (having horns) is not related to being a cow, since animals other than 
cows also have horns. The difference between the two types of incorrect reason is that in the 
first the relationship is non-existent whereas in the second the relationship is doubtful. Neither 
type of reason results in inference. 
J Gough 1873, 86-101. 
2 Sinha 1911, 111-121. 
3 Hattori 1966, 98. 
4 Schuster 1972, 388 note 18, and commentary on 3.1.9-10 in note 19. 
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The second interpretation of these sutras differs from the first in that it distinguishes 
three types of incorrect reason, the two mentioned above plus one more. The third type is 
taken from the beginning of sutra 3.1.15/10. That is, 'aprasiddha' is not interpreted as 
defining all incorrect reasons (anapadeia), but as describing one particular type of incorrect 
reason. This type of incorrect reason is often named contradictory (viruddha), the other two 
being called unproven (asiddha) and doubtful (sandigdha). This second interpretation is the 
more common interpretation of these sutras in spite of the fact that it is left with the problem 
of having only two examples. Faddegon rejects this second interpretation describing it as 
based on a wrong explanation of sutra 3.1.15.1 Keith, Randle and Solomon all describe 
Ka1).ada's system of incorrect reasons as consisting of only two types.2 
Conclusion 
The Caraka Saytlhitii classifies inference into three types based on time, i.e. from the 
perception of some evidence in the present to a conclusion about something in either the 
present, past or future, respectively. The Upiiyahrdaya also classifies inference into three, but 
it bases its classification on the way the evidence is related to the conclusion, i.e. whether the 
inference is from past to present, from part to whole, or from similar cases to one particular 
case. This method of classifying inference is similar to the classification of inference in the 
Vaise~ika Sutra. It classifies inference into two and then makes an in-depth analysis of the 
relations between objects. The significance of relationship for Ka1).ada is that it provides the 
justification for inference. That is, inference occurs provided the reason is related to the 
conclusion in any of four ways. If this relationship fails to hold then the reason is incorrect 
and no inference occurs. The Vaise~ika Sutra presents its discussion on inference within a 
system of metaphysics that advocates real relationships existing between real objects. This 
system of metaphysics is also found in the Nyiiya Sutra. 
I Faddegon, B. 1918,303. Note his comment on 302: "With reference to siltra 15 we may notice that it contains 
two parts: a definition of the term anapadesa and a division of this anapadesa into two kinds asan and 
sandigdhab, sutra 16 contains the example of the former kind and siltra 17 of the latter." 
2 Keith 1921, 133; Randle 1930,189-191; and Solomon 1976-78, 1,279-280. 
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6.2 The Nyaya Satra 
Introduction 
The Nyiiya Sidra (Logic Aphorisms)1 consists of short pithy statements on logic and 
philosophy. The work is attributed to Gautama (or Gotama), also known as Ak~apada, whose 
dates are unknown.2 Gautama and Ak~apada are usually accepted as referring to the same 
person. Vidyabhu~a:t:la, however, does not accept this. He claims that Gautama was the author 
of an earlier work that was later redacted by Ak~apada and called the Nyiiya Sutra, just as 
Atreya was the author of the an earlier work later redacted by Caraka and called the Caraka 
SaYf1hitii.3 Vidyabhu~Kl).a's claim has not received any support from modern commentators.4 
The Nyiiya Sutra is thought to have taken its present form around 200 AD.s This date is 
based on its references to Buddhist ideas which are thought to date from around that time. The 
work as it now exits is arranged in five lessons (adhyiiya) or chapters, each consisting of two 
daily portions (iihnika) or lectures. The contents of the work can be arranged in six parts: 
1. Chapter 1: describes 16 terms 
2. Chapter 2: describes doubt (sarrzsaya), term 3, and valid cognition (pramiil}a), term 1 
3. Chapters 3 and 4 Part 1: mainly on the objects of valid cognition (prameya), term 2 
4. Chapter 4 Part 2: discusses philosophical issues 
5. Chapter 5 Part 1: describes the 24 kinds of futile rejoinder (jiiti), term 15 
6. Chapter 5 Part 2: describes the 22 points of defeat (nigraha-sthiina), term 16 
The first chapter makes up one complete section on its own. It describes 16 terms 
related to logic and debate. Many of these terms are similar to those described in the Caraka 
SaYf1hitii. The Nyiiya Sutra refers once to medical scriptures, but only as an example of 
trustworthy scriptures.6 There is nothing to indicate that this reference is specifically to the 
Caraka SaYf1hitii as is suggested by Vidyabhu~a1).a.7 Shekhawat also claims that the Nyiiya 
J The Nyaya Sutra is translated, along with Vatsyayana's commentary the Nyaya Bhii:;ya, in Jha 1915-19; 
Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya 1967-68; and Gangopadhyaya 1982; and is summarised by Potter ed. 1965-99, 
2, 221-238. For a summary of the Nyiiya Bha~ya see Potter ed. 1965-99,2, 240-274. 
2 Sastri 1905b, 177, claims Ak$apada (Gautama) lived before the Buddha. 
3 VidyabhU$at,la 1920,49-50 and 498. 
4 Randle 1930,12 note 1. Cf. Chakravartti 1910,294. 
5 McEvilley 2002, 510 has: "perhaps the first century BC". 
6 Nyaya Sutra (2.1.68), trans. Jha 1915-19, 2, 283-295. 
7 VidyabhU$al,la 1920,50. 
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Sutra is indebted to the Caraka Sa1J1hitii. He describes the Nyiiya Sutra as "being a mere 
rearrangement ofthese fundamental concepts and principles worked out in the [Vimana] 
Sthana,,,l i.e. the section containing the list of 44 terms in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii. Dasgupta 
suggests that both may be indebted to a third. He says: "It seems therefore in a high degree 
probable that both Caraka and the Nyiiya Sutras were indebted for their treatment of these 
terms of disputation to some other earlier work.,,2 
Chapters 2-5 discuss issues related to these terms, but there is no discussion on terms 4-
14, plus these chapters discuss topics not mentioned in the first chapter. Chapter 5 differs 
from chapters 2, 3 and 4 in that it simply describes examples of the last two terms, terms 15 
and 16. Chapter 5 is therefore like a continuation of the first chapter. This has led some to 
argue that the first and last chapters form the nucleus of the original work to which chapters 2, 
3 and 4 were later added.3 
Chapter 5 is in two parts, the first of which describes 24 futile rejoinders (term 15). 
Almost half of these are also found in the list of refutations in the Upiiyahrdaya. The Caraka 
Sa1J1hitii does not provide a list of rejoinders. The second part of chapter 5 describes 22 points 
of defeat (term 16). The Upiiyahrdaya lists approximately 20 points of defeat,4 11 of which 
are included in the Nyiiya Sutra as points of defeat. The Caraka Sa1J1hitii lists 15 points of 
defeat,5 six of which are included in the Nyiiya Sutra. Prets (following Meuthrath) says that 
the original version of the Nyiiya Sutra did not consist of the first and all of the last chapter, 
but in fact consisted of chapter 1 and just the second part of chapter 5, and the first part of 
chapter 5 is a later addition.6 Sastri claims that all three parts, i.e. the first chapter (with the 
exception of a few sUtras), chapter 5 part 1, and chapter 5 part 2, are in fact three separate 
treatises, each with a different author.7 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 discuss mainly philosophical issues and also contain replies to 
Buddhist arguments. Tucci claims that these three chapters originally existed as part of a 
I Shekhawat 1996, 77. 
2 Dasgupta 1922-55, 1,301. 
3 See for instance Randle 1930, 343; and Warder 1971, 136. Cf. Warder 1968,330, where chapters 2-4 are 
considered earlier than chapters 1 and 5. 
4 Upayahrdaya chapter two, in Tucci 1929b, 18-21. 
5 Caraka Sal!1hita (3.8.65), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 368-369. 
6 Prets 2001, 548. 
7 Sastri 1905a, 246-247. 
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Vaise~ika treatise before they were incorporated into the Nyiiya Sutra. 1 This claim is rejected 
by Bronkhorst,2 but Tucci's general conclusion is a useful one. He describes the Nyiiya Sutra 
as a combination of two sections, the first (chapters 1 and 5) containing material on logic and 
debate posterior to that preserved is the Caraka SaJ?lhitii and the Upiiyahrdaya, and a second 
section (chapters 2, 3 and 4) containing material on philosophical issues which were added 
later in response to Buddhist objections.3 The logical material from chapters 1 and 5 describes 
16 terms. These terms are not arranged into groups, but related terms appear together and this 
suggests a classification of these 16 terms under eight topics: 
1. Epistemology, term 1 
2. Objects of knowledge, term 2 
3. Proofs, terms 3-9 
4. Debate, terms 10-12 
5. Faulty reasons, term 13 
6. Equivocation, term 14 
7. Futile rejoinders, term 15 
8. Points of defeat, term 16 
6.2.1 Epistemology (term 1) 
The first term in the Nyiiya Sutra is pramal).a which is usually translated as means of 
valid cognition. Valid cognition is understood as a knowledge event that correctly cognises an 
object. The means of such events refers to the instruments with which objects are correctly 
cognised. The Nyiiya Sutra lists four such instruments: perception (pratyal~a), inference 
(anumiina), analogy (upamiina) and word (sabda) or verbal testimony. These four are the 
ways in which knowledge of reality is acquired. They therefore constitute the pre-eminent 
standard against which the truth of claims about the world can be determined. 
The Nyiiya Sutra takes the term 'means of valid cognition' as its starting point for a 
discussion on logic and debate. This is in contrast to the Caraka SaJ?lhitii which begins its 
discussion with the term 'debate'. Caraka mentions perception, inference, tradition (aitihya) 
I Tucci 1929b, xxviii. 
2 Bronkhorst 1985b, 123. 
3 Tucci 1929b, xxx. 
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and analogy (aupamya) as the four ways in which a reason is known. 1 He also says that 
whatever is revealed with these four is reality (tattva).2 This corresponds to what the 
Nyaya Sutra says about the four means of valid cognition. Caraka discusses each of these four 
separately in his list of terms, but he does not say that they are the means of valid cognition. 
Caraka claims that authoritative statements (aptopadesa), perception, inference and reasoning 
(yukti) are the means of valid cognition.3 The Upayahrdaya accepts the same four means of 
valid cognition as does the Nyaya Sutra, whereas the Vaise~ika Siitra accepts only the first 
two, perception and inference. 
Perception (1.1) 
The Nyaya Sutra describes perception (pratya~a) as knowledge that (i) arises from 
contact between the sense organs and their objects, (ii) is not associated with a name 
(avyapadeSya), i.e. arises without the aid of verbal representation, (iii) is not erroneous 
(avyabhicari), i.e. not contradicted by later experience, and (iv) is of a definite character 
(vyavasayatmaka), i.e. devoid ofuncertainty.4 
Caraka's definition of perception mentions contact between four things: the self, sense 
organs, mind and sense objects,5 whereas the Nyaya Sutra mentions contact between only two 
things, sense organs and sense objects, and omits contact between the self and the mind. This 
difference is discussed in the Nyaya Sutra and in its commentaries.6 The Nyaya Sutra also 
adds three more conditions not mentioned by Caraka. These include conditions which exclude 
erroneous and doubtful cognitions and thereby ensures that perception complies with the 
definition of a means of valid cognition. The Upayahrdaya and the Vaise~ika Sutra also 
accept perception as a means of valid cognition. 
Inference (1.2) 
The Nyaya Sutra declares that inference (anum ana) is preceded by perception and is of 
three kinds: (i) as before (purvavat) or the prior, (ii) as the remainder (se~avat) or the 
1 Caraka's term for analogy is spelt "aupamya" while the Nyiiya Sutra spells the same term "aupana". 
2 Caraka SW.nhita (3.8.33), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361. 
3 Caraka SW!lhita (1.11.33), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,74. 
4 Nyiiya Sutra (1.1.4), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,111-152. 
5 Caraka SW!lhita (1.11.20), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,72. See translation in Filliozat 1993, 104. 
6 Nyaya Siitra (2.1.20-23), trans. Jha 1915-19, 2, 77-87. See also Jha 1915-19, 1, 111-112, and 121-125; and 
Vidyabhi:i~a1Ja 1920,92-93. 
198 
Chapter six: Ancient Indian philosophy 
subsequent, and (iii) as observed in similar (instances) (siimiinyato-dr$ta) or corresponding to 
a general class. l The first chapter of the Nyiiya Siitra does not provide any examples of these 
three, nor does it explain the meanings of these three terms. This has given rise to various 
interpretations of the three types of inference.2 
Vatsyayana's commentary on the Nyiiya Siitra offers two different interpretations of this 
passage.3 Vatsyayana may mean these to be two equally acceptable interpretations or possibly 
two rival interpretations. The fact that he provides two interpretations indicates that there was 
uncertainty regarding the meaning of these terms even in Vatsyayana's day (fifth century 
AD).4 The first interpretation of the passage states that: 
1. 'as before' refers to an inference from what preceded, i.e. from cause to effect, e.g. 
inferring from the sight of gathering clouds to the conclusion that rain will fall, 
2. 'as the remainder' refers to an inference from what follows, i.e. from effect to 
cause, e.g. inferring from the sight of a swollen river to the conclusion that rain has 
recently fallen (upstream), and 
3. 'as observed in similar (instances), refers to an inference from what is observed in 
other similar cases, i.e. from present similarity, e.g. (concerning moving bodies) 
inferring from the observation of the sun in different positions to the conclusion 
that the sun is moving. 
These same three tenns according to Vatsyayana's second interpretation are: 
1. 'as before' refers to an inference by recalling previous experiences, i.e. just as one 
object has been seen to always accompany another object before, e.g. inferring 
from the sight of smoke to the conclusion that fire is present, 
2. 'as the remainder' refers to an inference by elimination, i.e. the exclusion of other 
alternatives leaves the remainder, e.g. inferring from the fact that sound must be 
I Nyaya Siitra (1.1.5), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 153-196. The third type of inference, as observed in similar 
(instances), is also mentioned in the Vai§e~ika Siitra (2.1.16), trans. Sinha 1911, 69. 
2 Tucci 1929b, xvii-xviii; Schuster 1972,377-386; and Matila11985, 30-33. 
3 Nyiiya Bha~ya on 1.1.5 trans. Jba 1915-19, 1, 153-155. See also Schuster 1972, 393 note 59, for a translation of 
the second interpretation. 
4 Cf. Keith 1921, 88. 
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either a substance, quality, or activity, and its not being either a substance or 
activity, to the conclusion that sound is a quality,l and 
3. 'as observed in similar (instances), refers to an inference from what is observed in 
other similar cases, i.e. from other objects with a common characteristic, e.g. 
(existing only in substances) inferring from the fact that desire, etc., are attributes 
and must therefore abide in a substance, to the conclusion that the self exists (as the 
required substance).2 
The first of these two interpretations distinguishes between three types of inference on 
the basis of the three times (the future, past and present) and not on the basis of cause and 
effect. That is, the first type of inference is an inference from present evidence (gathering 
clouds) to the future (rain); the second is an inference from present evidence (a swollen river) 
to the past (rain); and the third is an inference from present evidence (the sun's occupying 
different positions) to the present (movement of the sun). Vatsyayana describes the first two 
types of inference as being from cause to effect and from effect to cause respectively, but he 
makes no mention of cause and effect in the third type of inference. However, all three of 
Vatsyayana's examples involve cause and effect. In the first case, the reason (gathering 
clouds) is the cause of the conclusion (rain); in the second case, the reason (a swollen river) is 
the effect of the conclusion (rain); and in the third case the reason (the sun's occupying 
different positions) is the effect of the conclusion (movement of the sun).3 However, these 
three types of inference are not distinguished from one another on the basis of cause and 
effect.4 If they were then the third type of inference would be no different form the second. 
The distinction between them is made on the basis of time, i.e. whether the object inferred is 
in the future, past or present. 
At the end of his discussion on these two interpretations Vatsyayana says: 
[The difference between perception and inference is that] perception pertains to things 
present, while inference pertains to things present as well as not present [i.e. past and 
future]. "How so?" As a matter of fact, inference is applicable to all three points of time: 
by means of inference we apprehend things past, present and future: for instance, we infer 
[a] that 'such and such a thing will happen', - [b] that 'such and such a thing is present',-
I A similar argument is in the Vaise.Jika Sulra (2.1.27), trans. Sinha 1911, 76; see also 2.2.23-24 trans. Sinha 
1911,95-96. 
2 Cf. VaiSe.Jika Sulra (3.2.7-12), trans. Sinha 1911, 132-136. 
3 Cf. Dhruva 1920,252 and 255. 
4 Cf. Sinha 1911, 306-307. 
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and also [c] that' such and such a thing existed.' The past and the future are 'not present', 
[hence we speak of inference as pertaining to the present as well as the not-present].} 
Also, in each of these cases, i.e. inferring a past, future or present object, the object 
inferred is not known by perception. In the first two cases, i.e. when inferring a past or future 
object, the rain that has fallen and that will fall, are not visible in the present when the 
inference is made simply because neither the past nor the future rain exists in the present. In 
the third case, i.e. inferring a present object, the sun's movement is not visible to those 
making the inference because the movement is very gradual, although the sun's movement 
does exist in the present. In the first two cases the object inferred, i.e. the past and future rain, 
is something which is normally perceptible, but just not perceptible at the time when the 
inference is made (in the present). In the third case, the object (the sun's movement) is not 
perceptible, i.e. is not visibly noticeable at any time. 
Understanding Vatsyayana' s first interpretation as distinguishing on the basis of time 
rather than on the basis of cause and effect also receives support from the Nyiiya Siitra itself. 
Chapter two discusses objections raised against the three types of inference.2 The objector 
claims that the conclusion in each case, i.e. past rain, future rain and a present peacock, could 
be explained by obstruction, destruction and resemblance (respectively). That is, the objector 
rejects the following claims: (i) that a swollen river is conclusive evidence of past rain, (ii) 
that running ants are conclusive evidence of coming rain, and (iii) that a peacock's call is 
conclusive evidence of the presence of a peacock. The reasons for these three objections are: 
(i) because a river could rise due to an obstruction (dam), (ii) because ants could be running 
due to the destruction of their nest, and (iii) because what sounds like a peacock could be the 
mere resemblance of a peacock's call. In reply to these objections the Nyiiya Sutra says: not 
so, because the actual reasons are not simply a swollen river, running ants, and a peacock's 
call. The reasons are in fact qualified in each case. That is, when inferring past rain, the reason 
is a swollen river that is flowing swiftly and carrying debris; when inferring future rain, the 
reason is running ants that are moving their eggs in an orderly fashion without fear; and when 
inferring the presence of a peacock, the reason is a peacock's call that is the genuine sound of 
a peacock. 
1 Nyaya Bha~ya on 1.1.5 trans. Jha 1915-19,1, 155. Cf. trans. in Schuster 1972, 392 note 51. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (2.1.37-38), trans. Jha 1915-19, 2,212-218. 
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The point here is that these three types of inference are: (i) from the present to the past, 
(ii) from the present to the future, and (iii) from the present to the present. The three examples 
are distinguished by time, not by cause and effect. In fact, the example of running ants being a 
sign of future rain does not suggest that running ants actually causes rain, only that both 
running ants and rain have a common cause and thus the fact that ants are running is a sign of 
coming rain. Immediately after this discussion on the objections to these three types of 
inference there is a discussion on the three times, past, present and future. l This discussion on 
time is a natural continuation of the threefold division of inference based on time.2 
This discussion of the three types of inference in the second chapter of the Nyiiya Sutra 
matches Vatsyayana's first interpretation - the only difference is that two of the examples in 
the second chapter are different from those that Vatsyayana provides in his first interpretation, 
and the order in which the first two types of inference are discussed is reversed. The first of 
Vatsyayana's two interpretations understood as a classification of inference based on time 
matches the system of classifying inference in the Caraka Sal!lhitii. Caraka says: "Inference is 
based on prior perception. It is of three types and is related to the three times.',3 Caraka does 
not name the three types of inference, but he does provide examples of each type. These are: 
(i) inferring the presence of a hidden fire from the perception of smoke (present to present), 
(ii) inferring the past act of sexual intercourse from the perception of a foetus (present to 
past), and (iii) inferring future fruit from the perception of a seed (present to future).4 A minor 
difference between Caraka's system and Vatsyayana's first interpretation is that the order in 
which Caraka presents his three types of inference is different from that used in the Nyiiya 
Sutra and in Vatsyayana's commentary. Thus, the system of dividing inference into three 
based on time can be dated well before the fifth century AD when Vatsyayana wrote his 
commentary. It is clearly used in the Caraka Sal!lhitii (c. I 00 AD) and it was probably the 
intention of the author of the first chapter of the Nyiiya Sutra.5 
The second of Vatsyayana' s interpretations does not distinguish between the three types 
of inference on the basis of time or on the basis of cause and effect. These three types of 
I Nyaya Siitra (2.1.39-43), trans. Jha 1915-19,2, 219-229. 
2 See MatiIa11985, 38-39. 
3 Caraka SaJ?lhita (1.1 1.21-22), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 72. Cf. trans. in Schuster 1972, 391 note 46. 
4 See Schuster 1972, 354. 
5 Katsura 1986,3. 
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inference are distinguished on the basis of the relationship that exists between the evidence 
and what is inferred. The first type of inference is based on the constant conjunction of two 
objects (e.g. smoke and fire) such that the presence of one object (smoke) is evidence for the 
presence of the other (fire); the second is an inference based on the fact that the exclusion of 
some objects (e.g. substance and activity) from a group of objects (e.g. substance, quality and 
activity) is evidence for the presence of the remainder (quality);1 and the third is based on the 
fact that an object (e.g. desire) shares characteristics (e.g. existing only in a substance) with 
other objects of its type (attributes) such that the presence of the object in question (desire) is 
evidence for the presence of the shared characteristic (existing only in a substance). 
The system of classifying inference on the basis of the relationship between the 
evidence and what is inferred is also found well before Vatsyayana's time. Schuster2 argues 
that Vatsyayana's second interpretation was influenced by a Sarp.hkya work entitled the 
$a$titantra (Science of Sixty Topics)3 written by V:r~aga:Q.a (Var~aga:Q.ya, c.100-300 AD).4 
V:r~aga:Q.a's work is now lost but its contents have been reconstructed by Frauwallner.5 The 
$a$titantra may well have been based on an earlier work or system with the same name. 
According to Frauwallner's reconstruction, seven types of relation (sambandha) were 
fundamental to inference.6 Inference is defined as depending on the perception of one aspect 
of an established relation in order to infer the other aspect.7 The $a$titantra describes two 
types of inference: (1) that based on a specific perception in one situation (vise$ato-dr$ta), and 
(2) that based on a specific perception in more than one situation (siimiinyato-dr$ta) i.e. 
inference based on general correlation. The second of these is also divided into two: (i) as 
before (piirvavat) or from cause to effect, e.g. from the perception of gathering clouds to the 
conclusion of imminent rain, and (ii) as the remainder (se$avat) or from effect to cause, e.g. 
from the perception of a swollen river to the conclusion of that rain has recently fallen. 8 The 
1 Katsura 2000a, 4. 
2 Schuster ]972, 36]-363. 
3 The work is summarised in Potter ed. 1965-99,4, 125-]28. 
4 Dhruva 1920, 274 has c.l50 Be. 
5 Frauwallner ] 958. 
6 Listed in Katsura ]986,4; Potter ed. ]965-99,4,95; Oetke ]996,448; Walser 1998,195-196; and in Ganeri 
2000, 148 note 4. 
7 Potter ed. 1965-99,4, 135 and 136. Cf. Walser] 998, 194-195. 
8 Potter ed. 1965-99,4,95-96; and Walser ]998, ]97-198. 
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similarities with Vatsyayana's second interpretation of three types of inference are clearly 
evident in the ancient Sarphkya system as it appears in the $a~titantra. 
The Nyaya Sutra and Vatsyayana's commentary also share points in common with the 
systems of classifying inference in the Upayahrdaya and the Vaise~ika Sutra (both discussed 
above). The Upayahrdaya classifies inference into three and uses the very same three terms as 
those in the Nyaya Siitra: as before (purvavat), as the remainder (se~avat), and as observed in 
similar (instances) (samanyato-dr~ta). These three are explained in the Upayahrdaya as 
inference from past to present, from part to whole, and from similar cases to this case. 
Vatsyayana's second interpretation of these three is from effect to cause, from the exclusion 
of others to the remainder, and from similar cases to this case. The VaiSe~ika Sutra also uses 
the term 'as observed in similar (instances), (samanyato-dr~ta) to name one of its two types 
of inference. The fact that the Upayahrdaya was written by a Buddhist suggests that rival 
schools during this early period shared a similar system of logic. The Vaise~ika Sutra, on the 
other hand, is philosophically closely aligned with the Nyaya Sutra and their similarities come 
as no surprise.1 
The tradition of dividing inference into three types is also found in a Jaina work called 
the Anuyogadvara (Means of Examination) written by Aryarak~ita (c.l 00 AD). Dhruva argues 
that the author simply reproduced or rearranged the contents of another work with the same 
title that dates from the beginning of the third century Be. 2 The Anuyogadvara divides 
inference into three: 
1. as before (puvvava) i.e. from marks previously observed, e.g. inferring from the 
sight of a scar previously observed on a child to the conclusion that the same person 
is present (as an adult), 
2. from the other (sesava) i.e. from one member of a related pair to the other; this is 
further divided into five types: (i) inferring a cause from its effect (kajje1}am), e.g. a 
peacock from its call, (ii) inferring an effect from its cause (kara1}e1}am), e.g. a 
piece of cloth from (the weaving of) threads, (iii) inferring a substance from its 
attribute (gu1}e1}am), e.g. salt from its taste, (iv) inferring a whole from its parts 
1 Ui 1917, 16 note 1; and Thakur 1963, describe the many points of correspondence between the Vaise~ika Sutra 
and Vatsyayana's commentary on the Nyaya Sutra. See also Keith 1921, 21 note 1. 
2 Dhruva 1920, 265. 
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(avayavel!am), e.g. an elephant from (seeing only) its trunk, and (v) inferring the 
abode from what abides therein (iisayel!am), e.g. water from (flying) cranes, and 
3. from similar cases (ditta-siihammava) i.e. from what is observed in other similar 
cases. This is further divided into two types: (i) inferring from what is common to 
all of a group (siimanna-dittham), e.g. as one man is, so are many, and as many are, 
so is one, and (ii) inferring from the distinguishing trait of a certain individual in a 
group (visesa-dittham), e.g. as (recognising) one's friend in a crowd.1 
Dhruva2 also claims that these same three terms, i.e. purvavat (as before), se~avat (as 
the remainder) and siimiinyato-dr~ta (as observed in similar instances), originated in the 
ancient Mlmarpsa school and can be found in the Mimii1J1sii Sutra (attributed to Jaimini).3 
This work is the earliest treatise of the school and is dated around the second century Be. The 
terms purva (the prior or primary) and se~a (the remainder or subsidiary) are used to mean the 
prior and posterior part of a sentence or a relation of a primary thing to its subsidiary. The 
term siimiinya (likeness or participation in a common class) is used as the basis of an 
argument from parallel instances.4 
The similar ways in which inference is classified indicates that there was an exchange of 
ideas between the different schools of thought. The works containing classifications of 
inference cover the whole spectrum of schools in ancient India. There is the Caraka Sa1J1hitii 
and the $a~titantra from the Sarphkya school, the Upiiyahrdaya from the Buddhist school, the 
Vaise~ika Sutra from the Vaise~ika school, and the Anuyogadviira from the Jaina school, and 
the Mimii1J1sii Sutra from the Mlmarpsa school. The Nyiiya Sutra appears to have taken over 
the classification scheme for inference used by other schools. There is no indication of any 
Greek influence in these ways of classifying inference. 
Analogy (1.3) 
The Nyiiya Sutra describes analogy (upamiina) as a means to knowledge gained through 
comparison with a well-known (prasiddha) object.s For instance, when an unfamiliar animal, 
1 Dhruva 1920, 258-260; Solomon 1976-78, 1, 379-380; and Schuster 1972, 384-385. The Anuyogadviira also 
divides inference into three as in the Nyiiya Sutra, and into two as in the $a:;fitantra. 
2 Dhruva 1920,261-264. 
3 Dhruva 1920,262, lists the passages in the MfmiilJ1sii Sutra that contain these terms. See Matila11985, 40-41. 
4 Sec Schuster 1972,390 note 45. 
5 Nyiiya Slltra (1.1.6), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 196-199. 
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such as a gavaya (wild cattle), is known to resemble familiar ones, like domestic cattle, then 
the unfamiliar animal is recognised as a gavaya (for the first time) when it is noticed that it 
resembles a (domestic) cow. In this way knowledge that the animal in question is a gavaya is 
gained through analogy. 
The Caraka SaJ?1hitii describes analogy (aupamya) in the same way, but with a slightly 
different spelling of the term. l The Upiiyahrdaya accepts analogy as a separate means of valid 
cognition as does the NyiiyaSiitra, whereas the Vaise$ika Siitra includes analogy in 
inference.2 The Nyiiya Siitra discusses objections to analogy in chapter two and specifically 
rejects the claim that analogy should be included in inference.3 
Verbal testimony (1.4) 
Word (sabda) or verbal testimony is described in the Nyiiya Siitra as the assertions 
(upade.sa) of credible persons (iipta).4 The Caraka SaJ?1hitii calls the assertions of credible 
persons 'authoritative statements' (iiptopadesa),5 and calls sources of knowledge such as the 
Vedas 'tradition' (aitihya).6 Both terms, authoritative statements and tradition, are used 
synonymously in the Caraka SaJ?1hitii. Further, the Nyiiya Siitra says explicitly that tradition 
(aitihya) is no different from word (sabda).7 The Upiiyahrdaya uses a slightly different term, 
'scriptural tradition' (iigama), for the same source of knowledge. Despite the variation in 
terminology, all three authors would agree that authoritative sources are sources of knowledge 
separate from perception, inference and analogy. The Vaise$ika Siitra includes word (sabda) 
or verbal testimony in inference.8 The Nyiiya Siitra takes up this point and argues that word is 
definitely a separate source of valid cognition from inference.9 
I Term 21 in Caraka Safjlhitii (3.8.42), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,363. 
2 Vaise~ika Sulra (9.2.5), trans. Sinha 1911, 316. 
3 Nyiiya Sutra (2.1.44-48), trans. Jha 1915-19,2, 230-238. 
4 Nyiiya Siltra (1.1.7), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,199-208. 
5 em'aka SGlphitii (1.11.18-19 and 3.4.4), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,72 and 325. 
6 Term 20 in Caraka Safjlhitii (3.8.41), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 363. See also Caraka Safjlhitii (1.11.27), trans. 
Sharma ]981-94, 1, 73. 
7 Nyiiya Sutra (2.2.2), trans. Jha 1915-19,2,300-304. 
8 Vaise~ika Siitra (9.2.3), trans. Sinha ]91],310. 
9 Nyiiya Sutra (2.1.49-52), trans. Jha 1915-19,2,239-249. 
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The Nyaya Sutra divides word into two: (i) words referring to the observable 
(dr~tartha), and (ii) words referring to the unobservable (adr~tartha).l Caraka uses the term 
'word' (sabda) not to mean one of the sources of knowledge, but to mean an assertion.2 
Caraka lists four types of assertions, the first two of which are exactly the same as the two 
types found in the Nyaya Sutra. The Nyaya Sutra seems to have combined together what 
Caraka understood as two different terms, and then applied the division of one to the other. 
6.2.2 Objects of knowledge (term 2) 
The second of the sixteen terms is 'object of valid cognition' (prameya). This term 
refers to everything that exists. That is, the four means of valid cognition, viz. perception, 
inference, analogy and verbal testimony, are the means by which all existent objects are 
correctly cognised. All existent things are therefore objects cognised by valid cognition. 
However, the Nyaya Sutra lists only 12 objects of valid cognition: self (atman), body (sarla), 
sense organs (indriya), sense objects (artha), intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), activity 
(pravrtti), fault (do~a), rebirth (pretyabhava), effect (phala), suffering (du~kha), and 
liberation (apavarga)? These twelve are obviously not presented as an exhaustive list of the 
categories (padartha) of all phenomena as was done in the Vaise~ika Sutra, but as a list of 
those objects that should be correctly understood. These twelve objects of valid cognition are 
things that Buddhists also consider important to understand. 
The second sutra in the Nyaya Sutra also appears to resemble Buddhist ideas. The 
second sutra says (paraphrased): 
The cessation of false knowledge [mithyiijniina] removes faults [do§'a] , the cessation of 
faults removes activity [pravrtti] , the cessation of activity removes birth [janma], the 
cessation of birth removes suffering [du/:lkha], the cessation of suffering is liberation 
[apavarga].4 
Sastri claims "that some later writer has interpolated the second sUtra with a view to add 
philosophical sections to the work."s This sutra resembles the Buddhist theory of dependent 
origination (paticca-samuppada)6 which is described in such works as the Nidana Sal!1yutta 
I Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.8), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,208-210. 
2 Term 17 in em'aka Sa1!1hita (3.8.38), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 362-363. 
3 Nyiiya Sutra (1.1.9), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,210-216. 
4 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.2), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 83-97. 
5 Sastri 1905a, 248. 
6 Sanskrit pratltya-samutpada, also translated as dependent arising. 
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(Connected Discourses on Causation), I the Mahatm'}hasankhaya Sutta (Great Discourse on 
the Destruction of Craving),2 the Mahanidana Sutta (Great Discourse on Origination),3 the 
Catu$pari:jatsutra (On the Foundation of the Buddhist Order),4 and in the Salistamba Sutra 
(Stalk of Rice Sutra).5 These (and other) sources describe a twelve-stage process that closely 
resembles the process described in six stages in the second sUtra of the Nyaya Sutra. 
Sastri argues that a Buddhist writer not only added the second sutra of the first chapter 
but also changed the list of twelve objects of valid cognition in order to convert a logical 
treatise by Alqapada into a system of philosophy. Sastri says: 
The Buddhist tradition, as we know it from China and Japan, distinctly says that the 
Logic of Ak~apada was their handbook in logic, and that they added to and subtracted 
from it. ... That the science of Ak~apada was, for a long time, in the hands of the 
Buddhists, and, therefore, not in great favour with the Brahmanist, will appear from the 
following considerations. The Ramaya.t:la, the Mahabharata, the Pura.t:las, and even the 
Dharmasastras dislike those who studied the Tarkasastra. The VedantasUtras distinctly 
say that this science was not accepted by the orthodox. They are known as little removed 
from the Buddhists - the Buddhists are nihilists, they are half nihilists [ardhavainasika]. 
That there was an unholy alliance between the Nyaya and the Buddhists in the early 
centuries of Buddhism, is not open to grave doubts.6 
Tucci is less emphatic about the origins of the system of logic in chapters one and five 
of the Nyaya Sutra. He says: 
We must confess that we do not know anything about their origin and the fact that they are 
of Buddhist origin can neither be affirmed nor denied by the sources at our disposal? 
6.2.3 Proofs (terms 3-9) 
The next seven terms are: 
3. doubt (saf!1saya), 
4. purpose (prayojana), 
5. example (dr$tanta), 
6. theory (siddhanta), 
1 The first chapter of Nidiinavagga (Book of Causation) in the SalJlyutta Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids 1917-30, 2, 
1-94; and Bodhi 2000, 1, 533-620. 
2 Sutta 38 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59, 1, 311-324; and Bodhi 1995, 349-361. 
3 Sutta 15 of Dlgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,2,50-70; and Walshe 1987,223-230. 
4 Trans. Kloppenborg 1973, 6-98, especially 13-14. 
5 Trans. Ross Reat 1993; and Schoening 1995. Summary in Potter ed. 1965-99,8,194-197. 
6 Sastri 1905a, 249. See also Vidyabhil~m:la 1917,159-161, and Vidyabhil~al)a 1920, 36-37. Solomon 1976-78,1, 
366 has source references. See also Dasgupta 1922-55,1,303. 
7 Tucci 1929b, xxiv-xxv. 
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7. member (avayava) of a proof, 
8. reasoning (tarka), and 
9. decision (nirlJaya). 
Five of these seven terms (3-5, 8 and 9) correspond to five similar terms in the Caraka 
SaJ?lhita.1 Each of Caraka' s five terms is associated with one of the five parts of a proof. The 
Nyaya Sutra also describes the same five-part proof (under the term 'member'). Caraka's five 
terms probably represents the original system for the corresponding terms in the Nyaya Sutra. 
Members of a proof 
1. proposition (pratijfia) 
2. reason (hetu) 
3. instance (udaharalJa) 
4. application (upanaya) 













Each of the five members of a proof has its associated epistemic term, i.e. doubt for the 
proposition, purpose (or intention) for the reason, and so on. The Nyaya Sutra discusses two 
more terms (theory and member) in the middle of these five and also uses different terms in 
some places, but it is clear that these five terms in the Nyaya Sutra correspond to the five 
epistemic terms in the Caraka SaJ?lhita. Also, the Nyaya Sutra does not describe the 
relationship between each member of a proof and its associated epistemic term. This 
relationship is implied by the context and description of the terms involved. The discussion 
below follows the order of terms as they appear in the Nyaya Sutra. 
Doubt (term 3) 
The third term is doubt (saJ?lsaya). The Nyaya Sutra describes doubt as entertaining 
conflicting views about an object while its specific characteristics remain unknown.2 Both the 
Caraka SaJ?lhita,3 and the VaiSe~ika Sutra,4 discuss doubt. Caraka does not describe any types 
of doubt, whereas the Vaise~ika Sutra describes three types, i.e. doubt arising from seeing 
something (only) in general, from not seeing its distinguishing properties, or from recalling an 
alternative property. The description of doubt in the Nyaya Sutra is unclear and it is 
I Terms 22-26 in Caraka Sal!lhita (3.8.43-47), trans. Sharma] 98] -94, 1, 363-364. 
2 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.23), trans. Jha 19]5-]9,1,299-3]4. Note that page numbers are misprinted from 337 onwards 
in Jh1i's translation. See also Nyiiya Sutra (2.].] -7), trans. Jha ] 915-19,2, 1-21. 
3 Term 22 in Caraka Swnhita (3.8.43), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,363. 
4 Vaise~ika Siitra (2.1.17-20), trans. Sinha 1911, 89-93. See also trans. in Schuster 1972, 352 and 390 note 36. 
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understood in various ways.l Some interpret this description as proposing three and some as 
proposing five types of doubt. The three types of doubt are: 
1. recognising common properties (samiina-dharma-upapatti), e.g. noticing that an 
object is tall and upright, properties common to both a man and a post, and then 
doubting which this object is, 
2. recognising unique properties (aneka-dharma-upapatti), e.g. noticing that sound is 
produced by something breaking, a property unique to sound, and then doubting 
whether sound is therefore a substance, quality or action, and 
3. conflicting claims (vipratipatti), e.g. noticing that one source claims that the soul 
exists, whereas another claims the opposite, and then doubting whether the soul exits. 
The first of these three appears to be the same as the first type of doubt in the Vaise~ika 
Sfttra, whereas the other two are not exactly the same. Those who interpret this description as 
proposing five types of doubt add two more to the three above: 
4. uncertainty regarding apprehension (upalabdhi-avyavasthii), e.g. noticing that water 
is apprehended in a pond where it exists and in a mirage where it does not exist, and 
then doubting whether water exists where it is presently apprehended, and 
5. uncertain regarding non-apprehension (anupalabdhi-avyavasthii), e.g. noticing that 
water is not apprehended in a radish where it exists nor in dry land where it does not 
exist, and then doubting whether water exists where it is presently not apprehended. 
Some interpret the discussion on doubt not as a classification of doubt but as a 
description of the various circumstances in which doubt arises. Doubt is the first of the five 
epistemic terms associated with the five members of a proof. It is related to the proposition, 
the first member of a proof. That is, the proposition in a proof must be in doubt since a 
proposition that is not in doubt needs no proof. 
Purpose (term 4) 
The fourth term is purpose (prayojana). The Nyiiya Sfttra describes purpose as the 
object that is the aim of an action? The Caraka SaJ?1hitii describes purpose in similar terms.3 
Purpose or intention is the second epistemic term and it is related to the reason, the second 
I Potter ed. 1965-99,2, 170-172. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.24), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 299-301. 
3 Term 23 in Caraka Saf!1hitii (3.8.44), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,363-364. 
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member of a proof. That is, the purpose of the reason is to eliminate doubt concerning the 
proposition. The person considering the reason does so with the intention of eliminating doubt 
about the proposition. 
Example (term 5) 
The fifth term is example (dr.Jtiinta). The Nyiiya Sutra describes example as something 
understood by both ordinary people and the learned alike. 1 The Caraka Sal!1hitii also 
describes the example in a proof the very same way.2 However, the NyiiyaSutra should not be 
describing the example member of a proof at this point in the text. The example member is 
described below under the term instance (udiiharm}a) along with the other members of a 
proof. If the Nyiiya Sutra is following the pattern of terms as they are in the Caraka Sal!1hitii 
then it should be describing scepticism (savyabhiciira) at this point. The Caraka Sa1Jlhitii 
discusses scepticism as a state ofuncertainty.3 Scepticism is the third epistemic term in the 
Caraka Sa1Jlhitii and it is associated with the example in a proof. 
In contrast to the Caraka Sal!1hitii, the Nyiiya Sutra here discontinues the description of 
the five epistemic terms associated with a proof to discuss two other terms, theory and 
member. After the members of a proof (discussed next), the Nyiiya Sutra returns to the two 
remaining epistemic terms associated with a proof (reasoning and decision). 
Theory (term 6) 
The sixth term is theory (siddhiinta). The Nyiiya Sutra describes theory as a 
philosophical doctrine.4 Four kinds of theory are described in the following Nyiiya Sutra: 
1. universal theory (sarvatantra-sa1Jlsthiti), 
2. restricted theory (partitantra-sa1Jlsthiti), 
3. implied theory (adhikarm}a-sa1Jlsthiti), and 
4. hypothetical theory (abhyupagama-sal!1sthiti).5 
These same four types of theory are found in the Upiiyahrdaya and in the Caraka Sal!1hitii. 1 
I Nyaya Siitra (1.1.25), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,301-303. 
2 Term 12 in Caraka SaJ!lhitii (3.8.34), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,361. 
3 Term 24 in Caraka Saf!1hitii (3.8.45), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 364. 
4 Nyaya Siitra (1.1.26), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,303-305. Siitra 26 is slightly ambiguous. 
5 For examples of each see Vidyabhi:i~af.la 1920,59-60. 
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Members of a proof (term 7) 
The seventh term is member (avayava). This term refers to the five parts of a proof. The 
Caraka SaJ?1hitii discusses two terms not mentioned in the Nyiiya Sutra.2 These are proof 
(sthiipanii) and counter-proof (prati-$thiipanii).3 Both of these consist of the same five parts: 
proposition (pratijiia), reason (hetu), example (dr$tiinta), application (upanaya), and 
conclusion (nigamana). The Nyiiya Sutra describes these same five as members, except that it 
uses the term 'instance' (udiihara1Ja) where Caraka uses 'example' (dr$tiinta) for the third 
member.4 The Nyiiya Siitra discussed example (term five above) at a point where Caraka 
discusses scepticism. 
Jhll translates the term "avayava" (member) in the sutra (1.1.32) that lists the five 
members as "factor" of reasoning (tarka).5 Other translations use "inference-components".6 
However, there is no mention in the Nyiiya Sutra that the five members are required for an 
inference (anumiina), one of the four means of valid cognition (pramii1Ja). The term tarka 
(reasoning) is discussed below (term eight). 
The commentaries on the Nyiiya Siitra also discuss ten members of a prooe These ten 
consist of the same five members listed above plus five epistemic terms, i.e. inquiry (jijfiiisii), 
doubt (sa1J1saya), belief in the possibility of a solution (sakya-priipti), purpose (prayojana), 
and dispelling doubt (sa1J1saya-vyudiisa). Three of these (inquiry, doubt and purpose) occur 
amongst the five epistemic terms found in the Caraka Sa1J1hitii, and the other two of Caraka's 
terms (scepticism and resolution) are only slightly different from 'belief in the possibility of a 
solution' and 'dispelling doubt', respectively. 
The Nyiiya Sutra and the Caraka Sa1J1hitii accept only five members in a proof. These 
five, from proposition to conclusion, are statements whereas the five epistemic terms, from 
doubt to decision (or resolution), are steps or stages in a psychological process of moving 
J Term 16 in Caraka Sa'!lhitii (3.8.37), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361-362. Note that the Caraka Sm!lhitii uses 
siddhiinta where the Nyaya Sutra uses sal!1sthiti in the enumeration of the four types of theory. See also Prets 
2000,373. 
2 Vatsyayana mentions the word "proof' (sthiipana) when discussing futile rejoinders (jati) in his commentary 
on the Nyiiya Sutra, see Prets 2000, 378 note 38. 
3 Terms 9 and 10 in Caraka Sa'!lhitii (3.8.31-32), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 360-361. 
4 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.32), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,315-319. 
5 Jha 1915-19, 1, 315. 
6 Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya 1967-68, 1,106; and Gangopadhyaya 1982, 39. 
7 See for instance Jha 1915-19, 1, 316-319. 
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from the initial doubt about the proposition to the final decision about the conclusion. Those 
who accept only five members in a proof do not deny that each member or statement has an 
associated psychological step. The main difference between those systems that accept five 
members and those that accept ten is determined by whether or not the five epistemic terms 
are counted as members or parts of the proof.1 
An example proof with these five members is: 
1. Sound is impermanent 
2. Because of being produced 
3. Like a pot and unlike ether 
4. Sound is like a pot and unlike ether 
5. Therefore, impermanent (applies to sound) 
Proposition 
Reason 
Similar and dissimilar instances 
Application 
Conclusion 
The first member of a proof is the proposition (pratijfia). The Nyaya Sidra describes the 
proposition as the assertion of what is to be proved,2 exactly as it is described in the Caraka 
Sa1f1hita.3 The proposition consists of the subject (sound) and the property (impermanent). 
The proposition must be in doubt (or able to be doubted) and the fact that the subject has the 
property in question is what is to be proved. 
The second member of a proof is the reason (hetu). The reason presents the property 
that proves or establishes the proposition through its similar and dissimilar instances being 
(respectively) like and unlike the subject. That is, the reason (being produced) demonstrates 
how a pot is similar to sound since a pot and sound both have the property of being produced. 
The reason also demonstrates how ether is dissimilar to sound since ether and sound do not 
both have the property of being produced. Thus the reason is the property that proves, i.e. 
causes someone to determine, that the subject has the property in the proposition. 4 Caraka 
describes the reason simply as the cause of understanding.s Purpose (prayojana) or intention 
is the epistemic term associated with the reason. 
The third member of a proof is the instance (udahara7Ja) or example. The instance 
member presents two objects, the similar instance (sadharmya-udahara7Ja) and the dissimilar 
instance (vaidharmya-udahara7Ja). The first object is similar to the subject in that it shares 
I This does not apply to the ten members described by Bhadrabahu, since each of these is a statement. 
2 Nyiiya Si7tra (1.1.33), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 320-343. 
3 Term 8 in Caraka SaJ?lhita (3.8.30), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 360. 
4 Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.34-35), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 343-384. 
5 Term II in Caraka SaJ?1hita (3.8.33), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361. 
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with the subject the property presented in the reason. The second object is dissimilar to the 
subject in that it does not share with the subject the property presented in the reason. 1 The 
Caraka Sa1J1hitii uses the term example (dr#iinta) to describe the third member of a proof and 
makes no mention of two types of example.2 It describes the example as something 
understood by both ordinary people and the learned alike, just as the Nyiiya Siitra described 
the example (term number 5 above). The Upiiyahrdaya uses the term instance (udiihara1Ja) 
for the third member of a proof and describes two types of instance, the similar and the 
dissimilar instance. The Nyiiya Sutra agrees with the Upiiyahrdaya's terminology and 
classification of the third member of a proof. Neither the Upiiyahrdaya nor the Nyiiya Sutra 
make it clear whether both instances are required to establish the proposition or whether either 
instance alone would be sufficient. 
The Caraka Sa1J1hitii discusses scepticism as the epistemic term associated with the 
third member of a prooe The Nyiiya Sutra makes no mention of this. The commentaries on 
the Nyiiya Sutra mention only that the person considering the two instances considers how the 
similar instance has the property in the proposition and is like the subject in that the subject 
and similar instance share the property in the reason, whereas the dissimilar instance is the 
exact opposite of this. Thus, if the subject (sound) in the proof above is impermanent then it 
would be like the similar instance (a pot), and if the subject is permanent then it would be like 
the dissimilar instance (ether). 
The fourth member of a proof is the application (upanaya). The application emphasises 
the similarity between the subject and the similar instance, and the dissimilarity between the 
subject and the dissimilar instance.4 The Caraka Sa1J1hitii does not provide a specific 
explanation of the application,S although the application member in Caraka's sample proof is 
in agreement with the Nyiiya Sutra description of the application. Caraka discusses inquiry 
(jijiiiisii) whereas the Nyiiya Sutra discusses reasoning (tarka) as the epistemic term 
associated with the application member in a proof (see term number 8 below). 
1 Nyaya Siitra (1.1.36-37), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,385-396. 
2 Term 12 in Caraka Sa'!1hitii (3.8.34), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361. 
3 Term 24 in Cm'aka SalJlhitii (3.8.45), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 364. 
4 Nyaya Siitra (1.1.38), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,396-398. 
5 Term 13 in Caraka SalJlhitii (3.8.35), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,361. 
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The fifth member of a proof is the conclusion (nigamana). The conclusion emphasises 
the original proposition, i.e. that the subject has the property in question, because of the 
reason provided.1 The conclusion in Caraka's sample proof is the same as in the Nyiiya Siitra, 
although the Caraka Saf!1hitii does not provide a clear explanation of the conclusion.2 The 
Caraka Saf!1hitii discusses resolution (vyavasiiya) whereas the Nyiiya Siitra discusses decision 
(nin}aya) as the epistemic term associated with the conclusion member of a proof (see term 
number 9 below). 
Reasoning (term 8) 
The eighth term is reasoning (tarka).3 The Nyiiya Siitra describes reasoning as 
deliberating on the evidence to determine the real nature of an object when it is not known.4 
This suggests that the general meaning of reasoning is perhaps to deliberate on all five 
members of a proof. However, the meaning of reasoning as it is used here is limited to 
deliberating on the application member only. That is, reasoning is the stage before the 
decision is made regarding the conclusion. Reasoning in this sense is associated with the 
application, the fourth member of a proof. The Caraka Saf!1hitii discusses inquiry (jijiiiisii) as 
the epistemic term associated with the application.s 
Reasoning in this technical sense is the process of deliberating on the two alternatives 
for the subject. The first alternative is that the subject is like the similar example and has the 
property in the proposition, and the other alternative is that it is like the dissimilar example 
and does not have the property in question. Reasoning involves assuming one alternative and 
then the other in order to eliminate one of these. In the example proof above, this involves 
assuming for instance that sound is permanent like ether. But if this were the case then sound 
would not be produced, when sound clearly is produced. Thus the assumption that sound is 
I Nyiiya Siitra (1.] .39), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 398-405. Note that repetition (punarukta) is a point of defeat 
(nigraha-sthiina), i.e. it counts as a reason to lose a debate. See Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.14-15), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 
333-335. 
2 Term 14 in Caraka SGl!lhitii (3.8.35), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,361. 
3 Alternative translations for tarka are, for instance: Vidyabhii~a1.J.a 1920, 61; and Radhakrishnan, Moore 1957, 
363, "confutation". JM, G. 1915-19,1,406; and Solomon 1976-78,1,464, "hypothetical reasoning". 
Gangopadhyaya ]982,47, "hypothetical argument". Matila11986, 78, "supportive argument". Colebrooke 1824, 
48; Keith 1921, 174; Kajiyama 1958, 33; and Potter ed. ] 965-99, 2, 203, "reductio ad absurdum". 
4 Nyiiya Sutra (1.1.40), trans. JM 1915-19, 1,405-417. 
5 Term 25 in Caraka SGl!lhitii (3.8.46), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 364. 
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pennanent leads to a contradiction. Based on this, one of the two alternatives for the subject is 
eliminated thereby clearing the way for the last remaining epistemic term, decision. 
Reasoning differs from doubt in that doubt entertains both alternatives whereas 
reasoning assumes one alternative and then the other in order to eliminate one of these 
alternatives. Reasoning also differs from decision in that it lacks the certainty of decision. 
That is, all doubt about the proposition is not eliminated until the final decision is made 
regarding the conclusion. This occurs after the stage of reasoning about the application. 
Decision (term 9) 
The ninth term is decision (nirlJaya). The Nyiiya Sutra describes decision as the 
determination of the real nature of an object which was originally in doubt. This is done by 
accepting the proposition and rejecting its opposite, the counter-proposition.] In the sample 
proof above for instance, the proposition that sound is impermanent was initially in doubt. 
After reasoning that sound cannot be pennanent, the decision is made that the conclusion is 
beyond doubt and that sound is in fact impermanent. Decision is associated with the fifth 
member of a proof, the conclusion. The Caraka Salflhitii discusses resolution (vyavasiiya) as 
the epistemic term associated with the conclusion.2 
This completes the section on the five members of a proof, each with its associated 
psychological step. These proofs are used to establish theories in debates. 
6.2.4 Debate (terms 10-12) 
The next three terms concern debate. The Caraka Sarrzhitii also discusses these same 
three terms. The first term is debate or academic discussion (viida) which the Caraka Sarrzhitii 
divides into two: positive (jaZpa) and negative (vitWuJii). Positive or constructive debate is 
where each party opposes an opponent's view and endeavours to establish their own view. 
Negative or destructive debate is where each party endeavours to demolish an opponent's 
view without attempting to establish their own view? The Nyiiya Sutra does not describe the 
latter two terms as subdivisions of the first, but describes the first term as friendly debate and 
the latter two as hostile forms of debate. 
I Nyaya Siitra (1.1.41), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,417-428. 
2 Term 26 in Caraka SaJ!1hita (3.8.47), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,364. 
3 Term 1 in Caraka Saf!lhita (3.8.28), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,360. 
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Debate (term 10) 
The tenth term is debate (viida). The Nyiiya Sutra describes debate as discussion where 
each party adopts the opposite position on some issue and presents their position using the 
five-membered proof. Each party then supports their own position and refutes that of their 
opponent's using legitimate means, i.e. valid cognition (pramiilJa) and reasoning (tarka), 
without contradicting their respective tenets. 1 The object of this type of discussion is to 
establish the truth of the matter using legitimate means. 
Disputation (term 11) 
The eleventh term is disputation (jalpa). The Nyiiya Sidra describes disputation as a 
discussion carried on as in the case of a debate (viida) except that each party is not limited to 
using only legitimate means to support their own position and to refute that of their 
opponent's. They may also use illegitimate means such as quibbles (chala), futile rejoinders 
(jiiti) and points of defeat (nigraha-sthiina).2 These three terms are discussed below. The 
object of a disputation is to establish one's own position by any means whatsoever. Caraka 
describes this term as positive or constructive debate. 
Wrangle (term 12) 
The twelfth term is wrangle (vitalJcJii). The Nyiiya Sutra describes wrangle as a 
discussion carried on as in the case of a disputation (jalpa) except that each party does not 
support their own position but only attempts to refute their opponent's position.3 The object of 
a wrangle is simply to demolish an opponent's position by any means whatsoever. Caraka 
describes this term as negative or destructive debate. 
6.2.5 Faulty reasons (term 13) 
The thirteenth term is fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa). The reason (hetu) is the second 
member of a proof and it is described as consisting of a property that establishes the 
proposition through its similar and dissimilar examples being (respectively) like and unlike 
the subject. That is, the reason demonstrates how the similar example is like the subject, since 
the similar example and subject both have the property presented in the reason. The reason 
also demonstrates how the dissimilar example is unlike the subject, since the dissimilar 
J Nyiiya Siifra (1.2.1), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 429-47l. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (1.2.2), trans. JM 1915-19, 1,471-478. 
3 Nyiiya Siltra (1.2.3), trans. JM 1915-19, 1,478-480. 
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example and subject do not both have the property presented in the reason. In this way the 
reason establishes that the subject has the property in the proposition. 1 
Strictly speaking, this is a description of a correct reason. A reason that fails to meet the 
requirements of a correct reason is called a fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa). A fallacious or 
pseudo reason is one that has the mere appearance of being a correct reason when in fact it is 
not a correct reason. A fallacious reason occurs as the second member of a proof, just as a 
correct reason does, but unlike a correct reason it does not successfully establish the 
proposition. The ways in which a reason can fail to establish the proposition are listed in the 
Nyiiya Sutra as five. The five fallacious reasons are: 
1. inconclusive (sa-vyabhiciira) 
2. contradictory (viruddha) 
3. similar to the point at issue (prakarm:za-sama) 
4. similar to the proposition to be proved (siidhya-sama) 
5. mis-timed (kaziitlta)2 
The Vaise~ika Sutra, the Upiiyahrdaya and the Caraka Sarrzhitii all describe various 
types of incorrect reasons. There are many points in common between their respective 
descriptions. The Vaise#ka Sutra uses the term anapadeSa rather than hetviibhiisa to refer to 
incorrect reasons. These are interpreted as consisting of either two or three types. The two 
types are: unproven (asat) and doubtful (sandigdha), and the scheme of three types includes 
one more, i.e. contradictory (aprasiddha). These three are similar to numbers 1,2 and 4 of the 
Nyiiya Sutra. The Upiiyahrdaya divides fallacious reasons (hetviibhiisa) into eight. These 
eight include all but one (number 4) of the five fallacious reasons in the Nyiiya Sutra. The 
other four in the Upiiyahrdaya not included in the Nyiiya Sutra are: verbal equivocation (viik-
chala), universal equivocation (siimiinya-chala), reason similar to the grounds for doubt 
(sarrzsaya-sama), and reason where the example is similar to the subject (van:zya-sama). The 
Caraka Sarrzhitii uses the term 'ahetu' to refer to its three types of incorrect reason. Only one 
of these three, reason similar to the point at issue (prakarm:za-sama), is found in the Nyiiya 
Sutra. The other two are reason similar to the grounds for doubt (saf(lsaya-sama) and reason 
similar to the subject (van:zya-sama). 
I NyiJya Siitra (1.1.34-35), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,343-384. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (1.2.4), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,481-496. 
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Inconclusive reason (13.1) 
An inconclusive reason (sa-vyabhiciira) is one that is not restricted to the similar 
position.1 For instance, in the proof 'sound is permanent, because of being intangible, like 
ether' the reason suffers the fault of being inconclusive. The similar position includes 
everything that has the property in the proposition and the dissimilar position includes 
everything that does not have this property. The reason exists in the similar position, as a 
correct reason should, since ether for instance is permanent and also intangible. The fault with 
this reason is that it also exists in the dissimilar position, i.e. it is found amongst things that 
are impermanent. Intellect for instance is something impermanent that is also intangible. A 
correct reason must exist in the similar position, but must not exist in the dissimilar position. 
A reason that exists in both the similar and the dissimilar position is called inconclusive. 
This description of an inconclusive reason matches the doubtful reason (sandigdha), 
one of the incorrect reasons in the Vaise~ika Siitra. It also matches the way in which the 
Upiiyahrdaya describes the same term (sa-vyabhiciira). Caraka describes this term as 
scepticism or indecision, the third epistemic term which is associated with the example, the 
third member of the proof.2 
Contradictory reason (13.2) 
A contradictory reason (viruddha) is one that contradicts an accepted position.3 The 
earliest surviving commentary on the Nyiiya Siitra describes a contradictory reason as one that 
an opponent uses to support their tenets when the reason in fact contradicts the very tenets the 
opponent seeks to support. Later commentators describe a contradictory reason as one that 
contradicts the very proposition that the reason is meant to establish, i.e. the reason and the 
property in the proposition (within the same proof) are contradictory properties. This type of 
reason does not exist in the similar position. For instance, in the proof 'sound is permanent, 
because of being a product' the reason suffers the fault of being contradictory. That is, the 
reason 'being a product' does not exist in the similar position since there is nothing produced 
that is permanent. A correct reason must exist in the similar position and if it does not then it 
is contradictory. 
I Nyiiya Siitra (l.2.5), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,496-503. 
2 Tenn 24 in Caraka Saillhila (3.8.45), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 364. 
3 Nyiiya Sutra (1.2.6), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,503-507. 
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There is also a contradictory reason (aprasiddha) in the Vaise~ika Sutra according to 
one interpretation. The Upayahrdaya uses this term (viruddha) in three places. First it is used 
to name one of its fallacious reasons. It is described there in the same way as the later 
commentators describe a contradictory reason in the Nyaya Sutra. Secondly, it is listed as a 
point of defeat (number 20), and thirdly, it is used to name one of the refutations (number 13) 
in the Upayahrdaya. Caraka describes this term as a type of defective speech, and also lists it 
under the points of defeat (number 13). 
Reason similar to the point at issue (13.3) 
A reason that is similar to the point at issue (prakarmJa-sama) is one that attempts to 
establish the conclusion by (simply) denying the contrary position.! For instance, in the proof 
'sound is impermanent, because of not having the characteristics of something permanent' the 
reason suffers the fault of being similar to the point at issue. That is, the reason in this proof 
'not having the characteristics of something permanent' means simply 'not being permanent' . 
Thus the proof in question amounts to, 'sound is impermanent, because of not being 
permanent'. The person who doubts the proposition in this proof must decide between two 
alternatives, i.e. whether sound is impermanent (and not permanent), or whether sound is 
permanent (and not impermanent). A reason that simply denies one alternative without 
providing any additional information lacks the necessary persuasive power for the person who 
doubts the proposition. Thus, such a reason is unable to establish its conclusion for this 
person. 
The reason in this proof (not having the characteristics of something permanent) is a 
property that exists only in the similar position since only impermanent things do not have the 
characteristics of something permanent. However, this does not mean that the reason is a 
correct reason because the person who doubts the proposition is not able to determine that the 
reason exists only in the similar position. That is, the person who doubts the proposition has 
yet to determine whether sound has the characteristics of something permanent or whether 
sound has the characteristics of something impermanent. If it were possible to prove to this 
person that sound is impermanent simply because the characteristics of something permanent 
had not been apprehended in the subject, then it would be equally possible to prove to the 
same person that sound is permanent because the characteristics of something impermanent 
I Nyaya Siitra (1.2.7), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,508-512. 
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have also not been apprehended in the subject. But such reasons are in fact reasons that are 
similar to the point at issue and neither one of them is able to establish its conclusion. 
The problem with this reason is that it is not sufficiently different from the property in 
the proposition to effectively remove doubt about whether the subject has the property in 
question for a person who doubts the proposition. The person who doubts the proposition is 
therefore unable to decide that the conclusion is in fact correct. 
The Nyiiya Sutra uses this same term (prakaraIJa-sama) to name one of the futile 
rejoinders (number 15 below), although the explanation of this rejoinder suggests that the 
problem is one of indecision or vacillating between the two alternatives rather than one where 
the reason simply denies the contrary position. The Upiiyahrdaya uses this term to name one 
of its fallacious reasons and describes it in a similar way. Caraka also uses this term to name 
the first of his three fallacious reasons.! Caraka's description of this fallacious reason is the 
same as the Upiiyahrdaya and they both use practically the same example. 
Reason similar to the proposition to be proved (13.4) 
A reason that is similar to the proposition to be proved (siidhya-sama) is one that has 
not been proven to apply to the subject and it is similar in this respect to the proposition, i.e. 
both the reason and the proposition stand in need of a proof. 2 That is, the purpose of a proof is 
to establish the proposition. If the reason used to do this does not apply to the subject then the 
fact that the subject has the property specified in the reason remains unestablished just as the 
fact that the subject has the property specified in the proposition remains unestablished. For 
instance, in the proof 'sound is impermanent, because of being visible' the reason (being 
visible) does not apply to the subject, since sound is not visible. Thus, the reason in this proof 
is a fallacious reason that is similar to the proposition in that it has not been established. 
The point here is that this type of reason simply does not apply to the subject, not that 
the reason stands in need of a separate proof in order to confirm for the person who doubts the 
proposition that it does in fact apply to the subject. A proof cannot establish something that is 
not the case. Thus, if an object does not in fact have a property then there is no proof that can 
establish that this object has that property. Similarly, if the subject does not have the property 
specified in the reason then there is no proof that can establish that it does have this property. 
J Term 36 in Caraka Saf!1hitii (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 367. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (l.2.8), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,512-516. 
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This type of faulty reason is similar to the unproven (asat) in theVaise~ika Siitra. The 
Nyaya Siitra uses this same term (sadhya-sama) to name one of the futile refutations (number 
8 below), although it is not described in the same way as this type of fallacious reason is 
described. This term is not mentioned in the Caraka SmJ1hita or in the Upayahrdaya. 
Mis-timed reason (13.5) 
A reason that is mis-timed (kiilatlta) is one that does not apply to the subject at the 
relevant time.1 The exact meaning of this type of fault is unclear. Various interpretations are 
offered in the commentaries. The earliest extant commentary by Vatsyayana (cASO-SOO AD) 
rejects an interpretation that Vacaspati (tenth century AD) attributes to Buddhist logicians.2 
According to this interpretation a reason is mis-timed when it is not presented in its proper 
place within a five-part proof, or presented in the wrong temporal order during a debate.3 This 
interpretation is similar to the way that a mis-timed reason (kalatlta) is described in the 
Buddhist Upayahrdaya, i.e. as a reason used to prove a proposition that should have been 
proved earlier in the temporal order of arguments in a debate. The Upayahrdaya lists a similar 
fault, mis-timed proof (aprapta-kiila), as one of the points of defeat (number 16) but without a 
description. The Nyaya Siitra also includes mis-timed proof (aprapta-kala) in its points of 
defeat (number 10 below) and describes it as occurring when the members of a proof are 
presented in the incorrect order. Another interpretation in the commentaries on the Nyaya 
Siitra is that a mis-timed reason is one presented after the doubt about the proposition has 
been eliminated.4 
Vatsyayana's own interpretation is that a mis-timed reason does not apply to the subject 
because there is a temporal mismatch between the subject and the reason. For instance, in the 
proof 'sound is permanent, because of being made manifest by conjunction, like colour' the 
reason suffers the fault of being mis-timed. That is, the reason 'being made manifest by 
conjunction' does not apply to the subject because sound exists only after the conjunction that 
made it manifest has ceased to exist. Since subject and reason in this proof never exist at the 
same time, the reason does not correctly apply to the subject. 
1 Nyiiya Siitra (1.2.9), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,516-521. 
2 Chattopadhyaya, Gangopadhyaya 1967-68,1,149. 
3 Jha 1915-19, 1,518-521. 
4 Solomon 1976-78,1,278-279. 
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The reason in the proof above is used by those who attempt to prove that sound is 
permanent. The reasoning they use is that the colour of a pot is made manifest (in a dark 
room) by the conjunction of lamp light and the pot. The colour of the pot exists before the 
conjunction of the lamp light and the pot, and this colour also continues to exist after the lamp 
is removed, although the colour is not manifest (visible) before and after conjunction with the 
lamp. Similarly, sound exists both before and after it is made manifest by the conjunction of a 
stick and a drum or the conjunction of an axe and a log of wood, although it is not manifest 
(audible) at those times. 
Vatsyayana argues that there is a temporal mismatch between the conjunction that 
makes sound manifest and the conjunction that makes colour manifest. In the case of colour, 
its manifestation coincides with the time of conjunction. That is, the colour of a pot is visible 
only while the lamp light is present. There is no colour visible before or after the presence of 
the light. In the case of sound, however, its manifestation is only after the time of conjunction, 
as is witnessed by the fact that sound is heard well after a distant axe is seen to have struck a 
log of wood. There is no sound heard before or at the same time as the axe strikes, but there is 
sound heard after the axe has struck. Thus, at the time when the subject (sound) exists, the 
conjunction that produced the sound has ceased to exist and therefore the reason does not 
apply to the subject. 
The Nyiiya Sutra describes equivalence in non-generation (anutpatti-sama), one of the 
futile rejoinders (number 13 below), as a proof where it is (wrongly) claimed that the reason 
does not apply to the subject on the grounds that there is a temporal mismatch between the 
subject and the reason. The author of the Nyiiya Sutra rejects this claim declaring it to be a 
futile rejoinder. This seems to count against Vatsyayana's interpretation of a mis-timed 
reason. Caraka describes a similar term, delayed statement (atztakiila), as a statement 
presented after the appropriate moment for its use has elapsed. 
Comparison 
One reason may suffer from more than one fault, but each fault is different from the 
others. The inconclusive reason exists in both the similar and the dissimilar positions. 
Contradictory reasons do not exist in the similar position. The reason similar to the point at 
issue simply re-states the position to be proved. This reason exists only in the similar position 
but it is not known to be in either position by the person who doubts the proposition. The 
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reason similar to the proposition to be proved is one that does not apply to the subject, and the 
mis-timed reason does not apply to the subject at the correct time. 
These faults suggest that a correct reason is one that is known by the person who doubts 
the proposition (i) to exist in the similar position, (ii) to not exist in the dissimilar position, 
(iii) to apply to the subject, and (iv) to apply to the subject at the correct time. 
6.2.6 Equivocation (term 14) 
The fourteenth term is equivocation (chala), also translated as quibble. The Nyaya Sutra 
defines equivocation as occurring when an opponent deliberately misinterprets the meaning of 
a word and responds to the unintended meaning. 1 The Caraka Sal!lhita defines equivocation 
in the same way.2 Three types of equivocation are described in the Nyaya Sutra: 
1. Verbal equivocation (vak-chala), i.e. playing on the ambiguity of a word, e.g. the 
word "nava" in Sanskrit can mean new or nine. In response to the statement that someone has 
a new (nava) blanket the opponent replies that there is only one blanket, not nine (nava). 
There are two equally acceptable meanings to the word "nava" and the opponent has 
deliberately responded to the meaning not intended by the speaker. 
2. Universal equivocation (samanya-chala), i.e. over-generalising the meaning of a 
word, e.g. in response to the statement that Brahmans are learned the opponent says that even 
an uneducated Brahman must be learned. Here the word "Brahman" is generalised to include 
every single Brahman whereas the speaker intended only that Brahmans are normally learned. 
3. Figurative equivocation (upacara-chala), i.e. interpreting a word in its primary or 
literal sense when the secondary or figurative sense is intended by the speaker, e.g. in reply to 
the statement that the chair has called for order the opponent says that the chair has not called 
for order since chairs cannot speak. Here the word "chair" is used to refer to the chair person 
whereas the opponent takes the literal or primary sense of the word not unintended by the 
speaker. 
The Nyaya Sutra spends three slitras (1.2.15-17) arguing against an opponent who 
claims that the third type of equivocation is included in the first type and consequently only 
two categories are required for equivocation. The Caraka Sal!lhita and the Upayahrdaya both 
I Nyaya Siitra (1.2.1 0-17), trans. Jha ] 9] 5-19, 1, 522-534. 
2 Term 35 in Caraka Sm!1hita (3.8.56), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,366-367. 
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discuss equivocation in two categories, i.e. verbal and universal equivocation. Kajiyama 
claims that the opponent referred to in the Nyiiya Sutra is the author of the Upiiyahrdaya.l 
One of the examples of verbal equivocation in the Upiiyahrdaya is that a mountain is not on 
fire since it is grass and trees that are burning rather than the mountain itself. This example 
fits the description of a figurative equivocation as it appears in the Nyiiya Sutra. The 
Upiiyahrdaya describes its two types of equivocation as types of fallacious reasons (see 
above), whereas the Caraka SaJ?1hitii describes them as two types of statement. The Vaise~ika 
Sutra does not discuss equivocation. 
6.2.7 Futile rejoinders (term 15) 
The fifteenth term is futile rejoinder (jiiti). This term is discussed in two places in the 
Nyiiya Sutra. The first chapter contains a brief description of futile rejoinder and the fifth 
chapter contains a list of 24 futile rejoinders. The first chapter describes futile rejoinder as an 
objection (pratyavasthiina) by means of similarity (siidharmya) and dissimilarity 
(vaidhannya).2 That is, a reason in a successful proof establishes its proposition by 
demonstrating that the two examples are (respectively) similar and dissimilar to the subject.3 
A futile rejoinder, on the other hand, is a proof where the reason does not establish its 
proposition because the required similarity and dissimilarity between the subject and each 
example is only apparent. This description of futile rejoinder seems to be based on what is 
now the first two futile rejoinders in the list of 24 in the fifth chapter. 
A more general description of a futile rejoinder is a proof used to refute an opponent's 
explanation of the way in which propositions are established. For instance, an opponent may 
claim that a proposition is established whenever the subject is similar to one example, or 
dissimilar to the other example. A rejoinder attempting to refute this claim is a proof where 
the subject is in fact similar to one example, or dissimilar to the other example, but where the 
proposition is obviously not established. This rejoinder would then force an opponent to 
abandon their claim regarding the way in which a proposition is established. 
1 Kajiyama 1991, 110. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.18), trans. Prets 2001,547. Cf. Jha 1915-19, 1,535-536. 
3 Nyaya Siitra (1.1.34-35), trans. Jha 19] 5-19, 1, 343-384. 
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This general description does not apply to all 24 futile rejoinders listed in chapter five. 1 
The description in chapter one may be for a typical futile rejoinder rather than a definition that 
strictly applies to all its various types, or it may be that more examples were subsequently 
added in the fifth chapter than were originally intended to be included under the term. The 
Nyaya Sutra says at the end of chapter one only that there are various futile rejoinders without 
indicating exactly how the term should be subdivided.2 Many of the 24 futile rejoinders listed 
in chapter five appear to be simply various examples rather than a specific example 
illustrating each different subdivision of futile rejoinder.3 This is in contrast to the way terms 
are discussed in the first chapter. When the subdivisions of terms are described in chapter one, 
each subdivision excludes the others and together the subdivisions include all instances of the 
term. The list of futile rejoinders in chapter five appears to include what was probably the 
contentious issues of the day rather than an enumeration of subdivisions. This supports the 
view that the first part of chapter five is a later addition.4 
The author of the Nyaya Sutra considers all futile rejoinders (jati) to be unsuccessful in 
their attempts to refute some position. The word ''jati'' is therefore translated not just as 
"rejoinder" but as "futile rejoinder" to make it clear that all these rejoinders are unsuccessful 
attempts to prove a correct position wrong.5 A typical futile rejoinder is used to refute some 
position by demonstrating how the acceptance of that position leads to an unacceptable 
consequence. Since the consequence must be unacceptable to the opponent in order for the 
rejoinder to be effective in forcing the opponent to abandon their position, the rejoinder is 
intentionally one where the proposition is not established, or at least not considered to be 
established by the opponent. It is therefore a complete mistake to claim that a rejoinder is 
futile because the proposition in the rejoinder itself is not established. This would be to 
misunderstand the whole purpose of a rejoinder. A rejoinder where the proposition is 
established would endorse rather than count against some position. The author of the Nyaya 
Sutra considers these rejoinders to be futile because they fail to prove another position wrong, 
not because the proposition in the rejoinder itself is not established. 
J Sastri 1905a,247. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (1.2.20), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,538-540. 
3 Gokhale 1992, 151. 
4 Prets 2001, 548. 
5 See list of alternative translations ofjiiti in Prets 2001,553 note 7. 
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Almost half of the 24 futile rejoinders listed in the Nyaya Siitra are also found in the 
Upayahrdaya as refutations. Five of the refutations in the Upayahrdaya appear in the Nyaya 
Siitra with the same name and described in the same way.1 The names of three other 
refutations in the Upayahrdaya also appear in the Nyaya Siitra, but their descriptions differ in 
the Nyaya Siitra. 2 One other refutation in the Upayahrdaya is described in the same way as in 
the Nyaya Siitra, but it is given a different name.3 The refutations (du~a7Ja) in the 
Upayahrdaya appear to have been renamed futile rejoinders (jati) in the Nyaya Siitra. These 
two terms probably have their origins in what Caraka calls rejoinder (uttara). Caraka does not 
discuss any types of rejoinders. He describes rejoinder as a statement that denies similarity 
when similarity has been asserted, or vice versa.4 The Nyaya Siitra describes futile rejoinder 
in a similar way, i.e. as an objection by means of similarity and dissimilarity. 
Vatsyayana's commentary on the Nyaya Siitra explains futile rejoinder as an objection 
which is a directly following consequence (prasaizga).5 The word "consequence" (prasaizga) 
is used to refer to a style of argument where an unacceptable corollary of an opponent's 
position is used to defeat an opponent. This form of argument is often associated with 
NagiiIjuna (see next chapter) and its origin may be traced back to the futile rejoinders (jati) of 
the Nyaya Siitra, the refutations (du~a1Ja) of the Upayahrdaya, and the rejoinders (uttara) of 
the Caraka Saf!lhita. There is no discussion on rejoinders, refutations or futile rejoinders in 
the Vaise~ika Siitra. 
There are 24 futile rejoinders (jati) listed in the first part of chapter five. These have 
been discussed in a number of modern pUblications.6 Comparisons are made between those 
futile rejoinders that have counterparts in the Caraka Sa7?1hita or the Upayahrdaya in the 
order that they occur in the Nyaya Siitra. The list is not arranged in sections, although related 
items occur together in the list. This suggests a classification of these 24 into three groups of 
I Refutations 1,2, 11, 12 and 15 in the Upiiyahrdaya appear in the Nyiiya Siitra as futile rejoinders 3, 4,10,9 
and 14, respectively. 
2 Refutations 7, 17 and 20 in the Upiiyahrdaya appear in the Nyiiya Siitra as futile rejoinders 24, 12 and 13, 
respectively. 
3 Refutation 10 (kala-sarna) in the Upiiyahrdaya appears in the Nyiiya Siitra as futile rejoinder 16 (ahetu-sarna). 
4 Term 15 in Caraka SaJJ1hitii (3.8.36), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 361. 
5 Prets 2001,548. Cf. Jha 1915-19, 1,535; and Randle 1930,342. 
6 See for instance: Stothert 1867-70, 209-214; VidyabhU~al)a 1920,67-81; Dasgupta 1922-55, 2, 380-382 note 4; 
Randle 1930,341-368; Radhakrishnan, Moore 1957,371-377; Potter, ed. 1965-99,2,268-272; Solomon 1976-
78,1,146-185; Gokhale 1992,152-166; and Matilal 1998, 61-73. 
227 
Chapter six: Ancient Indian philosophy 
eight: (1) futile rejoinders 1-8 are related to the example, (2) futile rejoinders 9-16 are related 
to the reason, and (3) futile rejoinders 17-24 are related to the subject in a proof. 
Futile rejoinders related to the example (1-8) 
Futile rejoinders 1-8 are related to the example (or instance) member of a proof. They 
argue that the similar example being like the subject, or the dissimilar example being unlike 
the subject, does not constitute a suitable basis upon which to establish the proposition. 
The first two futile rejoinders are called: 
1. Equivalence in similarity (sadharmya-sama) 
2. Equivalence in dissimilarity (vaidharmya-sama)l 
These two rejoinders argue that if the similar example shares a property with the subject 
then it is like the subject, and similarly, if the dissimilar example does not share a property 
with the subject, then it is unlike the subject. But the mere fact that an example shares or does 
not share a property with the subject is not a reliable basis upon which to establish the 
proposition. For instance, in the following proof: 
(1) Sound is impermanent Proposition 
Reason (2) Because of being a product 
(3) Like a pot, and unlike ether Similar and dissimilar examples 
the fact that similar example (a pot) shares the property specified in the reason (being a 
product) with the subject (sound), or the fact that the dissimilar example (ether) does not share 
this property with the subject, is not a reliable basis upon which to establish the proposition 
that sound is impermanent. 
The first futile rejoinder argues that if the proposition is established on the basis that the 
similar example shares a property with the subject then the very opposite proposition could 
also be established in the same way. For instance: 
(1) Sound is permanent 
(2) Because of being intangible 




In this proof the similar example (ether) shares the property of being intangible with the 
subject (sound) and thus the proposition that sound is permanent would be wrongly 
established. 
1 Nyaya Sidra (5.1.2-3), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 238-244. 
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The second futile rejoinder raises the same point using the dissimilar example. That is, 
if the proposition is established on the basis that the dissimilar example does not share a 
property with the subject then the very opposite proposition could also be established in the 
same way. For instance: 
(1) Sound is permanent 
(2) Because of being intangible 




In this proof the dissimilar example (a pot) does not share the property of being intangible 
with the subject (sound) and thus the proposition that sound is pennanent would be wrongly 
established. 
These two futile rejoinders argue that if propositions could be established on the basis 
that their similar examples share a property with their SUbjects, or that their dissimilar 
examples do not share a property with their subjects, then contradictory propositions could be 
established. Since these contradictory propositions are not established, the way in which a 
proof is successfully established is not based upon the similar example being like the subject 
or the dissimilar example being unlike the subject. 
The author of the Nyaya Siitra rejects these two rejoinders as futile. That is, in the first 
rejoinder, i.e. 'sound is permanent, because of being intangible, like ether' , it is true that the 
similar example (ether) shares the property of intangibility with the subject (sound), since 
both ether and sound are intangible. However, this does not mean that ether is like sound. In 
order for the similar example to be like the subject, both the similar example and the subject 
must share an essential property. Since intangibility is not an essential property of sound, but 
merely a superficial property, the fact that both ether and sound are intangible does not mean 
that ether is like sound. Since the similar example is not like the subject in this proof, the 
proposition is not established, and thus the first rejoinder is futile. 
Similarly, in the second rejoinder, i.e. 'sound is permanent, because of being intangible, 
unlike a pot', it is true that the dissimilar example (a pot) does not share the property of 
intangibility with the subject (sound), since it is not the case that both a pot and sound are 
intangible (although sound is intangible). However, this does not mean that a pot is unlike 
sound. In order for the dissimilar example to be unlike the subject they must not share an 
essential property. Since intangibility is not an essential property of sound, the fact that a pot 
and sound do not share intangibility does not mean that a pot is unlike sound. Since the 
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dissimilar example is not unlike the subject in this proof, the proposition is not established, 
and thus the second rejoinder is also futile. 
The Nyaya Sutra argues that the similar example is like the subject, and the dissimilar 
example is unlike the subject, because they share, or do not share, an essential property with 
one another. A pot for instance is like sound because it shares an essential property with 
sound. Similarly, ether is unlike sound because it does not share an essential property with 
sound. The essential property in both cases is that of being a product (i.e. being something 
made or produced). This essential property is used as the reason in the proof. 
The next six futile rejoinders are related to the similar example. The converse of each 
rejoinder would equally apply to the dissimilar example, although these are not mentioned in 
the Nyaya Sutra. In the following rejoinders, the example refers only to the similar example. 
According to the Nyaya Sutra, the proposition is established on the basis that the 
(similar) example is like the subject. For the example to be like the subject, the example and 
subject must share an essential property. The fact that they share some superficial property is 
not sufficient for the example to be like the subject. This essential property is specified in the 
reason. Since the example and the subject share an essential property they must also share 
another property. This other property is the property specified in the proposition. For instance, 
in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being a product, like a pot', the example (a 
pot) shares the essential property of being a product with the subject (sound). Since a pot and 
sound share this essential property, they must also share the property of being impermanent, 
the property specified in the proposition. Thus, the proposition 'sound is impermanent' is 
established on the basis that the example, a pot, is like the subject, sound. 
The next two futile rejoinders challenge this view. These are called: 
3. Equivalence in attribution (utkar~a-sama) 
4. Equivalence in exclusion (apakar~a-sama)l 
The objector argues in these two rejoinders that if sharing an essential property is a 
reliable basis upon which to conclude that two objects also share some other property, then 
these two objects would have to agree in all their properties. But, claims the objector, this is 
1 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.4-6), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,245-253. 
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plainly not the case because if it were the case then unacceptable propositions could be 
wrongly established. 
The third futile rejoinder argues that in the proof, 'sound is visible, because of being a 
product, like a pot' , a pot and sound share the essential property of being a product, and thus 
they must also share other properties. Since a pot is visible, sound must also have this 
property. Thus, the proposition 'sound is visible' would be wrongly established on the basis 
that the example, a pot, shares an essential property with the subject, sound. 
The fourth futile rejoinder raises a similar point using the absence of a property. That is, 
in the proof, 'sound is not audible, because of being a product, like a pot', a pot and sound 
share the essential property of being a product, and since a pot lacks the property of being 
audible, sound must also lack this property. Thus, the proposition 'sound is not audible' 
would be wrongly established on the basis that the example, a pot, shares an essential 
property with the subject, sound. 
These two futile rejoinders appear as the first two refutations in the UpGyahrdaya. They 
have the same names and are described in the same way in the UpGyahrdaya. The Nyaya 
Siitra does not name the objector but if it is not the author of the Upayahrdaya then it is a 
Buddhist arguing in the same way. 
According to the Nyaya Siitra, these two futile rejoinders are based on the mistaken 
view that because two objects share an essential property they must share all their properties. 
If this were the case then the example and subject would be identical. However, the example 
and subject in a successful proof are always different because the person who doubts the 
proposition must know that the example has the property specified in the proposition while 
still doubting whether or not the subject has this property. 
It is not simply the fact that the example and subject share an essential property that 
ensures that they share certain other properties. Rather, it is the knowledge that the example 
and subject share an essential property that provides the justification for the person who 
doubts the proposition to conclude that the example and subject also share another property, 
one that the example is known to have. For instance, the knowledge that a pot and sound 
share the property of being a product provides the justification for the person who doubts 
whether or not sound is impermanent to conclude that a pot and sound do share the property 
of being impermanent. 
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The next two futile rejoinders challenge this view. These are called: 
5. Equivalence in uncertainty (vanJya-sama) 
6. Equivalence in certainty (avanJya-sama)l 
These rejoinders argue that simply knowing that the example and the subject share an 
essential property does not justify extending what is known about one to the other. If this 
were the case then legitimate proofs would not establish their propositions. This is because 
the person who is in doubt about the proposition is, on the one hand, uncertain about whether 
the subject has the property specified in the proposition, and on the other hand, certain that the 
example has this property. Since this person knows that the example and subject share an 
essential property, they would treat these two objects as essentially the same. Thus, what is 
uncertain about the subject would automatically extend to the example, or what is certain 
about the example would automatically extend to the subject. 
The fifth rejoinder argues that the person who is in doubt about the proposition is 
uncertain about whether the subject has the property specified in the proposition and thus they 
would be equally uncertain about whether the example has this same property. The sixth 
rejoinder argues the converse. That is, the person who is in doubt about the proposition is 
certain that the example has the property specified in the proposition and thus they would be 
equally certain that the subject has this same property. 
For instance, in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being a product, like a 
pot', the person who is in doubt about the proposition is uncertain about whether sound is 
impermanent. Since they know that a pot is like sound, they would be equally uncertain as to 
whether or not a pot is impermanent and thus a pot would be unacceptable as an example. 
Alternatively, if this person is certain that a pot is impermanent and knows that a pot is like 
sound, then they would be equally certain that sound is impermanent. Since this person would 
then be in no doubt about whether sound is impermanent, the proposition in this proof would 
be an unacceptable proposition. 
In both cases the proposition 'sound is impermanent' would not be established; either 
because the person who doubts the proposition would also doubt whether the example has the 
property in question, or because this person would be in no doubt about the proposition. Thus 
I Nyaya Siitra (5.1.4-6), trans. 1ha 1915-19,4,245-253. 
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the claim that the knowledge that the example is like the subject provides the justification to 
conclude that the subject has a property that the example is know to have is unacceptable. 
The term used to name the fifth futile rejoinder (vanJya-sama) appears in both the 
Upiiyahrdaya and the Caraka SaJ?1hitii described as a fallacious reason. Both works describe 
the fault as occurring when the example stands as much in need of a proof that it has the 
property in the proposition as does the subject. The fifth futile rejoinder is described in a 
similar way, i.e. where the uncertainty about whether the subject has the property specified in 
the proposition applies equally to whether the example has this same property. Since the 
example is uncertain it would require a proof to establish that it has the property in the 
proposition. 
The author of the Nyiiya Sutra would reject both futile rejoinders because they do not 
take into account the fact that the example and the subject are always different in a successful 
proof. That is, the example and subject each have their own properties which are not shared 
by the other. The person who doubts the proposition can be certain, therefore, that the 
example has a property without thereby being equally certain that the subject has this same 
property. Similarly, this person can be uncertain about the subject without thereby also being 
equally uncertain about the example. Thus, the difference between the example and subject 
ensures that the certainty concerning the example and the uncertainty concerning the subject 
do not automatically extend to the other. However, this person is still justified in concluding 
that what is known about the example, namely that it has the property in question, does apply 
to the subject. 
The next two futile rejoinders challenge this view. These are called: 
7. Equivalence in an alternative (vikalpa-sama) 
8. Equivalence in the need for a proof (siidhya-sama)1 
The seventh futile rejoinder argues that if the example and subject are always different, 
each with properties that are not shared by the other, then the property that the example is 
known to have could be one such property. For instance, in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, 
because of being a product, like a pot', the example (a pot) has properties like colour and 
shape that the subject (sound) does not have. Since the property of impermanence could be a 
property like colour and shape that a pot has and sound does not have, it is unacceptable to 
I Nyiiya Siitra (5.1.4-6), trans. Jha 1915-19,4, 245-253. 
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apply the property specified in the proposition to the subject simply on the basis that the 
example has this property. 
The eighth futile rejoinder argues that if it is legitimate to apply a known property of the 
example to the subject, then it would be equally legitimate to apply a known property of the 
subject to the example. One such property that the subject is know to have is the need for a 
proof (to establish that it has the property specified in the proposition). For instance, in the 
proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being a product, like a pot', the subject (sound) 
stands in need of a proof in order to establish that it is impermanent. If this same property is 
applied to the example (a pot) then whether or not a pot is impermanent would also need a 
proof. But if the example requires a proof in order to establish that it has the property 
specified in the proposition then the example would be unacceptable since this would lead to 
an infinite regress. Since a property of the subject cannot be applied to the example, it is 
equally unacceptable to apply a property of the example to the subject. 
These two futile rejoinders would be rejected by the author of the Nyiiya Siitra on the 
grounds that an example in a proof is by definition something that both ordinary people and 
the learned alike know to be an illustration of the property specified in the proposition. Only 
such an object is suitable as an example. Thus, the example never needs a proof to establish 
that it has the property specified in the proposition. The proposition, on the other hand, is by 
definition subject to doubt. That is, whether or not the subject has the property specified in the 
proposition is not known by both ordinary people and the learned alike, and it must be 
established using a proof. Hence the need for a proof always applies to the subject of a 
proposition but never to the example. 
The term used to name the eighth futile rejoinder siidhya-sama (equivalence in the need 
for a proof) was previously used in the Nyiiya Siitra to name a fallacious reason, i.e. one 
where the reason is similar to the proposition to be proved (described above). The fault in this 
type of fallacious reason is described as one where the reason does not apply to the subject 
which is different from the way the eighth futile rejoinder is described. Sastri claims that the 
use of the same term to name both a fallacious reason in the first chapter and a futile rejoinder 
in the fifth chapter shows that these two chapters were written by different authors.] 
I Sastri 1905a, 247. 
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Futile rejoinders related to the reason (9-16) 
The following eight futile rejoinders are related to the reason (hetu) member in a proof. 
The author of the Nyaya Sutra claims that the reason is instrumental in establishing the 
proposition. That is, it is not merely the similarity between the example and the subject that 
establishes the proposition. Rather, it is the reason that establishes the proposition. The reason 
does this firstly by establishing the presence of the property (specified in the proposition) in 
the example, and secondly by establishing the similarity between the example and the subject. 
Thus the reason is instrumental in establishing the presence of the same property in the 
subject, and in this way the reason establishes the proposition in a proof. 
The next two futile rejoinders argue against this view on ontological grounds. These 
two futile rejoinders are called: 
9. Equivalence in convergence (prapti-sama) 
10. Equivalence in non-convergence (aprapti-sama)l 
These two futile rejoinders argue that if the reason establishes the proposition then it 
must do so either by connecting or by not connecting with the proposition. The first rejoinder 
argues against the first option and the second rejoinder argues against the second option. The 
relevance of these two rejoinders is lost when they are considered along with other refutations 
of the standard example proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being a product, like a pot' . 
It must be remembered that the Nyaya Sutra is discussing Buddhist refutations of a proof for 
the existence of the self, and explaining why such refutations are unsuccessful. The logical 
significance of most rejoinders is more easily understood when the rejoinder is applied to the 
standard example proof that sound is impermanent. But for these two rejoinders, it is best to 
return to the original proofs involving the self such as the proof found in the Upayahrdaya, 
i.e. 'the self is permanent, because of being imperceptible by the senses, like ether' , 
The Upayahrdaya describes the very same two refutations (as numbers 11 and 12) and 
names them with the same two terms. The author of the Nyaya Sutra does not mention the 
source for these two futile rejoinders but it is no doubt from a Buddhist source. The author of 
these futile rejoinders is in effect arguing that the reason in a proof with a proposition like 'the 
self is permanent' cannot successfully establish its proposition because if it did then such a 
proposition would be true. And if this proposition is true then the opponent's ontological 
I Nyiiya Sutra (5.1.7-8), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,255-259. 
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views regarding the self would be correct, i.e. the self would exist and be permanent. But, 
according to the Buddhists, the opponent's ontological views would make it impossible for 
any cause to produce an effect, and thus it would be impossible for the reason to cause the 
establishment of the proposition. Given that the process of establishing a proposition is 
possible, the opponent's ontological views must be incorrect. Since an incorrect proposition 
cannot be established, the reason cannot establish a proposition like 'the self is permanent' . 
Thus, these two rejoinders argue that the reason would fail to establish the proposition if the 
proposition were correct. 
According to the Buddhist author of these two rejoinders, those who argue that the self 
exists do so because they hold that every existent thing has an objective reality that is totally 
independent of every other thing. Thus, the reason and the proposition would be real objects 
totally independent of one another. If such a reason is to establish its proposition then it must 
do so either by connecting with the proposition in some way, or else establish the proposition 
without connecting with its proposition. 
The ninth futile rejoinder argues that if the reason establishes the proposition by 
connecting with it then the reason would become indistinguishable from the proposition. If 
the reason and proposition are completely unified then there would be no distinction between 
the reason which establishes and the proposition which is established. With no distinction 
between these two in the mind of the person who doubts the proposition, the reason could not 
function to establish the proposition for this person. 
The tenth futile rejoinder argues against the other alternative. That is, if the reason 
establishes the proposition without connecting with it then the reason and proposition would 
be completely separate from one another. But then there could be no interaction between the 
reason which establishes and the proposition which is established. Without any interaction 
between these two, the reason would fail in its function of establishing the proposition, just as 
(the light of) a lamp fails to reveal an object (in the dark) if it does not connect with the 
object. 
The Nyaya Siitra gives a separate reply to each of these rejoinders. In reply to the first 
rejoinder, the Nyaya Siitra argues that when the reason and proposition are connected it does 
not mean that they become indistinguishable from one another. For instance, the parts of a pot 
are united in a pot but this does not mean that each part merges indistinguishably with the 
other. The bowl of the pot remains distinct from the neck even though both are united within a 
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single object. Similarly, when the reason and proposition are connected they do not lose their 
individual characteristics. Thus, the reason would not lose its ability to establish the 
proposition when it is connected with the proposition. 
In reply to the second rejoinder, the Nyaya Sidra argues that when two properties are 
not connected it does not mean that they cannot interact with one another. For instance, a 
magic spell kills its victim without connecting with the victim. Similarly, when the reason and 
the proposition are not connected they nevertheless still interact with one another. Thus the 
reason does not fail to establish the proposition when it is not connected with the proposition. 
Further, if these two rejoinders were successful, then they would establish the fact that 
cause and effect are impossible. But if cause and effect are impossible then it would be 
impossible for these two rejoinders to successfully establish their cases. Thus, these two 
rejoinders are futile. The reason is the cause which produces the effect of an established 
proposition. The reason is required in a proof since there could be no establishment of the 
proposition without the reason. 
The next two futile rejoinders are: 
11. Equivalent consequence (prasaJiga-sama) 
12. Equivalent counter-example (pratidr~tanta-sama) I 
These two futile rejoinders argue that if a reason is required to establish the proposition 
by first establishing the presence of the property (specified in the proposition) in the example, 
and thereby establishing the presence of this same property in the subject, then either another 
reason would be required to establish the presence of the first reason in the example, or else 
the original reason could establish anything including the opposite of the proposition. 
The eleventh futile rejoinder argues that if a second property (specified in the reason) is 
required in order to establish the presence of the first property (specified in the proposition) in 
an object (subject), then a third property would also be required to establish the presence of 
the second property in a second object (example), and so on infinitely. That is, in the proof, 
'sound is impermanent, because of being a product, like a pot', the property 'being a product' 
is required to establish the presence of impermanence in an object like sound. But by the same 
reasoning, another property (second reason) would also be required to establish the presence 
J Nyiiya Sidra (5.1.9-11), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 259-264. 
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of being a product (first reason) in an object like a pot(example). This second reason would 
also require its own example. This would entail an infinite regress with each reason requiring 
yet another reason and its associated example which would mean that nothing would ever be 
established. Thus the original reason (being a product) does not establish the presence of the 
property (impermanence) in the original object, sound. 
The Nyaya Siitra replies to the eleventh rejoinder arguing that there is no need to have a 
second reason to establish the presence of the first reason in the example, and thus an infinite 
regress does not result. For instance, a lamp is required to see some object (in the dark), but 
there is no need for a second lamp in order to see the first lamp, since a lamp is something that 
can be seen without the aid of another. In the same way, an example is required in order to 
understand something that is not already known, i.e. the presence of a property (specified in 
the proposition) in the subject. However, a second reason is not required in order to 
understand something that is already known, i.e. the presence of the (first) reason in the 
example. This is because the example is something that both ordinary people and the learned 
alike know to be an illustration of the (first) reason. Thus, there is no need for another reason 
(and example) in order to establish the presence of the (first) reason in the (first) example. 
Thus the charge of an infinite regress is unfounded and the rejoinder is futile. 
The twelfth rejoinder argues that the reason's establishing the presence of the property 
(specified in the proposition) in the example does not mean that the reason thereby also 
establishes the presence of the same property in the subject, because if it did then 
contradictory propositions could be established. For instance, in the proof, 'sound is 
impermanent, because of being produced by effort, like a pot' , if the reason establishes 
impermanence in a pot and thereby establishes impermanence in sound, then this same reason 
could also establish the opposite proposition. That is, in the proof, 'sound is permanent, 
because of being produced by effort, like ether (in a hole dug in the ground)', the very same 
reason (being produced by effort) also establishes permanence in ether and must therefore 
also establish permanence in sound. Thus, the fact that the reason can establish the presence 
of the property (specified in the proposition) in an example does not mean that this same 
reason can also establish the presence of the same property in the subject. 
The term used to name the twelfth futile rejoinder, equivalent counter-example 
(pratidr~fanta-sama), is also found in the Upayahrdaya. It is used there to name a refutation 
(number 17) that appears to be similar to the twelfth futile rejoinder in the Nyaya Sidra. 
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The Nyaya Sidra replies to the twelfth rejoinder arguing that the counter-example proof 
presented in this rejoinder either successfully establishes its proposition or it does not. If the 
counter-example proof successfully establishes its proposition then the reason in the counter-
example proof does in fact establish the presence of the property (specified in the proposition) 
in the example and thereby establishes its proposition. This is in complete agreement with the 
view propounded by the Nyaya Sutra regarding the way a reason functions in a successful 
proof. Alternatively, if the counter-example proof does not successfully establish its 
proposition then the opponent has failed to provide any evidence to prove the Nyaya view 
incorrect. Thus, either the opponent has provided a proof that supports the Nyaya view, or the 
opponent has not provided a proof that disproves the Nyaya view. Either way the rejoinder is 
futile. 
The next two futile rejoinders are: 
13. Equivalence in non-generation (anutpatti-sama)l 
14. Equivalence in doubt (sa1J1saya-sama)2 
These two rejoinders argue that even if the reason establishes the presence of the 
property (specified in the proposition) in the example, the reason still does not establish the 
presence of the same property in the subject either because the reason simply does not apply 
to the subject, or because the reason cannot remove all doubt concerning the subject. 
The thirteenth rejoinder argues that the reason does not establish the proposition 
because it does not apply to the subject. For instance, in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, 
because of being produced by effort, like a pot', the subject (sound) comes into existence only 
after effort. Thus, before the effort that brings sound into existence, the basis for the property 
of being produced by effort does not exist. (At this time) the property of being produced by 
effort does not apply to the (non-existent) subject. Since the reason fails to apply to the 
subject, it also fails to establish the property of impermanence in the subject. Thus, the reason 
in this proof does not establish the proposition. 
The term used to name the thirteenth futile rejoinder, equivalence in non-generation 
(anutpatti-sama), is also used in the Upayahrdaya to name a refutation (number 20) that is 
described in a slightly different way to the twelfth futile rejoinder in the Nyaya Sutra. 
I Nyaya Siitra (5.1.12-13), trans. Jha ]915-19,4,264-268. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.14-15), trans. Jha 1915-]9,4,268-270. 
239 
Chapter six: Ancient Indian philosophy 
The Nyiiya Siitra replies to the thirteenth rejoinder arguing that the reason does in fact 
establish the proposition in this proof. That is, since sound is produced by effort, sound is 
sound (only) after its production. (At that time) the subject does exist and the reason, being 
produced by effort, does apply to the subject. Since the reason applies to the subject (when the 
subject exists), it does establish the presence of impermanence in sound, and thus the reason 
does establish the proposition. 
The thirteenth futile rejoinder appears to be similar to a mis-timed reason (kiiliitlta), one 
of the fallacious reasons (hetviibhiisa) discussed in the Nyiiya Siitra. Vatsyayana describes a 
mis-timed reason as one that does not apply to the subject because there is a temporal 
mismatch between the subject and the reason. When this same point is raised here as a fault, 
the author of the Nyiiya Siitra rejects it as futile, i.e. as not being a fault. 
The fourteenth rejoinder argues that the reason does not establish the proposition 
because it can never completely eliminate all doubt concerning the subject. That is, there is 
always some property that the subject shares with objects that lack the property specified in 
the proposition, and thus there is always some grounds to doubt that the subject may not have 
the property in question. For instance, in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being 
perceptible by the senses, like a pot', the reason is a property that exists in both impermanent 
and permanent objects. That is, according to the Nyaya, the sound universal exists together 
with sound. Both are objects of the auditory sense, but whereas sound is impermanent, the 
sound universal is not. Thus the reason is not able to completely eliminate all doubt 
concerning whether or not the subject is impermanent and consequently the reason is not able 
to establish the proposition. 
The term used to name the fourteenth futile rejoinder, equivalence in doubt (saf!1saya-
sarna), occurs twice in the Upiiyahrdaya. First it is used to name a refutation that is described 
in the same way as the fourteenth futile rejoinder in the Nyiiya Siitra. Secondly it is used to 
name a fallacious reason, one that is similar to the grounds for doubting the proposition. 
Caraka also uses this term to name the same type of fallacious reason. 1 
The Nyiiya Siitra replies to the fourteenth rejoinder by arguing that the reason in a 
successful proof does in fact completely eliminate all doubt concerning the subject and thus it 
is able to establish the proposition. For instance, even though a post and a man share a 
J Term 36 in Cm"aka Sa1!1hitii (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 367. 
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property like standing erect, when a distant object is seen to have a property like movement 
(walking) which not shared with a post, then all doubt as to whether or not the object in 
question is a man is completely removed. Similarly, when sound is seen to have a property 
like being produced by effort, 1 which is not shared with permanent objects, then all doubt as 
to whether or not sound is impermanent is completely removed. The fact that sound continues 
to have a property (like being perceptible by the senses) that both impermanent and 
permanent objects share does not mean that this property continues to be a cause for doubt, 
for if it did then doubt could never be completely eliminated. Since doubt can be eliminated, a 
reason is able to successfully establish the proposition. 
The next two futile rejoinders are: 
15. Equivalence in vacillation (prakaralJa-sama)2 
16. Equivalence with a fallacious reason (ahetu-sama)3 
These two rejoinders argue that even if the reason establishes the presence of the 
property (specified in the proposition) in the example, the reason still does not establish the 
presence of the same property in the subject, firstly because there is always some evidence to 
the contrary, and secondly because the reason fails to establish the proposition whether it 
exists before, after or at the same time as the proposition is established. 
The fifteenth rejoinder argues that if one reason is countered by another then neither 
reason establishes its proposition because there is always vacillation between the two. For 
instance, in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being produced by effort, like a 
pot', the reason provides evidence supporting the proposition that sound is impermanent, 
whereas in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being perceptible by the senses, like 
a pot', the reason provides evidence (both for and) against this same proposition (see previous 
futile rejoinder). The effect of the evidence supporting the proposition in the first proof is 
neutralised by the effect of the evidence against the same proposition in the second proof. 
Since there is vacillation between these two reasons, the reason (supporting the proposition) 
in the first proof is not able to successfully establish the proposition that sound is 
impermanent. 
I Note that 'being produced by effort' is not the reason in the original rejoinder, that reason was 'being 
perceptible by the senses'. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.16-17), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,270-273. 
3 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.18-20), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,273-276. 
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The term used to name the fifteenth futile rejoinder, equivalence in vacillation 
(prakaral;a-sama), is also used in the Nyiiya Sutra to name one of the fallacious reasons 
(number 3 above), although this fallacious reason is described as one that simply denies the 
contrary position rather than one where there is vacillation between two alternatives. The 
Upiiyahrdaya also uses this term to name a fallacious reason, one that is described in much 
the same way as it is described in the Nyiiya Sutra. Caraka uses the same term to name the 
first of his three fallacious reasons. 1 Caraka's description of this fallacious reason is the same 
as in the Upiiyahrdaya and they both use practically the same example. 
The Nyiiya Siitra replies to the fifteenth rejoinder arguing that the reason in a successful 
proof does establish its proposition even when there is another reason that provides some 
evidence against the same proposition. That is, the opponent who claims that there is 
vacillation between opposing reasons must accept that the reason supporting the proposition is 
as successful in providing evidence for its proposition as the reason against the same 
proposition is in providing evidence (both for and) against this same proposition. If one 
reason provided overwhelming evidence then there would be no cause for vacillation. But in 
accepting the admissibility of the reason supporting the proposition, the opponent cannot then 
consistently deny its admissibility. Thus, if the reason supporting the proposition is admissible 
then this reason does in fact successfully establish its proposition that sound is impermanent. 
This futile rejoinder is similar to the nineteenth, equivalence in evidence (upapatti-sama), 
discussed below. 
The sixteenth futile rejoinder argues that the reason in a proof with a proposition like 
'the self is permanent' cannot establish its proposition because if this proposition is true then 
the ontological theory that negates the possibility of cause and effect would also be true. This 
same point is also found in the Upiiyahrdaya (as number 10) where it is called 'equivalence in 
time' (kiila-sama). The Upiiyahrdaya also describes two other refutations along with the 
equivalence in time refutation (numbers 11 and 12). Those two refutations appear in the 
Nyiiya Sutra as futile rejoinders 9 and 10 (above). The sixteenth futile rejoinder argues that 
the reason (with an ontological status implied by the truth of the proposition) could not 
establish its proposition because there is no point in time at which such a reason could cause 
the proposition to be established. 
J Term 36 in Caraka Salphitii (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,367. 
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That is, an objectively real reason must exist either before, after or at the same time as 
the established proposition, but none of these options is possible. Firstly, if the reason existed 
before the proposition is established then at the time of establishment there would no longer 
be any reason in existence to establish the proposition. Secondly, if the reason exists after the 
proposition is established then at the time of establishment there would not yet be any reason 
in existence to establish the proposition. Finally, if the reason exists at the very same time as 
the proposition is established then, since the reason and the established proposition exist 
simultaneously, the reason could not be the cause of establishment. Thus, an objectively real 
reason does not establish the proposition. 
The Nyiiya Siitra replies to the sixteenth rejoinder arguing that the reason in a successful 
proof exists before the proposition is established. That is, establishing the presence of the 
property (specified in the proposition) in the subject, just like knowing the presence of this 
property in the subject, is caused by the reason. The reason establishes the presence of the 
property in the subject for the person who doubts the proposition and in this way causes this 
person to know that the subject has the property in question. The reason does this before the 
property has been established as being present in the subject. At that time the proposition does 
not exist as established, but it does exist as the proposition to be established. Further, if the 
opponent argues that this is impossible then the opponent's own argument against this 
position would be equally impossible since it would suffer from the same fault. If the 
opponent's reason can establish its proposition then a reason in a successful proof does in fact 
establish its proposition, and thus the refutation is futile. 
Futile rejoinders related to the subject (17-24) 
The following eight futile rejoinders are related to the subject in the proposition. The 
first of these is called: 
17. Equivalent implication (arthiipatti-sama)] 
This futile rejoinder argues that the proof, 'sound is impermanent because of being 
produced by effort, like a pot,' implies that sound is permanent, because of being intangible, 
like ether. That is, the statement that a subject has some property because of its likeness to one 
thing implies that this subject also has the another (opposite) property because of its likeness 
to another thing, even though it was not expressly stated in the original statement. 
I Nyaya Siitra (5.1.21-22), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,276-278. 
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The author of the Nyiiya Siitra replies that if the latter statement follows by implication 
from the former statement even though it is not expressly stated, then it is equally true that the 
former statement would also follow by implication from the latter statement even though it is 
not expressly stated. Since implications are not restricted to just one alternative, they are 
inconclusive. Further, the negative of a statement does not follow by implication. For 
instance, the fact that solid rocks fall downwards does not imply that something not solid like 
(liquid) water would fall upwards. Thus the rejoinder is futile. 
18. Equivalence in no difference (avise~a-sama)l 
This rejoinder is like the first futile rejoinder, equivalence in similarity (siidharmya-
sarna) (discussed above). The first futile rejoinder argued that if the example needs only to 
share a property (specified in the reason) with the subject in order to be like the subject then 
(permanent) ether would be like (impermanent) sound since ether shares the property of 
intangibility with sound. In response to this rejoinder, the author of the Nyiiya Siitra argued 
that in order for the example to be like the subject they must share an essential property, not 
just any property. 
Here in the eighteenth futile rejoinder the opponent argues that if the subject is similar 
to the example simply because it shares a property (reason) with the example, then the subject 
would be similar to everything since the subject shares the property of existence with all 
things. Thus, it follows that all things are impermanent because of existing, like a pot. 
The Nyiiya Siitra replies that in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being 
produced by effort, like a pot', the subject is known to share a property with a pot, i.e. the 
property of being produced by effort. This similarity provides the grounds to conclude that 
these two objects are similar in another respect also, i.e. in terms of being impermanent. The 
fact that two objects share the property of existence does not provide the grounds to conclude 
that these two objects are therefore similar because for two objects to be similar they must be 
similar in some respect. That is, they must share some property and not others. Similarity 
cannot be established on the basis of sharing the property of existence because there is no 
property that existent things do not possess. Thus, the proof 'all things are impermanent, 
because of being existent, like a pot' , does not establish its proposition because all things are 
not similar to a pot in any respect. If it is claimed that they are similar in terms of being 
I Nyiiya Siitra (5.1.23-24), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 278-281. 
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impermanent then, since sound is one of all things, it would follow that sound is 
impermanent. Either way the rejoinder is futile. 1 
The next futile rejoinder is: 
19. Equivalence in evidence (upapatti-sama)2 
This rejoinder is like the fifteenth futile rejoinder, equivalence in vacillation 
(prakarmJa-sama) (discussed above). The fifteenthrejoinder argued that if there are reasons 
both for and against a proposition then there would always be vacillation between the two and 
as a consequence, neither reason would establish its proposition. In response to this rejoinder, 
the author of the Nyaya Sutra argued that if the reason supporting the proposition is 
admissible then this reason does in fact successfully establish its proposition even when there 
is another reason which provides some evidence against the same proposition. 
Here in the nineteenth futile rejoinder the opponent argues that the subject in the proof, 
'sound is impermanent, because of being produced by effort, like a pot' , possesses the 
properties of being a product, which is evidence for sound being impermanent, but it also 
possesses the property of being intangible, which is evidence against sound being 
impermanent. Since the subject possesses properties that both support and count against its 
being impermanent, the proposition in this proof is not established. 
The author of the Nyaya Sutra replies that when the opponent accepted that the subject 
possesses the property which is evidence for its being impermanent then the opponent 
admitted that there are adequate grounds for the proposition to be successfully established. 
Having accepted this, the opponent cannot then deny these same grounds. If the subject 
possesses the property which is evidence for its being impermanent then this proposition is 
successfully established even though there is some evidence to the contrary. Thus the 
rejoinder is futile. 
The next futile rejoinder is called: 
20. Equivalence in apprehension (upalabdhi-sama)3 
I See also futile rejoinder 22, equivalence in impermanence (anitya-sama) below. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.25-26), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,281-283. 
3 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.27-28), trans. Jha 1915-]9,4,283-286. 
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This rejoinder argues that the subject in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of 
being produced by effort, like a pot', is not totally included in the reason. That is, some sound 
is produced by effort, but some sound is not, e.g. the sound of tree branches breaking in the 
wind is not produced by effort. Since the reason in a successful proof must apply to all of the 
subject and not to just some of the subject, the proposition in this proof is not established. 
The author of the Nyaya Sutra replies that 'produced by effort' does not mean produced 
by human effort, rather it means produced by a cause. Since all sounds are produced by 
causes, all sounds are produced by effort. Since the subject in this proof is completely 
included in the reason, the rejoinder is futile. 
The next futile rejoinder is called: 
21. Equivalence in non-apprehension (anupalabdhi-sama)l 
This futile rejoinder attempts to defend the view that sound is permanent (eternal) by 
claiming that sound exists even before it is made. The reason sound is not heard before it is 
made is because of the presence of an obstruction. The Nyaya Sutra rejects this view and 
argues instead that if an object is not apprehended (in some situation) then this object does not 
exist (in that situation). An exception is when there is no apprehension (of something) 
because of the presence of an obstruction, e.g. underground water is not apprehended due to 
the presence of an obstruction (the ground). In this situation the ground that is obstructing the 
apprehension of the water is apprehended. However, in the case of sound not being 
apprehended before it is made, there is no obstruction because if any such obstruction were 
present it would be apprehended, and there is no such apprehension (of any obstruction). 
Thus, if sound existed before it was made then it would be heard. Sound is not heard before it 
is made and there is no reason for it not to be heard. Thus, no sound exists before it is made. 
The opponent defends their view by arguing that the obstruction to apprehending sound 
before it is made does in fact exist because there is no evidence for the absence of such an 
obstruction. The evidence that the Nyaya Sutra presents, i.e. the non-apprehension of any such 
obstruction, is no evidence at all because there is no non-apprehension of an obstruction. The 
reason that the non-apprehension of an obstruction does not exist is because this non-
apprehension is itself not apprehended. Since this non-apprehension is not apprehended it 
does not exist and thus there is no evidence that the obstruction does not exist. Since there is 
1 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.29-31), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,286-290. 
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no evidence for it not existing, this obstruction must in fact exist. This obstruction is what 
prevents the apprehension of sound before it is made and thus sound exists always even 
before it is made. Therefore, sound is permanent. 
The rejoinder supporting this argument is, 'the non-apprehension of the obstruction 
does not exist, because of not being apprehended, like the horn of a rabbit'. The reasoning 
here is that if the non-apprehension of an object establishes the non-existence of that object, 
then the non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of an obstruction would establish the non-
existence of the non-apprehension of an obstruction. If the non-apprehension of an obstruction 
does not exist, then there is no evidence for the non-existence of the obstruction. 
The author of the Nyaya Siitra argues that the reason (not being apprehended) does not 
apply to this subject (the non-apprehension of the obstruction), i.e. non-apprehension does not 
apply to non-apprehension. That is, non-apprehension is the mere absence of an apprehension. 
Since this is simply the lack of an object, it is not an object of apprehension. The non-
apprehension of an object negates the existence of the object, but the non-apprehension of the 
absence of an object does not negate the absence of an object and thereby establish its 
presence. 
If not apprehending the non-apprehension (of an obstruction) could negate the existence 
of this non-apprehension (of an obstruction) then, similarly, since the non-apprehension of the 
non-apprehension (of an obstruction) is itself not apprehended, this non-apprehension would 
negate the effect of the previous non-apprehension and thereby reverse the effect of the 
previous non-apprehension, and so on endlessly. 
Thus, the rejoinder that the non-apprehension of an obstruction does not exist because it 
is not apprehended, is futile. The fact that there is no apprehension of an obstruction is known 
to the person who does not apprehend an obstruction. When an obstruction is not apprehended 
then that non-apprehension is an acceptable reason to establish the absence of the obstruction. 
But it is not acceptable to repeat this process on the absence of apprehension. 
The next futile rejoinder is called: 
22. Equivalence in impermanence (anitya-sama)l 
I Nyiiya Siitra (5.1.32-34), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 291-295. 
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This futile rejoinder raises an objection similar to the one raised in the first rejoinder, 
equivalence in similarity (sadharmya-sama), and in the eighteenth rejoinder, equivalence in 
no difference (avise~a-sama). That is, in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of being 
produced, like a pot', it is argued that the subject is established as impermanent because of its 
similarity with the example. But if this is acceptable then the proposition that all things are 
impermanent would also be established in the proof, 'all things are impermanent, because of 
being similar to a pot, like a pillar', since all things share the property of existence with a pot. 
But all things are not impermanent. Ether for example is not impermanent. Thus the original 
proof that claims to establish its proposition on the basis that the subject is similar to the 
example is not acceptable. 
The author of the Nyaya Siitra gives different reasons for why such rejoinders are futile. 
The reason in the first rejoinder is that in order for the example to be like the subject they 
must share an essential property, not just any property. The reason in the eighteenth rejoinder 
is that similarity cannot be established on the basis of sharing the property of existence. Here 
in this rejoinder the author of the Nyaya Siitra argues that if similarity is unacceptable as the 
basis upon which to conclude that the subject has the property in question then the similarity 
between the proof that the opponent wishes to reject and the proof used to show why this 
proof must be rejected would likewise be an unacceptable basis upon which to conclude that 
the original proof must be rejected. That is, the opponent relies upon similarity in order to 
prove that similarity is not to be relied upon. 
Further, it is not just similarity between the subject and the example that is relied upon 
in order to establish the proposition. That is, what provides the basis upon which to establish 
that the subject has the property in question is the fact that both the subject and example 
possess a property (specified in the reason) that is a reliable indicator of the property in the 
proposition. Since this property (being produced) is shared by the subject (sound) and the 
similar example (a pot) there is similarity involved in the proof. However, there is also 
dissimilarity involved in the proof since this property (being produced) is not shared by the 
subject (sound) and dissimilar example (ether). This dissimilarity is also used to establish the 
proposition. Thus the proposition in a proof is not established simply on the basis of 
similarity, and consequently the rejoinder is futile. 
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. The next futile rejoinder is called: 
23. Equivalence in permanence (nitya-sama)l 
This rejoinder argues that the subject in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because of 
being produced, like a pot', must be permanent (eternal). That is, if sound is impermanent 
then this property of impermanence must either be or not be in sound all of the time. If 
impermanence is in sound at all times then this property must be a permanent property of 
sound. But then sound would be permanent because if a property is ever-lasting then the thing 
to which the property belongs must also be everlasting (permanent). Alternatively, if 
impermanence is not in sound at all times, then at some time it must be absent from sound. 
But then sound would be permanent since it would lack the property of impermanence at 
some time. Either way, sound must be permanent. 
The Nyaya Sutra rejects this rejoinder as nonsensical because when the opponent argues 
that the impermanence of sound is always present in sound then the opponent has accepted 
that sound is impermanent. Alternatively, when the opponent argues that the impermanence of 
sound is sometimes present in sound then again the opponent has accepted that sound is 
impermanent. Given these admissions, the opponent's claim that sound must be permanent is 
inconsistent. Further, impermanence means destruction after production, and thus it makes no 
sense to ask whether or not sound is permanently impermanent. Thus, the rejoinder is futile. 
This debate concerns the meaning of the term impermanent and is not strictly concerned 
with logical issues that relate to proofs. 
The final futile rejoinder is called: 
24. Equivalent effect (karya-sama)2 
This futile rejoinder argues that the reason in the proof, 'sound is impermanent, because 
of being produced by effort, like a pot' , can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that 
something not previously existing is caused to come into existence, e.g. like making a pot. 
Secondly, it can mean that something previously existing is made manifest by removing some 
obstruction that was concealing it, e.g. like drawing water from a well. Since there is no way 
I Nyaya Siitra (5.1.35-36), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,295-299. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.37-38), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,299-302. 
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of knowing which of these two meanings applies in the present case, the proof does not 
successfully establish its proposition. 
The Nyaya Siitra replies that in the case of sound, the meaning of being produced by 
effort is that of something not previously existing being caused to come into existence. The 
other meaning of being produced by effort does not apply to sound because sound is not 
apprehended before it is produced, nor is any obstruction to sound's being heard apprehended 
(as described above in the equivalence in non-apprehension, number 21). Thus the rejoinder is 
futile. 
This rejoinder is concerned with the meaning of the reason and not about the 
requirements of a proof. The same term is found in the Upayahrdaya (as number 7) 
equivalent effect (karya-sama), although the type of refutation is completely different. 
At the end of the list of twenty-four futile rejoinders, the Nyaya Siitra briefly discusses 
six steps (~atpa~l) of a futile discussion (kathabhasa ).1 This type of debate is inconclusive 
and without merit? Solomon notes that the same six steps of futile discussion are also 
mentioned in the Upiiyahrdaya? Sastri claims that this short section has nothing to do with 
futile rejoinders and seems to an addition.4 
6.2.8 Points of defeat (term 16) 
The sixteenth term is point of defeat (nigraha-sthana), also translated as clincher. This 
term is discussed in two places in the Nyiiya Siitra. The first chapter contains a brief 
description of points of defeat and the fifth chapter contains a list of 22 such points. The first 
chapter describes a point of defeat as occurring whenever there is misunderstanding 
(vipratipatti) or no understanding (apratipatti) by either party in a debate.5 These points of 
defeat define the circumstances in which a debate is lost. That is, if either party commits any 
of the faults listed in the 22 points of defeat then the debate ends and victory is handed to the 
other party. 
I Nyaya SiUra (5.1.39-43), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,302-308. 
2 See VidyabhU~a1)a ]920, 81-84; Randle 1930,368-371; Warder 1971, 137; and Potter 1965-99,2,272. 
3 Solomon 1976-78,1,351. 
4 Sastri 1905a, 246. 
5 Nyaya Sidra (1.2.19), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 537-538. 
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The Nyiiya Sutra says at the end of chapter one only that there are various points of 
defeat without indicating exactly how the term should be subdivided. 1 The examples of the 22 
points of defeat listed in chapter five appear to be simply various examples rather than a 
specific example illustrating each different subdivision of points of defeat. The list of points 
of defeat is similar in this respect to the list of futile rejoinders. That is, both lists appear to be 
simply lists of examples rather than subdivisions of each term. This is in contrast to the way 
terms are subdivided in the first chapter. 
Approximately 20 points of defeat are listed in the Upiiyahrdaya. Half of these appear 
in the Nyiiya Sutra as points of defeat.2 The Caraka Sa1'(lhitii lists 15 points of defeat.3 Two 
thirds of the points of defeat listed in the Nyiiya Sutra are also found in the Caraka Sa1'(lhitii. 
Six points of defeat in the Caraka Sa1'(lhitii appear in the Nyiiya Sutra with the same name and 
described in the same way.4 Six other points of defeat in the Caraka Sa1'(lhitii are described in 
the same way in the Nyiiya Sutra, but they are given different names.s One of the terms from 
Caraka's list of points of defeat, i.e. abandoning the proposition (pratijnii-hiini), appears in 
the Nyiiya Sutra but it is described differently, and one of the terms in the list of points of 
defeat in the Nyiiya Sutra, i.e. incoherent speech (apiirthaka), appears in the Caraka Sa1'(lhitii 
with the same description but Caraka does not include this term in his list of points of defeat.6 
There are 22 points of defeat listed in the second part of chapter five. These are 
described in a number of modern publications.7 Terms that have counterparts in the Caraka 
Sa1'(lhitii and the Upiiyhrdaya are mentioned as they occur in the Nyiiya Sutra. The list is not 
divided into sections in the Nyiiya Sutra, although some commentaries arrange them into six 
groups. 
I Nyaya Siltra (1.2.20), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,538-540. 
2 Points of defeat 4,5,6,12,13,14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 in the Upiiyahrdara appear in the Nyaya Siitra as 16, 
15,8,8, 11, ]2,7, ]0, 13,3, and 4, respectively. 
3 Term 44 in Caraka SaJ!1hitii (3.8.65), trans. Sharma] 981-94, 1, 368-369. 
4 Points of defeat 8, 9, 11, 12, 14 and 15 in the Caraka Saf!1hitii appear in the Nyaya Sutra as 11, 12, 7, 13, 5 and 
6, respectively. 
5 Points of defeat], 4, 5, 6, 7 and 13 in the Caraka Saf!1hitii appear in the Nyaya Sutra as 8,4, 18, 10, 22 and 3, 
respectively. 
6 See term 33 in Caraka Saf!1hitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 365-366. 
7 See for instance: Stothert 1867-70,214-216; VidyabhU:;;alJa ]920, 84-90; Radhakrishnan, Moore ]957,377-
379; Potter, ed. 1965-99,2,272-274; Solomon ]976-78, 1,209-245; Gokhale 1992, 169-179; and Matilal1998, 
81-86. 
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These groups focus on: 
1. the members of a proof (1-5) 
2. ways of expressing information (6-9) 
3. ways of presenting the proof (10-13) 
4. answering questions (14-17) 
5. procedure of a debate (18-20) 
6. faulty reasoning (21-22) 
Points related to the members of a proof (1-5) 
The first five points focus on faults concerning the five members of a proof. 
1. Abandoning the proposition (pratijfiii-hiini)l 
To give up the original proposition by admitting that the opposite property is present in 
the (similar) example. For instance, arguing that 'sound is impermanent, because of being 
perceivable by the senses, like a pot' and then admitting (under pressure from an opponent) 
that a pot is permanent. This admission is incompatible with the original position, although it 
is not an explicit denial of the original proposition (as in number 4 below). Caraka describes 
abandoning the proposition as an explicit denial of the original proposition,2 and also lists this 
term as one of the points of defeat. 
2. Modifying the proposition (pratijfiiintara)3 
To change the original proposition by qualifying the property in the proposition. For 
instance, arguing that 'sound is impermanent, because of being perceivable by the senses, like 
a pot' and then, when an opponent points out that a universal (siimiinya) is perceivable by the 
senses and it is not impermanent, the defendant qualifies the property in the proposition in 
order to ensure that the reason is conclusive. That is, the defendant claims that a universal is 
all-pervading whereas sound is not, and thus amongst things that are not all-pervading, 'being 
perceivable by the senses' is a conclusive reason to establish that something is impermanent. 
By qualifying the property in the proposition with the property of not being all-pervading, the 
defendant has effectively modified the original proposition. This original proposition was 
I Nyiiya Sidra (5.2.2), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,533-317. 
2 Term 40 in Caraka SW!1hitii (3.8.61), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,368. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.3), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,317-319. 
252 
Chapter six: Ancient Indian philosophy 
'sound is impermanent' whereas the new proposition is 'sound is amongst things that are not 
all-pervading and is impermanent'. 
3. Contradicting the proposition (pratijiiii-virodha)! 
To present a reason that counts against the proposition. For instance, in the proof 
'substance is distinct from its qualities, because only qualities are apprehended', the reason 
counts against the proposition rather than supporting it (see number 21 below). The 
Upiiyahrdaya lists the same term as a point of defeat (number 18) and describes it in the same 
way. Caraka describes a similar term, contradictory speech (viruddha), under defective speech 
as an inconsistent statement,2 and he also lists this term as one of the points of defeat. 
4. Renouncing the proposition (pratijiiii-sannyiisa)3 
To give up the original proposition by explicitly denying that position. For instance, 
arguing that 'sound is impermanent, because of being perceivable by the senses, like a pot' 
and then (under pressure from an opponent) retracting the original position and asking: "Who 
says sound is impermanent?" The Upiiyahrdaya lists the same term as a point of defeat 
(number 19) and describes it in the same way. Caraka does not mention this term, but he 
describes abandoning the proposition (pratijiiii-hiini) (number 1 above) as the explicit denial 
of the original proposition. 
5. Modifying the reason (hetvantara)4 
To change a reason by adding a qualification. For instance, arguing that 'everything 
manifest has a single origin (prakrti), because of having a definite magnitude, like a pot' , i.e. 
just as a pot has the same magnitude (mass) as the clay from which it was made. Then, when 
an opponent points out that the reason is inconclusive because things having a definite 
magnitude can have either a single or multiple origins, the defendant qualifies the reason in 
order to ensure that it is conclusive. This new reason is 'because of having a definite 
magnitude while still having the same original substance'. Caraka describes the term 
I Nyiiya Siltra (5.2.4), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 319-321. 
2 Term 33 in Caraka Sa1!lhita (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 365-366. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.5), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,321-322. 
4 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.6), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 322-324. 
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hetvantara, not as modifying the reason, but simply as giving an incorrect reason,l and also 
lists this term as one of the points of defeat. 
Points related to expressions (6-9) 
The next four points focus on faulty ways of expressing information in a debate. 
6. Irrelevant statement (arthiintara)2 
To make a statement that is not related to the point of the debate. For instance, one party 
may attempt to change the topic and discuss an unrelated issue like the grammatical 
distinctions of the words used in the proof, thereby diverting the debate away from the point 
at issue. Caraka describes irrelevant statement in the same way,3 and also lists this term as one 
of the points of defeat. 
7. Meaningless speech (nirarthaka)4 
To use a string of syllables making no sense. For instance, reciting the letters of the 
alphabet as the reason for why sound is permanent (note number 9 below). The Upiiyahrdaya 
lists the same term as a point of defeat (number 15) but without a description. Caraka 
describes another similar term, meaningless speech (anarthaka), under defective speech as a 
string of syllables making no sense,5 and also lists this term as one of the points of defeat. 
8. Incomprehensible statement (avijiiiitiirthaka)6 
To say things that cannot be understood even when stated three times. This occurs when 
one party makes a statement that is not understood by the opponent or by the members of the 
audience even after it has been stated three times. For instance, the statement may be uttered 
very quickly or use words in a non-standard way. When the incomprehensible statement is 
made for the third time, it is taken to be a deliberate attempt to hide a weakness in reasoning 
(see also number 15 below). The Upiiyhrdaya lists this same fault twice in its list of points of 
defeat. It is listed once as making a statement that cannot be understood by others even though 
it has been explained three times (number 6) and again as speaking so quickly that others do 
I Term 42 in Caraka Sal!lhita (3.8.63), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,368. 
2 Nyflya Sutra (5.2.7), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,324-325. 
3 Term 43 in Caraka Sall/hila (3.8.64), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 368. 
4 Nyflya Sutra (5.2.8), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,325-326. 
5 Term 33 in Caraka Saf!1hita (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 365-366. 
6 Nyflya Siitra (5.2.9), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 326-327. 
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not understand (number 12). Caraka describes this same point as the first of his points of 
defeat, i.e. saying things that cannot be understood even if stated three times. 
9. Incoherent speech (apiirthaka)l 
To use words or phrases with no syntactic connection with one another. For instance, 
stating a list of words or phrases that are individually meaningful but collectively do not form 
a coherent statement because they lack the necessary syntactic relationship with one another. 
The difference between this term and meaningless speech (number 7 above) is that these 
words are individually meaningful whereas meaningless speech is simply syllables without 
any meaning. Caraka describes incoherence under defective speech as a disordered string of 
unrelated but otherwise meaningful words,2 but unlike the other four types of defective 
speech, he does not list incoherence as a point of defeat. 
Points related to presentation (10-13) 
The next four points focus on faults in the presentation of an argument. 
10. Mis-timed proof (apriipta-kiila)3 
To present the members of a proof in the incorrect order. The correct order for the five 
members of a proof is: proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion. When this 
order is changed the proof does not form a coherent argument. This description appears to be 
the same as one that Vatsyayana rejects when discussing mis-timed reason (kiiliitlta) (see 
above). The Upiiyahrdaya lists the same term as a point of defeat (number 16) but without a 
description. Caraka describes a similar term, delayed statement (atltakiila), as a statement 
presented after the appropriate moment for its use has elapsed,4 but does not list this as a point 
of defeat. Caraka lists another term, mis-timed statement (kiiliitlta-vacana), as a point of 
defeat but without a description. 
11. Incompleteness (nyiina i 
To omit relevant information in a debate. That is, all five members are required in a 
proof and if any member is omitted then the proof is incomplete. There is no mention here 
I Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.10), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,327-328. 
2 Term 33 in Caraka Saf!1hitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma] 981-94, 1, 365-366. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.11), trans. Jha 1915-19,4, 328-330. 
4 Term 37 in Caraka SaJ!1hitii (3.8.58), trans. Sharma] 981-94,1,367-368. 
5 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.12), trans. Jha 1915-]9,4,330-331. 
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whether both the similar and dissimilar examples are required, or whether either example 
alone is sufficient (see following point). The Upayahrdaya lists the same term as a point of 
defeat (number 13) but without a description. Caraka describes incompleteness (under 
defective speech) as omitting any of the five parts of a proof, or providing only one reason 
when many are required, l and he also lists this term as one of the points of defeat. 
12. Redundancy (adhika)2 
To include irrelevant information in a debate. This is the opposite of incompleteness. 
This occurs whenever any members of a proof are repeated. The Upayahrdaya lists the same 
tenn as a point of defeat (number 14) but without a description. Caraka describes redundancy 
(under defective speech) as including information not relevant to the debate, or even when 
relevant, repeating the same sense with different words or repeating the same words,3 and he 
also lists this tenn as one of the points of defeat. 
13. Repetition (punarukta)4 
To repeat words without reason. This occurs when the same words or meanings are 
repeated in a proof without any justification. One such justification is when the proposition is 
re-stated in the conclusion. This is not a fault since it is done for emphasis.s The Upayahrdaya 
lists the same tenn as a point of defeat (number 17) but without a description. Caraka lists this 
term as one of the points of defeat, also without a description. 
Points related to answering (14-17) 
The next four points concern faults that prevent an opponent from correctly answering 
questions in a debate. 
14. Non-restatement (ananubha~aJJa)6 
To not restate the position. It was apparently a requirement that the opponent repeat the 
position stated by the defendant at the beginning of a debate to demonstrate that the point at 
issue had been correctly understood. If the opponent is unable to do this even though the 
I Term 33 in Caraka Sm.nhitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,365-366. 
2 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.13), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 331-333. 
3 Term 33 in Caraka SmJ1hitii (3.8.54), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1,365-366. 
4 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.14-15), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 333-335. 
5 See Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.39), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 398-405. 
6 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.16), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,335-336. 
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defendant has stated the position three times and the members of the audience have 
understood it, then the opponent forfeits the debate. 
15. Failure to comprehend (ajiifina)l 
To not understand the position. This occurs when one party makes a statement that is 
understood by the members of the audience but not by the opponent even after it has been 
stated three times. If no members of the audience understand the statement then it is a case of 
incomprehensible statement (number 8 above), but if the audience understands the statement 
while the opponent does not, then it is a case of failure to comprehend. The Upfiyahrdaya lists 
this same fault as its fifth point of defeat. 
16. Lack of inspiration (apratibhfi)2 
Being unable to find a suitable reply. This occurs when the opponent cannot think of an 
appropriate reason to refute an opponent's position and simply remains silent. The 
Upfiyahrdaya describes a similar point of defeat (number 4) as the inability to answer a 
question that should be answered. 
17. Evasion (vik~epa)3 
To avoid answering. This occurs when an opponent finds some excuse to break off the 
debate, claiming for instance that urgent business calls them away. 
Points related to procedure (18-20) 
The next three points concern faults in the procedure of a debate. 
18. Conceding a charge (matfinujiifi)4 
To admit to a fault. This occurs when one party, rather than defending their own 
position against a charge, claims that their opponent also suffers from the same fault. This 
amounts to an admission that their position has the fault in question. Caraka describes a 
similar term, admission (abhyanujiifi), as conceding an opponent's position,S and he also lists 
this term as one of the points of defeat. 
1 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.17), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 337. 
2 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.18), trans.JM 1915-19, 4, 337. 
3 Nyiiya Siltra (5.2.19), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 337-338. 
4 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.20), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 338-340. 
5 Term 41 in Caraka Swnhita (3.8.62), trans. Sharma 1981-94, 1, 368. 
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19. Overlooking the censurable (paryanuyojya-upe~a1Ja)l 
This occurs when one party fails to point out that their opponent has committed an error 
that constitutes a point of defeat, i.e. a reason to lose the debate. 
20. Censuring the non-censurable (niranuyojya-anuyogai 
This occurs when one party incorrectly claims that their opponent has committed an 
error that constitutes a point of defeat, i.e. a reason to lose the debate. 
Points related to reasoning (21-22) 
The final two points concern faults in reasoning. 
21. Inconsistency (apasiddhiinta)3 
This occurs when one party accepts a position that is contrary to their own theory. This 
fault is different from contradicting the proposition (number 3 above) in that it involves a 
conflict between a particular position accepted by an opponent and the opponent's own tenets. 
Contradicting the proposition, on the other hand, occurs when the reason counts against the 
proposition in the very same proof. 
22. Fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa)4 
To use a faulty reason. The Nyiiya Sutra lists five fallacious reasons: inconclusive, 
contradictory, similar to the point at issue, similar to the proposition to be proved, and mis-
timed reason.s The use of any of these five constitutes a point of defeat. The Upiiyahrdaya 
lists eight fallacious reasons, and Caraka lists three. 6 Caraka refers to fallacious reasons as 
fallacies (ahetu) and he lists them as a the point of defeat. 
1 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.21), trans. JM 1915-19,4,340-341. 
2 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.22), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,341-342. 
3 Nyiiya Sutra (5.2.23), trans. JM 1915-19,4, 342-343. 
4 Nyaya Siitra (5.2.24), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 343-345. 
5 Nyiiya Sutra (1.2.5-9), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 496-521. 
6 Term 36 in Caraka SalJlhita (3.8.57), trans. Sharma 1981-94,1,367. 
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6.3 Early Indian logic 
6.3.1 A common system of logic 
The Nyaya Sidra describes 16 main terms, all but one of which (number 2) have 
counterparts in the Caraka Sal!lhita. The corresponding terms from the Caraka Saf!1hita are 
listed on the right with the term numbered according to its place in the list of 44 terms. 
Nyaya Sfitra 
1. means of valid cognition (pramiilJa) 
2. object of valid cognition (prameya) 
3. doubt (saf!1saya) 
4. purpose (prayojana) 
5. example (dr~tanta) 
6. theory (siddhanta) 
7. member (avayava) of a proof 
8. reasoning (tarka) 
9. decision (ninJaya) 
10. debate (vada) 
11. disputation (jalpa) 
12. wrangle (vitwJcJa) 
13. fallacious reason (hetvabhasa) 
14. equivocation (chala) 
15. futile rejoinder (jati) 
16. points of defeat (nigraha-sthana) 
Caraka Sal1lhita 
18-21. (four types listed separately) 
22. doubt (sal!lsaya) 
23. purpose (prayojana) 
12. example (dr#anta) 
16. theory (siddhanta) 
9. proof (sthapana) 
25. inquiry (jijfiasa) 
26. resolution (ryavasaya) 
1. debate (vada) 
1.1 positive debate (jalpa) 
1.2 negative debate (vitalJcJa) 
36. fallacy (ahetu) 
35. equivocation (chala) 
15. rejoinder (uttara) 
44. points of defeat (nigraha-sthana) 
Five of the terms in the Nyaya Sutra (numbers 7-9, 13 and 15) correspond to slightly 
different terms in the Caraka Sal!lhita, but their respective descriptions are similar. The four 
means of valid cognition (pramalJa) listed under the first term in the Nyaya Sutra are all 
found in the Caraka Sal!lhita as independent terms. Two terms, jalpa and vitalJcJa, have been 
translated slightly differently in the Nyaya Sutra and the Caraka Saf!1hita to reflect the 
different ways these terms are understood in each work. There are over 70 more terms 
described as the subdivisions of the 16 main terms in Nyaya Sutra. Approximately half of 
these are found in the Caraka Sal!lhita, often with similar descriptions, although not always 
classified in exactly the same ways. 
Caraka appears to have taken what was then the current system of logic from some 
source and adapted it to suit the training of a physician. There is no evidence that the Nyaya 
Sutra used Caraka's work as its source, but the similarities between these two works indicate 
that the Nyaya Sutra is describing the same tradition as that found in the Caraka Sal!lhita. 
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Further, the similarities between the Upayahrdaya and the Caraka Saf!lhitii make it clear that 
all three works follow the very same tradition of logic and debate. They all use similar 
terminology that is generally described in similar ways. Many of the refutations of a faulty 
proof presented in the Upiiyahrdaya have been answered in the Nyiiya Sidra in its discussion 
on futile rejoinders. Given this fact, as well as the relative degree of organisation in each 
work, the probable chronological order of these three works is first the Caraka Saf!lhitii, 
followed by the Upiiyahrdaya and then the Nyiiya Siitra last. Each author follows a different 
philosophical tradition, but their respective descriptions of logical terminology employed in 
debate are mostly the same. 
6.3.2 Origin of the five-part proof 
The system of logic found in the Caraka Saf!lhitii, the Upiiyahrdaya and the Nyiiya 
Siitra is closely connected with the ancient Indian tradition of debate. This tradition has a long 
history, one that stretches back to a period well before the Greeks first came to India.] 
Evidence for this is found in the (early) Upani/fads that pre-date Buddhism. Early Buddhist 
works preserved in the P~ili Canon provide evidence for the continuation of this tradition of 
debate during the time of the Buddha. Other Buddhist works like the Kathiivatthu and the 
Vijiiiinakiiya contain examples of the use of debate in the days after Greeks first arrived in 
India, but with no apparent influence from the Greeks. 
The ancient system of debate used arguments with ten steps which were later reduced to 
five. The five-membered proof is often compared with the Greek syllogism. Vidyabhu~al).a 
argues that it actually came from Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric: 
The work of Aristotle of which we find a trace in this period is the Art of Rhetoric, which 
was evidently a favourite subject of study among the Indian Greeks, and from which the 
syllogism of five members as illustrated in the Caraka-sal11hita, referred to above, seems 
to have been derived.2 
Vidyabhu~al).a's claim that Indian logic was influenced by the Greeks calls for a three-
staged entry of Aristotle's logic into India. According to McEvilley, the model proposed by 
Vidyabhu~al).a is incorrect, but perhaps the best that could be offered: 
To account for this development Vidyabhusana suggested a staged entry of Greek logic 
into India. First, he suggested, c.175-30 B.C., a few passages of Aristotle's Rhetoric 
J Jayatilleke 1963,43-46; and McEvilley 2002, 408-409. 
2 VidyabhU~aDa 1918,486; repro VidyabhU~aDa 1920,511-512. 
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arrived, passages conveying the basic idea of inference but without its formal exposition. 
A century or two later, the Prior Analytics was absorbed into the Indian tradition, and 
several centuries later still, the Posterior Analytics. Given the great differences between 
the Aristotelian and Naiyayika syllogisms, this unwieldy model was perhaps the best that 
could be offered. 1 
The more likely source of influence, according to McEvilley, is the Epicurean system of 
logic rather than the Peripatetic syllogism: 
There were Stoic and Epicurean teachers active in Afghanistan and quite possibly in 
northwest India also. The Epicureans especially disseminated their message with a 
missionary fervor and believed that it was their duty to teach the "barbarians." And the 
central point is that the very quality that differentiates Naiyayika logic from Peripatetic 
renders it similar-indeed nearly identical-to the Epicurean and other Hellenistic varieties . 
... The general philosophical frameworks of the Epicurean and Naiyayika logics are 
identical.2 
Epicureanism was one of the three leading Greek philosophies of the Hellenistic age. 
The school was founded by Epicurus of Samos (341-271 BC). A library containing over 1,800 
papyrus scrolls was discovered in the remains of a villa at Herculaneum in the Bay of Naples, 
southern Italy. These scrolls had been carbonised and buried by an eruption ofMt Vesuvius in 
79 AD that destroyed the ancient city of Herculaneum.3 Amongst these scrolls is a work by 
Philodemus of Gadara (c. II 0-c.40 BC) entitled On Signs (De Signis).4 Philodemus was born 
in Gadara, Syria, and died in Italy. He studied in Athens under Zeno of Sidon who was at the 
time the head of the Epicurean school. On Signs is essentially a transcript of the lectures 
Philodemus heard from Zeno in Athens. This work is the main source for Epicurean logic. 
The main topic of On Signs is a controversy between the Stoics and Epicureans over the 
validity of inference. Both Stoic and Epicurean logic is centred around the hypothetical 
proposition. The Stoics claim that such propositions are sound unless the antecedent is true 
and the consequent false, whereas the Epicureans claim that these propositions are validated 
by induction based on experience.5 If these views on inference are to be compared with the 
Nyaya Siitra then they should be compared with inference in the Nyaya Siitra and not with the 
five-part proof. The Nyaya Siitra does not make an association between the five-part proof 
I McEvilley 2002,510. See VidyabhU~a:t;la 1918,486-487; repr. VidyabhU~a:t;la 1920, 511-512. 
2 McEviIley 2002, 5] 2. 
3 De Lacy, De Lacy ]978, 145-]55; and Erler 1998. 
4 Trans. De Lacy, De Lacy 1978,9]-131. 
5 See De Lacy ]938. 
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and inference.! Inference (anumiina) is described separately as one of the means of valid 
cognition (pramiiIJa),2 and it does not involve hypothetical propositions. 
McEvilley goes on to claim that the description of the five-part proof in the "syllogistic 
sections" of the Nyiiya Siitra is completely without precedent in the Indian tradition: 
But for the syllogistic sections there is no identifiable source anywhere in the Indian 
tradition. Only one known source in the world could have provided the input at the time, 
and that very source is known to have been abundantly present in India during the period 
• . 3 
In questIOn. 
The source that McEvilley claims was abundantly present in India during the period in 
question is Epicurean logic. McEvilley has overlooked the Indian sources for the five-part 
proof in Nyiiya Siitra. These are the Caraka Sarrzhitii which describes not only the five-part 
proof but also the five epistemic terms that together made up the original ten members. 
Vatsyayana in his commentary on the Nyiiya Siitra also explains that the ancient Indian 
logicians accepted all ten as members of the proof. Further, Bhadrabahu describes another 
ten-part proof, and yet another version of a ten-part argument is found in the Kathiivatthu. 
Added to this is the fact that there is no mention of anything like the five-part proof in 
the works by Philodemus. In fact, there is no mention of a five-part proof in any extant Greek 
work, a point that McEvilley himself concedes.4 In spite of the fact that the Indian tradition 
possesses identifiable sources for the origin of the five-part proof and the Greek tradition 
possesses none whatsoever, McEvilley continues to maintain that the ancient Indian logicians 
relied on imported Greek material rather than their own tradition to form the five-part proof: 
The new method of argumentation was adapted to the local style by means of the five-
membered syllogism based in part on the ten-limbed debating procedure and in part on 
the imported materials. The Naiyayika, in other words, may have tamed the Hellenistic 
syllogism into assimilable form by rendering it superficially similar to the inherited forms 
of debate.5 
Further, the very argument that McEvilley uses to support the claim that the Indian five-
membered proof resulted from outside influence, i.e. the complete lack of any developmental 
stages, is in fact used rather selectively by McEvilley. Not only does this reason not apply in 
I Randle 1930, 164. 
2 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.5), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,153-196. 
3 McEvilley 2002, 515. 
4 McEvilley 2002, SIS. 
5 McEvilley 2002, 516. 
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the case of the Indians, but it actually applies in the case of the Greeks. That is, the 
Aristotelian syllogism appears without any developmental stages, a point that Randle makes: 
The Western syllogism has the appearance of having sprung all at once into existence, 
from the head of Aristotle, clad in complete mail. It has about it no marks of the labour of 
thought which brought it to birth, and seems more like a work of art than an organism 
with an evolution behind it. The Indian 'syllogism', on the other hand, is an organism 
with its history plainly recorded in its structure: an untidy organism, too, with vestigial 
structures and rudimentary organs which are changing their functions while preserving 
more or less of their primitive form. J 
In the case of the Aristotelian syllogism, the complete absence of any developmental 
stages in the Greek tradition is not considered by McEvilley as proof of outside influence, but 
in the case of the five-membered proof described in the Nyaya Siitra, he claims that an 
absence of developmental stages in the Indian tradition is proof of outside influence. Further, 
his reason does not apply to the five-membered proof since there are prior developmental 
stages for the five-membered proof in the Indian logical tradition. 
McEvilley uses the same argument, i.e. the complete absence of any developmental 
stages, to argue for a Greek origin of not only the Nyaya system of proofs, but also for a 
Greek origin of the system of Buddhist dialectics used in the Madhyamika school: 
It is more than plausible that both the Nyaya-Vaise~ika and its classical adversary, the 
Madhyamika school, were responding to stimulus from Hellenistic Greek schools, 
especially in the development of their methods. Both the systematic dialectical reductio 
ad absurdum and the logic of the syllogism probably arose at least in part from western 
sources, and the conflict between them which enlivened Indian philosophical discourse 
for several centuries may reflect a similar, somewhat earlier moment of the Greco-Roman 
milieu. 2 
The system of Buddhist dialectics found in the Madhyamika school is the subject of the 
following chapter. 
J Randle 1924, 398. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 514-515. 
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Introduction 
The term Buddhist dialectics refers to the second of the two types of logic used in 
ancient India. The first type of logic, described in the Nyaya Siitra, focused on establishing 
matters of fact using structured proofs governed by rules. The second type of logic focuses on 
refuting matters of fact using a system of dialectics that employs consequences (prasmiga). 
The most well-known representative of the second type of logic is Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna is 
known as the founder of a Buddhist school of thought called the Madhyamika (Middle Way). 
McEvilley claims that Nagarjuna's system of dialectics has a Greek origin: 
After Alexander's colonization of northwest India a five-hundred-year-Iong period of 
Greek and Indian cultural intermixing took place. Toward the end of this period, the array 
of Greek dialectical forms turns up in India, mature, complete, and without evidence of 
developmental stages, in the school of Buddhist thought called Madhyamika.! 
McEvilley's main reason for claiming that Buddhist dialectics has a Greek origin is that 
it appears in Nagarjuna's works complete and without any prior developmental stages. The 
Greeks were in India for some centuries, as McEviIIey says, and thus the opportunity for them 
to influence Nagarjuna's views certainly existed. However, contrary to what McEvilIey 
claims, there is no evidence of any foreign influence to be found in Nagarjuna's works.2 
This chapter describes Nagarjuna's system of dialectics and shows that Buddhist 
dialectics did have developmental stages within the Indian philosophical tradition. This 
removes the need to invoke Greek influence in order to account for the advent of Buddhist 
dialectics in India. These developmental stages are found in the same works that provided 
evidence of developmental stages for the first type of logic. 
7.1 Nagarjuna 
Nagarjuna is one of the most well-known of Indian Buddhists. However, for someone 
so well-known, relatively little is known about him for certain. Modern scholarship does not 
agree on exactly where in India and at what time he lived, nor which of the many works 
I McEvilley 2002,416. 
2 Aryadeva, Nagarjuna's student and contemporary, mentions the days of the week which indicates Greek 
influence, see Jacobi 1911,2 note 1; and Keith 1921,22-23. 
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attributed to him are genuine. NagaIjuna is surrounded by so much uncertainty that Walleser 
felt compelled to declare that "we cannot even positively say that he has really existed."l 
The name Nagarjuna is used here to refer to the person who wrote the famous Mula 
Madhyamaka Karika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way).2 He is also associated with 
the Prajl1aparamita Sutras (Perfection of Wisdom Aphorisms)3 and is traditionally considered 
to be the founder of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Buddhist philosophy. Much of 
what is known about Nagarjuna' s life comes from traditional biographies preserved in Tibetan 
and Chinese.4 According to the traditional sources, NagaIjuna came from the south of India 
and was associated with Nagarjunakot;lQa (hill ofNagarjuna) in the Andhra country, not far 
from AmaravatI.5 This view has received some support from archaeological discoveries made 
at Nagarjunakot;lQa.6 
Nagarjuna was the friend of a Satavahana king who built a monastery for NagaIjuna at 
Bhramaragiri (SrIparvata).7 Nagarjuna wrote two works for a monarch, the Ratnavall 
(Precious Garland)8 and the Suhrllekha (Letter to a Friend),9 the presumption being that both 
works were for this same king.1O According to the Tibetan tradition, Nagarjuna's Ratnavall 
and Suhrllekha were both written for a king whose Tibetan name is Bde spyod. 11 The name 
"Bde spyod" has been reconstructed in Sanskrit as "Udayana" in the translation of the Chos 
I Walleser 1923,424. See also Watters 1904-05, 203; and Ramanan 1966, 25. For an extensive list of modern 
sources regarding the life ofNagarjuna see Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IB, 475-476 note 213. 
2 Tib. Dbu ma tsa ba 'i tshig Ie 'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba. Tohoku: 3824. Peking: 5224. Trans. Streng 1967, 
183-220; Inada 1970, 35-171; Kalupahana 1986, 99-391; and Garfield 1995, 1-83. See also Sprung 1979. 
3 Surveyed in Conze 1960. 
4 Meulenbe1d 1999-2000, lA, 368, lists many of the traditional sources for the life of Nagarjuna found in Tibetan 
and Chinese 
5 Conze 1960, 1-2. Ichimura 1992, 9, argues that Nagarjuna did not come from south India, but came from 
Vidarbha (Vedalf), an area 200 miles northeast of Bombay. 
6 Yiin-hua 1970, 139 note 1, lists the useful publications on archaeological discoveries at Nagarjunako1J<Ja. 
7 Chattopadhyaya 1970, 384; and Ramanan 1966, 27. 
8 Tib. Rgya/ po La gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba. Tohoku: 4158. Peking: 5658. Trans. Hopkins, Lati 
Rimpoche 1975; and Hopkins 1998. Mitta11984, 69, notes another translation in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, 1934,307-325; and 1936, 237-252,423-435. Summarised in Potter ed. 1965-99,8,153-161; and in 
Lindtner 1986, 292-297. Vetter 1992 questions the authenticity of this work. 
9 Tib. Bshes pa'i spring yig. Tohoku: 4182, 4496. Peking: 5409,5682. Trans. Wenzel 1886; Excell, et al. 1966, 
15-44; Beyer 1974,10-18; Kawamura 1975, 1-93; and Jamspal, et al. 1978. Winternitz 1933,2,347 note 3 
mentions another translation by S. Beal1887 Indian Antiquary, 16, 169 ff.; and Takakusu 1896, 158 note 4 also 
mentions a translation by S. Bea11892, Luzac & Co. Summarised in Potter ed. 1965-99,8, 163-176; Lindtner 
1982, 218-227; and Lindtner 1986,298-304. Dietz 1983 questions the authenticity of this work. 
10 Sastri 1955,201. 
11 Ruegg 1982, 506. 
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'byung (Religious History/ by Taranatha (1575-1634),2 as well as in the translation of the 
Chos 'byung (Religious Historyi by Bu ston (1290-1364),4 and as "Sucarita" in the 
translation of the dPag bsam !jon bzang (The Excellent Wish Fulfilling Tree)5 by Sum pa 
mkhan po Ye shes dpal 'byor (1704-1788).6 According to de Jong, "Bde spyod" corresponds 
to "Satavahana". 7 This is supported by Takakusu, who discusses the identity of this king at 
length.8 Kawamura points out that "Satavahana" is not the name of a particular king, but the 
name of a family of Andhra kings founded by Simuka.9 Robinson, following Lamotte, says 
that the Suhrllekha is dedicated to one of the Satavahana kings, possibly YajiiasrL lO Ramanan 
suggests that this king was Gautamlputra Satakall)I who ruled for 24 years, either 80-104 AD 
or 106-130 AD.II According to Ichimura, Nagarjuna may well have written the Suhrllekha for 
Gautamlputra Satakall)I (100-130 AD) or for his successor Vasi~thlputra Pulumayi (130-159 
AD), but he wrote the Ratniivallfor Rudradaman (130-155 AD), the great Satrap of 
UjjayinI.I2 Ruegg lists the names of four kings that have been suggested as the recipients of 
Nagaljuna's two works.13 
The traditional biographies in Tibetan claim that Nagarjuna had a very long life. The 
Chos 'byung by Bu ston,I4 the Deb ther sngon po (Blue Annals)I5 by 'Gos lo-tsa-ba gzhon nu 
1 Complete title is: Dam pa'i chos rin po che 'phags pa'i yul duji Itar dar ba'i tshul gsal ston dgos 'dod kun 
'byung. Trans. Chattopadhyaya 1970. Nagarjuna's biography is described 106-119 and 383-385. See Schiefner 
1927 for another translation. 
2 Chattopadhyaya 1970, 109, cf. 9 (and note 22) where it is rendered as UdayI and Uttrayana. Udayana has also 
been used in the translation of Taranatha's Bka' babs bdun Idan (Seven Instruction Lineages), see Templeman 
1983,7. 
3 Complete title is: bDe bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod. 
Trans. Obermiller 1931-32. Nagarjuna's biography is described 2, 122-130. 
4 Obermiller 1931-32, 2,167. 
5 Complete title is: 'Phags yul rgya nag chen po bad dang sag yui du dam pa'i chos 'byung tshul dpag bsam ljOll 
bzang. The part containing Nagarjuna's biography is translated in Pathak 1954. 
6 Pathak 1954, 94. 
7 de long 1978a, 137. 
8 Takakusu 1896, 159, also note 1,159-160. See also Kawamura 1975,4 note 2. 
9 Kawamura 1975,4 note 2. 
10 Robinson 1967, 24. 
11 Ramanan 1966, 28. Cf. Winternitz 1933,2,348. 
12Ichimura 1992,9. 
13 Ruegg 1982,506. See also Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IB, 477 note 223. 
14 Obermiller 1931-32, 2,127. 
15 Trans. Roerich 1949. Nagarjuna's biography is described 34-35. 
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dpal (1392-1481),1 and the Grub mtha' shel gyi me long (Crystal Mirror of Tenets)2 by Thu'u-
bkwan blo bzang chos kyi nyi rna (1737-1802),3 all say that Nagajruna lived for 600 years. 
Taranatha claims in his Chos 'byung that Nagarjuna lived for either 530 or 571 years,4 and in 
the dPag bsam [jon bzang, Nagarjuna is said to have lived for either 541 or 583 years.s 
According to Walleser, the Tibetan sources report that Nagarjuna "lived 71 years less than 
600 years of the duration of each of half a year.,,6 
A biography of Nagarjuna written in the first half of the 4th century AD was translated 
into Chinese by KumarajIva in about 405 AD.7 Its account of Nagarjuna's life is discussed by 
Walleser, Winternitz, and Robinson.8 The Chinese pilgrim Hstian-tsang (629-645 AD), who 
visited Indian in the seventh century, says that Nagarjuna had the secret of long life and had 
attained an age of several centuries.9 Hiuen-tsiang also says that Nagarjuna was a 
contemporary of Asvagho~a, 10 who was in turn a contemporary of Kani~ka. Another Chinese 
pilgrim, I-tsing (671-695 AD), also visited Indian in the seventh century and he makes a 
similar association between Nagarjuna and Asvagho~a.11 Takakusu also claims that Nagarjuna 
was a contemporary of Kani~ka.12 However, it is difficult to determine the value of these 
claims when determining Nagatjuna's dates because Kani~ka's dates are very uncertain, and 
because there was more than one Kani~ka.13 According to Ytin-hua, both Chinese and Korean 
works testify to Nagatjuna living for 700 years. 14 
There is some speculation that the claims that Nagarjuna lived for some hundreds of 
years may have come about because of prophecies regarding Nagarjuna. Such prophecies are 
1 Roerich 1949,34. 
2 Complete title is: Grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long. Partial 
translation in Mitta11984. Nagarjuna's biography is described 38-41. 
3 Mittal 1984, 40. 
4 Chattopadhyaya 1970, 110. 
s Pathak 1954,94. 
6 WaJleser 1923,430. 
7 Lung shu p'u sa ch'uan. Taish6: 2047. Nanjio: 1461. 
8 WaJleser 1923,443-448. Winternitz 1933,2,342-343. Robinson 1967,21-22. 
9 Beal 1884,2,212; and Watters 1904-05,2,201. 
10 Bea11884, 2, 302-303; and Watters 1904-05, 1,245. 
II Trans. Takakusu 1896, 181. 
12 Takakusu 1896, lix. 
13 Sastri 1955, 198; Ramanan 1966,28-30; and Ruegg 1982,506. 
14 Ytin-hua 1970, 149. 
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found in the La1ikiivatiira Sutra (Descent into Lanka), l and other works.2 Dutt explains that 
the origin of the stories about Nagarjuna's long life arose out of confusion about two separate 
individuals who lived some centuries apart. According to this view, there were in fact two 
Nagarjunas, an earlier one who wrote the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika and a later one who was 
a siddha (tantric practitioner). Dutt says: "Taranatha linked up the life-span of the first 
Nagarjuna with that of the last, and as the belief in the capacity to prolong life through Tantrik 
methods was then current, he did not think it absurd in any way that a person would live for 
about 600 years.,,3 Similarly, Joshi explains: "These Tibetan authorities have hopelessly 
mixed together, not only history and legends, but also the information belonging to different 
persons of the same name, who flourished in different epochs.,,4 Ruegg also accepts that in 
order to bridge the long period of time that separates NagaIjuna the author of the Mula 
Madhyamaka Kiirika and the siddha Nagarjuna (pada), a single Nagarjuna was ascribed an 
unusually long lifespan of 600 years.s The second of these two Nagarjunas mentioned here is 
presumably the Nagarjuna described in various histories of Indian siddhas.6 
Exactly how many historical figures there were in India with the name Nagarjuna 
remains unclear. Opinions range from none at all, up to five or more different individuals. 
Walleser alone questions the very existence of Nagarjuna.7 The traditional accounts preserved 
in Tibetan and Chinese describe one Nagarjuna. Yiin-hua and Mabbett both accept that there 
was in fact only one NagaIjuna. He was the author of the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika and the 
founder of Madhyamaka philosophy. Yiin-hua argues that numerous works and incredible 
stories were later attributed to this one individual so making him the person of legend.8 
1 Tib. 'Phags pa lang kar gshegs pa'i theg pa chen po'i mdo. Tohoku: 0107. Peking: 0775. Trans. Suzuki ]932, 
see 239-240. See also Suzuki 1930,23-24; Obermiller 1931-32, 2, ]29-130; and Robinson 1967,24. 
2 Prophecies regarding Nagarjuna from Tibetan sources are described in Hopkins] 998,9-21; and those found in 
various languages are discussed by Mabbett 1998, 335-338. 
3 Dutt 1931, 638. 
4 Joshi 1965, 14-15. 
5 Ruegg 1982,512. 
6 See Caturaslti-siddha-pravrtti (History of the Eight-four Siddas) Tib. Grub thob brgyad cu rtsa bzhi'i 10 rgyus, 
Peking: 5091, by Abhayadatta (lIth or early 12th century), trans. Robinson 1979,75-80; and Dowman 1985, 
112-117. Also in Bka' babs bdun Idan (Seven Instruction Lineages) by Taranatha, trans. Datta 1944,4-7; and 
Templeman 1983, 4-8. 
7 Walleser 1923,421 and 424. 
8 Y un-hua 1970, ] 52. 
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Mabbett claims that the fame of the original Nagarjuna inspired others to adopt his name and 
in this way the legend regarding the original person developed over the centuries.1 
Those who maintain that there were two Nagarjunas claim that the original Nagatjuna 
was the Madhyamaka philosopher, and he was followed by another later Nagatjuna who was 
a siddha or tantric practitioner (described above). These two individuals were separated by 
some centuries and they have somehow become confused as one person in the traditional 
accounts and hence the claim that Nagatjuna had an extremely long life. 2 
According to Joshi, Tucci maintained that there were not two, but three Nagarjunas. 
These three are the two above plus a later one who was an alchemist.3 
Those who claim there were four Nagatjunas accept the former three, i.e. a philosopher, 
a siddha, and an alchemist, and then add a fourth, Nagarjuna the physician.4 Nagarjuna the 
physician, or Susruta the younger, redacted the Ayurvedic medical work entitled Susruta 
SaYf1hitii (Susruta's Compendium) and added a final section to it called Uttara Tantra (Later 
Treatise).5 Meulenbeld lists over 50 medical works attributed to Nagarjuna the physician.6 
There is no agreement on the chronological order of these four Nagarjunas. Murthy's order is: 
1. the Madhyamaka philosopher (1st-2nd century AD), 2. the physician (4th-5th century AD), 
3. the tantric siddha (7th century AD), and 4. the alchemist (8th-9th century AD)? 
All these views (except W alleser' s scepticism) describe the original Nagatjuna as a 
philosopher who wrote the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika and who was a friend of a Satavahana 
king. Those who maintain that there were not four but five Nagarjunas claim that the 
Nagarjuna who was a friend of a Satavahana king was different from the author of the Mula 
Madhyamaka Kiirika. According to Trikamji and Ram, the order of these five individuals is: 
1. Nagarjuna the Madhyamaka philosopher (1st century AD), 
2. Nagarjuna the friend of the Satavahana king, GautamIputra Satakal1).l (178-207 AD), 
3. the physician (5th century AD), 
1 Mabbett 1998, 343. 
2 Dutt 1931,636-637; Pathak 1954, 95; Joshi 1965, 13-14; Joshi 1967,262-263; and Ruegg 1982, 512. 
3 Joshi 1965, 13 note 4. The source is Tucci 1930, 'Animed versiones Indicae'. Journal of the Asiatic Society of 
Bombay. 26, 138 ff. 
4 Winternitz 1933,2, 343-344 note 2; and Karambelkar 1952,21-33. 
5 Trans. Bhishagratna 1998, 3, 113-646. 
6 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, lA, 365-366. 
7 Murthy 1992a, 294-296. 
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4. the siddha (8th century AD), and 
5. the alchemist (l2th century AD).1 
According to Pezzali, the order of the last two Nagatjunas is reversed: 
1. the first Madhyamaka philosopher who wrote the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika (3rd 
century AD), 
2. the second Madhyamaka philosopher who lived about 50 years later than the first, 
3. the physician (6th century AD), 
4. the alchemist (8th century AD), and 
5. the siddha (9th century AD).2 
Other scholars claim that there were up to eight different Nagatjunas.3 However, it is 
generally accepted that the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika was written by (the original) 
Nagatjuna and whatever other Nagatjunas there may have been came later in history. 
The dates proposed for (the original) Nagarjuna range over the first four centuries AD. 
Ramanan and Ichimura suggest 50-120 AD and 50-150 AD, respectively.4 Ui claims that 
Nagarjuna lived slightly later, 113-213 AD.5 Ruegg places him later again, 150-200 AD.6 A 
commonly accepted date for Nagarjuna is 150-250 AD.7 Mabbett suggests the third century 
AD,S and Vidyabhu~al).a suggests an even later date, 250-320 AD.9 
The exact number of works that were written by (the original) Nagatjuna is also the 
subject of uncertainty. There is a group of five or six works that are traditionally listed 
together because of their importance in understanding Nagatjuna's philosophical views, rather 
than being a definitive list of all of Nagarjuna' s works. 1O Robinson lists 10 works by 
Nagarjuna,ll while Winternitz and Murti both describe 13 works.12 Vaidya lists 15, and 
I Trikamji, Ram 1980, ix. 
2 Pezzali 1986, 502. 
3 Meulenbeld 1999-2000, IB, 476 note 216. 
4 Ramanan 1966, 30; and Ichimura 1992, 8. 
5 Ui 1917,43. See also Robinson 1967,22. 
6 Ruegg 1982,507. 
7 Robinson, Johnson 1970,70; Inada 1970,3; Nakamura 1980,235; and Kalupahana 1992,160. 
8 Mabbett 1998, 332. 
9 VidyabhU~aJ?a 1920,251. 
10 Obermiller 1931-32, 1,50-51; Chattopadhyaya 1970,108 and 386; and Warder 1973,78. See also Warder 
1970,519. 
II Robinson 1967, 27. 
12 Winternitz 1933,2,344-348. Murti 1955,88-91. 
270 
Chapter seven: Buddhist dialectics 
Ramanan lists 22 works.1 In the Chinese collection of translations there are 22 or 24 works 
attributed to Nagarjuna.2 Murthy reports that there are about 100 works attributed to 
Nagarjuna.3 The Tibetan collection of translations holds well over 100 works by Nagarjuna.4 
The larger numbers of works probably comes about because no distinction is made between 
any different NagaIjunas there may have been. Lindtner has attempted to determine exactly 
which of the many works associated with NagaIjuna's name are genuine. He examined 51 
works, 19 of which he considers to be beyond doubt, i.e. 13 definitely genuine and 6 
definitely spurious. Amongst the remaining 32 works, Lindtner classifies 16 as possibly 
genuine and 16 as probably not genuine.s 
Only two works are used here to analyse NagaIjuna's dialectics. These are the Vaidalya 
PrakarmJa (Commentary on the Pulverization) and the Mula Madhyamaka Karika 
(Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way). These two works are amongst those traditionally 
listed as Nagarjuna's main philosophical works and they are also included amongst the 13 
works that Lindtner considers to be definitely genuine. They are generally accepted to be by 
Nagarjuna, even by those who maintain that there was more than one NagaIjuna. 
7.2 Refutation of the Nyaya system of logic 
The first of these works, the Vaidalya PrakarmJa, is not mentioned by McEvilley in any 
of his arguments for Greek influence in Nagarjuna' s system of dialectics. In fact, McEvilley 
makes a claim that suggests he is completely unaware of the work: 
The early Madhyamika literature-the works of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva in the second or 
third centuries AD-contains a fully articulated dialectic but no hint of awareness of the 
syllogism. If the Naiyayikas already had the syllogism in hand, Nagarjuna and Aryadeva 
could not have avoided a dialectical confrontation with it.6 
I Vaidya 1960, xv. Ramanan 1966,36-37. 
2 Pezzali 1986,503 and Murti 1955,91, respectively. 
3 Murthy 1992a, 291, i.e. about 52 works under Nagarjuna the propagator of Mahayana, and about 80 under 
Nagarjuna the alchemist and Ayurvedist, see 296 note 1. 
4 According to the Tohoku Catalogue there are 122 works attributed to Nagarjuna (see Vaidya 1960, xiv and xv), 
and according to the Peking Catalogue there are] 37 works attributed to Nagarjuna (see Suzuki 1962), although 
some are duplicates. Pezzali 1986,503, claims that the Peking Catalogue attributes works 125 to Nagarjuna. 
Chattopadhyaya 1970,385, and Mitta11984, 67, both claim the Tanjurholds about 180 works attributed to 
Nagarjuna. 
5 Lindtner 1982. 
6 McEvilley 2002, 406. 
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The "syllogism" that McEvilley refers to here is the five-membered proof used by the 
Naiyayikas or followers of the Nyiiya Siitra. However, Nagarjuna gives more than a hint of an 
awareness of the five-membered proof, since he devotes 17 siitras of his Vaidalya PrakaraJJa 
to a dialectical confrontation with it. l 
The Vaidalya Prakara1Ja is a polemical work aimed at refuting the system of logic 
described in the Nyaya Siitra. The Sanskrit word used in the title, "vaidalya", means to reduce 
to small particles, as in to crush, grind or pulverize.2 There are two versions of the work, the 
Vaidalya Siitra3 and the Vaidalya PrakaraJJa. 4 The Vaidalya Siitra consists of 73 short 
aphorisms (siitras) and the Vaidalya Prakara1Ja is a commentary on those same aphorisms. 
Both versions of the work are extant in Tibetan translation only. Each version was translated 
into Tibetan by different translators and the wording in the aphorisms varies between the 
Siitra (root text) and the Prakara1Ja (commentary) versions. The work in general is referred to 
as the Vaidalya Prakara1Ja since this version contains the siitra version. Both versions of the 
work are attributed to Nagarjuna in the Tibetan tradition and this attribution is generally 
accepted by modern scholarship. Tola and Dragonetti, however, argue that "neither the Siitras 
nor the commentary of the Vaidalyaprakara1Ja were composed by Nagarjuna."s 
Nagarjuna begins the Vaidalya PrakaraJJa6 by quoting the first siitra of the Nyaya Siitra 
where the 16 logical terms are listed.7 He then spends the remainder of the work arguing that 
none of these 16 could possibly exist as they are claimed to do by the author of the Nyaya 
Siitra. Nagarjuna's refutations follow the order of the terms in the Nyaya Siitra. 
The discussion below follows a regular pattern. First, the definition of a term is 
presented as it is found in the Nyaya Siitra. There are references to the relevant siitras in the 
Nyaya Siitra and also to the relevant sections in the previous chapter of this thesis where the 
term in question is discussed. Next comes Nagarjuna' s refutation of the term. The numbers of 
the relevant sllfras in the Vaidalya PrakaraJJa are provided as a means to locate the same 
I Siitras 33-49, trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,74-81. 
2 The meaning of this word is discussed by Kajiyama 1965, 131-133. 
3 Tib. Zhib rno rnarn par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo. Tohoku: 3826; Peking: 5226. 
4 Tib. Zhib rno rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa. Tohoku: 3830; Peking: 5230. 
5 To1a, Dragonetti 1995, 15 (supported by Wayman in the Foreword). See also Bronkhorst 1985b, 126. 
6 Vaidalya Prakarmya (1), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,57. 
7 Nyaya Siitra (1.1.1), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 37-83. 
272 
Chapter seven: Buddhist dialectics 
information in the translations of the work. The Vaidalya PrakaraJJa has been translated into 
English by Tola and DragonettL1 These references facilitate a close comparison between the 
ideas in the Nyfiya Sutra and those in the Vaidalya PrakaraJJa. The Nyfiya Sutra also contains 
replies to many of Nagarjuna' s objections. They appear in chapters that were probably added 
to the original parts of the Nyfiya Sulra. These replies are also noted in the relevant places. 
The following description of Nagarjuna' s arguments against the Nyfiya Sulra forms a 
short commentary on the Vaidalya PrakaraJ}a. Tola and Dragonetti have also written a 
commentary on the Vaidalya PrakaraJ}a,2 but their commentary is more concerned with the 
meanings of the sulras rather than with just the logical points that Nagarjuna makes. The 
following discussion focuses on Nagarjuna's style of argument and contrasts it with the logic 
of the Nyfiya Sulra. This shows that NagaIjuna is familiar with the Nyaya system of logic in 
general, and with the five-part proof in particular, and it also exemplifies Nagarjuna's system 
of dialectics. The specific characteristics of this system and the question of Greek influence 
are discussed in the following section (section 7.3). 
7.2.1 Epistemology (terms 1-2) 
The first two terms in the Nyfiya Sulra are means of valid cognition (pramfi1Ja i and 
objects of valid cognition (prameya).4 The means or instruments of valid cognition are four: 
perception (pratyal~a), inference (anumfina), analogy (upamfina) and word (sabda) or verbal 
testimony. (See section 6.2.1 above.) According to the Nyfiya Sutra, these four are the ways in 
which knowledge of reality is acquired since only these four are reliable. The means of valid 
cognition therefore constitute the pre-eminent standards against which the truth of claims 
about the world can be determined. If a valid cognition cognises an object then the object in 
question is established as really existent. The term 'objects of valid cognition' refers to 
everything that exists. (See section 6.2.2 above.) The fact that objects exist as cognised 
testifies to the reliability of the four means of valid cognition. 
1 Trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,57-95. Summarised by Lindtner 1982, 88-93; Lindtner 1986, 273-278; and 
Lindtner in Potter ed. 1965-99,8, 143-149. 
2 To1a, Dragonetti 1995,99-156. 
3 Nyaya Szitra (1.1.3-8), trans. 1ha 1915-19,1,97-210. 
4 Nyaya Siitra (1.1.9-22), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 1, 210-298. 
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Refutation of epistemology (siitras 2-4) 
Nagarjuna begins the Vaidalya PrakarmJa with a refutation of the means of valid 
cognition and the objects of valid cognition.1 The view of the Nyaya Sutra is that the 
existence of an object is established (determined or proven) by its being cognised by one of 
the means of valid cognition, and the reliability of the means of valid cognition are in turn 
verified by the fact that their respective objects actually exist in the way they are cognised. 
But, argues Nagarjuna, if this is the case then both the means of valid cognition and the 
objects of valid cognition would each be determined only with reference to the other, and thus 
neither of them would be independently determined. Also, neither of these two could possibly 
validate itself, and thus there is no absolute proof of the reliability of the means of valid 
cognition, nor that the objects of valid cognition really exist as they are cognised. 
Further, if it is claimed that each of these two is established by the other then the 
establishment of either one would have to occur either when the other exists, or when the 
other does not exist, or thirdly, when the other both exists and does not exist. Firstly, one 
cannot be established when the other already exists since the other would then lack its means 
of (independent) establishment. Secondly, one cannot be established when the other does not 
exist since there would be nothing in relation to which this establishment could occur. 
Thirdly, one cannot be established when the other both does and does not exist since this 
option attracts the combined faults that each option has individually. Thus, neither the means 
of valid cognition nor the objects of valid cognition can be established by the other. 
The means of valid cognition establishes all things (sufras 5-11) 
The Naiyayika (follower of the Nyaya) argues that just as a weight (on a set of scales) is 
used to determine the weight of all other things, so too do the means of valid cognition 
establish all things. In reply, Nagarjuna argues that if everything is established by the means 
of valid cognition, then any instance of the means of valid cognition must itself be established 
either with another instance of the means of valid cognition, which entails an infinite regress 
(anavastha), or else without another instance of the means of valid cognition, which 
contradicts the original claim. Either way, concludes Nagarjuna, the means of valid cognition 
do not establish all things as the Naiyayika claims. 
1 Vaidalya PrakaraIJa (2-20), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,58-68. 
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The Naiyayika defends the Nyaya position by arguing that an instance of the means of 
valid cognition establishes both itself as well as other objects, just as a lamp illuminates both 
itself and other objects (in a dark room). Since the means of valid cognition are self-
established (svayarrzsiddha), there is no infinite regress. Nagarjuna's response to this defence 
is that the example of a lamp used by his opponent is not analogous to the point at issue 
because a lamp does not illuminate darkness. That is, in order for (the light of)l a lamp to 
illuminate or dispel darkness it must do so either by coming into contact with darkness or else 
by not coming into contact with darkness. Firstly, lamplight cannot dispel darkness through 
coming into contact with darkness since wherever there is light there is no darkness. Since 
these two can never co-exist, lamplight can never come into contact with darkness and then 
subsequently dispel that darkness. Secondly, lamplight cannot dispel darkness without coming 
into contact with darkness just as a sword cannot cut an object without coming into contact 
with that object. Either way, lamplight does not dispel darkness as claimed by the Naiyayika. 
The arguments that Nagarjuna presents here are also found in the second chapter of the 
Nyiiya Sutra. The author of the Nyiiya Sutra discusses the example of a weight used on a set 
of scales,2 the problem of infinite regress,3 and the analogy of the lamp,4 all in the same order 
as they are raised in the Vaidalya Prakarmya. This material was probably added to the original 
parts of the Nyiiya Sutra, possibly in response to arguments such as those found in the 
Vaidalya Prakarmya. However, these same ideas appear to have existed during Nagarjuna's 
time since he is referring to a real opponent in his Vaidalya Prakarmya and not simply to a 
hypothetical opponent in order to explain his own ideas. 
The debate continues in the Vaidalya Prakarmya with the Naiyayika claiming that a 
lamp dispels darkness without coming into contact with darkness, just as the planets harm 
people without coming into contact with people.s Nagarjuna rejects the analogy of harm done 
by planets because in the case of planets harming people, there are two objects involved, i.e. 
the planets and the body of the person. However, in the case of lamplight dispelling darkness 
there are not two objects involved. That is, darkness is simply the absence of light and thus 
1 A lamp and lamplight are used here synonymously. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (2.1.16), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 2, 47-61. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (2.1.17), trans. Jhi! 1915-19, 2, 61-64. 
4 Nyiiya Siitra (2.1.19), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 2, 65-71. 
5 The harmful influence of some planets or stars is a customary belief in India. 
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darkness is not an object which can be somehow driven away by lamplight. Further, argues 
Nagiiljuna, if lamplight could dispel darkness without coming into contact with darkness then 
lamplight situated in one location could dispel the darkness in some far off caves without the 
need of coming into contact with that darkness. Furthermore, lamplight cannot illuminate 
itself because there is no darkness in lamplight to be illuminated. If lamplight could illuminate 
itself then, equally, darkness whould be able to conceal itself and thus darkness would never 
be seen. Since darkness does not exist as an object that can be illuminated or dispelled by a 
lamp, the analogy of a lamp illuminating both itself and other objects does not prove that the 
means of valid cognition establishes both itself and other objects. Consequently, the means of 
valid cognition does not establish all things. 
Arguments similar to these are found in the Nyiiya Sutra. The 9th futile rejoinder, 
equivalence in convergence (priipti-sama), and the 10th, equivalence in non-convergence 
(apriipti-sama), argue that the reason cannot establish the proposition whether it connects or 
does not connect with the proposition.! The Nyiiya Siitra uses the analogy of a magic spell 
killing its victim without connecting with the victim, and Vatsyayana' s commentary uses the 
analogy of a lamp not illuminating an object unless it connects with the object. Also, in the 
11th futile rejoinder, equivalent consequence (prasanga-sama),2 the Nyiiya Sutra defends its 
position against a charge of an infinite regress with the analogy of a lamp. It explains how one 
lamp is required to see some object (in the dark), but there is no need for a second lamp in 
order to see the first, since a lamp is something that can be seen without the aid of another. 
This argument is concerned with the example, the third member of a proor,3 
Past, present and future (siitras 12-15) 
Nagarjuna's next argument against both the means and the objects of valid cognition is 
based on the three times - past, present and future. That is, the means of valid cognition 
cannot be established either before, after or at the same time as the objects of valid cognition. 
Firstly, the means of valid cognition cannot be established before the objects of valid 
cognition have come into existence because at that time there would not yet be anything in 
relation to which the means of valid cognition could be established. Secondly, the means of 
valid cognition cannot be established after the objects of valid cognition have ceased to exist 
I Nyaya Siitra (5.1.7-8), trans. 1ha 1915-19,4,255-259. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (5.1.9-] I), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 4, 259-264. 
3 Term 5 defined in Nyaya Siltra (1.1.25), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 1,301-303. 
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because at that time there would no longer be anything in relation to which the means of valid 
cognition could be established. Thirdly, the means of valid cognition cannot be established at 
the very same time as the objects of valid cognition exist because at that time the means of 
valid cognition would already exist and therefore not be in need of establishment. 
At this point in the debate, the followers of the Nyaya argue that Nagarjuna' s arguments 
also suffer from the very same fault. That is, if the means of valid cognition cannot establish 
the objects of valid cognition in any of the three times, then equally, Nagarjuna's own 
arguments cannot establish (in any of the three times) that the means of valid cognition do not 
establish the objects of valid cognition. That is, since Nagarjuna's refutation of the Nyaya 
position is equally impossible, the Nyaya position is not in fact refuted. Nagarjuna replies that 
by attempting to defend their position in this way, the followers of the Nyaya have lost the 
debate. Firstly, they have committed a point of defeat according to their own rules. The 18th 
point of defeat (nigraha-sthiina), conceding a charge (matiinujiiii) , 1 is described in the Nyiiya 
Sutra as occurring when one party attempts to defend their position by claiming that an 
opponent suffers from the same fault. Secondly, they have by this very move conceded that 
their own position has the fault in question and, having made such an admission, it is illogical 
to then claim that no such fault exists. Thus, argues Nagarjuna, their defence is unsuccessful. 
The argument based on the three times is also found in the Nyiiya Sutra. It occurs in the 
second chapter of the Nyiiya Sutra,2 where the reply is given that such arguments suffer from 
the same fault? The Nyiiya Sutra goes on to argue that the existence of the means of valid 
cognition is inferred from the objects of valid cognition, just as the existence of a musical 
instrument is inferred from the sound of a musical instrument.4 The 16th futile rejoinder, 
equivalence with a fallacious reason (ahetu-sama),5 also contains the argument based on the 
three times. 
Negative subjects (sOtra 16) 
The Naiyayika argues that Nagarjuna's denial of the means and the objects of valid 
cognition requires an object to be denied, since there can be no denial without an object. 
J Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.20), trans. Jha 1915-19,4,338-340. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (2.1.8-11), trans. Jha 1915-19,2,22-34. 
3 Nyiiya Sutra (2.1.12-14), trans. Jha 1915-19, 2, 34-44. 
4 Nyaya Sutra (2.1.15), trans. Jha 1915-19,2,44-47. 
5 Nyaya Sutra (5.1.18-20), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4, 273-276. 
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Further, this object ofdenial must exist since it is not possible to deny what does not exist. 
Thus, the objects of denial in Nagarjua's arguments, i.e. the means and the objects of valid 
cognition, must exist in order for them to be denied. NagiiIjuna rejects this defence arguing 
instead that the object negated can be the idea or concept of something, i.e. there is no need 
for the object of denial to exist. Nagarjuna's example is the denial that a river is deep, i.e. 
when it is denied that the river is deep, the object denied is the idea of a deep river. The idea 
of a deep river exists, whereas the deep river itself does not exist. 
Correct understanding (siitras 17-20) 
The Naiyayika's final argument is that the means of valid cognition exist because they 
provide the correct understanding of reality. That is, since they provide correct knowledge, 
the means of valid cognition must exist, and since the means of valid cognition exist, the 
objects of valid cognition must also exist. Nagatjuna replies that even if the means of valid 
cognition were to exist as claimed, this would not constitute proof that real external objects of 
valid cognition also exist. For instance, when there is an inference of fire on a hill from the 
perception of smoke, the object of this inference is the idea (buddhi) of fire in the mind, and it 
is the same with the perception of a pot. That is, the object of the perception of a pot is the 
idea of a pot formed in the mind and it is not possible to deduce from this idea that there is a 
real pot existing external to the mind. 
The Naiyayika defends the Nyaya position by claiming that the idea of a pot is not the 
object but the means of the valid cognition of a pot, and a real pot external to the mind is the 
object of this valid cognition. Nagarjuna' s reply is that the idea of a pot is not the means of 
the valid cognition of a pot, but only a condition for the means of the valid cognition of a pot. 
Since the idea of a pot is something known, it must be the object and not the means of valid 
cognition.! Thus, the means of valid cognition do not establish the existence of independent 
external objects of valid cognition as claimed by the Naiyayika. The Nyiiya Sutra replies to 
arguments such as these in chapter four? 
I Buddhi is listed as the fifth object of valid cognition (prameya), see Nyaya Siltra (1.1.9), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 
210-216. For synonyms of buddhi see Nyaya Siltra (1.1.15), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 265-268. 
2 Nyaya Siltra (4.2.26-37), trans. JM 1915-19,4,201-220. 
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7.2.2 Doubt (term 3) 
The third term in the Nyiiya Siitra is doubt (sa1J1saya), which is described as entertaining 
conflicting views about an object while its specific characteristics remain unknown. l (See 
section 6.2.3 above.) For instance, when a tall upright object is seen in the distance there is 
doubt as to whether the object in question is a person or a tree-trunk. Doubt exists because 
only the characteristics of being tall and upright that are common to both a person and a tree-
trunk are perceived. 
Refutation of doubt (sotras 21-23)2 
Nagarjuna argues that doubt cannot exist as claimed by the Naiyayika because it does 
not exist in any of three possible situations. First, doubt does not exist when an object's 
specific characteristics are ascertained, since there is then certainty regarding the object. 
Second, doubt does not exist when an object's specific characteristics are not ascertained, 
since there is then only the absence of knowledge regarding the object. Third, doubt does not 
exist during the time when the specific characteristics are being ascertained, since there is no 
such point at which doubt could exist. 
The Naiyayika argues in return that it is the reference to specific characteristics that 
causes doubt. For instance, movement (walking) is a characteristic specific to a person, and 
the nesting of birds is specific to a tree-trunk. With reference to these characteristics, specific 
to each object, there is doubt regarding the object in question. Nagarjuna's reply to this 
defence is that the existence of doubt has already been refuted. That is, there is either 
knowledge or the absence of knowledge, neither of which constitutes doubt. If knowledge 
exists when the specific characteristics are ascertained then there would be the lack of this 
knowledge when specific characteristics are not ascertained. Further, since it is not possible 
for both knowledge and the lack of knowledge regarding the specific characteristics to exist 
simultaneously, there can be no doubt. 
7.2.3 Purpose (term 4) 
The fourth term in the Nyiiya Siitra is purpose (prayojana), which is described as the 
object that is the aim of an action. l (See section 6.2.3 above.) 
I Nyaya SZltra (I. I .23), trans. Jha 1915-I 9, 1,299-314. See also Nyaya Siitra (2.1.1 -7), trans. Jha 1915-19,2, 1-
21. 
2 Vaidalya Prakara~1a (21-23), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,68-70. 
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Refutation of purpose (siitra 24t 
Nagatjuna quotes this definition of purpose from the Nyaya Sutra and then argues that 
purpose cannot exist as claimed. According to the Naiyayika, a pot for instance is the object 
that is the aim of a potter's actions. But, argues Nagarjuna, a pot either already exists in the 
potter's clay or it does not. If the pot already exists in the clay then the actions of the potter 
are without purpose since an already existent pot does not need to be made over again. 
Alternatively, if the pot does not exist in the clay then again there is no purpose since the 
object required for this purpose is missing. Either way, purpose does not exist. 
7.2.4 Example (term 5) 
The fifth term in the Nyaya Sutra is example (dr~tanta), which is described as 
something understood by both ordinary people and the learned alike.3 (See section 6.2.3 
above.) The Sanskrit word for example, dr~ta-anta, means literally 'an end (anta) that is seen 
(dr~ta)' . 
Refutation of example (siitras 25-31 t 
Nagarjuna argues that an end (anta) exists only relative to a beginning (adi) and a 
middle (madhyama). Since neither a beginning nor a middle are seen, there can be no end that 
is seen. Further, an example that is either the same as or differentfrom the thing exemplified 
is no example at all. That is, if the example is the same as the thing exemplified, e.g. if fire is 
an example of fire, then the exemplifier and the exemplified are without distinction. 
Alternatively, if the example is different from the thing exemplified, e.g. if water is an 
example of fire, then the exemplifier and the exemplified would be without resemblance. In 
either case there can be no such thing as an example. 
The followers of the Nyaya defend their position with the claim that something is an 
example when it is slightly similar to the thing exemplified. Nagatjuna rejects this because 
anything can be considered slightly similar in some respects to anything at all. Even things as 
dissimilar as a hair and a mountain are slightly similar to each other in terms of being existent, 
1 Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.24), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,299-301. 
2 Vaidalya PrakarmJa (24), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,71. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.25), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,301-303. 
4 Vaidalya PrakaralJa (25-31), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,71-73. 
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singular or physical things, but neither is considered to be an example of the other by both 
ordinary people and the learned alike. 
There are two types of example (dr~tiinta) or instance (udiiharalJa) described in Nyiiya 
Sutra. These are the similar instance (siidharmya-udiiharalJa) and the dissimilar instance 
(vaidharmya-udiiharalJa). The first is similar to the subject in that it shares with the subject 
the property presented in the reason, and the second is dissimilar to the subject in that it does 
not share with the subject the property presented in the reason. 1 Nagarjuna rejects both types 
of example since the same reasoning that refutes something being slightly similar to the thing 
exemplified can be used to refute something being slightly dissimilar to the thing exemplified. 
7.2.5 Theory (term 6) 
The sixth term in the Nyiiya Sutra is theory (siddhiinta), which is described as a 
philosophical doctrine.2 (See section 6.2.3 above.) The Sanskrit word for theory, siddha-anta, 
means literally 'an established (siddha) end (anta),. 
Refutation of theory (siitra 32t 
Nagarjuna uses the same argument as he used in the refutation of example (dr~ta-anta) 
above. That is, there can be no end without a beginning and middle. Since neither of these is 
established, there can be no established end (siddha-anta) or theory. 
7.2.6 Members (term 7) 
The seventh term in the Nyiiya Sutra is member (avayava). This term refers to the five 
parts of a proof: the proposition (pratijfia), reason (hetu), instance (udiiharalJa), application 
(upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana).4 (See section 6.2.3 above.) Nagarjuna first argues 
against the existence of all five members jointly, then against each of these five individually, 
and finally he rebuts the Naiyayika's defence of the members of a proof. 
I Nyaya Sijtra (1.1.36-37), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,385-396. 
2 Nyaya Sulra (1.1.26), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 303-305. SiUm 26 is slightly ambiguous. 
3 Vaidalya Prakara~1a (32), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,73-74. 
4 Nyaya Sfitra (1.1.32), trans. Jha 1915-19,1,315-319. 
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Refutation of members jointly (siitras 33-39f 
The Nyaya position is that all five members together form a complete proof. Nagarjuna 
argues that there is no single unit composed of these five members and, equally, the 
individual members of such a whole are also non-existent. The whole does not exist because it 
does not exist either one with or separate from the five individual members. Firstly, if the 
whole existed one with the five members then there would be five wholes since there are five 
members, or else there would be only one member since there is only one whole. 
Alternatively, if the whole existed separate from the five members then there would be six 
parts to a proof, the five members plus the whole. 
Further, the whole does not exist in any of the three times. That is, the whole does not 
exist either before or after the members, since there would then be a time at which the whole 
existed without any members. Also, the whole does not exist at the same time as the 
members, because the five individual members are each presented sequentially, with one 
member not beginning until the former member has been completely presented. Thus, there is 
no point in time at which all five members co-exist, and consequently, there is no point in 
time at which the whole could co-exist with all five members. 
The Naiyayika defends the Nyaya position by arguing that the whole (proof) exists in 
the collection of members. For instance, one strand of baZbaja grass cannot bind an elephant, 
but a collection of strands forms a rope that can bind an elephant. Similarly, the five members 
considered individually do not form a whole, but the collection of these five does indeed form 
a whole. But this is not so according to Nagarjuna, since the reason is at fault. That is, one of 
the fallacious reasons (hetviibhiisa) in the Nyiiya Siitra is a reason that is similar to the 
proposition to be proved (siidhya-sama).2 It is described as a reason that has not been proven 
to apply to the subject and it is similar in this respect to the proposition, i.e. both the reason 
and the proposition stand in need of a proof. The reason in the (following) proof, 'the whole 
(proof) exists, because of existing in the collection of five members', stands as much in need 
of a proof as does the proposition. Nagarjuna' s point here is that if one member lacks the 
capacity to form a whole then a collection of five members will also lack the capacity to form 
J Vaidalya PrakaralJa (33-39), trans. Tola, Dragonetti ] 995, 74-76. 
2 Nyiiya Siltra (1.2.8), trans. Jha ]915-19, 1,5]2-5]6. 
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a whole. Nagarjuna argues that if one barren woman, for instance, cannot give birth to a child 
then a thousand barren women collectively cannot do so either. 
The Naiyayika defends their position by claiming that a single strand of balbaja grass 
has the capacity to bind a butterfly, and this capacity is increased as more strands are added 
until they have, collectively, the capacity to bind an elephant. Nagarjuna replies that the 
example of a rope made from balbaja grass is not analogous to the point at issue because in 
the case of rope made from balbaja grass, all the strands co-exist, but in the case of the proof, 
the five members never co-exist. That is, each member is presented sequentially and at no 
time do all five members co-exist. These arguments concerning the existence of wholes and 
parts also occur in the Nyaya Sutra, l although they are no applied specifically to the members 
of a proof. 
Refutation of the members individually (siitras 40-43)2 
Nagarjuna next refutes each member of a proof individually. The first member of a 
proof is the proposition (pratijfla) which the Nyaya Sutra defines as 'the assertion of what is 
to be established' .3 Nagarjuna argues that if the proposition is required in order to establish 
the whole (proof) then the whole would remain unestablished until it is established by the 
proposition (and other parts). But, by the same reasoning, the proposition itself would also 
remain unestablished until it was established by its own constituent parts, and so on infinitely. 
Consequently, nothing would ever be established. Alternatively, if the proposition is self-
established without the need of its parts then it is no longer to be defined as 'the assertion of 
what is to be established'. Thus, the proposition would either not exist as something so 
defined or else it must be explained why the whole (proof) is established by its parts whereas 
the proposition is not. 
The second member of a proof is the reason (hetu), which the Nyaya Sutra defines as a 
property that establishes the proposition, i.e. it establishes that the subject has the property in 
the proposition.4 NagaIjuna has two arguments against the reason. The first argument is that 
the reason cannot establish the proposition whether it is the same as or different from the 
property in the proposition. Firstly, a reason that is the same as the property cannot establish 
I Nyaya Siltra (5.2.4-17), trans. Jha 1915-19, 4,159-181. 
2 Vaidalya PrakaralJa (40-43), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,77-78. 
3 Nyaya Siltra (1.1.33), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 320-343. 
4 Nyaya Slltra (1.1.34-35), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 343-384. 
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the proposition. For instance, a reason such as 'because of being white' cannot establish a 
proposition like 'the cloth is white' since 'being white' cannot establish 'being white'. 
Secondly, a reason that is different from the property cannot establish the proposition. For 
instance, a reason such as 'because of being black' cannot establish a proposition like 'the 
cloth is white' since 'being black' cannot establish 'being white'. Neither a reason that is the 
same as the property, nor one that is as different from the property as black is from white, 
would be an acceptable reason in the Nyaya system. Nagarjuna's point here is that there is no 
way for the Naiyayika to avoid the two extremes where the reason is either identical to or 
completely different from the property in the proposition. This argument is similar to the one 
used to refute the example (term 5 above). 
Nagatjuna's second argument against the reason is that if the reason (a property) is 
required in order to establish the presence of the another property (in the subject), then a 
second reason (property) would also be required to establish the presence of the first reason 
(in the example), and so on infinitely. Alternatively, if a second reason is not required to 
establish the presence of the original reason (in the example), then the original reason would 
also not be required to establish the presence of the original property (in the sUbject). This 
same argument occurs in the Nyaya Sutra as the 11th futile rejoinder, equivalent consequence 
(prasmiga-sama ).1 
The next member of a proof is the example. Nagarjuna does not provide an argument 
against the example at this point, since it has already been refuted (term 5 above). Also, the 
last two members, the application and conclusion, are dealt with together. The Nyaya Sutra 
describes the fourth member of a proof, the application (upanaya), as emphasising the 
similarity between the subject and the similar example, and the dissimilarity between the 
subject and the dissimilar example? The fifth member of a proof is the conclusion 
(nigamana), which the Nyaya Sutra describes as emphasising the original proposition, i.e. that 
the subject has the property in question, because of the reason provided.3 Nagarjuna's 
argument against the last two members of a proof is simply that because the application and 
conclusion depend upon the proposition, example and reason, each of which have been shown 
not to exist as claimed, neither the application nor the conclusion could exist. 
I Nyiiya Sutra (5.1.9-10), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 259-262. 
2 NyayaSutra(1.l.38), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 396-398. 
3 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.39), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 398-405. 
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Rebutting the defence (sOtras 44-49f 
Nagarjuna now replies to the N aiyayika' s defence of the existence of the proof. 
Nagatjuna argues that if it is claimed that the proposition is established because it is 
established by the reason, then the example and other remaining members of the proof would 
remain unestablished, since there is nothing with which to establish them. Further, if the 
proposition is established by the reason then the other members of the proof would not be 
required, since the purpose of the proof would have been accomplished by the reason (alone). 
Alternatively, if the proposition is established by the example, then the reason and other 
members of the proof would not be required. That is, the same problems would apply to the 
example. Thus, the members of the proof do not exist as claimed. 
The Naiyayika claims that the reason and example exist since they establish that the self 
exists in a proof like 'the self is permanent, because of not having a body, like space' .2 
Nagatjuna replies that if the self could be established by the reason and example in this proof 
then the self would not be perrnanent.3 That is, the self would not exist without being effected 
by anything in any way, since it can be established by a reason and an example. If the self can 
be effected in this way then it would be impermanent, the very opposite of the proposition in 
this proof. Thus, the self does not exist by its own nature, and similarly, the example and 
reason also do not exist by their own nature. 
Further, the members of a proof are always presented one at a time. Thus, when the 
proposition is being presented, the reason and other members of the proof do not exist. 
Similarly, when the reason is being presented, the proposition and other members of the proof 
do not exist. Consequently, the members of the proof never co-exist and therefore they do not 
exist as claimed by the Naiyayika. The Naiyayika argues in return that Nagarjuna must except 
the existence of the proposition because in claiming that the members of a proof do not exist, 
Nagatjuna has in fact asserted a proposition. Nagarjuna rejects this defence arguing that the 
very same analysis that was made with the whole (proof) also applies to a part (proposition). 
That is, the whole proof does not exist anywhere amongst its five members, and similarly, the 
proposition does not exist anywhere amongst its parts (syllables). Each syllable is always only 
expressed one at a time, and thus the proposition does not exist as claimed by the Naiyayika. 
I Vaidalya PrakarmJa (44-49), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,79-81. 
2 The Nyaya Siitra argues for the existence of the self in general (3.1.1-17), trans. Jha 1915-19, 3, 1-86, and that 
the self is permanent in particular (3.1.18-26), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 3, 86-106. 
3 Nagarjuna seems to understand impermanent here not as momentary but as dependent. 
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7.2.7 Reasoning (term 8) 
The eighth term in the Nyiiya Siitra is reasoning (tarka), which is described as 
deliberating on the evidence to determine the real nature of an object when it is not known.] 
(See section 6.2.3 above.) Reasoning differs from doubt in that doubt entertains two 
alternatives together whereas reasoning assumes one alternative and then the other in order to 
eliminate one alternative. 
Refutation of reasoning (sDtra sot 
Nagarjuna's refutation of reasoning is similar to his refutation of doubt (term 3 above). 
That is, reasoning cannot exist as claimed by the Naiyayika because it does not exist in either 
of the two following situations. First, reasoning does not exist when an object is known, since 
there is then certain knowledge regarding this object. Second, reasoning does not exist when 
an object is not known, since there is then only the absence of knowledge regarding this 
object. Since there is no third alternative, reasoning cannot exist as claimed by the Naiyayika. 
7.2.8 Decision (term 9) 
The ninth term in the Nyiiya Siitra is decision (ninyaya), which is described as the 
determination of the real nature of an object which was originally in doubt. 3 (See section 6.2.3 
above.) 
Refutation of decision (siitra 51)4 
Nagarjuna argues that decision does not exist as claimed because there can be no 
determination of the real nature of an object. That is, in order to determine that an object like 
a pot exists, is round, is red, and so forth, then the object in question (the pot) must in fact be 
existent, round, and red, etc. But for this to be the case, a pot would have to be either one with 
or separate from these attributes of existence, roundness, and redness, etc. If a pot is one with 
its attributes then it would be impossible to distinguish between a pot and its existence, 
roundness, or redness, etc. Alternatively, if a pot is separate from its attributes then the pot 
itself would be separate from, and therefore would not be, existent, round, or red, etc. 
I Nyaya Siitra (1.1.40), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,405-417. 
2 Vaidalya PrakarmJa (50), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995, 81. 
3 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.41), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,417-428. 
4 Vaidalya PrakaralJa (51), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995, 81-82. 
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The Naiyayika defends the Nyaya position by arguing that a pot possesses its attributes 
of existence. roundness, redness, and so forth, and consequently a pot does exist and is round, 
red, etc. Thus, it is possible to determine the real nature of an object through the attributes that 
it possesses, and consequently decision does exist. Nagarjuna rejects this defence arguing that 
an object does not become what it possesses, just as a tree does not become the branch that it 
possesses. Since it is not possible to determine the real nature of an object whether it is one 
with or separate from its attributes, and since there is no third alternative, decision does not 
exist as claimed by the Naiyayika. 
7.2.9 Debate (term 10) 
The tenth term in the Nyiiya Siitra is debate (viida), which is described as a discussion 
where each party adopts the opposite position on some issue and presents their position using 
the five-membered proof. Each party then supports their own position and refutes that of their 
opponent using legitimate means, i.e. valid cognition (pramii1Ja) and reasoning (tarka), 
without contradicting their respective tenets. l (See section 6.2.4 above.) The object of this 
type of discussion is to establish the truth of the matter using legitimate means. 
Refutation of debate (stJtras 52-56)2 
Nagarjuna argues that debate cannot exist because it is not possible to conduct a debate 
without both names and things named also existing. Since these do not exist, debate cannot 
exist. Names and things named do not exist because they do not exist as either the same as or 
different from one another. If a name was the same as the thing named then a pot, for 
instance, could be produced without the effort of a potter or the use of clay just by uttering the 
word "pot". Alternatively, if the name was different from the thing named then a pot would 
not be determined when the word "pot" is uttered. 
This same refutation is also found in the second chapter of the Nyiiya Sutra? The 
defence provided in the Nyiiya Sutra is that the relation between words and their objects is 
established by convention.4 Nagarjuna begins his rebuttal of this defence by declaring that this 
point has implications for the Nyaya system in general. That is, the first sutra of the Nyiiya 
I Nyaya Siitra (l.2.1), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,429-471. 
2 Vaidalya PrakarmJa (55-56), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,82-85. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (2.1.53-54), trans. Jha 1915-19,2, 249-256. 
4 Nyiiya Siitra (2.1.55-56), trans. Jha 1915-19,2,256-260. 
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Sutra lists all 16 terms and declares that knowledge of the real nature of these 16 leads to the 
attainment of the highest good (i.e.liberation).1 NagaIjuna argues that these 16 terms do not 
have any basis in reality but are simply used by convention just as the names Devadatta 
(literally 'given by the gods') and Indragupta (literally 'protected by Indra') are used by 
parents to name their children. That is, these names could be given to any child and when a 
child is so named, it does not establish that the child in question was literally given by the 
gods (devadatta) or is actually protected by Indra (indragupta). Similarly, there is no relation 
between these 16 terms and objects. Further, it is a complete contradiction to claim that such a 
relationship is established by convention since this reason actually counts against the Nyaya 
position rather than supporting it? 
According to Nagarjuna, words are merely the outcome of convention. There are 
multiple words (synonyms) for a single thing, and a single word (homonym) for multiple 
things. They have no (real) relation to objects but are simply used arbitrarily. Thus, neither 
names nor the things named exist as claimed, and consequently debate cannot exist. 
7.2.10 Disputation and wrangle (terms 11-12) 
The eleventh term in the Nyaya Sutra is disputation (jalpa), which is described as a 
discussion carried on as in the case of a debate (vada) except that each party is not limited to 
using only legitimate means to support their own position and to refute that of their opponent. 
They may also use illegitimate means such as quibbles (chala), futile rejoinders (jati) and 
points of defeat (nigraha-sthana).3 (See section 6.2.4 above.) The object of a disputation is to 
refute an opponent's position and establish one's own position by any means whatsoever. 
The twelfth term in the Nyaya Sutra is wrangle (vitm:uja), which is described as a 
discussion carried on as in the case of a disputation (jalpa) except that each party does not 
attempt to establish their own position, but attempts only to refute that of their opponent.4 
(See section 6.2.4 above.) The object of a wrangle is simply to demolish an opponent's 
position by any means whatsoever. 
I Nyiiya Siitra (1.1.1), trans. JM 1915-19, 1, 37. 
2 See the third point of defeat, contradicting the proposition (pratijiiii-virodha), Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.4), trans. JM 
1915-19,4,319-32l. 
3 Nyiiya Siitra (1.2.2), trans. JM 1915-19, 1,471-478. 
4 Nyiiya Siitra (1.2.3), trans. JM 1915-19, 1,478-480. 
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Refutation of disputation and wrangle (sOtra 57f 
Nagarjuna uses the same arguments to refute disputation and wrangle as he used to 
refute debate since the only difference between these two and debate is that debate is limited 
to using legitimate means in order to establish the truth of the matter, whereas disputation and 
wrangle use any means whatsoever to establish one's own position in the case of disputation, 
or to demolish an opponent's position in the case of wrangle. 
7.2.11 Fallacious reason (term 13) 
The thirteenth term in the Nyiiya Sutra is fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa). The reason 
(hetu) is the second member of a proof and it is described in the Nyiiya Sutra as consisting of 
a property that establishes the proposition through its similar and dissimilar examples being 
(respectively) like and unlike the subject. That is, the reason demonstrates how the similar 
example is like the subject, since the similar example and subject both have the property 
presented in the reason. The reason also demonstrates how the dissimilar example is unlike 
the subject, since the dissimilar example and subject do not both have the property presented 
in the reason. In this way the reason establishes that the subject has the property in the 
proposition.2 (See section 6.2.5 above.) 
Strictly speaking, this is a description of a correct reason. A reason that fails to meet the 
requirements of a correct reason is called a fallacious reason (hetviibhiisa). A fallacious or 
pseudo reason is one that has the mere appearance of being a correct reason when in fact it is 
not a correct reason. A fallacious reason occurs as the second member of a proof, just as a 
correct reason does, but unlike a correct reason it does not successfully establish the 
proposition. The Nyiiya Sutra describes five ways in which a reason can fail to establish the 
proposition. In each of these five cases the reason suffers from a particular fault that prevents 
it from successfully establishing the proposition. The five faults are: 
1. inconclusive (sa-vyabhiciira) 
2. contradictory (viruddha) 
3. similar to the point at issue (prakaraJ}a-sama) 
4. similar to the proposition to be proved (siidhya-sama) 
5. mis-timed (kiiliitzta)3 
Nagarjuna first refutes fallacious reasons in general and then refutes them individually. 
I Vaidalya PrakarmJa (57), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,85. 
2 Nyaya Siltra (1.1.34-35), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 1,343-384. 
3 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.4), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,481-496. 
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Refutation of fallacious reasons in general (sOtra 58)1 
Nagatjuna's refutation of fallacious reasons in general exploits the literal meaning of the 
term hetvabhasa, i.e. the mere appearance of a reason. Nagarjuna first argues that gold is not 
something that merely appears to be gold since it actually is gold. Also, pebbles are not 
something that merely appear to be gold since they are unlike gold. Similarly, a reason is not 
something that merely appears to be a reason since it actually is a reason. Also, something 
unlike a reason is not something that merely appears to be a reason since it is different from a 
reason. Nagarjuna uses this point to argue against the existence of the mere appearance of a 
reason (fallacious reason). 
That is, the mere appearance of a reason does not exist because it cannot exist as either 
the same as or different from a (correct) reason. Firstly, if the mere appearance of a reason is 
the same as a reason then it would actually be a reason and thus it would not be the mere 
appearance of a reason. Alternatively, if the mere appearance of a reason was different from a 
reason then it would not be a reason at all, and then again it would not be the mere appearance 
of a reason. Since the mere appearance of a reason does not exist as either the same as or 
different from a reason, and since reason has already been refuted (above), the mere 
appearance of a reason (fallacious reason) does not exist at all. Nagarjuna next refutes the 
various fallacious reasons individually. 
Refutation of the inconclusive (siitras 59-62)2 
The first type of fallacious reason is the inconclusive reason (sa-vyabhicara), which is 
described in the Nyaya Sutra as one that is not restricted to the similar position. 3 The similar 
position includes everything that has the property in the proposition whereas its opposite, the 
dissimilar position, includes everything that does not have this same property. A correct 
reason must exist in the similar position, and it must not exist in the dissimilar position. A 
reason that exists in both the similar and the dissimilar positions is called inconclusive. 
Nagatjuna argues that an inconclusive reason does not exist because for it to do so, such 
a reason must itself be either inconclusive or not inconclusive, both of which are impossible. 
Firstly, if the reason is really inconclusive then it is inconclusive by its very nature. But then 
I Vaidalya PrakaralJa (58), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995, 85-86. 
2 Vaidalya PrakaralJa (59-62), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,86-89. 
3 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.5), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,496-503. 
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such a reason would not be something about which there could be a conclusive determination, 
since it is inconclusive by its very nature. Alternatively, if the reason is not really inconclusive 
then it is not inconclusive by its very nature. But then it would be unacceptable to claim that 
such a reason is nevertheless an inconclusive reason, since its nature is otherwise. That is, if 
such a reason is by nature other than inconclusive then it would not have the very attribute in 
virtue of which a reason is inconclusive. Since an inconclusive reason does not exist as either 
inconclusive or as not inconclusive, inconclusive reasons do not exist at all. 
The Naiyayika defends the Nyaya position by arguing that there is such a thing as an 
inconclusive reason since 'being bodiless', for instance, is an inconclusive reason when 
proving that some subject is permanent. That is, this reason exists in the similar position, 
since space, for instance, is both bodiless and permanent, and it also exists in the dissimilar 
position, since action, for instance, is bodiless but not permanent. Because 'being bodiless' is 
not restricted to the similar position when proving that some subject is permanent, it is an 
inconclusive reason. Thus, there is such a thing as an inconclusive reason. 
Nagarjuna rejects this defence arguing that his opponent has not provided an instance of 
an inconclusive reason. That is, the reason that exists in the similar position is not the same as 
the reason that exists in the dissimilar position. If the reason exists in the similar position then 
it is permanent, and if the reason exists in the dissimilar position then it is impermanent. Since 
one and the same reason cannot be both permanent and impermanent, there must be two 
separate reasons. Thus, the Naiyayika has not provided an instance of an inconclusive reason. 
NagaIjuna also provides another argument against the existence of an inconclusive reason 
based on the fact that all things are impermanent and therefore subject to constant change. 
The reasoning used in this argument is similar to the following argument. 
Refutation of the contradictory (sOtras 63-64)1 
The second type of fallacious reason is the contradictory reason (viruddha), which is 
described in the Nyaya Siitra as one that contradicts an accepted position.2 This type of reason 
does not exist in the similar position, i.e. in the position that includes everything that has the 
property in the proposition. Thus, a contradictory reason is one that is in contradiction with 
the property in the proposition. 
I Vaidalya PrakarmJa (63-64), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995, 89-90. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.6), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1,503-507. 
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Nagarjuna argues that a contradictory reason does not exist because for it to do so, the 
reason must be in conflict with the property in the proposition. And in order for this to be the 
case, the reason and the property in the proposition must co-exist. But since each member of a 
proof is presented sequentially, with one member not beginning until after the former member 
has been completely presented, there is no time at which the reason and proposition could co-
exist. Since these two never co-exist, they cannot corne into conflict. Thus, a contradictory 
reason does not exist. 
Nagarjuna's refutation of fallacious reasons individually does not include specific 
refutations of the third and fourth types of fallacious reason, i.e. reasons similar to the point at 
issue (prakaralJa-sama)l and similar to the proposition to be proved (siidhya-sama).2 
Refutation of the mis-timed (sDtras 65-67)3 
The fifth type of fallacious reason is the mis-timed reason (kiiliitlta), which is described 
in the Nyiiya Sutra as a reason that does not apply to the subject at the relevant time.4 A 
similar term occurs as the 10th point of defeat, mis-timed proof (apriipta-kiila).5 It is 
described as occurring when the members of a proof are presented in the wrong order. A mis-
timed reason is one whose time (or opportunity) to be effective has elapsed. 
Nagarjuna argues that mis-timed reasons do not exist, since the three times (past, 
present and future) do not exist. That is, in order to establish the existence of the three times, 
the existence of one of these three must first be established. But there is no way to establish 
one of these three independent of the other two. For instance, it is said that a pot is present, 
the clay past, and the potsherds future. However, if something has passed away then it no 
longer exists. Thus, at the time of the potsherds, the pot and the clay do not exist, since they 
have both passed away. But then the potsherds would not be the future of anything. Since 
something cannot be the future of nothing, the future does not exist. Similarly, the past does 
not exist because when the clay exists the pot has not yet corne into existence. That is, at the 
time when the past is supposed to exist, the present does not exist. If the past existed it would 
then be the past of something non-existent. Thus the past does not exist. Finally, the present 
I Nyaya SZltra (1.2.7), trans. 1M 1915-19, 1, 508-512. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.8), trans. 1M 1915-19,1,512-516. 
3 Vaidalya PrakaralJa (65-67), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,90-91. 
4 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.9), trans. 1M 1915-] 9, 1,516-521. 
5 Nyaya Siitra (5.2.11), trans. 1M 1915-19,4,328-330. 
292 
Chapter seven: Buddhist dialectics 
also cannot exist since there can be no present independent of the past and the future. Since 
the three times do not exist, a mis-timed reason, i.e. a reason whose time has passed, cannot 
exist. The Nyaya Sutra argues that the three times do exist in the second chapter. I 
Nagarjuna continues that all languages confirm that things that have passed away no 
longer exist. Since it is not possible to establish a relationship between something and 
nothing, it is not possible to establish a relationship between a present reason and a past 
opportunity. Further, if there were such a relationship then the reason and opportunity would 
have to co-exist. But then the reason would not be one whose time to be effective has elapsed. 
Thus, the mis-timed reason does not exist. 
7.2.12 Equivocation (term 14) 
The fourteenth term is equivocation (chala), which is described in the Nyaya Sutra as 
occurring when an opponent deliberately misinterprets the meaning of a word and responds to 
an unintended meaning.2 (See section 6.2.6 above.) 
Refutation of equivocation (sDtra 68)3 
Nagarjuna argues that equivocation cannot exist because there could be no dialogue 
without an agreement on the meanings of words. The Naiyayika replies that equivocation 
does exist since Nagarjuna's refutations of these logical terms are instances of equivocation. 
That is, Nagarjuna has interpreted these terms in an extreme way demanding that they refer to 
real entities that exist in some absolute sense whereas these terms are used simply to refer to 
logical elements employed in debate. Nagarjuna rejects this defence and argues instead that 
the Naiyayika must accept that both parties are either using these terms in the same way or 
they are not. If both parties are using these terms in the same way then they are each referring 
to the same things and Nagarjuna's refutations are not equivocation. Alternatively, if both 
parties are not using these terms in the same way then they are each referring to different 
things. In this case there could be no meaningful dialogue between the two parties and here 
again there is no equivocation. Either way equivocation does not exist. 
I Nyiiya Siltra (2.1.39-43), trans. Jha 1915-19,2,219-229. 
2 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.10-17), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 522-534. 
3 Vaidalya PrakaralJa (68), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,91-92. 
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7.2.13 Futile rejoinder (term 15) 
The fifteenth term is futile rejoinder (jiiti), which is described in the Nyiiya Sutra as an 
objection by means of similarity (siidharmya) and dissimilarity (vaidharmya).l (See section 
6.2.7 above.) That is, a reason in a successful proof establishes its proposition by 
demonstrating that the two examples are (respectively) similar and dissimilar to the subject.2 
A futile rejoinder, on the other hand, is a proof where the reason does not establish its 
proposition because the required similarity and dissimilarity between the subject and each 
type of example is only apparent. A typical rejoinder is used to refute some position by 
demonstrating how its acceptance leads to an unacceptable consequence. The author of the 
Nyiiya Sutra lists 24 rejoinders it considers to be futile, since they all fail in their attempts to 
prove some other position wrong? 
Refutation of futile rejoinder (satra 69t 
Nagarjuna argues that a futile rejoinder does not exist since it cannot occur at any time, 
not when it has already occurred, nor when it has not occurred, nor when it both has and has 
not occurred. Firstly, a futile rejoinder cannot occur when it has already occurred since 
nothing occurs over again after itself. Secondly, a futile rejoinder cannot occur when it has not 
yet occurred since nothing occurs before itself. Finally, a futile rejoinder cannot occur when it 
is occurring since nothing exists separate from both already occurred and not yet occurred. 
7.2.14 Points of defeat (term 16) 
The sixteenth term is point of defeat (nigraha-sthiina), which is described in the Nyiiya 
Sutra as occurring whenever there is misunderstanding (vipratipatti) or no understanding 
(apratipatti) by either party in a debate.5 (See section 6.2.8 above.) The author of the Nyiiya 
Sutra lists 22 points of defeat in the second part of chapter five. 6 These points of defeat 
describe the circumstances in which a debate is lost. That is, if either party commits any of the 
faults listed then the debate ends and victory is handed to the other party. 
I Nyaya Sutra (1.2.18), trans. Prets 2001,547. Cf. Jha 1915-19, 1,535-536. 
2 Nyaya Sutra (1.1.34-35), trans. Jha 1915-19, 1, 343-384. 
3 Nyaya Siltra (5.1.2-38), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 238-302. 
4 Vaidalya PrakarmJa (69), trans. To1a, Dragonetti 1995,92-93. 
5 Nyaya Siitra (1.2.19), trans. JM 1915-19, 1,537-538. 
6 Nyaya Sutra (5.2.2-24), trans. JM 1915-19, 4, 533-345. 
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Refutation of points of-defeat (sutras 70-72)1 
NagaIjuna argues that points of defeat do not exist since they could never occur. The 
Naiyayika replies that points of defeat do exist since NagaIjuna's refutations of these 16 
logical terms involve repetition (punarukta), the thirteenth point of defeat? Repetition occurs 
when the same words are repeated in a proof without any justification. Since Nagarjuna has 
said repeatedly that things do or do not exist, he has committed the fault of repetition and thus 
points of defeat do exist. Nagarjuna argues that he could not have committed the fault of 
repetition because repetition itself does not exist. That is, what was said earlier and what was 
said later cannot be the same words because once a word is uttered that very utterance cannot 
possibly come into existence over again. Thus, what was said earlier and what was said later 
must be different words. But if they are different words then there can be no repetition. Hence 
repetition does not exist. 
Furthermore, none of the other points of defeat exist since they could never occur. That 
is, just as was explained in the case of futile rejoinders, points of defeat cannot occur at any 
time, not when they have already occurred, nor when they have not yet occurred, nor when 
they both have and have not occurred. Thus there are no points of defeat. 
This completes Nagarjuna's refutation ofthe 16 terms in the Vaidalya PrakaraJ:ta. The 
following section describes the specific characteristics ofNagarjuna's system of dailectics and 
the question of Greek influence. 
7.3 Nagarjuna's dialectics 
7.3.1 Dialectics 
Nagarjuna rejects the system of logic that uses the five-membered proof in favour of a 
system of dialectics. The advocates of demonstration by proofs consider the conclusion to be 
proven absolutely beyond all doubt by the evidence presented in the proof. Nagarjuna argues 
that the conclusion is not established by the evidence because the need for logical justification 
has simply moved from the conclusion to the evidence. Since the evidence has no logical 
justification of its own, the conclusion has not been proven absolutely beyond all doubt. If yet 
more evidence is required to prove the legitimacy of the original evidence then this entails an 
infinite regress. If the original evidence can be accepted without justification then anything 
I Vaidalya PrakaralJa (70-72), trans. Tola, Dragonetti 1995,93-94. 
2 Nyiiya Siitra (5.2.14-15), trans. 1ha 1915-19, 4, 333-335. 
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could be accepted without justification, including the original conclusion. Further, the original 
evidence cannot be accepted as an independent truth because there are no independent truths. 
In fact, according to Nagarjuna, it is not possible for anything to exist independently. 
Nagarjuna does not abandon rationality and embrace contradictions.1 Rather, he takes the 
requirement for logical justification beyond the point that his opponents consider necessary. 
NagaIjuna's style of argument is often described as reductio ad absurdum, although it 
need not always involve a regression to the absurd. Nagarjuna argues that if some position is 
accepted then one of a limited number of alternatives that logically follow from that position 
must also be accepted. He then argues that each alternative is unacceptable and thus the 
original position must be abandoned. This style of argument involves forming conditionals 
with his opponent's position as the antecedent and with an unacceptable position as the 
consequent. The consequent can be unacceptable to an opponent because it contradicts the 
antecedent used in the same conditional, because it contradicts the opponent's tenets (in 
general), or because it is simply illogical. The consequent can be illogical because it entails an 
infinite regress or because it is logically impossible. Such conditionals do not always 
constitute a paradox since they can be straight forward refutations of some position. An 
element of paradox may nevertheless arise in the minds of those who hold that the rejection of 
some position entails as many difficulties as Nagarjuna's arguments raise against that 
position. There are two aspects to this style of argument. First, it involves refutation only. 
Second, it employs consequences. 
7.3.2 Negative arguments 
The style of argument that Nagarjuna uses throughout the Vaidalya Prakarm/a is one 
that involves refutation only. That is, Nagarjuna is interested only in negating the existence of 
the 16 terms described in the Nyiiya Sutra, not in establishing alternative theories. But a 
negative style of debate is certainly not evidence of Greek influence. There are Indian 
precedents for debate involving refutation only which predate NagaIjuna. For instance, the 
Nyiiya Sutra describes its twelfth term, wrangle (vita1JQii), as a discussion carried on as in a 
disputation (jalpa), except that neither party attempts to establish their own position but is 
concerned only to refute that of their opponent. This term is not unique to the Nyiiya Sutra. 
The Caraka Sm?1hitii also describes the same term (vita1JQii) as a negative or destructive type 
J Robinson 1957, 307. 
296 
Chapter seven: Buddhist dialectics 
of debate (vada) where each party endeavours to demolish an opponent's view without 
attempting to establish their own. Also, all the arguments in both the Kathavatthu and the 
Vijiianakaya are negative in the sense that they are aimed at forcing an opponent to abandon 
their position. This is done by presenting evidence contradicting an opponent's position rather 
than by attempting to prove that an alternate position is correct. Further, the so-called hair-
splitters described in the early Buddhist works devised arguments so that no matter what 
position an opponent takes they have a reason to disprove it. An example of their tactics used 
in debate is found in the CiiJahatthipadopama Sutta (Shorter Discourse on the Simile of the 
Elephant's Footprint): 
If he is asked like this, he will answer like this, and so we will refute his doctrines in this 
way; and if he is asked like that, he will answer like that, and so we will refute his 
doctrine in that way.1 
These hair-splitters do not argue for any particular position but are interested only in 
refuting the views of others. There are numerous precedents for a negative style of debate in 
the Indian tradition. Thus, there is no need to invoke Greek influence in order to explain the 
purely negative aspect of Nagarjuna' s style of debate. It could easily have come from the 
long-standing tradition of debate in India. 
7.3.3 Consequences 
Nagatjuna uses consequences (prasmiga) in his negative style of argument. The 
principle involved in these consequences is that if an opponent accepts some position then 
they must also accept what logically follows from that position. If what follows is 
unacceptable then the opponent must abandon their original position. These arguments 
normally have only two or three alternatives following from some position. The form of an 
argument with two alternatives is: if A then either B or C; neither B nor C; therefore not A. 
For example, if a whole exists then it must exist either one with or separate from its five parts. 
If the whole exists one with its five parts then there are either five wholes or only one part. If 
the whole exists separate from its five parts then there are not five but six parts. Since neither 
is acceptable, the whole does not exist. An example of three alternatives is, for instance, if 
something occurs (in time) then it must occur in either the past, the present or the future. 
Since nothing occurs in any of these three periods, nothing occurs. 
I Majjhima Nikiiya (i 176), trans. Bodhi 1995,269-270. 
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As in the case of debate involving refutation only, the use of consequences is not 
evidence of Greek influence. The Indian precedents for using consequences to refute an 
opponent's position are found in the Nyaya Sutra, the Upayahrdaya and the Caraka Saf!lhita. 
Caraka describes a rejoinder (uttara) as a contrary statement that denies similarity when 
similarity has been asserted, or vice versa. The examples that Caraka provides indicate that he 
understands a rejoinder to be a statement supported by a counter-example that contradicts 
some other statement. A similar term is found in the Upayahrdaya. It describes 20 refutations 
(du$a~1a), most of which are presented in pairs where each member of the pair refutes one of 
two alternatives. The first two refutations, for instance, argue that an example having the 
property specified in the reason is not a reliable basis upon which to conclude that the subject 
also has this same property. The first refutation argues that the consequence of one property 
of the example applying to the subject is that another (unacceptable) property of the example 
would also (incorrectly) apply to the subject. The second refutation argues the converse, i.e. 
the consequence of one property of the example not applying to the subject is that another 
(acceptable) property of the example would also (incorrectly) not apply to the subject. 
The Upayahrdaya is preserved in Chinese translation only, and this has been translated 
back into Sanskrit by Tucci.} The Sanskrit word dU$m:za (refutation) is the term Tucci uses to 
translate the Chinese word hsiang-yin (xiangyin). Kajiyama says that "the Chinese word 
'hsiang-yin' is most likely to correspond to the Sanskrit prasanga or prasanga-jati.,,2 The word 
prasanga is often translated as "consequence" and it is used to refer to an unacceptable 
corollary of an opponent's position. The wordjati is normally translated as "futile rejoinder". 
The term futile rejoinder (jati) is used in the Nyaya Sutra to name what the author of the 
Upayahrdaya calls a refutation (du$m:za). That is, almost half the 20 refutations found in the 
Upayahrdaya are included in a list of 24 futile rejoinders in the Nyaya Sutra. The author of 
the Nyaya Sutra argues that all 24 futile rejoinders are unsuccessful attempts to refute correct 
proofs and hence the use of the word "futile" in the English translation of Sanskrit termjati. 
The term futile rejoinder occurs in both the first and the fifth chapters of the Nyaya Sutra, and 
given that the fifth chapter may well date from a time after Nagarjuna, it is the use of the term 
in the first chapter that qualifies as a precedent for Nagarjuna's use of consequences. 
Vatsyayana's commentary on the Nyaya Sutra (also written after Nagarjuna) explains futile 
1 Tucci 1929b. 
2 Kajiyama 1991, 108 note 7; cf. Katsura 2000b, 225-226. 
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rejoinder (jiiti) as an objection which is a directly following consequence (prasanga).l The 
term consequence or prasanga is often used to refer to Nagarjuna's dialectical consequences. 
The works mentioned above contain precedents for the style of argument involving both 
consequences and refutation only. This shows that these two aspects of Nagarjuna's system of 
dialectics had developmental stages in the Indian logical tradition and this undermines the 
need to invoke Greek influence in order to account for their existence in Nagarjuna's works. 
Even ignoring these precedents, it is an extremely weak argument to claim that Indians could 
not possibly have come up with a negative style of argument involving consequences, and this 
form of argument must therefore have been introduced by the Greeks. 
7.4 The Mula Madhyamaka Karika 
McEvilley's claims regarding the origins of Buddhist dialectics focus on NagaIjuna' s 
famous Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way).2 According to 
McEvilley, Greek dialectics appear in this particular work without evidence of prior 
developmental stages in the Indian tradition: 
. .. Nagarjuna's work appears without known Indian forerunners of its dialectical 
methods. It has the whole pattern of the Greek dialectic, with its complex and extensive 
system of arguments which in Greece took six centuries to develop, yet it arises without 
evidence of developmental stages in its own tradition ... 3 
McEvilley's point here is that NagaIjuna's system of dialectics as it is found in the Mula 
Madhyamaka Kiirika appears suddenly without any evidence of developmental stages and this 
system must therefore have come from the Greeks. 
Introduction to the work 
The Milla Madhyamaka Kiirika is NagaIjuna's most famous work.4 There is no dispute 
about its authorship since even those who accept multiple Nagarjunas agree that it was written 
by (the original) Nagarjuna. This work forms a cornerstone for the Madhyamaka or Middle 
1 Prets 2001,548. Cf. Jta 1915-19, 1, 535; and Randle 1930, 342. 
2 And to a lesser extend on Nagarjuna' s Vigraha Vyiivartanf (Turning Back Dispute), trans. Tucci 1929b; 
Mookerjee 1957,7-41; Streng 1967,221-227; Bhattacharya 1971; Bhattacharya 1978; and Wood 1994,307-322. 
See McEvilley 2002, 455. 
3 McEvilley 1982, 28. See also McEvilley 2002, 500. 
4 Also called Praji'iii Miila. Tib. Dbu ma tsa ba'i tshig {e'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba. Tohoku: 3824. Peking: 
5224. Trans. Streng 1967, 183-220; Inada 1970,35-171; Kalupahana 1986,99-391; and Garfield 1995, 1-83. See 
also Sprung 1979. Summary by Lindtner in Potter ed. 1965-99, 8, 98-124. 
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Way system of Buddhist philosophy and it gave rise to many works in India as well as in 
other Asian countries. Lindtner reports that there were at least ten Indian commentaries and 
two sub-commentaries written on the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika. 1 The extant commentaries 
are the Akutobhayii (Beyond All Fear) attributed to Nagarjuna,2 the Buddhapiilitavrtti (The 
Buddhapalita Commentary) by Buddhapalita (470-540 AD),3 the Prajiiiipradfpa (Lamp of 
Wisdom) by Bhavaviveka (500-570 AD),4 to which A valokitavrata (7th century AD) wrote an 
extensive sub-commentary, i.e. the Prajiiiipradfpa-t'ikii (Great Commentary on the 'Lamp of 
Wisdom'),5 the Prasannapadii (Clear Words)6 and the Madhyamakiivatiira (Entering the 
Middle Way),7 both by Candraklrti (600-650 AD). Only the Prasannapadii, which contains 
NagaIjuna's original verses,8 survives in Sanskrit, although all these works are preserved in 
Tibetan translations. The indigenous Tibetan literature on the MUla Madhyamaka Kiirika is 
extensive. The Indian commentaries preserved in Chinese translation are the Zhonglun 
(Middle Treatise) by Pingala (4th century AD),9 which is closely related to the Akutobhayii, 
and the Dacheng Zhongguan Shilun (Commentary on the Contemplation of the Middle (Way) 
in the Great Vehicle) by Sthiramati (510-570 AD).lO 
In the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika, Nagarjuna sets out his arguments for emptiness 
(sunyatii), a term denoting the complete absence of any inherent existence (svabhiiva). 
According to Nagarjuna, if anything existed inherently then it would be independent 
(nirape~a), permanent (nitya), numerically one (eka) and self-created (svaya1J1k[ta). 
Nagarjuna argues that nothing could possibly exist in this way since every single thing is a 
dependent arising (prat'itya-samutpiida), and since all things are dependent, they are only 
conventionally existent. 
1 Lindtner in Potter ed. 1965-99,8,98. See also Huntington 1995,697. 
2 Tib. Dbu ma rtsa ba'; 'grel pa ga las 'jigs med. Tohoku: 3829. Peking: 5229. Trans. Bocking 1995. 
3 Tib. Dbu ma rtsa ba '; 'grel pa buddha pa Ii fa. Tohoku: 3842. Peking: 5242. Trans. Saito 1984 (chapters 1-16 
only). 
4 Tib. Dbu ma rtsa ba'; 'grel pa zhes pa sgrolll11a. Tohoku: 3853. Peking: 5253. Trans. Ames 1993, 1994 and 
1995 (chapters 1 and 2 only). 
5 Tib. Shes rab sgron ma'; rgya cher 'grel pa. Tohoku: 3859. Peking: 5259. 
6 Tib. Dbu ma rfsa ba'i 'grel pa fshig gsal ba zhes bya ba. Tohoku: 3860. Peking: 5260. Trans. Sprung 1979 
(partial translation). 
7 Tib. Dbu ma la 'jug pa zhes bya ba. Tohoku: 3861. Peking: 5261 and 5262. Trans. Huntington 1989; Tsong ka 
pa, Kensur Lekden 1980 (chapters 1-5 only); and Rabten, Batchelor 1983 (chapter 6 only). 
8 Sanskrit editions in de la Vallee Poussin 1903-13; and de Jong 1977. See also de Jong 1978b. 
9 Taish6: 1564. Trans. Bocking 1995. 
10 Taish6: 1567. 
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Nagarjuna claims not to be expounding anything new in the Mula Madhyamaka Karika, 
but only to be restoring the correct understanding of the Buddha's teachings. Nagarjuna 
rejects what he considers to be misrepresentations of the Buddha by his fellow Buddhists, 
particularly those who follow a body of literature known as the Abhidharma (higher 
knowledge). According to Potter, "Nagarjuna's arguments appear to have been addressed 
exclusively against Abhidharma interpretations of the Buddha's teachings.',} The followers of 
the Abhidharma (Pali Abhidhamma) claim that the elements of existence (dharmasi possess 
an essential nature (Sanskrit: svabhava, Pali: sabhava), a term variously translated in English 
as: own being, own essence, intrinsic being, self nature, self existence, inherent existence, 
essential nature, essence, identity, etc.3 This is the view that NagaIjuna argues against in his 
Mula Madhyamaka Karika. Its origins are in the Abhidharma section of the Buddhist Canon. 
7.4.1 Abhidharma 
The Buddhist Canon is traditionally arranged in three parts: the Vinaya Pitaka or 
collection of precepts, the Siitra Pitaka or collection of discourses, and the Abhidharma 
Pitaka or collection of doctrine. The third section, the Abhidharma, is the basis for the later 
development of Buddhist philosophical systems. Two complete Abhidharma Pitakas exist, 
each of which consists of a different set of seven treatises. There is one preserved in Pali that 
belongs to the Theravadin school of south-east Asia, and a second one that belongs to the 
Sarvastivadin school of northwest India. The Abhidharma Pitaka of the Sarvastivadin school 
was originally composed in Sanskrit, but it now exists only in Chinese and Tibetan 
translations.4 There are also Chinese translations of individual Abhidharma works that belong 
to other Buddhist schools. 
According to McEvilley, the philosophical ideas found in the Abhidharma of the 
Sarvastivadin school are the results of Greek influence. 
There is, to begin with, an overall structural resemblance between the theory of [Platonic] 
Ideas and the earliest known Buddhist philosophy, the abhidharma of the Sarvastavadin 
school.s 
I Potter 1965-99, 8, 16. See also Lindtner 1982, 71 note ] 10. 
2 Stcherbatsky 1927, 34. 
3 Garfield 1995, 89 note 4. 
4 See Takakusu 1904-05. 
5 McEvilley 2002,167. 
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McEvilley claims that Gandhara, in India's northwest, was an important centre for the 
development of the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma and this was probably due to Greek influence: 
The abhidharma seems to have developed ... at the time of the flowering of Indo-Greek 
Buddhism in the Northwest ... This concatenation of circumstances suggests that if 
abhidharma underwent significant development in Gandhara this is more likely to have 
happened among the Greeks there than among the later Sakas and Kushans. The Greeks, 
after all, had been accustomed to systematic thought for centuries, and both the Saka and 
Kushan communities were illiterate until they learned the Greek alphabet. Which group is 
more likely to have fomented the rigorously disciplined type of systematic thought that 
the abhidharma features?l 
And later in the same work McEvilley adds: 
Gandharan Buddhism was a center in which much of the abhidharma seems to have been 
worked out, and Greek Buddhists may have been involved in it.2 
McEvilley claims that the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma and Nagarjuna's style of dialectics 
reflect a similar development in the Greek tradition: 
The speed with which the abhidharma was developed and soon thereafter the 
Prajfiaparamita dialectical reduction of it are characteristic of the onrushing tendency of 
philosophical history in the Greek tradition.3 
In summary then, according to McEvilley, Nagarjuna's system of dialectics has Greek 
origins since it appears in his Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika without prior developmental stages. 
Also, the philosophical view that Nagarjuna argues against in this work has Greek origins 
since it appears in the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma works without prior developmental stages. 
Further, the controversy between NagaIjuna and the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma view reflect a 
similar controversy in the Greek tradition. 
However, on closer inspection it is found that both Nagarjuna's dialectical method in 
his MUla Madhyamaka Kiirika and the view he opposes in this work have Indian origins. This 
position is established by two points. First, the view that elements of existence possess an 
essential nature was not introduced to the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma school through Greek 
influence. This view has an Indian origin the predates the arrival of the Greeks in India. 
Second, NagaIjuna's dialectical methods have prior developmental stages in the Indian 
philosophical tradition. These two points are discussed in the following sections. 
I McEvilley 2002, 375. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 378. 
3 McEvilley 2002, 390. 
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Origin of the Abhidharma 
The Abhidharma works are believed to have evolved from lists of terms (Sanskrit: 
miitrkii, PITli: miitikii) that date from the days of the Buddha, l i.e. before the arrival of the 
Greeks in India. The Sanskrit word miitrkii is derived from the ordinary word for mother 
(miitr) and it is cognate with the English word matrix. Miitrkii can be used to mean simply 
mother, or more figuratively, to mean source or origin.2 Pruden describes the earliest meaning 
of the word miitrkii as merely a list,3 and Gethin defines it as any schedule, table of items or 
list that acts as a basis for an exposition.4 Lists of terms were gathered together to form the 
nucleus around which details were assembled to produce an exposition. Such lists were in this 
sense the source or origin from which expositions evolved. 
There are a number of Buddhist works that are based on lists of terms. An early 
example of this is the Smiglti Sutta (Chanting Together),5 a canonical work of the Theravadin 
school. In this work, Sariputta, one of the Buddha's principle disciples, recites lists of terms to 
summarise the Buddha's teachings. These terms are arranged according to number, i.e. the 
singletons, pairs, triples, and so on. The Saizglti Sutta recounts how this summary was made 
during the Buddha's lifetime in order to prevent disagreement from arising after the Buddha's 
death, as had recently happened amongst the followers of the J aina tradition following their 
founder's death. A commentary on this work, the Saizglti Paryiiya (Chanting Together 
Enumerations),6 is one of the canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarvastivadin school. 
Sariputra gives a similar list in another work, the Dasuttara Sutta (Expanding Decades).7 
These lists also occur in other works. The Aizguttara Nikiiya (Collection of Expanding 
GroupS),8 in particular, consists solely of an elaboration of such lists arranged according to 
number. 
I Frauwallner 1995, 1 and 121. 
2 Gethin 1992, 160. 
3 Pruden 1988, xxxviii. 
4 Gethin 1992, 160. Cf. Mizuno 1961,65. 
5 Sutta 33 of Dfgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3,201-249; Walshe 1987,479-510. 
6 Summarised by Takakusu 1904-05,99-103; and by Lindtner in Potter ed. 1965-99, 7,203-216. Attributed to 
Sariputra in the Chinese tradition, and to Mahakau~thila in the Sanskrit and Tibetan traditions. 
7 Sutta 34 of Dfgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3,250-265; Walshe 1987,511-521. 
S Trans. Woodward, Hare 1932-36; and Thera, Bodhi 1999 (partial translation). 
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One of the earliest lists is the list of thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment.1 These thirty-
seven terms are traditionally arranged in seven groups. They are discussed in the 
Mahasakuludayi Sutta (Greater Discourse to Sakuludayin),2 and they are also mentioned in a 
number of other places in the Pali Canon, e.g. the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (Great Passing),3 
the Sampasadanrya Sutta (Serene Faith),4 and the Pasadika Sutta (Delightful Discourse),5 and 
the Kinti Sutta (What Do You Think About Me?).6 These sources simply mention the seven 
groups that make up the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment without elaboration. These seven 
groups are: 
[1] The four foundations of mindfulness [smrtyupasthana], [2] the four right efforts 
[samyakpradhana], [3] the four roads to power [rddhipada], [4] the five spiritual faculties 
[indriya], [5] the five mental powers [bala], [6] the seven factors of enlightenment 
[bodhymiga], [7] the Noble Eightfold Path [arya-a~tanga-marga].7 
Interestingly, the passage in the Kinti Sutta continues with: 
. .. in these things you should all train in concord, with mutual appreciation, without 
disputing. While you are training in concord, with mutual appreciation, without disputing, 
two bhikkhus [monks] might differ about the higher Dhamma [abhidharma].8 
The term abhidharma (higher dharma) is used here in the Kinti Sutta to refer to the list 
of thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment just enumerated. This suggests that abhidharma was 
used from an early stage to refer to summaries of the Buddha's teachings (dharma) presented 
in these lists. The same term (abhidharma) is also used in a number of other ways.9 
I Sanskrit: bodhipa~ika-dharma, Pali: bodhipakkhiya-dhamma. 
2 Sutta 77 of Majjhima Nikiiya (ii 11-12), trans. Horner 1954-59, 2, 203-222; and Bodhi 1995,636-638. 
3 Sutta 16 of Dlgha Nikaya, trans. Rhys Davids 1881, 1-136; Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,2,78-191; 
Walshe 1987,231-277. 
4 Sutta 28 of Dlgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3,95-110; Walshe 1987,417-425. 
Also trans. Rhys Davids 1881, 1-136. 
5 Sutta 29 of Dlgha Nikiiya, trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3, 111-131; Walshe 1987,427-439. 
6 Sutta 103 of Majjhima Nikiiya, trans. Horner 1954-59,3,24-29; Bodhi 1995,847-852. 
7 Dlgha Nikiiya three locations: (1) ii 120 trans. Rhys Davids 1881,61; Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,2, 
128; Walshe 1987,253; (2) iii 103 trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3,97; Walshe 1987,418; and 
(3) iii 127-128 trans. Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 1899-1921,3, 120; Walshe 1987,432. Also Majjhima Nikiiya ii 
238-239 trans. Horner 1954-59, 3, 25; and Bodhi 1995,847. All 37 are listed in Rhys Davids, Rhys Davids 
1899-1921, 2, 128-130 note 2. 
8 Majjhima Nikiiya (ii 239) trans. Bodhi 1995, 847-848. 
9 Pruden 1988, xxxi-xxxvi. 
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Buswell and J aini argue that the list of the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment normally 
arranged in seven categories marks the first stage in the development of the Abhidharma: 
The beginnings of Abhidharma are found in certain fundamental listings of dharmas 
made by the Buddha, which are considered to be definitive and indisputable. The most 
important of these early listings was that of the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment (Pali 
bodhipakhiya dhamma) . .. , Such tabulations of seven categories of factors as a definitive 
listing of the path-related factors acceptable to all Buddhas is common to many siitras in 
all five nikayas; it marks the first stage in the development of the Abhidharma.1 
This view is echoed by Watanabe when he reports that: 
... we find the same list of seven headings ... in many other texts of all known schools. 
We would say that the thirty-seven practical dhammas given by the Buddha at Vesali 
gave rise to the idea of a set of matikas and in due course to the various elaborations of it 
as Abhidharma philosophy ... 2 
Referring to this list of thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment, Bronkhorst says: 
It seems clear that this is an early, perhaps the earliest, list of the type that came to be 
called matrkalP. matika and formed the basis for the later Abhidhanna works.3 
J aini also accepts that: "Whatever the original contents of the Miitikiis may have been, there is 
no doubt that it formed the nucleus of the Abhidhamma literature, both Piili and Sanskrit.,,4 
Thus, the Abhidharma is completely Indian in origin. Further, the view that elements of 
existence possess an essential nature (svabhiiva) was not introduced to the Sarviistiviidin 
Abhidharma school by the Greeks since it is common to various Abhidharma schools. 
Common ideas 
The original lists of terms were composed during the Buddha's lifetime or shortly 
thereafter. These lists were intended to provide definitive summaries of the Buddha's 
teachings. Explanatory material was added to form various expositions and these works 
formed the Abhidharma sections of the various versions of the Buddhist Canon. Bronkhorst 
suggests that this process may have begun soon after the Buddha's death (c.486 BC): 
There is evidence that there were Abhidharma-like activities going on well before the 
Sutras of the Sutrapitaka had achieved anything like their present shape. ... An 
independent development of this Matrka was used in the original Abhidharma-Vibhanga, 
which may date from less than 50 years after the death of the Buddha ... 5 
I Buswell and laini in Potter ed. 1965-99,7,82 and 83. 
2 Watanabe 1983,55. 
3 Bronkhorst 1985a, 305. 
41aini 1959,45. 
5 Bronkhorst 1985a, 318. 
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In the middle of the third century Be, the Buddhist king Asoka sent missions to Sri 
Lanka and to northwest India. These missions took with them a common core of ideas that is 
now found in both the Theravadin Abhidharma of south-east Asia and the Sarvastivadin 
Abhidharma of northwest India. Frauwallner describes how these two Abhidharma collections 
began from a common heritage: 
Both schools-the P~ili school in Ceylon and the Sarvastivada school in the extreme 
northwest-owe their foundation to the missions which were sent out under King Asoka 
around the middle of the third century Be. Since both schools have a common core in the 
old, basic stock of their Abhidharma, it is obvious that this core predates the missions and 
was thus brought to the mission countries as a common heritage.] 
Norman also accepts that there was a common core of ideas that predates the separation 
of the Sarvastivadins from the Theravadins. 
The codification of such principles which require exposition would give rise to the miitikii 
lists which form the basis of the Abhidhamma books, and now serve as tables of contents. 
The elaboration of these principles, their definition, and their proof by adding sutta 
passages would form the Abhidhamma proper. This is what we find in the Abhidhamma-
pitaka collection as we have it. These matters must have been discussed before the 
separation of the Sarvastivadins from the Theravadins, but not long before. The two sects 
agree closely in their Vinaya-pitakas and Sutta-pitakas, but beyond agreeing about the 
number of Abhidhamma texts, and the title of one book, there is little agreement in their 
Abhidhamma-pitakas. The two collections are two sets of texts compiled by two sects 
who independently examined and elaborated the same subject matter? 
The ideas that are common to both the Sarvastivadin and the Theravadin Abhidharma 
works date from a period before their separation and are entirely Indian in origin. There was 
an independent development of each tradition after their separation when Greek ideas could 
have influenced the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma alone, but the material that is common to both 
traditions does not have a Greek origin. One idea that is common to both traditions is the idea 
of inherent existence (svabhiiva). 
Origin of the term inherent existence (svabhava) 
The philosophical view that Nagaljuna is mainly concerned to refute in his Miila 
Madhyamaka Kiirika is that of inherent existence (svabhiiva). He devotes chapter fifteen, 
examination of inherent existence (svabhiiva-parlk~ii), in particular, to a refutation of this 
view. 
1 Frauwallner 1995,124, see also pp. 40-41. 
2 Norman 1983,97-98. 
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Nagaljuna quotes the Kiityiiyaniivaviida Sutra (Discourse to Katyayana) to justify his 
claim to be following the Buddha's teachings in rejecting inherent existence: 
The Victorious One, through knowledge 
Of reality and unreality, 
In the Discourse to Kiityiiyana, 
Refuted both "it is" and "it is not."] 
Candraklrti (600-650 AD) in his commentary on the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika, the 
Prasannapadii (Clear Words),2 quotes the passage from the Kiityiiyaniivaviida Sutra that 
Nagarjuna used as his source and describes it as being accepted by all Buddhist schoo1s.3 The 
Pali version of this sutra, the Kacciiyanagotta Sutta, contains the Buddha's description of the 
correct view which is expressed in terms similar to those used in the Kiityiiyaniivaviida Sutra.4 
Candraklrti also quotes two other sources, the Ratnaku{a Sutra (Heap of Jewels),5 and the 
Samiidhiriija Siitra (King of Concentration),6 both of which contain passages similar to the 
one in the Kiityiiyaniivaviida Sutra. Warder and Singh both describe this and four other places 
in the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika where Nagarjuna appears to have used sources similar to 
ones now found in the Pali Canon.7 
Nagarjuna believes himself to be following the correct understanding of the Buddha's 
teachings in his efforts to refute the followers of the Abhidharma who propound the view of 
inherent existence. According to McEvilley, it is the Sarvastivadins who propound this view 
and they do so because of Greek influence. McEvilley argues that evidence for this influence 
is found in the similarities between the Platonic theory of ideas and the Sarvastivadin theory 
that the ultimate constituents of phenomena (dharmas) are inherently existent. 
There is, to begin with, an overall structural resemblance between the theory of [Platonic] 
Ideas and the earliest known Buddhist philosophy, the abhidharma of the Sarvastavadin 
school. In both traditions, phenomena are not regarded as ultimately real but as 
1 Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika (15.7), trans. Garfield 1995,40,222. See also Hayes 1994,320 and 367-368. 
2 Trans. Sprung 1979. 
3 Passage translated in Sprung, Vyas 1973,208; Sprung 1979,159; and Hayes 1994, 373 note 10. See also 
Lindtner 1982,257-258; and Lindtner 1986, 323-324. 
4 Sa'!1yutta Nikiiya (ii 17), trans. Rhys Davids 1917-30, 2, 11-12; Kalupahana 1986, 10-11; Kalupahana 1992, 
58-59, and Bodhi 2000,1,544. See also Bhattacharya 1937, 85-86. Kalupahana 1986, 81 suggests that the Mula 
Madhyamaka Kiirika is a grand commentary on the Kacciiyanagotta Sutta. 
5 Also called the Kasyapa Parivarta Sutra. Trans. Chang 1983,387-414. See Potter ed. 1965-99,8, 88. Passage 
translated in Bhattacharya 1937, 85; Sprung, Vyas 1973,209; Sprung 1979, 159; and Chang 1983,395. 
6 Summarised in Potter ed. 1965-99,8, 185-192. Passage translated in Sprung 1979, 159. 
7 Warder 1973,79-80. Singh 1983-84, 314-316. 
307 
Chapter seven: Buddhist dialectics 
compounded of constituents which are ultimately real, called Ideas in the one case, 
dharmas in the other. Both schools had lists of these constituents, though the Platonic 
lists have not survived; the Sarvastavadin dharma-list recognised seventy-five impersonal 
"elements" or ultimate constituents of phenomena.1 
However, the term inherent existence is not limited to the Sarvastivadin tradition of 
northwest India since it also appears in the Theravadin tradition of south-east Asia. It is a term 
common to both traditions. First the evidence for the term in the Sarvastivadin tradition. 
Svabhava in the Sarvastivadin tradition 
The term inherent existence or essential nature (svabhiiva) is found in a number of 
works that belong to or describe the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma system. For instance, it is 
found in the Vijiiiinakiiya (Consciousness Group), the Mahiivibhii~ii (Great Commentary), the 
Abhidharmahrdaya (Essence of Higher Knowledge) and the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of 
Higher Knowledge). These sources show that inherent existence is definitely part of the 
Sarvastivadin tradition. 
The Vijiiiinakiiya was discussed above (in chapter three) in connection with the 
Kathiivatthu (Points of Controversy). The Vijiiiinakiiya is a Sarvastivadin Abhidharma work, 
whereas the Kathiivatthu is a Theravadin Abhidharma work. Both works use the same style of 
argument which most probably dates from a time before the independent development of 
these two schools, i.e. before Asoka's missions around the middle of the third century BC. 
The Vijiiiinakiiya is renowned for propounding the view that phenomena exist in all 
three times? The name Sarvastivada literally means 'the doctrine that all exists'? The 
Vijiiiinakiiya argues for its position in opposition to a certain Maudgalyayana (Mulian) who 
claims that things exist only in the present and not in the past or future. Following this 
discussion, the Vijiiiinakiiya argues that phenomena possess an essential nature (svabhiiva).4 
The same view is described in commentaries on the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma Pitaka. 
The first of the works making up the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma Pi{aka is the Jiiiinaprasthiina 
(Foundation of Knowledge)5 by Katyayanlputra who lived around the later part of the first 
I McEvilley 2002, 167. 
2 Cox 1995, 153 note 28. 
3 Williams 1981,229. 
4 TaishO 26.537a-26.538b. Trans. Watanabe ]983,177-180. See Buswell, Jaini in Potter ed. ]965-99,7,105. 
S Summarised by Takakusu 1904-05,82-98; and by Gerow, Potter in Potter ed. ] 965-99,7,4]7-449. 
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century BC. l An encyclopaedic commentary on the Jfianaprasthana, entitled the 
Mahavibha~a (Great Commentary),2 was compiled following a council held in Kashmir 
during the reign of King Kani~ka in the second century AD? The Mahavibha~a survives now 
only in Chinese translation. In a section discussing wrong views there is a discussion on 
essential nature.4 
The Abhidharmahrdaya (Essence of Higher Knowledge) by DhannasrI (Fasheng) also 
survives now only in Chinese translation.s Willemen places this work some time after 130 
BC, since DharmasrI is said to be a Tocharian from Bactria, but before the Mahavibha~a was 
compiled, since he is mentioned in there as one of the Western masters (bahirddakas). Others 
date the Abhidharmahrdaya as late as 200 AD.6 The work consists often chapters, the first of 
these, on elements (dhatu), ends with an explanation that things are comprised within 
something of their own nature.7 
The Abhidharmahrdaya is believed to have inspired the famous Abhidharmakosa 
(Treasury of Higher Knowledge) by Vasubandhu (cAOO-480 AD).8 In the sixth chapter of his 
own commentary on this work (Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya), Vasubandhu explains that elements 
of existence (dhamws) possess two types of characteristic, unique characteristics (svalak~a1'}a) 
and general characteristics (samanyalak~a1'}a). Vasubandhu defines 'unique characteristic' as 
an element's essential nature (svabhava).9 
There is no doubt that the term inherent existence or essential nature (svabhava) played 
a major role in Sarvastivadin Abhidhamw philosophy. However, it is not limited to the 
Sarvastivadin tradition since it also appears in works belonging to the Theravadin tradition. 
1 Buswell, laini in Potter ed. 1965-99,7,108. 
2 Summarised by Ichimura et al. in Potter 1965-99,7,511-568. 
3 Described in Taranatha 1970,91-95. Watters 1904-05,274-276 argues that the Mahiivibhii:jii was not produced 
following Kani~ka's council. 
4 Ichimura et al. in Potter 1965-99, 7, 517. 
5 Taish5: 1550. Also called the Abhidharmasiira. Trans. Willemen 1975. Summarised by Willemen in Potter ed. 
1965-99,7,451-470; and Pruden 1988-90,1,44-48. 
6 Willemen 1975, vi-viii. 
7 Willemen 1975, 10. 
S Frauwallner ] 961, 131. 
9 Abhidharmakosa (6.14c-d), trans. Pruden 1988-90,3,925. See Williams 1981,242-243; and Cox ]995, 139. 
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Svabhiiva in the Theravadin tradition 
This same term (Pali: sabhiiva) is also used in the Theravadin tradition. Evidence for 
this is found in the Patisambhidiimagga (Path of Discrimination), the BuddhavaJ?1sa (Lineage 
of the Buddhas), the Petakopadesa (Instructions to Students of the Pitakas), as well as in a 
number of Theravadin commentaries. 
The first of these, the Patisambhidiimagga, 1 is the twelfth text of the Khuddaka Nikiiya 
(Collection of Little Texts) and not one of the seven works that make up the Theravadin 
Abhidharma Pitaka, although it does follow the style of many Abhidharma works. According 
to Warder, "the Patisambhidiimagga was originally an Abhidhamma text" 2 and Frauwallner 
agrees, saying: "That this is clearly a work of the Abhidharma has always been recognised.,,3 
The work is traditionally attributed to Sariputta. Warder dates the work as probably 349 BC,4 
except that additions were made to it at a later time, "bringing in some later concepts which 
have been discussed above, namely 'own-nature' (sabhiiva) ... These probably take us into the 
2nd century BC at least. That would be the likely period for the elaboration of Treatise XX 
(on emptiness, using the term 'own-nature') ... " 5 
The "Treatise XX" that Warder refers to is the 20th chapter of the Patisambhidiimagga. 
It discusses the term sabhiiva which Nat;tamoli translates as 'individual essence,.6 This term is 
used in conjunction with a system of categorising the elements of existence (dhammas). 
Warder explains that in this system, "each dhamma is defined with a particular 'characteristic' 
peculiar to itself, in addition to the universal characteristics they all share.,,7 The unique 
characteristic of each element of existence is described as its individual essence (sabhiiva). 
This is the same as Vasubandhu's description of the Sarvastivadin understanding of the term. 
J Trans. NaQamoli 1982. Summarised by Norman] 983,87-89; McDermott in Potter ed. ]965-99,7,219-264; 
and by Frauwallner 1995, 87-89. 
2 Warder 1982, xl. 
3 Frauwallner 1995, 42. 
4 Warder] 982, xxx. 
5 Warder 1982, xxxv. Warder goes on to say (p. xxxvii) that other material may have been added to the 
Patisambhidamagga as late as the 1st century Be. See chronological table p. xxxix. 
6 NaQamoli ] 982,356-361, the term sabhiiva is mentioned on 357. 
7 Warder 1982, xvi. 
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According to Nat;lamoli, "this seems to be the onlyPitaka reference for the term 
sabhava (individual essence).,,1 However, the term is found in number of other Theravadin 
works. It is found in the BuddhavaJ?1sa,2 the fourteenth text of the Khuddaka Nikaya. The 
author of this work is unknown and it is believed to be later than the Patisambhidamagga.3 
Horner translates the passage in the BuddhavaJ?1sa containing the term sabhava: "While I was 
reflecting on these things with their intrinsic nature [sabhava], traits and characteristic 
marks,,,4 and Warder translates the same passage: "Of him comprehending these dhammas 
having their own natures [sabhava], tastes and characteristics." Regarding this passage, 
Warder goes on to say: 
Obviously this presupposes the later system of defining dhammas according to their 
characteristics, 'tastes' (functions) and own natures [sabhava] , which is not actually 
found even in the Pa!isambhidamagga although all three terms occur here with these 
special technical meanings already developing.5 
The same term is also found in the Petakopadesa which is traditionally attributed to 
Mahakaccayana. The Petakopadesa (fustructions to Students of the Pitakas) is translated as 
the Pitaka-Disc!osures.6 It is closely associated with another similar Theravadin work, the 
Nettippakarm;a (The Guide).7 Nat;lamoli maintains that the Petakopadesa is the older of the 
two and that it was composed in India before the first century BC, perhaps as early as the 
second century BC or even a little earlier.8 Norman agrees with this date.9 Nat;lamoli 
concludes that the Petakopadesa "represents the oldest layer of exegetical thought in the 
Theravada outside the actual Canon (excluding perhaps the Milindapafiha), a layer 
considerably older than that represented even by the Netti (itself prior to the main Pali 
Commentaries)."lO Bond dates the Petakopadesa in 150 BC. l1 
] I\HilJamoli 1982, 362 note 1. 
2 Trans. Horner 1975, 1-99 (previously translation in 1938 by B.C. Law as The Lineage of the Buddhas. London: 
Pali Text Society). Summarised in Norman 1983,92-94. See also Horner 1978. 
3 Law 1979,156-157. 
4 Horner 1975,23. 
5 Warder 1982, xvii. 
6 Trans. NaIJamo1i 1964. Summarised by Bond in Potter ed. 1965-99,7,381-401. See Zacchetti 2002. 
7 Trans. NalJamoli 1962. Summarised by Bond in Potter ed. 1965-99,7,403-416. 
8 NalJamoli 1964, xi-xii. 
9 Norman 1983, 108. 
10 NalJamoli 1964, xii. 
]] Potter ed. 1965-99, 7, 381. 
311 
Chapter seven: Buddhist dialectics 
The Petakopadesa includes the term in question in a discussion on the difference 
between causes and conditions: 
Herein, what is the difference between the cause [hetu] and the condition [paccaya]? The 
same-essence (individual-essence) [sabhava] is the cause and the other-essence 
[parabhava] is the condition ... 1 
This passage closely resembles the view that Nagarjuna refutes in his MUla Madhyamaka 
Karika.2 Warder maintains that the passage in the Petakopadesa is the earliest description of 
the term sabhiiva to be found in available Theravadin texts. 
Potter describes these and other Theravadin sources for the term essential nature and 
explains how Nagarjuna's rejection of it lead to his founding the Madhyamaka school. 
The Patisambhidamagga seems to anticipate a later Theravada description of factors 
according to their unique characteristics (Pali lakkha1Ja, Skt. lak~a1Ja), function (rasa), 
and essential natures (sabhava; Skt. svabhava). While the term sabhava appears in Pali in 
the semicanonical Petakopadesa, and the Dhammasanga1Ji-Atthakatha (Atthasalinl 39), 
as well as in such independent treatises as Visuddimagga, it is only in the 
Pa(isambhidamagga that it is described as being "empty by essential nature", a phrase 
that has been glossed by Mahanama (ca. 6th century AD), the author of the commentary 
to the text, the Saddammappakasinl, as "having emptiness as its own nature". This term 
gained currency in the Sarvastivada school, where svabhava as the abiding nature of 
factors was contrasted with karitra, or the ephemeral functioning of those factors. This 
elaboration of a theory of the essential nature of factors (dharmasvabhava) eventually led 
to Nagarjuna's dialectical critique of this position, and spawned the Madhyamaka school 
of Mahayana philosophy. 3 
These sources from both the Sarvastivadin and the Theravadin traditions show that the 
term essential nature or inherent existence (svabhava) is not limited to the Sarvastivadin 
Abhidharma works but is an idea common to both traditions. This indicates that it most 
probably dates from a time before the independent development of these two traditions, i.e. 
before Asoka sent missions to Sri Lanka and to northwest India in the third century Be. This 
would mean that the theory of an essential nature is Indian in origin and was not introduced to 
the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma tradition by the Greeks as McEvilley suggests.4 It follows from 
this that NagaIjuna was not reacting to Greek ideas when he wrote the Mula Madhyamaka 
Kiirika, but was arguing against an Indian theory common to various Abhidharma traditions. 
1 Trans. Nal!amoli 1964, 142 
2 Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika (1.3 and 15.3), trans. Streng 1967, 183 and 199; Inada 1970, 40 and 98; Kalupahana 
1986,107 and 229; and Garfield 1995, 110 and 221. See also Hayes 1994,312-322 and 365. 
3 Potter ed. 1965-99,7,98. See also Warder 1982, xvii-xviii. 
4 McEvilley 2002, 167. 
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7.4.2 . Nagarjuna's dialectical method 
McEvilley also claims that the dialectical method that Nagarjuna uses to refute the 
views of the Abhidharma tradition came from the Greeks since it appears in the Mula 
Madhyamaka Karika (Nagatjuna's Verses) without prior developmental stages: 
... there is inadequate background-almost none whatever-to account for the sudden 
appearance of the full-blown formal dialectic in Nagarjuna's Verses. Nagarjuna's work 
has the whole pattern of the Greek dialectic, with its complex and extensive system of 
arguments which in Greece developed over a period of centuries; yet it arises suddenly, 
without evidence of developmental stages, in its own tradition.] 
Origin of the tetralemma 
A distinctive feature ofNagarjuna's dialectical method is the fourfold scheme of 
predication (catu.Jkoti), nowadays called the tetralemma (or quadrilemma). McEvilley points 
out that a similar fourfold scheme was also used by Pyrrho: 
An extraordinary similarity, that has long been noticed, between Pyrrhonism and 
Madhyamika is the formula known in connection with Buddhism as the fourfold negation 
(catu$koti) and which in Pyrrhonic form might be called the fourfold indeterminacy.2 
The tetralemma consists of four statements (or questions) which taken together exhaust 
the ways in which the predicate applies to the subject. Using 'A' to stand for the predicate, the 
forms of these four statements are: 
1. The subject is A 
2. The subject is not A 
3. The subject is both A and not A 
4. The subject is neither A nor not A 
Nagarjuna uses the tetralemma in the opening verse of his MUla Madhyamaka Karika: 
Neither from itself nor from another, 
N or from both, 
Nor without a cause, 
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.3 
This same fourfold scheme is used on numerous occasions throughout Nagarjuna's 
work. A very similar scheme is also found in the Greek tradition. A passage from a work by 
Aristocles of Messene (late first century BC) preserved in Eusebius of Caesarea' s (c.264-
J McEvilley 2002, 500. See also McEvilley 1982,28. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 495. 
3 Mula Madhyamaka Karika (1.1), trans. Garfield 1995,3 and 105. 
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c.339 AD) Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation of the Gospel) describes a fourfold scheme 
used by Pyrrho ofElis (c.365-c.275 BC) according to his follower Timon (c.322-c.232 BC): 
Pyrrho of Elis was also a powerful advocate of such a position. He himself has left 
nothing in writing; his pupil Timon, however, ... saying about each single thing that it no 
more [1] is than [2] is not or [3] both is and is not or [4] neither is nor is not. l 
McEvilley concludes that: 
It is hard to identify any significant difference between either the methods or the stated 
purposes of Pyrrhonist and Madhyamika dialectic.2 
According to McEvilley then, the tetralemma that Nagarjuna uses in the MUla 
Madhyamaka Kiirika has a Greek origin dating back at least to the days ofPyrrho. However, 
the tetralemma was used in India as early as the days of the Buddha, i.e. before the Greeks 
first arrived in India. This was discussed at some length above (in chapter two). 
In the Indian tradition, the tetralemma is found first in the early Buddhist works. The 
logical principles that appear in these works indicate that statements can have at most four 
logical forms, i.e. where a subject is, is not, both is and is not, or neither is nor is not some 
predicate. If anyone of these four statements is true then the other three are false. Sometimes, 
all four statements are said to be wrong, not because all four are false, but because true and 
false do not apply to some statements. There are four types of statement: unambiguous, vague, 
ambiguous, and misleading. These four types of statement correspond to four types of 
question, i.e. those requiring a categorical, discriminating, counter-question, and no reply, 
respectively. True and false do not apply to any of the four forms of misleading statements, 
and consequently, misleading questions must be set aside and not answered. 
The Buddha refused to declare some statements to be true or false. These are the so-
called indeterminate (avyiikatiini) or undeclared points. A list of ten such points appears in a 





The world is permanent, impermanent, both, or neither 
The world is finite, infinite, both, or neither 
The Tathagata does, does not, both, or neither does nor does not exist after death 
The self (soul) is the same as, or different from the body 
I Praeparatio Evangelica (XIV 18.1-3), trans. Bett 1994, 140. See also De Lacy 1958,69; Long, Sedley 1987,1, 
14-15; and McEvilley 2002, 453. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 484. 
3 See for instance Udana (6.4), trans. Woodward 1935,81-83; Anguttara Nikaya (ii 41), trans. Woodward, Hare 
1932-36,2,47-48. 
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The Buddha explains that his reason for refusing to either affirm or deny any of these is 
because all such statements are misleading. That is, the predicate of each statement does not 
apply to its subject. This is explained in the Abyiikata SaT!1yutta (Connected Discourses on the 
Undeclared), l and in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta (To Vacchagotta on Fire)? Nagarjuna refers 
to these so-called undeclared points in the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika: 
How can the tetralemma of permanent and impermanent, etc., 
Be true of the peaceful? 
How can the tetralemma of finite, infinite, etc., 
Be true of the peaceful?3 
Candraklrti in his commentary on this verse also makes the point that the predicate of each 
statement does not apply to its subject: 
Similarly the four assertions concerning the eternal and the non-eternal have no 
relevance; because they are without relevance, as the predicates 'light' and 'dark' are 
without relevance for the son of a barren women ... 4 
This shows that there are Indian precedents for the tetralemma that NagaIjuna uses and 
thus there is no need to invoke a Greek origin in order to account for it in the Mula 
Madhyamaka Kiirika. Pyrrho may well have used a similar fourfold scheme, but as explained 
above (in chapter two) the origin of Pyrrho' s fourfold scheme is more likely to be Indian than 
to be Greek. Conze maintains that: 
... if it is granted that Pyrrhon owed his basic ideas to his conversion by Indians, and if 
his philosophy is very similar to that of the Madhyamikas, then the Madhyamika 
doctrines, which are known to us only from writings certainly not older than about 100 
BC, must go back in their essentials to ca 350 BC, i.e. to within 150 years after the 
Buddha's Nirvana.5 
Tetralemma is not a negation 
McEvilley concedes that there may be an Indian version of the tetralemma, but he 
maintains that Nagarjuna's interpretation of it as a negation was due to Greek influence: 
The redefinition of the four alternatives into a fourfold negation which occurred with the 
Madhyamika school had happened considerably earlier in Greece, and even though the 
four alternatives may not have been planted in India by Greek influence, it is quite 
plausible that the redefinition of them as negations may have been.6 
J Sa1Jlyutta Nikiiya (iv 379), trans. Bodhi 2000, 2, 1383. 
2 Majjhima Nikiiya (i 486-487), trans. Bodhi 1995,592-593. 
3 Mula Madhyamaka Karika (22.12), trans. Garfield 1995,61 and 281. 
4 Trans. Sprung 1979,203. 
5 Conze 1951,142. See also Conze 1949, 196. 
6 McEvilley 2002, 497. 
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The problem with this claim is that the tetralemma is not a negation, nor was it 
redefined into a negation in the Madhyamika school as McEvilley claims. It is not entirely 
clear what McEvilley means here by "the redefinition of the four alternatives into a fourfold 
negation". The term "catu~koti" is, however, occasionally translated as "four-cornered 
negation".1 This may be done to emphasis the fact that none of the four alternatives should be 
asserted in situations where the predicate does not apply to its subject. Nagarjuna provides an 
example of this: 
"Empty" should not be asserted. 
"Nonempty" should not be asserted. 
Neither both nor neither should be asserted. 
They are only used nominally.2 
Nagarjuna's claim that none of these alternatives should be asserted is perhaps what 
McEvilley means when he says that the four alternatives were redefined into a fourfold 
negation. However, this is certainly not new to the Madhyamika school, since it is the 
acknowledged position of the Buddha.3 Further, Nagarjuna does not always claim that these 
alternatives should be denied. Occasionally all four are asserted. For instance, Nagarjuna says: 
Everything is real and is not real, 
Both real and not real, 
Neither real nor not real. 
This is Lord Buddha's teaching.4 
The tetralemma is in fact a fourfold scheme of predication, not a fourfold negation. It 
consists of four statements that express the ways in which the predicate applies to the subject. 
If these four are straightforward unambiguous statements then one of the four will be true and 
the other three false. If the predicate does not apply to the subject then all four are considered 
to be misleading statements and none of them are asserted to be true or false. The tetralemma 
has a history of use in India dating back to the days before the Greeks first arrived in India. 
Robinson, for instance, describes the tetralemma as "simply a pattern consisting of four 
I See for instance: Raju 1954; Bahm 1957-58; Conze 1962,219; Tripathi 1963,233; Smart 1964, 35; Ross Reat 
in Potter ed. 1965-99,7,37; Gunaratne 1979,597; Ghose 1987,294; and Tuck 1990,55. 
2 Mula Madhyamaka Karika (22.11), trans. Garfield 1995,61 and 280. 
3 McEvilley 2002, 426 says: "there is no evidence as to whether the Noble Silence was a part of primitive 
Buddhism." 
4 Mula Madhyamaka Karika (18.8), trans. Garfield 1995,49 and 250. 
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propositions" ,l and Hayes describes it as "a fairly primitive framework for posing questions 
that was in use before the time of the Buddha".2 It is frequently used in the MUla 
Madhyamaka Karika, but this is not evidence of Greek influence as McEvilley claims. 
Eleatics and Madhyamikas 
McEvilley also claims that Nagarjuna's arguments are similar to those of the Eleatics: 
There exist, then, extremely close parallels between the fundamental arguments of the 
Eleatics and Madhyamikas against origination, destruction, motion, change, and plurality. 
It is not exaggerating to say that the two traditions comprise a single discourse on this 
subject? 
The Eleatics refers to three philosophers who were active in the early to mid-fifth 
century Be. They are: Parmenides (c.480 Be), Zeno of Elea (c.470 Be), and Melissus (c.440 
Be), called collectively the Eleatics after Elea (now Velia) in southern Italy.4 Zeno is well 
known for the paradoxes of motion recorded by Aristotle.5 Nagatjuna's arguments on motion 
have often been compared with those of Zeno. Jacobi noted in 1911 that Nagarjuna's system 
"may be compared with the philosophy of Zeno". 6 In 1927, Stcherbatsky agreed with this, but 
maintained that "there is no trace of Nagarjuna having known them [i.e. Zeno's arguments]".7 
Murti later (1955) argued that Nagarjuna's arguments are superior to those of Zeno.8 Next, 
Siderits and O'Brien (1976) described what they say seem to be "striking parallels between 
certain ofZeno's and Nagarjuna's arguments, both in methodologies and in targets.,,9 In 1984, 
Mabbett agreed with Murti's analysis and argued that "the temptation to make comparisons 
with Zeno, however natural, tends grievously to obscure Nagatjuna's meaning."IO 
Bhattacharya argued on a number of occasions (1980-85)1l for a grammatical interpretation of 
Nagatjuna's arguments. He rejected the mathematical interpretation of Siderits and O'Brien, 
1 Robinson 1969, 76. 
2 Hayes] 994, 322. 
3 McEvilley 2002,425. 
4 Honderich ed. 1995,222. 
5 The Dichotomy (Physics 239bll-13), the Achilles (Physics 239b14-]6), the Arrow (Physics 239b5-9, 239b30-
3), and the Moving Rows or the Stadium (Physics 239b33-40a1). 
6 Jacobi ]911,] note 2. 
7 Stcherbatsky 1927, 211 note 2; see also 86 and 107. 
8 Murti 1955,178, ]83-184. 
9 Siderits, O'Brien ]976,281. 
10 Mabbett 1984,402. 
11 See Bhattacharya 1980, Bhattacharya 1980-81, and Bhattacharya 1985. 
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and argued that Nagarjuna' s arguments have "nothing to do with Zeno' s arrow paradox". 1 
Then in 1987, Galloway disagreed with Bhattacharya's criticism of Siderits and O'Brien, and 
claimed that Nagarjuna' s arguments "can be most conveniently and clearly explained 
mathematico-physically.,,2 McEvilley also accepts that there are close parallels between 
Zeno's and Nagarjuna's arguments, suggesting thereby that the Greeks influenced 
Nagarjuna's arguments on motion? 
The extent to which Nagajuna's arguments are similar to those of Zeno remains unclear, 
but they are not without precedent in Indian literature. Thus, there is no need to invoke Greek 
influence in order to account for their occurrence in Nagajuna's works. 
Nagajuna's arguments against motion employ a grammatical method of analysis. In the 
second chapter of the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika, examination of motion (gatiigata-parlk~ii), 
Nagarjuna says: 
If there were a twofold motion, 
The subject of that motion would be twofold. 
For without a subject of motion, 
There cannot be motion.4 
Here Nagarjuna argues that the act of moving requires an agent or mover, and if there 
are two acts of moving then there must be two agents or movers. Candraklrti in his 
commentary on this verse says: 
As an activity necessarily requires certain factors for its realization, either an agent or an 
object, the activity of motion must reside in an agent and so requires a mover (gantii).5 
According to Bhattacharya, Nagarjuna's arguments are based on grammatical concepts 
that date back to Patafijali (c.2nd century BC), if not to Pat;lini himself (c.350 BC).6 These 
concepts, he argues, are essential for Nagarjuna' s method of argument: 
I believe equally, however, that the Madhyamika would never have been able to 
formulate his arguments against motion if he had not found in grammar the concepts 
which furnish him with the technical basis for them.7 
I Bhattacharya 1985,9. 
2 Galloway 1987, 8l. 
3 McEvilley 2002, 422-428. 
4 Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika (2.6), trans. Garfield 1995,7 and 127. 
5 Trans. Sprung 1979,80. 
6 Bhattacharya 1985, 12. 
7 Bhattacharya 1985, 13. 
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Hayes accepts Bhattacharya's analysis of Nagtiljuna's method: 
Bhattacharya finds it significant that hardly a single argument used by Nagarjuna was 
unknown to the grammatical tradition. It is his indebtedness to the grammarians that 
distinguished Nagarjuna from those Buddhists that preceded him and from the 
Greeks ... I 
Hayes also notes Candraklrti's debt to the grammarian Bhart-rhari? 
In chapter seven of the MUla Madhyamaka Karika, examination of the conditioned 
(sa1J1skrta-parlk~a), Nagarjuna makes reference to the argument he previously used in the 
discussion on motion: 
The arisen, the non-arisen and that which is arising 
Do not arise in any way at all. 
Thus they should be understood 
Just like the gone, the not-gone, and the going.3 
That is, the same arguments that are used in the section on motion, and that have been likened 
to Zeno's arguments, are also used in the refutation of events like arising. Warder notes that a 
similar argument is found in the Pafisambhidamagga: 
Treatise XXIII on abhisamaya (,convergence', insight) presupposes the forms of debate 
and the logical terminology of the Kathiivatthu ... The Treatise concludes with a 
remarkable argument (ii 217-8, § 11) to the effect that neither a past defilement, nor a 
future defilement, nor a presently-arising defilement, is abandoned. This seems to go 
beyond some of the Yamaka discussions involving oppositions of times in the direction of 
the Madhyamaka ... 4 
The argument in the Pafisambhidamagga that Warder refers to is quoted here in full: 
[When] this [noble person] abandons defilements, [then] he abandons past defilements, 
abandons future defilements, abandons presently-arisen defilements? 
[Suppose that] he abandons past defilements. Ifhe abandons past defilements, he destroys 
what has already been destroyed, causes to cease what has already ceased, causes to 
vanish what has already vanished, causes to subside what has already subsided. What is 
past, which is non-existent, that he abandons? He does not abandon past defilements. 
[Suppose that] he abandons future defilements. If he abandons future defilements, he 
abandons what has not been born, he abandons what has not been generated, he abandons 
what has not arisen, he abandons what has not become manifest. What is future, which is 
non-existent, that he abandons? He does not abandon future defilements. 
1 Hayes 1994,353. 
2 Hayes 1994,375 note 24. 
3 Miila Madhyamaka Karika (7.14), trans. Garfield 1995, 20 and 167. 
4 Warder 1982, xxxvi. 
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[Suppose that] he abandons presently-arisen defilements. If he abandons presently-arisen 
defilements, then though inflamed with greed, he abandons greed, though corrupted by 
hate, he abandons hate, though deluded, he abandons delusion, though shackled, he 
abandons conceit [pride], though misapprehending, he abandons [false] view, though 
distracted, he abandons agitation, though undecided, he abandons uncertainty, though 
having inveterate habits, he abandons underlying-tendency, dark and bright ideas occur 
coupled together, and there is development of a path that has defilement. 
He does not abandon past defilements, he does not abandon future defilements, he does 
not abandon presently-arisen defilements. If he does not abandon past defilements and he 
does not abandon future defilements, and he does not abandon presently-arisen 
defilements, then there is no development of the path, there is no realization of its 
fruition, there is no convergence of ideas?l 
Warder dates the Pa{isambhidiimagga as probably 349 BC,2 i.e. before Alexander's 
visit in 326-325 Be. However, he feels obliged to date Treatise XXIII, including the 
argument in question, as late as the 1st century BC since the argument is so similar to those of 
Nagarjuna.3 The exact date of this section of the Pa{isambhidiimagga remains unclear, but it 
is certainly earlier than Nagarjuna (c.2nd century AD). 
Thus, there are Indian precedents for Nagarjuna' s arguments on motion. These are 
found in the grammatical tradition and in the Abhidharma tradition. Also, the fourfold scheme 
of predication (catu$ko{i), nowadays called the tetralemma, has a history of use in India dating 
back to the days of the Buddha, i.e. before the Greeks first arrived in India. The view that 
Nagarjuna argues against in the Mula Madhyamaka Kiirika, that elements of existence 
(dharmas) possess an essential nature (svabhiiva), also has an Indian origin. Further, 
Nagarjuna's style of argument, involving consequences (prasaJiga) and refutation only, has 
developmental stages in the Indian logical tradition. Nagarjuna uses this style of argument 
throughout his works. In his Vaidalya PrakarmJa, Nagarjuna uses such arguments to refute 
the Nyaya system of logic. This shows that he is very well aware of the five-membered proof 
described in the Nyiiya Sutra. The combination of this evidence completely disproves 
McEvilley's claim that "the array of Greek dialectical forms turns up in India, mature, 
complete, and without evidence of developmental stages, in the school of Buddhist thought 
called Madhyamika.,,4 
1 NaI;lamoli 1982,389. 
2 Warder 1982, xxx. 
3 Warder 1982, xxxvii. 
4 McEvilley 2002, 416. 
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The final argument for Greek influence in Indian logic is that the Greeks are known to 
have influenced Indian astronomy, and thus they must have influenced Indian logic as well. 
However, this argument does not prove that the Greeks definitely influenced Indian logic. It 
shows only that they could have done so and that claims of Greek influence in Indian logic 
should therefore be taken seriously. 
8.1 Greek works taken to India 
The arguments for Greek influence in Indian logic are supported by claims that Greek 
works were taken to India and translated into Indian languages. There are claims that Greek 
works influenced both types of logic in ancient India. The first type of logic is represented by 
the Nyaya Siitra and the system of structured proofs governed by rules. Vidyabhii~at;la claims 
that Aristotle's works influenced the first type of logic: 
Aristotle's works were brought down to Alexandria (in Egypt) by Cal1imachus, the 
celebrated librarian of Ptolemy Philadelphus during 285-247 BC, and it seems that copies 
of some of these works reached India through Syria, Susiana, Bactria, and Taxila in 
subsequent times. From the stages in the development of the syllogism in Hindu logic ... 
it will appear that Aristotle's works migrated into India during three distinct periods. I 
The second type of logic is represented by Nagarjuna' s Madhyamika school and its 
system of dialectical refutations. McEvilley claims that Greek dialectical handbooks 
influenced the second type of logic: 
The cumulative heritage of seven hundred years of Greek dialectic was summed up in 
handbooks in and before the time of Sextus, and the contents of such a handbook, or their 
equivalent, may all be found in the Madhyamika texts.2 
Between Gorgias's On Nature, or On Non-Being and Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
there were scores of Greek dialectical books, no longer extant, at least one of which 
seems to have made its way to India during or shortly before the time of Nagarjuna.3 
. .. a dialectical handbook such as are known to have floated around the Hellenistic-
Roman world-perhaps the famous one by Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonic Discourses), or by 
Cleitomachus, or Agrippa, or one of those by students of Arcesilaus and Carneades, or 
countless others, some by nameless authors or compliers-all containing more or less the 
same accumulated apparatus of arguments, anyone capable of accounting for the entire 
argumentation of the early Madhyamika thinkers ... 4 
I VidyabhU~al.la 1918,486; repro VidyabhU~al.la 1920,511. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 422. 
3 McEvilley 2002,501. See also McEvilley 1982,30. 
4 McEvil1ey 2002, 503. 
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That is, both types of Indian logic are said to be based on Greek works which had been 
taken to India and studied by Indians. The proponents of this view argue that these works 
could have travelled to India quite easily since there was a large amount of trade between 
India and the west. 
8.2 Trade 
Trade between India and the Mediterranean probably existed from very eady times, 
both over land and by sea. Greek records show that trade by sea was common in the sixth 
century Be. Herodotus (484-424 Be) has preserved in his History a passage from a work by 
Skylax of Caryanda. Skylax was the first to write about India in Greek and his work now 
exists only in fragments. Herodotus quotes Skylax on his voyage down the Indus river. 
Darius, the king of Persia (522-486 Be), had sent Skylax to explore the Indus around 518-515 
Be. The passage ends: "After this voyage was completed, Darius conquered the Indians, and 
made use of the sea in those parts". 1 
This trade may have originally used coastal boats,2 but at some stage more direct routes 
between India and the Rea Sea ports serving Alexandria were used. The Greeks were 
probably not the first to sail directly to India; they originally traded through intermediaries in 
Arabian ports? When Greek sailors learnt to use the seasonal monsoon winds to sail directly 
to India, there was a great increase in trade with India. This occurred during the rule of the 
Roman emperor Augustus (reigned 27 Be - 14 AD). A comment by the Greek geographer 
Strabo (c.63 BC-c.24 AD) describes the amount of trade with India around 25 BC: 
At any rate, when Gallus was prefect of Egypt, I accompanied him and ascended the Nile 
as far as Syene and the frontiers of Ethiopia, and I learned that as many as one hundred 
and twenty vessels were sailing from Myos Hormos to India, whereas formerly, under the 
Ptolemies, only a very few ventured to undertake the voyage and to carryon traffic in 
Indian merchandise.4 
MyosHormos (Mussel Harbour), identified with Abu Scha'ar, was one of the Rea Sea 
ports serving Alexandria. Strabo's reference to the dramatic increase in the number of ships 
sailing to India probably marks the beginning of direct voyages to India by Greek ships. The 
I Herodotus (IV 44), trans. Rawlinson 1910,320-321. 
2 Karttunen 1997, 328. 
3 McCrindle 1879, 135; Tarn 1938,370; and Casson 1989, 11-12. 
4 Geography ofStrabo (2.5.12), trans. Jones 1917, 1,455. See also McCrindle 1901,6 and 98. 
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credit for discovering a direct route was given to Hippalus, but he may have been simply the 
first Greek to sail directly to India.1 
The Periplus Maris Erythraei (Circumnavigation of the Rea Sea) was written in the first 
century AD by a Greek merchant or sailor for traders who sailed the Red Sea, the coast of 
eastern Africa, southern Arabia and western India. The author of this work attributes the 
discovery of a direct route to India to Hippalus: 
The ship captain Hippalos, by plotting the location of the ports of trade and the 
configuration of the sea, was the first to discover the route over open water. 2 
Warmington suggests that Hippalus simply "helped to unravel a secret held perhaps for 
ages by Arabians and Indians, the Greeks knowing only that the winds existed.,,3 In any event 
the monsoon winds used to sail directly from the Red Sea ports to Indian were called the 
Hippalus. Pliny (23-79 AD) describes in his Natural History (written 51-77 AD) the route 
from Alexandria to India and return as well as the times to sail. He mentions the time taken to 
reach India: 
But the most advantageous way of sailing to India is to set out from Cella; from that port 
it is a 40 days' voyage, if the Hippalus is blowing, to the first trading-station in India, 
Cranganore ... 4 
Pliny also mentions the amount of trade between India and Alexandria: 
And it will not be amiss to set out the whole of the voyage from Egypt, now that reliable 
knowledge of it is for the first time accessible. It is an important subject, in view of the 
fact that in no year does India absorb less than fifty million sesterces of our empire's 
wealth, sending back merchandise to be sold with us at a hundred times its prime cost.5 
Later in his Natural History, Pliny says: 
And by the lowest reckoning India, China and the Arabian peninsula take from our 
empire 100 million sesterces every year-that is the sum our luxuries and our women cost 
us ... 6 
J Rawlinson 1916,91,104-106; Tarn, Griffith 1927,246-248; Warmington 1928,6; Wheeler 1954,115,129; 
and Puskas 1987. 
2 Periplus Maris Erythraei (57.19.5-7), trans. Casson 1989,87, see also 224. Also McCrindle 1879, 138. 
3 Warmington 1928,47. See also McCrindle 1879, 135. 
4 Natural History (6.26.104), trans. Rackham 1938-63, 2, 419. See also McCrindle 1901,111. 
5 Natural History (6.26.10 1-102), trans. Rackham 1938-63, 2, 417. 
6 Natural History (12.41.84), trans. Rackham 1938-63,4,63. 
323 
Chapter eight: Greek works in India 
This implies that half the trade was with India. If 120 ships sailed each year to India in 
Strabo's day (around 25 BC), then by Pliny's time some 70-90 years later, the number of 
ships would be in the hundreds. Another indication of the level of commercial activity with 
India is the amount of money involved. Trade typically involved the exchange of Roman 
coins for goods, rather than the exchange of goods for goods. The cost of this trade was so 
great that the emperor Tiberius (reigned 14-37 AD) felt compelled to write a letter to the 
Senate drawing attention to the damaging drainage of wealth. 1 The importation of exotic 
luxuries only increased during Nero's reign. This has been confirmed by archaeological 
evidence. Sedlar explains that large numbers of Roman coins have been found in India. These 
bear dates ranging over five and a half centuries, but there are more coins belonging to the 
period from Augustus (reigned 29 BC-14 AD) to Nero (reigned 54-68 AD) than for any other 
period.2 Barnett in a description of the commercial relations between India and the west says: 
The direct trade of the Roman Empire with India, founded by Augustus, reached its acme 
between 50 and 100 AD, and then began to decline. It was mainly concerned with the 
importation of Oriental luxuries and treasures into the West. After the reign of Caracalla, 
who in 215 massacred the Alexandrians and the traders in their port, ... the trade almost 
disappeared as the Roman world sank deeper into bankruptcy; but under the Byzantine 
emperors it revived slightly for a time, as a small amount of industrial products began to 
be imported, chiefly from the south-western coast of India, and then again disappeared? 
The massive amount of trade between India and Alexandria must have involved large 
numbers of ships plying these trade routes on a regular basis. According to McEvilley: 
This trade may have flagged during the third century AD due to wars and generally 
unsettled conditions in the Roman Empire, but it resurged in the fourth, and in both the 
second and the fourth centuries whole Greek books are known to have passed along this 
route to India, to have been translated into Indian languages, and to have exerted a 
permanent and significant influence there.4 
The Greek books that McEvilley refers to here are probably books on astronomy. 
I Sedlar 1980, 95. 
2 Sedlar 1980,95. 
3 Barnett 1917-20,104. See also Sedlar 1980, 96-97. 
4 McEvilley 2002, 350. See also McEvilley 2002, 380. 
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8.3 Astronomy 
Argument for Greek influence 
There is strong support for Greek influence in Indian astronomy. Pingree has long 
argued for significant foreign influence in Indian astronomy: 
That Indian astronomy was not completely static is due almost entirely to the repeated 
intrusion of new theories from the West. Five times have such intrusions occurred-in the 
fifth century Be, from Mesopotamia via Iran; in the second and third centuries AD, from 
Mesopotamia via Greece; in the fourth century AD, directly from Greece; in the tenth to 
eighteenth centuries, from Iran; and in the nineteenth century, from England.1 
The earliest traces of astronomy in India are found in Vedic texts, an ancient body of 
literature that was gradually compiled between 2000 and 1000 BC. These works describe the 
correct times for performing rituals and their terminology was adopted in later astronomical 
works. This terminology includes names for various periods (yugas), years (sa1?1vatsaras), 
half-years (ayanas), seasons (rtus), months (miisas), intercalary months (adhimiisas), half-
months (pak$as), as well as constellations (nak~atras). The earliest astronomical works form 
the Jyoti~a Vediil1ga (Astronomical Section of the Vedas)2 which is associated with Lagadha.3 
The origin of the early astronomical ideas is the subject of some dispute. Pingree argues 
that the fundamental concepts of the Jyoti:ja Vediinga can be traced to Mesopotamia. This 
influence, he suggests, entered India when the Achaemenids dominated northwest India 
during the period after Darius the Great annexed the Indus valley around 515 BC up until 
Alexander the Great conquered the same area in 326 BC.4 Achar disagrees with Pingree, 
arguing instead that there is absolutely no need to invoke a Mesopotamian origin for the 
astronomical ideas in the Jyoti:ja Vediinga since every astronomical concept it describes can 
be traced to Vedic sources.s 
I Pingree] 978a, 533; summarised in Pingree 1996a. 
2 Trans. Sarma 1985. 
3 Pingree's date for Lagadha is 400 Be, while others argue for an earlier date. See Achar 1997. 
<I Pingree 1963 and] 973. 
5 Achar 1997 and 1998. 
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A later period in Indian astronomy is from the second to the fourth centuries AD, when 
trade between India and the Roman Empire was at its height. Pingree maintains that Greek 
treatises on astrology were translated into Sanskrit during this period: 
In 150 AD Yavanesvara, the Lord of the Greeks, translated into Sanskrit prose a Greek 
astrological text which had been written in Alexandria in the preceding half-century. This 
translation is now lost, but there is preserved in an early thirteenth-century palm-leaf 
manuscript in Kathmandu a versification of it made in 270 by the Yavanaraja 
Sphujidhvaja. In the second century another Greek text on the same subject was 
translated into Sanskrit; this text and Yavanesvara' s were both used by a third-century 
author named Satya. Unfortunately, the second translation from the Greek is lost, and 
Satya's work is known only from the citations of later astrologers and in what appears to 
be a fairly recent forgery. However, there has survived a work based on both 
Sphujidhvaja and Satya; this is the Vrddhayavanajataka of Minaraja. 1 
He further adds: 
Other Sanskrit translations of Graeco-Babylonian texts in this period include the 
Vasi~tha, Romaka, and Paulisa siddhfintas, which we know of only through the 
somewhat incompetent summaries provided by Varahamihira in the Paficasiddhfintikfi 
that he wrote in about 550.2 
Pingree analyses the astronomical theories recorded in Indian works during the period from 
the second to fourth centuries AD and concludes that: 
There seems to be very little in it that one can positively assert to have originated in India, 
and the overwhelming accumulation of evidence pointing to at least four Greek sources, 
transformed in Western India into the Yavanajfitaka and the siddhantas of Vasi~tha, 
Romaka, and Paulisa.3 
The Yavanajiitaka (Greek Genethlialogy)4 and the Paficasiddhiintikii (Commentary on 
Five Works),5 containing the works of Vasi~tha, Romaka andPaulisa, are both available in 
English translation. 
A later period beginning in the fifth century AD is characterised by a planetary theory 
that Pingree argues was inspired by the Greeks, and he claims that probably two more Greek 
works6 were translated into Sanskrit during this period? This position has been disputed.8 
I Pingree 1963,234-235. See also Kane 1955; and Jairazbhoy 1963,73. 
2 Pingree 1996a, 125-126. 
3 Pingree 1976, 114. See also Pingree 1996b. 
4 Pingree 1978b. 
5 Neugebauer, Pingree 1970-71. 
6 Pingree 1976, 121. 
7 Pingree 1976, 115; and Pingree 1978a, 555. See also Pingree 1971. 
8 van der Waerden, Pingree 1980. 
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Evidence for Greek influence 
There is some uncertainty over specific details, but there is general agreement that some 
Greek works were translated into Sanskrit and studied in India, and the most compelling 
evidence seems to be associated with the period when trade between India and Alexandria 
was at its height, i.e. between the first and fourth centuries AD. 
The evidence supporting this position can be classified into four types: Firstly, Indian 
authors refer to book titles that appear to have western origins. The Romaka Compendium and 
Paulisa Compendium, in particular, appear to contain Sanskrit transliterations of "Rome" and 
"Paulus" respectively. 
Secondly, there are many terms that appear to have a Greek or Latin origin. The signs of 
the zodiac, for instance, first appeared in Indian literature in the Yavanajataka. 1 Lists 
comparing the Greek, Latin and Sanskrit names for these signs, and for the names of planets, 
have been published many times since 1827.2 The Indian names appear to be either 
translations or transliterations of their western counterparts. The similarity between these 
names has been noted by a number of authors.3 
Greek astronomical terms also appear in rock inscriptions. Chakravarty describes 
inscriptions written in the Kharo$thI script that are associated with the Saka and Kushan rulers 
who controlled northwest India from the first century BC to the third century AD. These 
inscriptions are dated in years, months and days. Chakravarty explains that: "The Kharo$thI 
inscriptions mention months by Greek names, Sanskrit names and sanskritized Greek 
names.,,4 
1 Pingree 1976, 112. 
2 Noted by Burgess 1893, 746. Reference is to C.M. Whish 1827 'On the antiquity of the Hindu zodiac'. 
Transactions of the Madras Library. 
3 See for instance: Weber 1878, 255; Voge11912, 40; Rawlinson 1914,236; Rawlinson 1916, 173; Kaye 1924, 
40; Jairazbhoy 1963,71; and Sagar 1992,260. Burgess 1864-66,327-328; and Das 1928,75-77, both argue that 
the lunar divisions of the zodiac have an Indian origin. 
4 Chakravarty 1988,21. Karttunen 1997, 318, mentions that two sun-dials were found during excavations at Ai 
Khanum. 
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Thirdly, there are references to westerners (Greeks or Romans) by Indian writers. For 
instance, Varahamihira (c.550 AD) says in his Brhatsa1J1hita (2.14): 
For although the Greeks are barbarians, they have brought this science to perfection and 
so are honoured as sages; how much more honourable, then, is an astrologer who is a 
Brahmaf.la!! 
Pingree mentions another instance where reference is made to westerners. This is in a passage 
quoted by Bhaskara (AD 629) in his commentary on the Aryabha(iya of Aryabhata (AD 499): 
Here the Romakas [i.e., Romans], who do not know the ultimate purpose read: 'The sages 
say that an ayana [begins] from the beginning of Vasudeva [Dhani~ta] ... 2 
Kay mentions that "Varaha Mihira, Brahmagupta [c.630 AD] and others refer to Greek 
astronomers",3 and Kern says that Utpala (c.966 AD) also refers to "the ancient Greeks".4 
Lastly, there is the correspondence in the ideas and methods used in both Indian and 
Greek astronomy. Much of this evidence is of a technical nature and can be appreciated only 
when the details of the relevant astronomical systems are closely compared. Pingree has made 
an extensive study of these similarities.5 He lists the things found in the Indian astronomical 
systems that appear to have a Greek origin. These are: 
... adoptions of Babylonian lunar and planetary theories; the year-length of Hipparchus, 
an adaptation of his coordinate-system for the fixed stars, and his theories of precession 
and trepidation; tables of chords transformed into tables of sines; Peripatetic planetary 
models employing double epicycles and concentres with equants; non-Ptolemaic 
planetary models combining an eccentre with an epicycle; the solution of problems in 
spherical astronomy by means of gnomons and analemmata; the computation and, 
probably, the projection of eclipses; the essential data for computing planetary 
parameters; models for detennining planetary latitudes; and the basic theory used in 
determining planetary distances.6 
These four types of evidence are exactly the types of evidence that should be found in 
Indian works on logic if the Greeks had influenced Indian logicians as has been claimed. 
I Pingree 1978b, I. Das 1928, 72-73, dismisses this quotation as evidence of Greek influence in Indian 
astronomy. 
2 Pingree 1972,28. 
3 Kaye 1924, 39. See also Das 1928,72-73. 
4 Kern 1865,597-598. See also Kane 1955,3. 
5 See especially Pingree 1978a. 
6 Pingree 1976,109-110. 
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A model for logic 
The evidence supporting Greek influence in Indian astronomy is used to argue for 
Greek influence in other Indian disciplines. Weber, for instance, uses this argument: 
It was, however, Greek influence that first infused a real life into Indian astronomy. This 
occupies a much more important position in relation to it than has hitherto been supposed; 
and the fact that this is so, eo ipso implies that Greek influence affected other branches of 
the literature as well, even though we may be unable at present directly to trace it 
elsewhere.! 
McEvilley also makes the same point: 
Greek input into Indian astronomy is known, on hard evidence, to have been serious and 
major, as was Greek input into Indian Buddhist art. The idea that Greek input into 
Buddhist philosophy may have been important during the same period flows naturally 
from these facts. 2 
That is, given the evidence of Greek influence in Indian astronomy, there may well have 
been similar influence in other Indian disciples, philosophy and logic in particular. Supporting 
this argument is the fact that Greek influence in Indian logic would involve the same 
communities living in the same places and at the same times as those involved in the case of 
Greek influence in Indian astronomy. McEvilley argues that the two cases are parallel: 
If a complex Greek astronomical work could arrive whole in India and there be 
understood and assimilated, there is no reason to doubt that a complex Greek 
philosophical work could have the same fate-for example, the lost book of Aenesidemus, 
or that of Agrippa, or some of Sextus Empiricus' s works ... 3 
However, if the two cases are parallel then the evidence in support of each case should 
be similar. That is, if the Greeks influenced Indian logic as they influenced Indian astronomy 
then there should be the same types of evidence found in Indian works on logic as there are 
found in Indian works on astronomy. But there is no such evidence. 
Firstly, there are no known references in any Indian work on logic to any book title that 
appears to have a western origin. All references are to works that are clearly Indian. Secondly, 
there are no known instances where Indian works use logical terms that appear to have a 
western origin. There is no hint of anything resembling a translation or transliteration of a 
Greek or Latin logical term. Thirdly, there are no known cases where Indian logicians refer to 
western authors. They refer exclusively to Indian authors. 
J Weber 1878,251. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 390. 
3 McEvilley 2002, 385. 
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The fact that no Indian work on logic ever mentions a Greek work, term or author does 
not prove that the Greeks had no influence in Indian logic. Vogel, for instance, mentions that: 
"In the whole of Sanskrit literature not a single reference is found to the Macedonian hero and 
to his invasion of the Land of the Five Rivers."} Levi mentions the same point: "The name of 
Alexander the Great ... has not yet been discovered even in a single Indian text.,,2 McEvilley 
uses this example to dismiss the fact that no Indian work on logic every makes reference to 
anything Greek: 
The fact that no Indian text mentions this is simply not important: No Indian text is 
known to mention Alexander the Great either, though he left some forty colonies in 
northwest India and seems to have had a major influence on the development of the 
Mauryan Empire? 
That is, the fact that Alexander is never mentioned in Indian literature does not prove 
that he did not conquer northwest India. Similarly, the fact that no Indian work on logic ever 
makes a reference to anything Greek is not proof that the Greeks had no influence in Indian 
logic. However, it is equally true that Greek influence in Indian astronomy does not prove that 
the Greeks influenced Indian logic. It proves only that they could have influenced Indian logic 
and this shows only that claims of Greek influence in Indian logic should be taken seriously. 
The more compelling reason involves the last of the four types of evidence found in the 
case of Greek influence in Indian astronomy. That is, McEviIley and others claim that the 
concepts and techniques used in Indian logic are similar to those used in Greek logic. The 
degree of similarity is the subject of some dispute, but even allowing that there is a high 
degree of similarity, this does not on its own prove that the Greeks influenced Indian logic. If 
the mere fact that Indian and Greek logic are similar were sufficient reason to prove that the 
Greeks influenced Indian logic, then it would also be sufficient reason to prove the very 
opposite, i.e. that the Indians influenced Greek logic. Additional reasons must be added to the 
mere fact of similarity. McEvilley adds the reason that logic appears in Indian literature 
complete and without any evidence of prior developmental stages. He then argues that only 
Greek influence can account for the sudden appearance of this logic in Indian literature. 
1 Vogel 1912, 33. 
2 Levi 1936, 121. 
3 McEvilley 2002, 501. See also McEvilley 1982,30. 
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The deep problem with this argument is that, as shown above, there are developmental 
stages for both types of logic that McEvilley claims were the result of Greek influence. The 
first type of logic is a system of structured proofs governed by rules. McEvilley claims that 
this system appeared first in the Nyaya Sidra complete and without prior developmental 
stages.} However, there are prior developmental stages for the five-part proof in Nyaya Sutra. 
These are found in the Caraka Saf!lhita, which describes not only the five-part proof but also 
the five epistemic terms that together made up the original ten-membered proof. Vatsyayana 
in his commentary on the Nyaya Siitra also explains that ancient Indian logicians accepted a 
ten-membered proof. Bhadrabahu describes another version of a ten-part proof and yet 
another version is found in the Kathavatthu. 
The second type of logic is a system of dialectics. McEvilley claims that this system 
appeared first in Nagarjuna' s works complete and without prior developmental stages.2 
However, there are precedents for a style of argument that involves refutation only. These are 
the term wrangle (vitm:uJa) in both the Nyaya Sidra and the Caraka Sa1J1hita. Also, the debates 
in both the Kathavatthu and the Vijflanakaya are negative in the sense that they attempt to 
refute an opponent without attempting to establish an alternate position. Further, the so-called 
hair-splitters who lived in the days of the Buddha also devised purely negative arguments. 
The Indian precedents for using consequences (prasmiga) are the futile rejoinders (jati) in the 
Nyaya Siitra, the refutations (du~m}a) in the Upayahrdaya and the rejoinders (uttara) in the 
Caraka Saf!lhita. The Indian precedents for using the tetralemma (catu~koti) are many since it 
has a history of use in India dating back to the days of the Buddha, i.e. before the Greeks first 
arrived in India. 
These instances of developmental stages for the system of structured proofs in the 
Nyaya Sutra and for the system of dialectics in Nagarjuna's works completely undermines 
McEvilley's argument that these two systems appear without prior developmental stages and 
that only Greek influence can account for their sudden appearance in Indian literature. 
Further, the very argument that McEvilley uses to support his claim of Greek influence is in 
fact used rather selectively. Not only does this argument not apply in the case of Indian logic, 
but it actually applies in the case of Greek logic. That is, the Aristotelian syllogism appears 
J McEvilley 2002, 515. 
2 McEvilley 2002, 416 and 500. See also McEvilley 1982,28. 
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complete and without any prior developmental stages in the Greek tradition. However, the 
complete absence of any developmental stages for the Aristotelian syllogism is not considered 
by McEvilley as proof of outside influence in Greek logic, whereas the absence of 
developmental stages is claimed to be proof of outside influence in Indian logic. 
This thesis does not prove that the Greeks had no influence in Indian logic. What it does 
prove is the claim that logic appeared in Indian literature complete and without developmental 
stages is false. It does this by setting out the all the stages in the development of early Indian 
logic from the very earliest records up to the Nyaya Siitra and Nagarjuna. This shows that the 
argument that only Greek influence can account for logic in India is not convincing. 
The burden of proof is on those making the claim that there was Greek influence in 
Indian logic. The arguments put forward thus far to support this claim have been found 
unconvincing. It is now up to those claiming that Indian logic was influenced by the Greeks to 
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